In the immediate aftermath of the Great War there was an overwhelming desire for peace. Never again would Europe be plunged into a bloody war of attrition that would turn factory and field alike into a wasteland and lead to the death of millions more innocent men, women and children. To that end the Central Powers were forced to accept a punitive peace settlement. Germany, deemed by the victors to be the guilty of starting the war, was particularly harshly dealt with. Her armed forces were emasculated; an army of occupation was posted and huge reparations imposed. More positively, a League of Nations was created to resolve differences between countries, and there was a move towards universal disarmament, not least because the size of the standing armies after the war was crippling the economies of the victorious powers.
The initial burst of optimism engendered by these measures was soon replaced by gloom and despondency as economic crisis and weak leadership saw Europe fall into the grip of political extremists. Countries increasingly questioned the effectiveness of politics and the League of Nations to maintain peace and began to build bunkers and blockhouses rather than bridges. These fortifications, the like and scale of which had never and will never, be seen again, stretched from France in the west to the Soviet Union in the east and from Greece in the south to Finland in the north.
In the development of these defences many countries drew heavily on their experiences in the First World War. The thinking of the French High Command was strongly influenced by the bloody battle of Verdun and in particular the crucial role played by the forts around which the gallant defence of la patrie had been organized. Not surprisingly then, when work began on France’s border defences in 1929, later christened the Maginot Line,(1) their shape owed much to the perceived strengths of the forts at Verdun. As such a thin, but immensely strong line of defences was constructed along France’s northeastern frontier and along the border with Italy.
The German High Command drew very different conclusions from the fighting of the First World War. Despite the fact that the Siegfriedstellung (or Hindenburg Line as it was known by the Allies) had been breached, the senior staff believed that the idea of defence in depth was sound and Germany began to construct a chain of fortifications along her western border that utilized many of the principles developed in the war. A series of small reinforced concrete shelters, protected by a curtain of anti-tank obstacles, covering almost the whole length of the western border and built in considerable depth were constructed.
The First World War not only provided valuable lessons for future defensive strategies, it was also the proving ground for new ways and means of fighting. The devastating effect of high explosive and shrapnel shells and machine guns made it impossible for soldiers to survive in the open. Gradually the war of movement degenerated into stalemate as both sides ‘dug-in’ for the long haul. Trenches soon stretched from Switzerland to the North Sea and, as the war dragged on, they gradually became deeper, were built in greater depth and also became increasingly elaborate. Deep dugouts, often reinforced with concrete, protected the infantry from the enemy barrage enabling the defenders to emerge largely unscathed to meet the inevitable infantry assault. Later still the Germans developed reinforced concrete ‘pillboxes’ which were difficult to hit and were largely impervious to all but the heaviest shellfire. The idea was later copied by the Allies and after the war was widely used by engineers of many nations.
For every innovation there is inevitably an attempt to develop a viable counter measure and this was true of the labyrinth of trenches that stretched across northern France and Belgium. The respective high commands desperately sought ways of overcoming the bloody stalemate of trench warfare and returning to a war of movement that had been anticipated prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The success of poison gas briefly offered the prospect of some success but the opportunity was lost and soon simple gas masks had been developed to neutralize the effects. More significant was the development of the tank, which had first been introduced by the British in battle of the Somme in 1916. At the outset the tanks were heavy, slow and unreliable and were equipped with fixed guns. However, in 1918 the French FT17 tank was introduced. This was a quick, light tank that had one very important difference to its British and German (and larger French) cousins – it had a traversable turret. This small tank, the brainchild of Gen Jean-Baptiste Estienne, was to revolutionize tank design and thereafter all tanks were fitted with turrets.
One of the many German concrete pillboxes that were used to strengthen the trenches on the western front in the First World War. This example now sits at the heart of the British Cemetery at Tyne Cot, Belgium. (Author)
By the end of the First World War the two key elements for the development of the panzerstellung were in place; the revolving tank turret and the concrete pillbox. The catalyst for their combination came during the increasing tensions prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.
The interwar period saw the pace of tank development quicken with new, faster and more powerfully armed tanks being produced. This presented something of a problem for the military since it left large numbers of outmoded tanks to be disposed of. In the Soviet Union, where industrialization was still in its infancy, the scrapping of perfectly serviceable turrets was deemed wasteful(2) and in 1931 the idea of using tank turrets as fixed fortifications was advanced. In the west France developed the tourelle démontable. This was a rotating armoured hood with an aperture for a machine gun that provided the crew with valuable protection against shrapnel and small arms fire. From 1935 these turrets were installed in fixed and temporary positions along the Maginot Line. At the same time the idea of using obsolete tank turrets was considered. During the 1930s the Renault FT17, for so long the backbone of the French cavalry, was gradually replaced by the Renault R35, Somua S35 and Hotchkiss models. Some FT17s were still in service when the Germans invaded in 1940, but a large number had been mothballed and a number were dug in to bolster the already impressive defences of the Maginot Line. France’s neighbour and ally Belgium also adopted this idea. In 1936 the Belgian army had taken delivery of a batch of French tank turrets and instead of using them for their original purpose they were mounted on concrete bunkers along the border with Germany and on the coast.
As it transpired, the French and Belgian defences, including the emplaced tank turrets, did little to stem the German advance in May 1940 and in only six weeks the rump of Continental Europe was under Nazi rule. The impressive defences that for so long had provided security, and on which rested the hopes for peace of the western democracies, were now subjected to a series of destructive tests to assess their effectiveness. Although spared this fate, German engineers made a detailed study of the various fortifications mounting tank turrets. However, with plans for the invasion of Britain still being finalized, this idea was simply noted and filed for future reference.
One of the tourelle démontable armoured hoods that were used in the Maginot Line. This example was installed in the Alpine section to a cover a bridge over the river Isère near Bourg St Maurice. (Author)
In 1941, Operation Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion) –the invasion of Britain – was postponed indefinitely; Hitler turned his attention east and in June invaded the Soviet Union. Once again the Wehrmacht was confronted by a line of fortifications studded with emplaced tank turrets and once again these defences did little to slow the German advance; although this was largely the result of Stalin’s decision to concentrate his efforts on the Molotov Line(3) at the expense of the more advanced defences of the line that bore his name.
As they had in the west, German engineers made a detailed study of the Soviet defences,1 but by the time these reports were complete the dominant position of the Third Reich had begun to deteriorate. Already in 1942, in the seesaw battles in the Western Desert, the turrets of captured British Matilda turrets had been removed and incorporated in the German defences of the Halfaya Pass. More significantly, following a series of raids on the French coast – the most significant being the Dieppe landings of August 1942 – a decision was taken to fortify the coast of Continental Europe against any future raids or even a full-scale invasion and plans to utilize captured French tank turrets were considered.
A Soviet emplaced tank turret, or Tankovaya Ognievaya Totshka. This T18 turret was installed in the Stalin Line and was captured by the advancing German forces in 1941. (J. Magnuski courtesy of S. Zaloga)
By 1942 the French tanks captured in the spring of 1940 were deemed unsuitable for frontline action. Though heavily armoured they were poorly armed and were very slow, designed, as they were, to move at the infantry’s pace.(4) Accordingly, many of these tanks were consigned to second-line units guarding key military installations such as airfields, or were used in anti-partisan duties. Some were simply loaded onto armoured trains to provide added protection.(5) Others had their turrets removed and a new superstructure constructed on the tank chassis to mount more powerful anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, while others were simply used as ammunition tractors or as driver instruction vehicles.2 As a result the Germans were left with a large stockpile of seemingly useless tank turrets complete with their main armament. Rather than waste this valuable resource it was decided that they should be utilized in much the same way as France, Belgium and the Soviet Union had used them earlier in the war. Thus the French turrets were mounted on specially designed bunkers which were positioned all long the Atlantic Wall, but principally on the French coast.(6)
The number of turrets available for use in this role grew dramatically following the arrival on the battlefield of the superior Russian T34. Almost overnight this rendered obsolete the mainstay of the Panzer divisions (Panzer I and II and Czech 35(t) and 38(t) tanks) that had swept all before them during the invasion of Poland, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. These tanks were now either relegated to second line duties, or experienced the same fate as those tanks captured in France: the chassis used as improvised anti-tank or self-propelled gun platforms and the turrets employed as makeshift pillboxes. These tank turrets, however, were used more extensively than the captured turrets – perhaps reflecting the greater numbers available, or the relative ease with which ammunition could be supplied – and were installed all over occupied Europe.(7)
One of the many French tank turrets captured by the Germans in 1940. This FT 17 was used to strengthen the defences of Utah Beach at Sainte Marie du Mont. The turret is of a riveted design and sits on a non-standard bunker near the Musée du Débarquement. (Author)
By 1943 then the idea of using tank turrets in this way was accepted practice. However, because the guns mounted were small by the standards of the day, these turrets posed little threat to Allied tanks and often acted as little more than armoured observation posts. That was all to change in that same year, when the Germans took a new and far more radical step in the use of tank turrets. Up to that point only obsolete turrets had been used, but now a decision was taken to use Panther turrets in this role. These turrets, some specifically designed for the task, were mounted on concrete, steel and later wooden shelters and saw action in Italy, on the eastern front and as part of the reconstructed West Wall defences.
These positions took a heavy toll on Allied armour, but they were not able to stop the inexorable Allied advance and as the Germans retreated, positions earmarked for emplaced turrets were often overrun before they had been installed. As things became increasingly desperate the Germans were forced to use damaged tanks as improvised pillboxes and at the very end of the war guns from tanks were mounted on simple frameworks and installed in open pits.
One of the specially designed Panther turrets developed by the Germans for use as fixed fortifications. This example was positioned in the Gothic Line in Italy to cover a bend in the road leading to the strategically important Futa Pass. (Imperial War Museum)
With the defeat of Italy, Germany and Japan the peoples of the world looked forward to a period of sustained peace. Instead the world was plunged into a Cold War as communism battled capitalism for supremacy. On occasion this war of ideologies escalated into localized conflicts, but in Europe it developed into an uneasy stand off, as the countries of NATO and the Warsaw pact stood toe-to-toe and prepared for the ultimate showdown.
Post-war economic hardship, which resulted from years of war, meant that for most countries large armies were no longer sustainable and more cost effective security solutions had to be found. At the same time Europe in particular was awash with large numbers of tanks which, although serviceable, had often been rendered obsolete by the pace of military advances. These factors neatly dovetailed and saw the emergence of a new generation of fortifications that used tank turrets. This improvisation was seen not only as an effective way of defending a country’s borders and its key installations, but was also cheap. As such this type of fortification was widely used after the war. Of the western powers Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway adopted this idea, while on the other side of the divide the Soviet Union and a number of her satellite states, including Finland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia did likewise. Other states aligned with the Soviet Union, like Cuba, also used static tanks for defence against her nemesis the USA.
Squeezed between these great power blocs, the neutral nations also adopted this expedient. Switzerland, literally and metaphorically stuck between the two camps, turned the country into an impregnable fortress and employed tank turrets along its borders. Austria, when free from military restrictions imposed on her after the war, also used the idea, as did Sweden, which used tank turrets to defend her airfields and coastline.
The concept also spread to the Far East where European powers like France used them to protect key installations in its colonies as pro-independence revolutionaries fought to throw off the imperialist yoke. In the Middle East, Israel used tank turrets to protect its newly won territories while Jerusalem’s hostile neighbours, like Syria, used dug-in tanks.
Although few of these turrets saw action, they signalled a country’s intent to defend itself with whatever means were at its disposal and in that respect they were successful. However, with weapons becoming increasingly sophisticated the value of emplaced tank turrets diminished. Moreover, with the changing threat to national security, away from a traditional invasion to a more oblique and arguably more worrying threat of terrorism, traditional security measures have been reappraised and most fortifications have been mothballed or demolished, and this is also true of emplaced tank turrets. Most turrets, save for those in museums, have now been removed and the installation filled in or destroyed; a sad but understandable end to a fortification that belongs to a bygone age. This book will hopefully help to ensure that the use of tank turrets as fixed fortifications, although gone, is not quickly forgotten.
Greece also made use of this expedient. This Sherman turret was installed at Evzoni on the border with the former Yugoslavia. Many of the turrets were remodelled with the 75mm gun being replaced with an aperture to take a machine gun. (Courtesy of T. Tsiplakos)
After the Second World War the Soviets made extensive use of emplaced tank turrets. This IS2 turret was installed on border with China. In the foreground it is just possible to see the steel rods that were used to reinforce the concrete. (Sergei Netrebenko)
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(1)Named after the new Minister for War, André Maginot.
(2)And this philosophy continued well into the Cold War when obsolete tanks were mothballed or their turrets removed and used in fixed positions.
(3)Constructed further west after the partition of Poland.
(4) The Renault, Hotchkiss and Somua models mounted only 37mm guns and the Char B1 bis a 37mm gun in the turret and a fixed 75mm in the hull. In 1941 the Soviets introduced the T34 mounting a 76mm gun and in 1942 the Tiger entered German service with its 88mm main armament.
(5) This is covered in more detail in Chapter 3.
(6) Already in 1941 the idea of using a detachable turret had been considered by the Germans. However, the turret of the ‘Heuschrecke 10’, as it was known, mounted a light field howitzer and was primarily designed for indirect rather than direct fire support.
(7)Nor did the Germans stop there. Armoured trains complete with tank turrets were also used for security and anti-partisan operations.