ABBREVIATIONS
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OR: |
United States War Dept., John Sheldon Moody et al. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies |
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NYH: |
New York Herald |
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NYT: |
New York Times |
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NYTrib: |
New York Tribune |
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NYW: |
New York World |
INTRODUCTION
1 Davis, Essential Writings, 198–203, 224–29; Davis, “Message to Congress,” Apr. 29, 1861, in OR, Series 4, Vol. 1, 268.
2 Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1861,” in Speeches and Writings, 2:292.
3 McPherson, Tried, 30–45.
CHAPTER 1 Lincoln’s Strategy
1 Donald, 357–58; McPherson, Tried, 98.
2 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 316–23.
3 Ibid., 289–90.
4 Hartford (CT) Courant, “Good News . . . ,” June 30, 1862; NYT, “Affairs . . .” and “Our Army,” July 1, 1962.
5 Goodwin, 445, McPherson, Tried, 99.
6 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 322–23, 326; Sears, McClellan, 226; Hay, Inside Lincoln’s White House, 191; Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:292.
7 Sears, McClellan, 226.
8 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, edited by Jean Gooder (New York: Penguin, 1995), 103.
9 The following analysis of the development of Federal strategy is based on McPherson, Tried, chs. 1–5, and Stoker, chs. 1, 3–6, 9. Lincoln’s admonition to McClellan is in Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:289–90.
10 Ibid.
11 On the development of Lincoln’s policy toward slavery and emancipation, see Guelzo, chs. 1–2; Foner, Fiery Trial, chs. 6–7.
12 McPherson, Tried, 99–100; Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:292.
13 Browning, 537–38; on Halleck’s appointment, see McPherson, Tried, 111–12.
14 On McClellan’s background, character, and preparation for command, see Sears, McClellan, chs. 1–4, and Rafuse, chs. 1–4. Rafuse pays particular attention to the development of McClellan’s political views and associations. Waugh, chs. 1–9, provides an overview of the ongoing tensions between the two.
15 Sears, McClellan, chs. 5–6; Rafuse, chs. 6–9; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 71.
16 Ibid., 70, 82.
17 Perret, xiii–xv.
18 McPherson, Tried, 54–60; Weber, 27–37.
19 Donald, 478–80; Goodwin, 463–68, 491–95, 563–70.
20 The Post and Tribune Company, Publishers, 1880, “Facing Treason,” 192: William C. Harris, Ph.D., Public Life of Zachariah Chandler, 1851–1875 (Lansing, MI: Michigan Historical Commission, 1917), 54, 66.
21 Browning, 554.
22 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 71–73.
23 Lincoln, Speeches, 1:512.
24 Ibid., 598–99.
25 William A. Blair, “The Seven Days and the Radical Persuasion,” in Gallagher, Richmond Campaign, 156–57; Silbey, chs. 1–2. On McClellan’s ties to Barlow, Aspinwall, and Belmont, see McClellan, Civil War Papers, 3, 127, 154, 213, 306, 365, 369, 376, 482, 490, 500, 525, 550, 556; Rafuse, 52, 68, 81, 93, 125, 148–53, 157, 172, 196–97, 212, 220, 244–46, 250; Katz, ch. 6, esp. 106, 112.
26 McPherson, Tried, 51; Sears, McClellan, ch. 5.
27 Sears, McClellan, 128; Rafuse, ch. 4; Stephen A. Douglas, in Lincoln, Speeches, 1:598.
28 Foner, Fiery Trial, chs. 3–4.
29 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 81–82.
30 Lincoln, Speeches, 2:294–95.
31 Ibid., 81–82, 87, 89, 91, 114.
32 Ibid., 85–86.
33 Sears, McClellan, 106–7; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 71–73, 75.
34 Sears, McClellan, 116–18; McJimsey, 38–39.
35 Sears, McClellan, 137–67.
36 Ibid., 132–36.
37 Sears, McClellan, ch. 1, esp. 5–6, 25, 132–36; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 477–48, 482.
38 Sears, McClellan, 132–34.
39 Segal, 155–56; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 164–67.
40 Sears, McClellan, 142–43.
41 Thomas and Hyman, ch. 6; Sears, McClellan, 136–56, 177–78.
CHAPTER 2 McClellan’s Strategy
1 On McClellan’s strategy for achieving a decisive battle at Richmond, see Sears, Gates of Richmond, esp. 9–10. McClellan had been a staff officer under Winfield Scott in 1847 and had seen Scott combine the moral effect of battlefield victories with conciliatory diplomatic gestures to persuade the Mexican leadership to come to terms. See Bauer, esp. ch. 17. Further confirmation came from his more recent experience of the Crimean War (1854–57), which McClellan studied as part of the U.S. military mission. The capture of a single major city, on the periphery of the Russian Empire, had compelled the czar to sue for peace (Sears, McClellan, 23–27, 44–49).
2 Ibid., 164–65.
3 See Sears, McClellan, 101–6, for a good overview of the defects in McClellan’s intelligence gathering and analysis; for his failure to develop an effective cavalry, 114. The lack of capacity for an independent analysis by the War Department is reflected in the similarly inflated estimates of Rebel strength given out by cabinet officers—see, for example, Seward, in Segal, 151. Lieutenant General Scott had the kind of expertise that might have served to correct McClellan, as when (August 1861) he scoffed at McClellan’s assertion that Beauregard had 100,000 men and was preparing to invade Maryland. McClellan not only rejected Scott’s views, he assailed Scott as a “dotard” and demanded the old general’s resignation. See McClellan, Civil War Papers, 79–80.
4 Sears, McClellan, ch. 5; Taafe, ch. 1.
5 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 183–84.
6 For example, see McClellan, Civil War Papers, 110–11, 219–20.
7 Hay, Inside, 36.
8 The best study of the Peninsula campaign is Sears, Gates of Richmond. For McClellan’s judgment of Lee, see McClellan, Civil War Papers, 244–45.
9 Ibid., 231, 235, 239.
10 McJimsey, 34–35; Sears, McClellan, 229–30; Crouthamel, 122–31; Long and Long, 169.
11 NYT, “The Submission Party,” July 1, 1862.
12 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 304.
13 Sears, Gates, 337, 347.
14 Sears, Gates, chs. 10–11, is the most complete treatment of the subject—see esp. 280–81, 308–9. See also Sears, McClellan, 203; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 234–35, 305–6. Rafuse, 237–43, takes a more favorable view of the campaign, but even he says that McClellan’s absenting himself from the battlefield of Glendale “defies belief.”
15 Sears, Gates, 233–34, 250.
16 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 322–23, 326.
17 Sears, McClellan, 213–15.
18 John T. Hubbell, “The Seven Days of George Brinton McClellan,” in Gallagher, Richmond Campaign, 28–43.
19 Ibid., 37–38; Sears, Gates, 281, 331; Sears, McClellan, 218–19.
20 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 305.
21 Catton, Mr. Lincoln’s Army, 88.
22 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:289; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 367.
23 Sears, McClellan, 229–30; NYT, “Ill-Timed and Mischievous,” July 10, 1862. Harper’s Weekly refused to admit that McClellan had actually been defeated: his retreat was a move long planned, and it left his army “nearer the accomplishment” of his objective “than it has ever been.” “On to Richmond!” (July 19, 1862, 450).
24 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 349.
25 Ibid., 346.
26 The full text is in McClellan, Civil War Papers, 344–45. See also Sears, McClellan, ch. 10; McPherson, Tried, 105–6.
27 He would say the same thing in a letter he wrote to Secretary of War Stanton that evening: “The nation will support no other policy . . . for none other will our Armies continue to fight” (McClellan, Civil War Papers, 247).
28 Ibid., 348, 351.
29 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:312–13, 317–18, 322, 328–31, 336–38.
CHAPTER 3 President Davis’s Strategic Defensive
1 Davis, Papers, 8:293.
2 The discussion of Confederate policy, politics, and society that follows owes a great deal to the analyses of Confederate nationalism, and the nationalist principles of President Davis, in Gallagher, Confederate War, and Faust, chs. 1, 2, and 5. See also Rable, chs. 3–7; Thomas, Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience, chs. 2–4; and McPherson,Battle Cry, ch. 8, which accurately describes secession as a preemptive counterrevolution.
3 Davis, Papers, 8: 293–94; DeBow’s Review, May 1, 1862, 44.
4 “The Conduct of the War,” reprint from Savannah Republican in Charleston Mercury, May 10, 1862; Richmond Daily Dispatch, “Invasion of the Enemy’s Territory,” May 6, 1862; Charleston Mercury, “The Crisis,” May 8, 1862.
5 Rable, 154–57, 161–63, 166–67, 249.
6 Davis, Papers, 8:285–86, 289; 299, 308.
7 Richmond Whig, “The Defensive Policy,” quoted in Charleston Mercury, Aug. 29, 1862.
8 The most thorough analysis of the evolution of Confederate strategy during this period is Harsh, Confederate Tide, ch. 1. See also Stoker, chs. 10–12; Woodworth, chs. 3–4; Davis quoted in Long and Long, 229; Davis, Papers, 8:279, 287.
9 Davis, Papers, 8:293; Harsh, Confederate Tide, ch. 2; OR, Series 1, Vol. 11, Pt. 3, 690.
10 Hattaway and Beringer, ch. 1; Strode, chs. 11, 17; Woodworth, ch. 3, esp. 80–81; McPherson, Battle Cry, 365–67, 394–97, 857.
11 Rable, ch. 7, esp. 138, 145–47.
12 Harsh, Confederate Tide, ch. 2. On Lee’s background, character, and ideas, see Thomas, Robert E. Lee, chs. 1–14. On Lee’s generalship and strategic thinking, see the excellent group of essays in Gallagher, Lee, especially Charles P. Roland, “The Generalship of Robert E. Lee,” 159–88; Gallagher, “Another Look at the Generalship of R. E. Lee,” 275–90; and also Woodworth, 151–53, 249–51, 157–59, 220–45. For criticism of Lee’s generalship, especially his predilection for the strategic and tactical offensive, see Nolan, esp. ch. 4; Thomas L. Connelly, “Robert E. and the Western Confederacy: A Criticism of Lee’s Strategic Ability,” in Gallagher, Lee, 189–208; and McWhiney and Jamieson, esp. chs. 7–8 and Pt. 3.
13 Woodworth, 57; William C. Davis, “Lee and Jefferson Davis,” in Gallagher, Lee, 291–308.
14 Woodworth, 164–65; Sears, Gates, 204–6; Harsh, Confederate Tide, chs. 2–3.
15 Hubbard, 107, 115.
16 Harsh, Confederate Tide, 98, 108–15.
17 Richmond Daily Dispatch, “Follow Up the Victory,” July 5, 1862.
18 Harsh, Confederate Tide, 60–73; ch. 4.
19 Connelly, Army, chs. 10–11; Davis, Papers, 8:288, 292, 301.
20 Ibid., 8:296, 298, 299, 305.
21 Woodworth, 174–75; Strode, 289–91; Davis, Papers, 8:302–3, 305–6; NYW, “Important War Papers,” Aug. 14, 1862.
22 Davis, Essential Writings, 259.
23 Harsh, Confederate Tide, 115–18.
24 Ibid., 119–22.
CHAPTER 4 Self-Inflicted Wounds
1 Guelzo, 111–44; Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:337–38.
2 Guelzo, 120–21.
3 Ibid., 121–23; Thomas and Hyman, 229–39; Sears, McClellan, 140–44; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 300.
4 Sears, McClellan, 235.
5 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:343, 350–51; Lincoln, Speeches, 2:344–46.
6 Blair, “The Seven Days,” in Gallagher, Richmond Campaign, 157–68, 174–77.
7 See, for example, NYH, “Fighting in Earnest—Down with All Traitors,” July 15, 1862; NYW, “The End of Peaceable Warfare,” July 11, 1862; NYW, “A Sterner War Policy,” July 12, 1862; NYW, “Jeff. Davis’s Last Lying Appeal to Europe,” Aug. 11, 1862; NYW, “Important War Papers,” Aug. 14, 1862. The World nominally favored emancipating the slaves of Rebel leaders, but not general emancipation, and was a strident advocate of racial theories of white supremacy. See “The Emancipation Bill,” June 20, 1862; “A Movement of Malcontents,” June 25, 1862; “An Argument for Gradual Emancipation,” June 27, 1862; “The Anglo-Saxon and the Colored Races,” July 8, 1862; “A Sterner War Policy,” July 12, 1862.
8 NYH, “The Past and the Future,” July 11, 1862; “Moral, Social and Political Revolutionary Movements of Greeley and His Fraternity” and “The New Conservative Policy of the Government,” July 21, 1862. For treatment of Pope’s proclamations and the Confiscation Bill, see NYH, “Pope’s Proclamation” and “Fighting in Earnest—Down with All Traitors,” July 15, 1862; NYH, “The Confiscation Bill,” July 13, 1862. Also see NYH,. “The Retaliatory Orders . . . ,” Aug. 10, 1862. These editorials favor Pope’s measures and Lincoln’s moderate revision of the Confiscation Act, while opposing the Radical version of the latter.
9 Sears, McClellan, 230–32; and NYW: “The Great Battle Before Richmond,” June 30, 1862; “Gen. McClellan’s Army” and “Military Strategy on the Peninsula,” July 1, 1862; “Gen. McClellan’s Army,” July 3, 1862; “The Crisis,” July 4, 1862; “Wanted—A War Cabinet,” July 7, 1862; “The Crisis” and “The Right Man in the Right Place,” July 8, 1862; “The Removal of Secretary Stanton,” July 9, 1862; “General Halleck,” July 14, 1862; “The Military Situation,” Aug. 1, 1862. The Herald agreed: see the coverage of the Richmond fighting, July 4 and 6, 1862; and “The Army of General McClellan,” July 6, 1862; “Mismanagement and Mismanagers of the War Department,” July 7, 1862.Frank Leslie’s Illustrated, a popular weekly, supported the Tribune’s view, that McClellan’s “Napoleonic genius” was fraudulent and his operations marked by “military incompetence.” See editorial of July 19, 1862.
10 NYT: “The Crisis of the War,” July 7, 1862; “Secretary of War,” July 10, 1862; “Audacity as a War Energy,” July 11, 1862. Compare NYH, “A Vigorous War,” Aug. 2, 1862.
11 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 365; Guelzo, 106–9, 286 n. 91. Articles from Spirit of the Times are collected in Wilkes, 8–9.
12 Guelzo, 130-31; Foner, Fiery Trial, 221–30.
13 McPherson, Tried, 111–13.
14 On Pope’s political background and wartime experience, see Cozzens, ch. 3; on his orders to his army, Cozzens, 83–88.
15 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 368, 378, 382.
16 Ibid., 369; Sears, McClellan, 240.
17 Ibid., 239–41.
18 Ibid., 235; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 360–62; Marvel, 99–100.
19 Kearny quoted in Catton, Mr. Lincoln’s Army, 88–89; de Peyster, 350; Guelzo, 98. For reaction of McClellan’s officers, see Sears, Gates, 337–39.
20 Hay, Inside, 231–32; Fehrenbacher and Fehrenbacher, Recollected Words of Abraham Lincoln, 230.
21 McClellan’s estimate of Lee’s force was ludicrously excessive, triple his actual troop strength. However, he seems actually to have believed he was outnumbered. He was certainly aware that the administration hoped to use his refusal to advance as an excuse to relieve him. See his letter to Aspinwall in McClellan, Civil War Papers, 365.
22 Ibid., 372, 380–81.
23 Ibid., 383, 385, 388–89.
24 Ibid., 349; NYW, “A Sterner War Policy,” July 12, 1862.
25 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 389–90, 376–77; quoted in McPherson, Crossroads of Freedom, 80–81.
26 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 387–88.
27 Ibid., 390.
28 Ibid., 378, 382, 388; and compare Wilkes, 3–4, 6, 8–10, on McClellan as “false prophet.”
29 NYW: “The Military Situation,” Aug. 1, 1862; “Army of Virginia,” Aug. 6, 1862; “News from Washington” [Lincoln defends Stanton], Aug. 7, 1862; “General McClellan’s Campaign,” August 7, 1862. For the World’s take on the McClellan/Pope conflict, see “Jeff. Davis’s Last Lying Appeal to Europe” (Aug. 11, 1862), which defends Pope, and “Important Move by Gen. McClellan” and “General McClellan’s New Orders” (Aug. 15, 1862), in which their different styles are contrasted, with an outcome favoring McClellan. See also McClellan, Civil War Papers, 358–59.
30 Ibid., 397; and see correspondence among McClellan, Fitz-John Porter, and Burnside, in OR, Series 1, Vol. 12, ch. 24, Pt. 3, 615–16, 651–52, 661–62.
31 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5: 370–75; Foner, Fiery Trial, 221–30; Guelzo, 130–44.
32 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:389.
33 Ibid., 388.
CHAPTER 5 Both Ends Against the Middle
1 Woodworth, 174–75.
2 This account of the campaign follows Harsh, Confederate Tide, ch. 5.
3 See ch. 3 n. 12 above; and Harsh, Confederate Tide, ch. 5.
4 I think Harsh, Confederate Tide, 136–37, overstresses Lee’s reluctance to risk heavy casualties.
5 Ibid., 132–33.
6 Ibid., 67–68, 142–43, 230, 278.
7 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 389–90, 404.
8 Ibid., 405.
9 Ibid., 407–12.
10 OR, Series 1, Vol. 12, ch. 24, Pt. 3, 691.
11 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 413.
12 OR, Series 1, Vol. 12, ch. 24, Pt. 3, 709.
13 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 414.
14 Ibid., 415–16; Sears, McClellan, 253.
15 Hay, Inside, 37; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 416; Sears, McClellan, 255.
16 OR, Series 1, Vol. 12, ch. 24, Pt. 3, 706, 709, 723, 739–40; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 413, 415–16.
CHAPTER 6 McClellan’s Victory
1 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 421–23.
2 Welles, 100–104.
3 Hay, Inside, 37; Sears, McClellan, 255; Welles, 93–95, 102, 104–9.
4 Sears, McClellan, 257–58; an alternative interpretation of McClellan’s actions during this crisis is Rafuse, 255–67.
5 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 423.
6 Adams Jr. et al., Letters, 176–80.
7 OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 2, 808.
8 NYTrib, “The War in Virginia,” Sept. 1, 1862. “If Jackson is not captured the responsibility will rest with Gen. McClellan, who was ordered to move three days since, but failed to obey. The order was repeated to march this morning, but still the movement was delayed . . . inexplicable inactivity at a most critical moment.” It is worth noting that theTribune estimates the Rebel force at 200,000—an indication of just how bad Northern intelligence was, even outside McClellan’s circle.
9 Wilkes, 3–4, 6, 9, 20–23.
10 NYW, “The Battles Before Washington . . . Charges Against Gen. McClellan”; NYW, “Are We Losing What We are Defending?,” Sept. 2, 1862, defends against the Tribune editorial “accusing Gen. McClellan of cowardice, indolence, or treachery.”
11 Adams Jr. et al., Letters, 178–80.
12 Hay, Inside, 38–39.
13 Ibid.
14 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 427; Sears, McClellan, 258; OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 2, 788, 798, 838, 1018.
15 Welles, 102; Segal, 192–94.
16 Sears, McClellan, 263–65; McPherson, Tried, 121.
17 Welles, 103, 107.
18 Historians have generally exonerated McClellan of deliberately treacherous intent. Stephen Sears sees his resentment of Pope as an unconscious drag on his operations but finds it hard to believe McClellan would deliberately abandon to destruction the soldiers he loved—including the corps led by his closest comrade and disciple, Fitz-John Porter. Yet as Sears himself notes, in the Seven Days McClellan abandoned Porter and his beloved army to separate himself from a potential debacle. See Sears, McClellan, 254. Rafuse, 271–72, offers a more positive defense.
19 Sears, McClellan, 255–56.
20 Hay, Inside, 38–39.
21 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:403–4.
22 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 435, 438.
CHAPTER 7 Lee Decides on Invasion
1 Harsh, Taken, 51.
2 Ibid., ch. 1, esp. 23–25, 31–32.
3 Davis, Papers, 8:373. I disagree with Woodworth, 185–87, who sees Lee and Davis thinking along different lines and interprets Davis’s silence on the invasion of Maryland as a sign he was too surprised to respond.
4 Jackson Mississipian, “Forward,” quoted in Charleston Mercury, Sept. 2, 1862, and Richmond Whig, quoted in Charleston Mercury, Sept. 6, 1862.
5 Davis, Papers, 8:377; Davis, Essential, 255–56; Strode, ch. 20, esp. 237–38, 289; Rable, ch. 7; Glatthaar, 164.
6 Davis, Papers, 8:376, 382.
7 Rable, ch. 7; Strode, chs. 23–24; Hubbard, 107, 115–23.
8 Davis, Papers, 8:373, 377.
9 Harsh, Taken, 107; OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 2, 600–601.
10 Harsh, Taken, 81–83; Strode, 301.
11 Davis, Essential, 261.
12 Hubbard, 115–23.
13 Harsh, Taken, chs. 1–2. On Lee’s troop strength (real and imagined) see Harsh, Sounding, 138–39.
14 Harsh, Taken, 70–71, 83–84.
15 Ibid., 72–76; Glatthaar, 166–67.
16 Harsh, Taken, 76; Davis, Papers, 8:373.
17 Harsh, Taken, 72–73.
18 Ibid., 39, 43–45, 117, 382; Harsh, Sounding, 102–3.
19 Sears, Landscape, 69, estimates 50,000. The higher estimate is from Harsh, Taken, 38–39, 170–71; and Harsh, Shallows, 139.
20 Lee himself had been disturbed by a much lower rate of straggling during the campaign against Pope: 9,000 stragglers from a force of 55,000 straggled, roughly 16 percent. The Army of Northern Virginia did indeed suffer extraordinary losses to straggling during the Maryland campaign, but a rate of 43 percent suggests a degree of demoralization that no officer observed at the time. The 65,000–70,000 estimate is also consistent with Harsh’s data on the losses and gains to Lee’s original force from battle casualties at Second Bull Run, postbattle reinforcements, and the return of stragglers (Harsh, Shallows, 138–39, 143–46).
21 Sears, Landscape, 69, estimates 50,000; the higher estimate is from Harsh, Taken, 38–39, 170–71. Lee’s inflated estimate owes something to the fact that his army now contained an extraordinary number of regiments—205 in total, a third of all units in Confederate service.
22 Harsh, Shallows, 152–53; Glatthaar, 164–65.
23 Harsh, Taken, 70–71, 83–84.
24 Judkins, “History of Co. G, 22nd Georgia,” 36.
25 Ibid., Sears, Landscape, 83–86; Harsh, Taken, 169.
26 Harsh, Taken, 107–11, 124–27; Strode, 301–2.
27 Harsh, Taken, 117–19; Glatthaar, 166.
28 Harsh, Taken, 133ff.
29 Sears, Landscape, 89.
30 Harsh, Taken, 145–67.
31 Ibid., ch. 3 and 149–51, 186–87.
32 The discussion of Lee’s plan is based on Harsh, Taken, ch. 3. See also Woodworth, 90–91; Sears, Landscape, 90–91.
33 Sears, Landscape, 87; Harsh, Taken, 175; Glatthaar, 166–67.
34 The account of Confederate movements that follows is based on Harsh, Taken, ch. 4.
CHAPTER 8 McClellan Takes the Offensive
1 Catton, Mr. Lincoln’s Army, 34.
2 Sears, McClellan, 266–8; Sears, Landscape, 79–81.
3 At Glendale, for example, he fought a successful rear-guard action to protect the Union retreat, but nearly negated its effect by refusing to follow the army’s withdrawal. Sears, Gates, 308.
4 Rafuse, 281–82.
5 Sears, Landscape, 101–7.
6 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 439.
7 The following discussion of McClellan’s plans and actions is based on Rafuse, 278–88; Sears, Landscape, 105–11.
8 Marvel, 111.
9 Cox, 354–59.
10 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 438.
11 NYH, “National Capital Safe . . . We Now Take a Fresh Start. No More Mistakes to Be Made,” Sept. 4, 1862; NYH, “The Enthusiasm for Gen. M’Clellan” and “The Virginia Campaign—The New Order of Things,” Sept. 5, 1862; NYH, “The Radical Plan,” Sept. 6, 1862.
12 NYW, “General McClellan,” Sept. 3, 1862; NYW, “Gen. McClellan Restored to Command” and “The Military Situation,” Sept. 4, 1862; NYW, “Strategy and Anti-Strategy,” Sept. 6, 1862; NYW, “A Rebel Army in Maryland” and “Gen. Pope in a New Command,” Sept. 8, 1862. The latter notes Pope has been sent to fight Indians, whose savage methods mirror his own treatment of civilians.
13 NYTrib, “The Crisis,” Sept. 4, 1862.
14 Strong, 255–56; Welles, 108, 112–13, 116–18.
15 Sears, McClellan, 272; Sears, Landscape, 111; Sears, Controversies, 134–35.
16 NYTrib, “Northern Independence,” Sept. 12, 1862; “Usurpation Threatened,” Sept. 13; see also Strode, 301.
17 Sears, McClellan, 268; NYH, “The Important Position of General McClellan,” Sept. 11, 1862; NYTrib, “Northern Independence,” Sept. 12, 1862. See also NYH, “General McClellan and the Chief Organ of the Radicals,” Sept. 20, 1862, and “McClellan and the Fire in His Rear,” Sept. 15, 1862, which responds to the Tribune’s charge of usurpation.
18 Sears, McClellan, 268, 272.
19 Rafuse, 280–81.
20 Sears, Landscape, 106.
21 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 440–44.
22 On the lost order and McClellan’s plans to exploit it, see Sears, McClellan, 280–87; Sears, Landscape, 112–21; Rafuse, 288–94. For Lee’s side of the story, see Harsh, Taken, 152–67, and ch. 5.
23 Sears, McClellan, 287.
24 Ibid., 284–87.
25 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 456–57.
26 Harsh, Taken, 240.
27 Sears, Landscape, 116–21; Sears, McClellan, 283–88; Rafuse, 292–94.
28 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 454–55.
29 Harsh, Taken, ch. 5, esp. 245, 249.
30 Sears, Landscape, 123–24.
CHAPTER 9 The Battles of South Mountain
1 This account of the fighting on Sept. 14 is based on Harsh, Taken, ch. 6, and Sears, Landscape, ch. 4.
2 Catton, Mr. Lincoln’s Army, 139.
3 Ibid., 149.
4 Ibid., 150.
5 Harsh, Taken, 288, 300.
6 Sears, Landscape, 151; Wittenberg, 32–33.
7 Sears, Landscape, 151–52.
CHAPTER 10 The Forces Gather
1 For Lee’s decision to reconcentrate his army at Sharpsburg see Harsh, Taken, ch. 7.
2 Ibid., 300–306.
3 Sears, Landscape, 154.
4 Harsh, Taken, 306, 315–22, 326–29.
5 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 461.
6 Ibid., 462–63.
7 Ibid., 463. It is worth noting that McClellan never positively affirmed the 15,000 casualties as his own estimate but attributed it to the reports of others, which gave him deniability. A later survey of the battlefield by officers reporting to McClellan’s staff estimated that 500 Confederates had been left dead on the field. Given the usual ratio of killed to wounded, and Hooker’s initial claim of “nearly” 1,000 POWs, an estimate of 3,500 would have been reasonable. However, it is not known when McClellan received the report of that survey. In his “Preliminary Report” (Oct. 15, 1862), McClellan reduced his estimate to a more reasonable 3,000 killed, wounded, and captured. OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, Reports, 38. Sears, Landscape, 143, estimates 2,300 Confederate casualties, including 400 captured.
8 Harsh, Taken, 310–12; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 464.
9 Harsh, Taken, 346–47.
10 Col. Jacob Hays, Report of September 22, 1862, OR, Series 1, Vol. 9, ch. 31, Pt. 1, Reports, 491–93.
11 McClellan, Report of Oct. 15, 1862 (“Preliminary”), OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 2, Reports, 29–31. Sears, Landscape, 164. Rafuse, 308 ff., says McClellan was uncertain about the arrival of Confederate reinforcements and sent Hooker to develop Lee’s left but reserved his main force until Lee’s strength and position were ascertained.
CHAPTER 11 Preparation for Battle
1 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 465.
2 Ibid., 464.
3 Ibid., 397.
4 Ibid., 473, 464; Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:426.
5 Estimates for Lee’s troop strength at Antietam range from 38,000 to 40,000, including A. P. Hill’s Division (2,500–3,000); so that the estimated strength for Lee’s force at Sharpsburg on the morning of Sept. 17 falls between 35,000 and 37,500. Harsh’s analysis of Lee’s troop strength seems to me the most credible, because of Harsh’s close attention to the accounting procedures followed by Lee’s HQ. I have therefore generally accepted the estimates he gives in Taken, 218–20, 559 n. 1; Harsh, Sounding, 201.
6 Judkins, 38.
7 Priest, 3.
8 The discussion of Lee’s defensive preparations that follows is based on Harsh, Taken, 354–61.
9 McClellan, “Report of August 4, 1863,” (“Final”), OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 67. McClellan counted as “present” all troops accredited to units in the field, whether they were actually at hand or absent (on leave, in hospital, on detached service); and he counted noncombatant elements (cooks, musicians, teamsters, etc.) as well as riflemen and cannoneers. In tallying Confederate strength he made the additional error of assuming that each regiment was at or near its authorized strength, although deep into a campaign there were scarcely any units in either army that mustered anything near their authorized strength. He and his officers also accepted uncritically the estimates offered by naïve civilians. These estimates ought to have been corrected by intelligence gained through cavalry probes and the interrogation of prisoners. On Confederate accounting see Harsh, Shallows, 139, and Taken, 169.
10 The evidence of earlier campaigns suggests that McClellan sincerely believed his erroneous figures. Some of the unwonted confidence with which McClellan approached the battle may have come from an awareness of the reduced numbers, the weakened physical strength and morale in Lee’s command.
11 Sears, Landscape, 173.
12 Sears, McClellan, 298–99.
13 In his “Final Report” (OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 55), McClellan says he intended Hooker’s force to deliver the main attack, to be supported by II and VI Corps, but there are good reasons to doubt this was actually his plan. If Hooker’s was supposed to be the main assault, then McClellan intended a flank or oblique attack. The textbook method for staging such an attack requires strong demonstrations or diversionary attacks, to pin enemy units in place and draw reserves away from the point of impact. Hooker’s column should also have been reinforced to give it a preponderance of strength, and if possible its approach should have been masked to conceal its strength. None of these conditions pertained to Hooker’s attack. His onset was to precede, not follow, attacks from McClellan’s center and southern flank. There was no attempt to conceal the assembly of Hooker’s force. Given McClellan’s estimate of enemy strength, the resources he gave Hooker were inadequate for any purpose other than that of a strong diversion. If Lee’s supposed 65,000 were evenly distributed, Hooker’s 20,000 were probably facing an equal number of Confederates, posted on good terrain for defense, with ample reserves nearby, on a line so long that Hooker did not have enough men to cover it, even with the addition of XII Corps. Moreover, the units McClellan gave Hooker were among those he considered second-rate.
14 McClellan, “Report of October 15, 1862,” OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 30. Sears, McClellan, 299, says Burnside’s attack was intended to strike the decisive blow, presumably after earlier attacks had drawn Lee’s forces northward. As it happened, the morning attacks did draw troops away from Burnside’s front, creating the opportunity for a decisive attack. But there is no evidence that McClellan anticipated such a development or made plans to exploit it. Burnside’s was the weakest maneuver element, and McClellan never indicated an intention to reinforce it from the army reserve; his orders to Burnside were vague but suggested a diversionary attack rather than a main assault.
15 Harsh, Taken, 347.
16 Sears, McClellan, 299.
17 Ibid., 297–99; Sears, Landscape, 169–73.
18 Sears, McClellan, 299; Marvel, 125–32.
CHAPTER 12 The Battle of Antietam: Hooker’s Fight
1 My discussion of this phase of the battle is based on Harsh, Taken, 368–85 (decisions by Lee’s HQ and Confederate movements); Sears, Landscape, ch. 6 (Federal movements and decisions by Hooker and by McClellan’s HQ); and Priest, chs. 3–7 (esp. for timing of particular troop movements). See also the maps at “Antietam on the Web,”http://antietam.aotw.org/maps.php?map_number=main, Detail Maps 1–3; and George W. Davis, E. A. Carman, and H. Heth, Atlas of the Battle of Antietam (1908), maps 1–8.
2 Priest, 332–33; Harsh, Sounding, 201.
3 Hess, 113–14.
4 Sears, Landscape, 191.
5 Ibid., 194–202; Priest, ch. 5.
6 The Second Virginia was detached during this battle.
7 http://14thbrooklyn.info/ShortRegtHistory.htm.
8 Sears, Landscape, 193–94.
9 Ibid., 188.
10 Ibid., 188–89.
11 Harsh, Taken, 373.
12 Quoted in Glatthaar, 171.
13 Sears, Landscape, 191, 201–2.
14 Ibid., 214; Harsh, Taken, 378–81.
15 Ibid., 380–81.
16 Ibid., 383.
17 Sears, Landscape, 195.
18 Sears, Landscape, 235; See Burnside’s “Report” in OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 416–17.
19 Sears, Landscape, 215.
20 Ibid., 261.
CHAPTER 13 The Battle of Antietam: Sumner’s Fight
1 My discussion of this phase of the battle is based on Harsh, Taken, 385–404 (decisions by Lee’s HQ and Confederate movements); Sears, Landscape, ch. 7 (Federal movements and decisions by Hooker and by McClellan’s HQ); and Priest, chs. 8–12 (esp. for timing of particular troop movements). See also the maps at “Antietam on the Web,”http://antietam.aotw.org/maps.php?map_number=main, Detail Maps 4–7; and Davis et al., Atlas, maps 9–11.
2 Sears, Landscape, 221.
3 Ibid., 224.
4 Harsh, Taken, 381.
5 Sears, Landscape, 224, says 1,400, but troops were continually arriving from McLaws’s and Walker’s commands.
6 Harsh, Taken, 385, says 6,600 CSA troops were on this line, but it is not clear whether he includes D. R. Jones’s Division.
7 Sears, Landscape, 238–39.
8 Ibid., 236, 241.
9 Priest, 3; Judkins, 39, 84.
10 Priest, 180; “Report of Francis C. Barlow,” OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 289–90: Patrick R. Kelly, ibid., 298.
11 Sears, Landscape, 244.
12 Ibid., 245, 247.
13 A single battery from that sector (Captian John A. Tompkins’s) had fired in support of French’s right flank for two hours before retiring to resupply with ammunition. McClellan had sent only one battery from his artillery reserve (Battery K, First U.S.) to Richardson’s support, but its guns were short-range smoothbores. It managed to drive off a Confederate battery that was within range but was itself damaged by fire from Confederate-rifled cannons, which had longer range.
14 Harsh, Taken, 404.
15 Sears, Landscape, 247ff.
CHAPTER 14 The Battle of Antietam: The Edge of Disaster
1 Harsh, Taken, 407.
2 My discussion of this phase of the battle is based on Harsh, Taken, 397, 401–29 (decisions by Lee’s HQ and Confederate movements); Sears, Landscape, ch. 8 (Federal movements and decisions by Hooker and by McClellan’s HQ); and Priest, chs. 8–12 (esp. for timing of particular troop movements). See also the maps at “Antietam on the Web,”http://antietam.aotw.org/maps.php?map_number=main, Detail Maps 8a–12; and Davis et al., Atlas, maps 11–14.
3 Sears, Landscape, 241.
4 Wilson, 1:112–15; Sears, Landscape, 272–73.
5 Sears, Landscape, 271–74.
6 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 467–68.
7 Sears, Landscape, 270–74; Harsh, Taken, 407–12.
8 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:460.
9 Harsh, Taken, 413; Sears, Landscape, 272–73.
10 In its tactical effect, the movement (made by Griffin’s and Stockton’s Brigades of Morell’s V Corps division) was entirely inconsequential: the two brigades had gone less than half a mile when they were ordered to halt and hold their position. However, the timing of the order (if it could be established) might yield some insight into McClellan’s decision-making process. In their official reports both McClellan and Porter affirm that the brigades were sent to support Sumner and Franklin—to aid in defense rather than lend muscle to an assault. One of the battlefield tablets (No. 26) says that the order was given at 2:00 pm; Sears, Landscape, 272, says the brigades were ordered to Sumner’s aid shortly after the capture of the Sunken Road (perhaps 2:00 pm); see also Harsh, Taken, 414; and Johnson and Buel, 2:656, Editors’ Note. However, General Griffin’s after-battle report states that he did not get the order until about 4:00 pm (OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 349–50); and Davis, Atlas, maps 12 and 13, confirm the brigades did not move before 4:00 pm. It is likely that McClellan sent the order from Sumner’s HQ, at the end of their meeting (ca. 3:00 pm), and that it took half an hour or more for the courier to bring the order to Porter and for Porter to forward it to Morrell.
11 Harsh, Taken, 421.
12 Tim Reese, “On the Brink: The Confederate Center, Boonsboro Turnpike,” “Antietam on the Web,” http://antietam.aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=371; and Sears, Landscape, 284–85.
13 Leslie J. Gordon, “All Who Went into the Battle Were Heroes: Remembering the 16th Regiment Connecticut Volunteers at Antietam,” in Gallagher, Antietam, 174–80.
14 Sears, Landscape, 290–91.
15 Reese, “On the Brink.”
16 OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 2, Reports, Correspondence, etc., 316.
17 Battles and Leaders 2:656; Sears, Landscape, 291; McPherson, Battle Cry, 544.
18 Sears, Landscape, 292.
19 Rafuse, 326–27.
CHAPTER 15 The Day When Nothing Happened
1 Sears, Landscape, 295–96.
2 See Harsh, Taken, 414ff.
3 Ibid., 425.
4 Ibid., 425–26.
5 Ibid., 436–37.
6 Ibid., 426; Sears, Landscape, 304; Taylor, 136.
7 Harsh, Taken, 441–43.
8 Ibid., 441–44.
9 Taylor, 136; Harsh, Taken, 437.
10 Ibid., 443.
11 Sears, Landscape, 298–303; Sears, McClellan, 318–20; Rafuse, 326–27.
12 Sears, Landscape, 298.
13 OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 66.
14 Sears, Landscape, 298–99.
15 Harsh, Taken, 438–39; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 468–69.
16 OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 65.
17 Fitz-John Porter, “Report,” OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, ch. 31, Pt. 1, 339; Burnside, “Report,” OR, Series 1, Vol. 19, Pt. 1, 416–17; Marvel, 145–47.
18 Sears, Landscape, 304–6; Catton, Mr. Lincoln’s Army, 85.
19 Rafuse, 328–29; Harsh, Taken, 445.
20 Ibid., 447.
21 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 470.
22 Ibid., 470, 473.
CHAPTER 16 Lincoln’s Revolution
1 Sears, Landscape, 298–301, 308–11; Sears, McClellan, 320–28; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 473, 476; Rafuse, 332–26.
2 Sears, McClellan, 324; Segal, 203–4; Rafuse, 335; Smith, 144–45.
3 Cox, 354–59.
4 Harper’s Weekly, “McClellan,” Sept. 27, 1862, 610.
5 Hay, Inside, 230–32.
6 Cox, 358–59. References in McClellan, Civil War Papers, 476, suggest that this meeting was on Sept. 21.
7 Rafuse, 329; Sears, McClellan, 320–28; Sears, Landscape, 312–15.
8 NYTrib [editorial], Sept. 19, 1862; NYTrib, “The War for the Union . . . ,” Sept. 20, 1862; NYTrib, “Leaving Maryland . . .” and editorial, Sept. 29, 1862. See also Segal, 298–99.
9 Sears, McClellan, 324; Rafuse, 335; Segal, 204–7.
10 Ibid., 207–8; Fehrenbacher and Fehrenbacher, 38; Hay, Inside, 40; Welles, 142–45. For a full discussion of the ideas behind the Proclamation, see Guelzo, ch. 4; Foner, Fiery Trial, ch. 7.
11http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/ransom.civil.war.us.
12 Foner, Fiery Trial, 249; Long, 706.
13 NYH, “A Proclamation by the President of the United States” and “Important from Washington—The President’s Proclamation,” Sept. 23, 1862; NYH, “Signs of Peace at Richmond,” Oct. 1, 1862.
14 NYTrib, “Northern Independence,” Sept. 12, 1862; NYTrib, “Usurpation Threatened,” Sept. 13.
15 Hay, Inside, 38–39; he later (231–32) took the view that McClellan’s hesitation was due to timidity, not conspiracy.
16 Welles, 146–48; Hay, Inside, 41.
17 Lincoln, Collected Works, 5:442–43, 508.
18 Sears, McClellan, 328; NYH, “The Convention . . . ,” Sept. 25, 1862, sees the conference as favorable to both McClellan and the president’s Proclamation, which the Herald was (for the moment) supporting. See also NYH, “Important from the South,” Oct. 4.
19 In November, after he had decided to fire McClellan, Lincoln would famously describe him as “an auger too dull to take hold.” But apparently that disparaging characterization was already current in the Republican press. A Tribune editorial titled “Augers That Won’t Bore” was printed Sept. 4, just after McClellan’s reappointment, and the paper would recall the phrase in its later criticisms of the general’s passivity. See Fehrenbacher and Fehrenbacher, 32; Segal, 203–4; Rafuse, 343–44; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 477.
20 Hay, Lincoln’s Journalist, 315–16.
21 Sears, McClellan, 324.
22 Sears, Landscape, 319–20.
23 McClellan, Civil War Papers, 482.
24 Sears, McClellan, 326; Rafuse, 339–41; Catton, Never Call Retreat, 357–59.
25 Cox, 359–64.
26 NYW, “The Emancipation Proclamation,” Sept. 24, 1862; NYH, “Important . . . ,” Oct. 4, 1862.
27 Sears, Landscape, 320–21.
28 Rafuse, 341–2.
29 Sears, Landscape, 319.
30 Rafuse, 87–89.
CHAPTER 17 The General and the President
1 Sears, Landscape, 325; Hay, Inside, 232; Rafuse, 344–45.
2 Ibid., 344.
3 McPherson, Tried, 151–55.
4 Rafuse, 343–46; Sears, Landscape, 324–25; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 488.
5 Ibid., 490; Rafuse, 346; Sears, Landscape, 325–26.
6 Welles, 163; Weber, 65.
7 NYH, “McClellan’s Great Victory,” Sept. 16, 1862; NYH, “The Campaign in Virginia,” Sept. 20, 1862; NYH, “The President’s Visit,” Oct. 7, 1862; NYW, “The Proclamation and Great Military Vigor,” Oct. 1, 1862; NYH, “The War . . . ,” Sept. 30, 1862; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 490, 492–93.
8 Ibid., 493–94.
9 Sears, Landscape, 331; Hay, Inside, 232; Strong, 1:256, 267. There is a revealingly ambivalent set of editorials in NYH, “The President’s Visit,” Oct. 7, 1862, and “General McClellan’s Recent Order,” Oct. 8, 1862. The first asserts that McClellan and Lincoln are partners, planning a swift and decisive campaign that will force the Rebels to make peace before the Proclamation can go into effect; the second contrasts McClellan’s patriotic and realistic order with the president’s “ineffective” proclamation.
10 Harsh, Taken, 468–75.
11 Ibid., 468.
12 Ibid., 468, 471.
13 Davis, Papers, 8:437; Connelly, Army, ch. 14.
14 Welles, 176–77; Sears, McClellan, 328; NYW, “The Proclamation and Great Military Vigor,” Oct. 1, 1862; NYW, The Discussion of War Measures” and “Gen. McClellan and Cabinet Officers,” Oct. 6, 1862.
15 Lincoln, Collected Works, 8:460–61.
16 Ibid., 474, 479.
17 Sears, Landscape, 329, 331, 337; McPherson, Tried, 41–45; Rafuse, 356. While he was supposedly granting McClellan a last chance to prove himself, he was already discussing possible replacements.
18 Sears, McClellan, 340–43; McClellan, Civil War Papers, 520–51; Rafuse, 375–79; NYH, “The Democracy Exultant,” Nov. 11, 1862.
CHAPTER 18 Dubious Battle
1 Hay, Inside, 40–41.
2 Gallagher, “The Net Result Was in Our Favor: Confederate Reaction to the Maryland Campaign,” in Gallagher, Antietam, ch. 1.
3 Ibid., 5.
4 Hubbard, ch. 9.
5 Connelly, Army, 278, says Davis should have insisted that Bragg and Smith combine forces and attack Buell instead of allowing them to go separate ways. However, given Davis’s distance from the scene of operations, it was reasonable and even wise for him to rely on the judgment of his field commanders; and practically speaking, it is likely that Smith and Bragg (like Lee) would have acted on their own judgment rather than adhering to the letter of orders issued by someone out of touch with their immediate situation.
6 Gallagher, “Net Result,” 17, 19; “Our Army in Maryland,” Richmond Daily Dispatch, Sept. 10, 1862, defends the invasion despite evidence its military result will be limited.
7 Lincoln, Speeches, 2:434.
8 Adams Jr. et al., Letters, 194.
9 Rafuse, 332.
10 Sears, Landscape, 339.
11http://civilwar.ilgenweb.net/articles.html.
12 Lincoln, Collected Writings, 5:444; McPherson, Battle Cry, 561–62.
13 See Wood, chs. 2–4.
14 Jones, Union in Peril, 138–90.
15 Foner, Fiery, chs. 8–9; McCurry, ch. 7.
16 Slotkin, ch. 7.
17 Long, 706. This estimate relates the mean of total enlistments for the period, roughly 850,000, to the mean of total black enlistments (90,000).
18 Frederick Douglass, “Should the Negro Enlist,” Frederick Douglass’ Monthly, August 1863, 851.
19 Lincoln, Collected Writings, 5:371–72; Lincoln, Letters, Speeches, 2:498–99.