Notes

In Memoriam Engelbert Endrass: Castor Mourns Pollux

1. Both Erich Topp, born in 1914, and Engelbert “Bertl” Endrass, born in 1911, belonged to Crew 34, the group of 318 officer recruits who began their naval careers in 1934.

Endrass was slightly older than most in his group because he had served in the German

merchant marine before transferring to the regular navy. Topp wrote these pages while in

command of U-552 on his 15th war patrol in the summer of 1942. Endrass and his entire crew in U-567 perished on December 21, 1941, while attacking the Allied convoy HG. 76

north of the Azores. The sloop HMS Deptford and the corvette HMS Samphire were jointly responsible for the kill. U-567 is credited with sinking the Norwegian steamer Annavore out of HG.76 but was itself destroyed before it could report this last success.

Two days earlier, yet another member of Crew 34, Dietrich Gengelbach in U-574, had

gone down under dramatic circumstances in the same convoy battle, the victim of HMS

Stork, one of the most successful Allied U-boat killers. In all, four German boats were lost while chasing HG.76. For details on Crew 34, see Eric C. Rust, Naval Officers under

Hitler: The Story of Crew 34 (Praeger, 1991). The most reliable work on German

submarine successes in World War II remains Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes

1939-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1983), while the fate of German U-boats is chronicled in several sources, including Erich Gröner, Die Schiffe der deutschen Kriegsmarine und

Luftwaffe 1939-45 und ihr Verbleib, 7th ed. (Lehmanns, 1972), pp. 70-86, and Peter

Cremer, U 333: The Story of a U-Boat Ace (Bodley Head, 1984), pp. 215-238.

2. For additional commentary on the symbolic meaning of Castor and Pollux and his

friendship with Endrass, see Erich Topp, The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander:

Recollections of Erich Topp (Praeger, 1992), pp. 81-82.

3. “Group Endrass” engaged convoy HG.84 from June 12-21, 1942. It consisted of eight submarines, and no German boat was lost in this particular action. In two separate attacks

in the morning hours of June 15, 1942, Topp is credited with sinking five ships of nearly

16,000 tons combined. While he thought and reported that he had damaged a sixth vessel

on this occasion, Allied records do not support his claim. Cf. Rohwer, Axis Submarine

Successes, p. 103. For a more detailed account of his impressions of this encounter, see Topp, Odyssey, pp. 76-79.

4. Germany’s naval academy, the Marineschule Mürwik, is located in Flensburg on the southern shore of Flensburg Bay just south of the Danish border. Topp, Endrass, and the

rest of Crew 34 spent nine months together there in 1935-36. The third ensign mentioned

was Klaus Pein, a native of Wilhelmshaven, Germany’s major naval base on the North

Sea. The described sailing trip led through the very restricted waters around the Holnis

Peninsula to Sønderborg in Denmark on the island of Als over a distance of some 50 miles

and back.

5. Weddigen, Saltzwedel and Emsmann (mentioned below) were German U-boat aces of World War I. When submarines were reintroduced into the German Navy in the mid

1930s, the new squadrons (or flotillas) of mainly coastal Type II boats were named after

them. Later squadrons of larger boats (Types VII and IX) were simply numbered, such as

the 7th U-Boat Flotilla based in St. Nazaire on France’s west coast, to which both Topp’s

U-552 and Endrass’ U-567 belonged. Friedrichsort is a suburb of Kiel, Germany’s chief naval base on the Baltic Sea.

6. At the beginning of the war Endrass served as First Watch Officer on U-47, a Type VII boat commanded by Günther Prien, who would become one of Germany’s most celebrated

submarine aces of World War II. Topp held a corresponding position on U-46. Early on October 14, 1939, U-47 made its way into the heavily guarded anchorage of Scapa Flow in Scotland and sank the battleship Royal Oak before escaping unharmed from the narrow waters. Prien, Endrass and their men became instant heroes. At the same time Klaus Pein,

then First Watch Officer on the smaller U-12, undertook a diversionary mission into the English Channel. As Topp indicates below, U-12 did not return from this patrol. Pein’s boat probably struck a mine and sank with all hands on October 8, 1939, in the Straits of

Dover.

7. Lacking independent means of verification, especially when attacking convoys at night, submarine commanders of all navies commonly overestimated the damage they thought

they inflicted on the enemy. Endrass sank a total of 25 vessels of 137,860 tons and

damaged four others of 25,209 tons while commanding U-46 (eight patrols) and U-567

(two patrols). Figures from Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes. Topp, by comparison,

sank a total of 181,754 tons of Allied merchant shipping, plus one destroyer. This earned

him third place among World War II aces, according to Timothy P. Mulligan’s careful

compilation in Lone Wolf: The Life and Death of U-Boat Ace Werner Henke (Praeger,

1992), p. 220.

8. According to Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, Endrass reported torpedoing a tanker of 9,000 tons on June 6, 1941, in a position east of Newfoundland. Allied records do not

indicate that a tanker was damaged in those waters at the time, nor does the tanker’s crew

appear to have noticed the collision with Endrass’ boat, U-46.

9. Post-war analysis reveals that Endrass actually sank the British freighter Trevarrack (5,270 tons) in this attack with one torpedo while damaging the tanker Ensis (6,207 tons) with the other. See Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 56.

10. Endrass engaged and sank the British freighter Phidias (5,623 tons) with gunfire after a torpedo failed to explode. Ibid.

11. The convoy in question was HX.156, guarded in part by U.S. Escort Group 4.1.3. in obvious violation of American neutrality. The destroyer Topp sank on October 31, 1941,

was the USS Reuben James (DD-245), an old four-stacker first commissioned in 1920. For Topp’s personal account and reflections on this episode, see Topp, Odyssey, pp. 1-8.

Despite the long chase, Topp and Endrass failed to inflict additional harm on HX.156,

even though each claimed to have damaged a freighter of 8,000 and 5,000 tons,

respectively, before daybreak on November 1, 1941, in waters south of Iceland. Cf.

Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 71.

12. For more on Monique’s background and her reaction to Endrass’ death, see Topp, Odyssey, p. 81.

Karl-Friedrich Merten and the Prussian Tradition

1. Sketches of Merten appear in Karl Alman, Ritter der sieben Meere (Rastatt, 1963), pp.

107-18, and the same author’s (under the pseudonym Franz Kurowski) Die Träger des

Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes der U-Bootwaffe 1939-1945 (Friedberg, 1987), p. 45, translated as Knight’s Cross Holders of the U-Boat Service (Atglen, PA, 1995), pp. 164-65, and Gordon Williamson, Aces of the Reich (New York, 1989), pp. 170-72. Merten’s

memoirs are discussed in footnote 4, below.

2. On the general history and significance of Prussia, see H. W. Koch, A History of Prussia (London, 1978), and E. J. Feuchtwanger, Preussen. Mythos und Realität (Frankfurt, 1978); Stauffenberg citation in Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1905-1944

(Cambridge/New York, 1995), pp. 289-90. In the absence of memoirs or a biography of

Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière, see Lowell Thomas, Raiders of the Deep (Garden City, 1928), pp. 126-31, 145-62.

3. Only as Stadtrat was the elder Merten popularly elected, mayors were usually appointed by city councils: See Frederic C. Howe, Socialized Germany (New York, 1917), pp. 270-71.

4. Personalakte (service record) Karl-Friedrich Merten, copy in the custody of the U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven, Germany; and Merten’s published memoirs Nach Kompass.

Lebenserinnerungen eines Seeoffiziers (Bonn/Herford, 1994), pp. 15-18, 120. This

carefully-researched autobiography is actually a condensation of nine volumes written by

Merten after the war, which include copies of British, German, and French official records

and postwar interviews/correspondence with other participants. An English translation

was begun by Maj. Jack Gibbon. Copies of the complete memoirs are on deposit with the

Bundesarchiv-Abt. Militärarchiv (Freiburg), the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart),

and libraries of military institutions.

5. Merten, Kompass, 15-18; on the Schichau yards see Gary E. Weir, Building the Kaiser’s Navy. The Imperial Naval Office and German Industry in the von Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919

(Annapolis, 1992), pp. 13-16, 40.

6. Quoted in Koch, Prussia, p. 286; see also, Corelli Barnett, “The Education of Military Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History, II, 3 (July 1967), p. 25.

7. Merten, Kompass, pp. 18-27; Kurt Stöckel, “Die Entwicklung der Reichsmarine nach dem Ersten Weltkriege (1919-1935). Ӓusserer Aufbau und innere Struktur” (doctoral

dissertation, Georg-August-Universität zu Göttingen, 1954), p. 94 and Anlage 7.

8. Merten, Kompass, p. 71; on the backgrounds of naval officers, see Eric C. Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34 (New York/Westport, 1991), pp. 9-28.

9. Merten Personalakte; Merten, Kompass, pp. 27ff., 322; identities of U-boat commanders provided in Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945

(Annapolis, 1983), pp. 303-16, and Kurowski, Knight’s Cross, pp. 213, 221, 299. The ten casualties were Freg.kapt. Rollmann (KIA South Atlantic, November 5, 1943); Freg.kapt.

Schacht (KIA off the Brazilian coast, January 13, 1943); Korv.kapt. von Stockhausen (died in an automobile accident in Berlin, January 15, 1943); Korv.kapt. Werner Lott (captured November 29, 1939); Korv.kapt. Rolf Dau (captured October 13, 1939); Korv.kapt. Heinz Beduhn (KIA North Sea, August 3, 1940); Korv.kapt. Johannes Franz (captured September 20, 1939); Korv.kapt. Roll-Heinz Hopmann (KIA North Atlantic, November 1, 1943);

Kaptlt. Hans Spilling (KIA as commander-in-training, November 21, 1940); and Kaptlt.

Ernst Raabe (KIA English Channel, March 29, 1945). See also Rainer Busch and Hans

Joachim Röll, Der U-Boot-Krieg 1939-1945. Bd. I: Die Kommandanten (Hamburg/Berlin,

1996), pp. 26, 48, 70, 106, 149, 185, 196, 202, 235, 271. For information on the selection

of officers and their educational and training period, see Charles S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era (Annapolis, 1990), pp. 111-16.

10. The significance of the different oaths taken by the Navy in 1933-34 is discussed in Karl Peters, Acht Glas (Ende der Wache). Erinnerungen eines Offiziers der Crew 38

(Reutlingen, 1989), pp. 32-37.

11. Merten, Kompass, pp. 110-16, 122; Michael Salewski, “Das Offizierk orps der Reichs-und Kriegsmarine,” in Hanns H. Hoffmann, Das deutsche Offizierkorps 1860-1960

(Boppardt/R., 1980), pp. 222-24. For Merten’s subsequent observations on Hitler, see

Kompass, pp. 144, 174, 346-47, 404-07.

12. These issues are discussed in Jost Dülffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine.

Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939 (Düsseldorf, 1973), p. 279ff.; and Axel Schimpf,

“Der Einsatz von Kriegsmarineeinheiten im Rahmen der Verwicklungen der spanischen

Bürgerkrieges 1936 bis 1939,” in Der Einsatz von Seestreitkräften im Dienst der

auswärtigen Politik, ed. by the Deutsche Marine Institut (Herford, 1983), pp. 76-103.

13. See, Willi Schultz, Linienschiff Schleswig-Holstein (Herford, 1991), pp. 163-97, and Bertil Stjernfelt and Klaus-Richard Böhme, Westerplatte 1939 (Freiburg/Br., 1979), p.

39ff. Merten’s personal experiences are described in Kompass, pp. 170-78. During this period Merten also met and influenced another future U-boat ace, Werner Henke. See

Timothy Mulligan, Lone Wolf: The Life and Death of U-boat Ace Werner Henke

(Westport, 1993), p. 37.

14. Admiral Raeder’s comment is reproduced in Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945, Introduction by Jak P. Mallmann Showell (Annapolis, 1990), pp. 37-38;

Merten, Kompass, pp. 179-80.

15. Kommando 1. Unterseebootslehrdivision, “Zeugnis-Kaptit. Merten,” October 1, 1940, in Merten Personalakte (U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven).

16. Merten’s experiences are described in Kompass, pp. 192-97. The author’s own research, based on the biographical data in Busch and Röll, Kommandanten, reveal

casualty rates of 44%-46% for each of the three groups.

17. Author’s interview of Merten, Waldshut, September 12, 1989; Merten, Kompass, pp.

198-209; for information on Liebe, see Busch and Röll, U-Boot Kommandanten, p. 145, and Rohwer, Successes, p. 1ff.

18. Eberhard Rössler, The U-boat. The Evolution and Technical History of the German Submarine (Annapolis, 1981), pp. 103-05; Fritz Köhl and Axel Niestle, Vom Original zum Modell: Uboottyp IXC. Eine Bild- und Plandokumentation (Koblenz, 1990), pp. 5-8, 13-14.

19. Köhl and Niestle, Original, p. 13; Rolf Güth and Jochen Brennecke, “Hier irrte Michael Salewski. Das Trauma vom “Kinderkreuzzug” der U-Boote,” Schiff und Zeit 28

(1989), p. 44.

20Kriegstagebuch (KTB) U-68, February 11 through June 30, 1941, reproduced on National Archives Microcopy T1022, Records of the German Navy, 1850-1945, roll 3030

(hereafter cited in the format T1022/3030/PG30065); Merten, Kompass, pp. 210-16; and Government Code & Cryptography Naval History Vol. VII, “The German Navy—The U-Boat Arm,” 72a, Item CBBD 53 in the NSA Historic Cryptographic Collection, Pre-Worid

War I through World War II, Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency

National Archives. The author will review the variations of U-boat training in a future

study.

21. KTB U-68, 30 June-1 August 1941, T1022/3030/PG 30065; Merten, Kompass, pp.

217-29; on the disputed claim of the corvette, see Rohwer, Successes, p. 60.

22. Cf. KTB U-68, 21-23 September 1941, T1022/3030/PG 30065; Merten, Kompass, pp.

236-42; Kurowski, Knight’s Cross, p. 165; and Rohwer, Successes, pp. 66-67.

23. KTB U-68, 28 September 1941, T1022/3030/PG 30065; an account based on interviews is Jochen Brennecke, Jäger-Gejagte. Deutsche U-Boote 1939-1945 (Munich,

1986), pp. 111-14; the British perspective is given in John Winton, Ultra at Sea (London, 1988), pp. 100-01.

24. Brennecke, Jäger, pp. 113, 203-05. The incident with the oilskins occurred on September 12, 1942, following the sinking of British freighter Trevilley. Merten, Kompass, pp. 320-21.

25. Brennecke, Jäger, p. 114.

26. Merten’s factual account in the KTB of U-68 for 23 October 1941, T1022/3030/PG

30065, is supplemented by the vivid narrative in Wolfgang Frank, Die Wölfe und der

Admiral (Oldenburg, 1953), pp. 251-55.

27. Merten’s account of the sinking of the Bradford City, in KTB U-68, October 28

through November 15, 1941, T102213030/PG 30065, contradicts the more colorful

version described by Brennecke, lager, pp. 205-0 7 (cf. also Frank, Wolfe, pp. 251-55); on

British signal intelligence, see F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second

World War, Vol. 2 (New York, 1981), pp. 166, 172-73.

28. KTB U-68, 11 November-25 December 1941, T1022/30301/PG30065); Merten, Kompass, pp. 259-79; Brennecke, Jäger, pp. 143-54; and Wolfgang Frank and Bernhard Rogge, Under Ten Flags, trans. by R. O. B. Long (New York, 1956), p. 134ff.

29. KTB U-68, 26 December 1941-6 December 1942, T1022/3030-31/PG30065; The U-boat Commander’s Handbook (U.S. Navy translation of German naval manual M.Dv. 906,

1943 Ausg.) (Gettysburg, PA, 1989), p. 63.

30. Ibid.; Merten, Kompass, pp. 297-306; Brennecke, Jäger, pp. 169-75. For German resupply operations in Spain, see Charles B. Burdick, “’Moro’: The Resupply of German

Submarines in Spain, 1939-1942,” Central European History, III, 3 (September 1970), pp.

256-84. The verdict on Merten’s success can be found in Gaylord T M. Kelshall, The U-

Boat War in the Caribbean (Annapolis, 1994), p. 108.

31. The deliberations of Dönitz and the Naval High Command are documented in the KTB

of Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, entries of 1-15 August 1942, T1022/3980/PG 30310a; for a general discussion of Eisbär’s background and operations, see the South African official history by L. C. F. Turner et al., War In the Southern Oceans 1939-45(London, 1961), PP. 157-61. General data on signal intelligence is provided in Winton, Ultra, pp.

104-08.

32. KTB U-68, 20 September-30 October 1942, T1022/3031/PG 30065; Merten, Kompass, pp. 314-35; Turner, et al., Southern Oceans, pp. 166-82.

33. On September 12, 1942, U- 156 ( Korv.Kapt. Werner Hartenstein) sank the liner

Laconia in the South Atlantic, only to discover that most of her passengers consisted of Italian prisoners of war en route to Canada. Hartenstein commenced a rescue operation for

all survivors, ultimately albeit reluctantly supported by Dönitz with additional submarines.

Four days later, an American bomber attacked U-156, despite its openly radioed

intentions, crowded decks and lifeboats in tow. Hartenstein escaped, but a number of

survivors were killed. As a consequence, Dönitz issued an order forbidding any rescue of

survivors of torpedoed vessels, a directive that formed the foundation for one of the main

war crimes charges against him at Nuremberg. For more information on this event, see

Léonce Peillard, The Laconia Affair (New York, 1963).

34. Neither U-68’s KTB nor Merten’s Kompass, pp. 336-37, provides much detail. The best account is by survivor Ralph Barker, Goodnight, Sorry for Sinking You. The Story of the S.S. City of Cairo (London, 1984). Merten’s Kompass, pp. 491-504, details his postwar contacts with survivors. The quotation appears in a newspaper article in the Daily Mail of September 15, 1984 (copy in the U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven).

35. Most postwar publications, e.g., Kurowski, Knight’s Cross, p. 165, still credit Merten with 29 ships totaling over 180,000 tons, but I am following the latest research by Jürgen

Rohwer, Successes, p. 60ff.

36. Merten, Kompass, pp. 210ff., 280ff., 364, 369; Kurowski, Knight’s Cross, pp. 158-59; Rohwer, Successes, pp. 157, 173-75.

37. Merten, Kompass, pp. 370-77; Fritz Brustat-Naval, Unternehmen Rettung (Bergisch Gladbach, 1970), pp. 30-31. Although no records of the 24th U-Flottilla are available for

this period, some useful data is available in the KTB of the Kommandant im Abschnitt

Memel, July 19 through August 5, 1944, T1022/4047/PG 39338-340.

38. The most extensive public documentation of these proceedings was collected by Merten as Teil V, Buch 9 (“Der Fall ‘Frimaire”) of his complete “Lebenserinnerungen,”

only a summary of which appears in Kompass, pp. 307-09, 312, 459-70.

39. For a cogent discussion of this issue, see Michael Hadley, Count Not the Dead (Montreal/Kingston, 1995), P. 140ff., and especially pp. 163-64, 169, regarding Merten.

40. Karl-Friedrich Merten and Kurt Baberg, Wir U-Bootfahrer Sagen: “Nein!” ”So war das nicht!” Eine “Anti-Buchheim Schrift” (Grossaitingen, 1985). Examples of his articles include “Betr. Film ‘Das Boot’ und Fernsehauftritt des Autors Buchheim,” Marineforum

12 (December, 1985), pp. 17-18; “U 110 und die ‘Gerechtfertigte Tötung…’,” Schiff und

Zeit 25 (1987), pp. 54-56. Examples of his correspondence, including typed notes of a telephone conversation with author Lothar-Günther Buchheim, May 22, 1985, are located

in folder “Schriftverkehr Merten-Bredow,” U-Boot-Archiv, Cuxhaven. The latter also

contains copies of Erich Topp’s critique of the Merten/Baberg book in Marineforum 11

(November 1986), pp. 399-400, and Merten’s letter to Topp, November 25, 1986.

41. For example, the author corresponded extensively with Merten from May 1987 to March 1992 in the course of his biographical research on Werner Henke.

Ralph Kapitsky: Battle in the Caribbean and the Death of U-

615

1. Interview with Herbert Schlipper, U-615’s First Watch Officer (IWO), who was on the conning tower alongside Kapitsky; Ralph Kapitsky’s Diary, author’s collection. According

to Kapitsky diary: “Suddenly all hell breaks lose. Everything blows up. The sky is a sea of flames from which glowing parts are raining. I have been thrown into the back of the

conning tower. I order every one under deck and make off at full speed. Then up again, but

there is nothing to be seen. The vessel and all lifeboats are gone. Only now I realize that my right arm does not move. My shoulder has been hit by a fragment.”

2. Gaylord T. M. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean (Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp.

380-381.

3. Essay on Ralph Kapitsky by Johannes Kapitsky, Ralph’s brother, and Joachim Jaworski, translated by Hans Jurgen Steffen, September 1996. Author’s Collection.

4. KTB U-615; U-Boat Command Diary. U-93 was sunk on January 15, 1943, by the British destroyers Laforey and Hesperus. Clay Blair, Hitler’s U- Boat War: The Hunters (New York, 1996), p. 489.

5. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, pp. 299-301.

6. Ibid., pp. 301, 302.

7. Ibid., p. 416.

8. Ibid., p. 311. On June 14, 1943, U-134, U-415, U-68, U-155, U-159, U-564 and U-185

were under attack by Coastal Command aircraft in the Bay of Biscay.

9. Description of the operation was provided to the author by IWO Herbert Schlipper and U-615’s Josef Faus, at the 1992 U-boat veteran’s reunion at Trinidad. Konstantin Metz’

tanker U-487 was sunk by aircraft from the USS Core 720 miles south-southwest of the Azores. Metz and several members of his crew went down with the boat; 33 others

survived. William T. Y’Blood, Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers in the Battle of the

Atlantic (Naval Institute Press, 1983), pp. 70-73.

10. Description of the last cruise of U-6 15 in Schlipper letter to author, June 1993, and USN Interrogation Report on U-615 survivors.

11. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, p. 381; War Diary, Chaguaramas Naval Operating Base; U-Boat Command War Diary.

12. Schlipper letter to author, June 1993. One of the mistakes made by the Germans in the Caribbean was that they never grouped U-boats into wolf packs as they did in the Atlantic.

Boats sent to the Caribbean always operated alone. Additionally they were assigned in a

cluster around the major convoy terminals, which was where the strongest defenses were

located. They might have achieved much more had they been grouped well away from the

terminals in the wide open spaces between the various bases, where the defenses were not

quite so strong and the combined strength of a wolf pack might have been able to break up

a convoy.

13. Ibid.

14. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, p. 413.

15. Ibid., p. 383. IWO Herbert Schlipper does not remember this incident, but the War Diary of VP-204 details the attack and provides the explanation that U-6 15 was using the

schooner’s radar shadow. U-615 was on the surface at this time.

16. In 1943, Trinidad housed up to five flying boat squadrons at NAS Chaguaramas, together with four land-based anti-submarine squadrons at Edinburgh Field and one

airship squadron, ZP-51. The Royal Navy at Piarco Field operated 300 training aircraft,

many of which were used on anti-submarine operations. In addition, U.S. carrier-based

aircraft used a dedicated runway for training. In total, the island had 16 runways, with at times up to 700 airplanes in operation. The Gulf of Paria, as well as being the terminus of the North Atlantic convoy route, was a major U.S. Navy work-up base for all classes of

warships and operated alongside the dedicated anti-submarine destroyers stationed there.

The TRNVR operated thirty anti-submarine vessels alongside Royal Navy MTBs and

MLs and an ocean escort group. Canadian, Brazilian, Dutch and Free French anti-

submarine ships also operated from Trinidad. Records indicate up to 250 warship

movements each month during 1943.

17. Schlipper letter, June 1993.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. U.S.N. Air Station, Chaguaramas War Diary

22. Schlipper letter to author, June 1993; ibid., September 1996.

23. Crockett Attack Report, P-11, VP-204; VP-204/VP-205 and ZP51War Diaries.

Although Horst Dietrichs managed to survive his ordeal in the Caribbean and return to

France, his boat was sunk with all hands by HMS Spey on February 18, 1944, at 48-32N, 23-36W. Peter Cremer, U-Boat Commander: A Periscope View of the Battle of the Atlantic

(Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 226.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, pp. 390-391.

28. Crockett Attack Report, P-11, VP-204; VP-204 War Diary

29. This sequence of events and circumstances contained in Schlipper letters, June 1993

and September 1996, and confirmed by U-615’s Josef Faus.

30. VP-204 War Diary

31. Ibid.

32. Schlipper letter, June 1993.

33. VP-204 War Diary; U.S.N. Air Station, Chaguaramas War Diary Lt. Cmdr. Hull’s first name is not mentioned in either the squadron War Diary or in the NAS Chaguaramas War

Diary

34. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, p. 395. Airship K74 attacked U-134 on July 18, 1943, in the Florida Straits. The airship attacked unsupported and was destroyed. Ibid., p. 342.

35. Ibid., pp. 306, 320, 321.

36. Ibid., p. 396.

37. Kelshall, U-Boat War in the Caribbean, p. 398; ZP-51 War Diary. The airship crashed on Blanquilla Island, and although the machine was a complete wreck, her crew escaped

injury. They were rescued from the deserted island the following day by a launch from

Trinidad. The cabin of the airship was recovered several months later.

38. Descriptive essay by Cmdr. Robert Trauger, aircraft commander of VP-205, describing the squadron and some of the actions while based in Trinidad. Author’s Collection; May

1994 letters from Robert Erskine, aircraft commander of VP-204, engaged in the action

against U-615. Author’s Collection; Schlipper letter, June 1993.

39. Schlipper letters, June 1993 and September 1996.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid. This was also confirmed by Josef Faus at the 1992 U-boat veteran’s reunion on Trinidad.

42. Schlipper letter, June 1993. There is little doubt that U-634 was well out of the area by this time and heading north for the Mona Passage. Originally it was believed that U-634

was in the vicinity because U.S. Navy after-action reports stated there was definitely

another submarine in the area.

43. War Diary U.S.N. Operating Base, Chaguaramas. Although the U.S. Navy History of the Trinidad Sector states that the Walker attacked on a sonar contact, there was no other U-boat operating in that area. The destroyer may have been carrying out a depth charge

attack on a whale or some natural anomaly. There is also the assumption that she may

have launched her attacks on the direction of the aircraft.

44. Schlipper letter, June 1993.

45. U.S.N.A.S., Chaguaramas War Diary; Trinidad Command War Diary.

Fritz Guggenberger: Bavarian U-Boat Ace

1. The author’s interview with Guggenberger was part of a larger project which has since been published as Eric C. Rust, Naval Officers under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34

(Praeger, 1991). Unless otherwise attributed, all information in this study is drawn from

that interview in July 1982, as well as related questionnaires and documents. Translations

from German into English furnished by the author, except where indicated otherwise. This

study was partially supported by a grant from Baylor University’s Research Committee.

2. For a socio-geographical profile of Guggenberger’s Crew 34, i.e. of those officers who began their naval training in 1934, see Rust, Naval Officers, pp. 19-36. Guggenberger’s personnel records state that he left the Church in September 1937 for reasons no longer

ascertainable. A complete copy of Guggenberger’s service record with pertinent personnel

data is contained in his “Personalnachweis,” part of his “Personalakte” in Folder “RK-

Träger der Kriegsmarine,” U-Boot-Archiv Cuxhaven-Altenbruch. The Archiv is hereafter

referred to as UACA. For a published summary of Guggenberger’s service record through

his reactivation in West Germany’s Federal Navy including promotions and decorations,

see Manfred Dörr, Die Ritterkreuzträger der U-Bootwaffe, Vol. 1 (Biblio, 1988), pp. 99-101.

3. Guggenberger and Crew 34 had taken the traditional oath to obey and protect the Constitution on May 1, 1934. See UACA, Personalnachweis, p. 1; further details in Rust,

Naval Officers, pp. 39-40, 43-44.

4. Grades from “Zeugnis über den Besuch des Hauptlehrganges für Fähnriche zur See, Lehrgang 1935/36” in Guggenberger’s Personalakte, UACA. Rankings from

Ostseestationstagesbefehl (O.T.B.) as of 13 April 1937; copy in Bundesarchiv-

Militärarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg; cf. Dörr, p. 100. Of Crew 34’s future U-boat aces, only

Erich Topp ranked higher than Guggenberger as ninth in his Crew. Interestingly both

would end their naval careers as rear admirals in the West German Navy.

5. One of the best sources on technical data and eventual fates of German submarines is Erich Gröner, Die Schiffe der deutschen Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe 1939-45 und ihr

Verbleib, 7th ed. (Lehmanns, 1976), esp. pp. 24-34, 70-87, 109-10. Jürgen Rohwer’s Axis Submarine Successes, 1939-1945 (Annapolis, 1983) remains the most detailed and reliable source of U-boat successes in all theaters of the war. U-boat allocations to particular

squadrons and location of their bases in Bodo Herzog, U-Boote im Einsatz (Podzun,

1970), and Jak P. Mallmann Showell, The German Navy in World War II: A Reference

Guide to the Kriegsmarine, 1935-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1979).

6. Data on U-28 successes from Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 16.

7. See Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, pp. 18-21.

8. Information from Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, pp. 26-27, and letter, Gustav Hölterscheidt to Horst Bredow, dated 12 October 1986, in folder “U-28”, UACA.

9. Hölterscheidt letter, p. 2.

10. Cf. Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 35.

11. Hölterscheidt letter, p. 2; Personalnachweis in Guggenberger papers, UACA. Rainer

Busch and Hans Joachim Röll in Der U-Boot-Krieg, 1939-1945: Die Deutschen U-Boot-

Kommandanten (Hamburg, 1996) give the date of Guggenberger’s takeover as U-28’s

C.O. as November 16, 1940, which would imply that Kuhnke stayed on board and in

charge until the boat reached Stettin. U-28’s transfer from the 2nd to the 24th Flottilla

occurred on November 10. The boat performed faithful service for more than three years

in the Baltic before it sank off Neustadt in March 1944 after a technical mishap.

12. Unless indicated otherwise, all data on U-81 and its patrols both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean from documents in Folder “U-81” in UACA, from the Guggenberger

interview and from Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes.

13. See illustration in Georg Högel, Embleme, Wappen, Malings deutscher U-Boote 1939-1945 (Munich, 1984).

14. For the evolution of Hitler’s naval strategy and the Kriegsmarine’s opposition to the use of German submarines in the Mediterranean, see Gerhard Wagner, ed., Lagevorträge

des Oberbefehishabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945 (Lehmanns, 1972).

15. The best book on German submarines in the Mediterranean, despite numerous inaccuracies, remains Karl Alman’s Graue Wölfe in blauer See (Pabel, 1967), which deals with Guggenberger’s exploits in considerable if some times inaccurate detail on pp. 26-33.

Similar accounts in Jochen Brennecke, Jäger—Gejagte: Deutsche U-Boote 1939-1945,

5th ed. (Koehler, 1956), pp. 117-125, and Günter Böddeker, Die Boote im Netz (Lübbe, 1981), pp. 149-151. Further pertinent data in U-81’s War Diary as well as Folders “U-81”

and “Mittelmeer” in UACA. Statistics calculated by author using data from Rohwer and

Groener, op. cit.

16. U-81 was preceded into the Mediterranean by U-371, 559, 97, 331, 75, 79 and 205, all commanded by experienced skippers, among them several of Guggenberger’s Crew 34.

Cf. Folder “Mittelmeei” UACA.

17. U-81 War Diary UACA. Reschke made an attack on “Force K” at 0506 that morning, later claiming to have damaged the Ark Royal and a destroyer. Actually his torpedoes missed their targets.

18. U-81 War Diary.

19. Quotation and details from Corelli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (Norton, 1991), pp. 371-374.

20. Lothar-Günther Buchheim’s novel and subsequent motion picture Das Boot provide a very realistic account of what could happen to U-boats trying to force the narrows at

Gibraltar.

21. See Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 230.

22. Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, p. 234; Folder “U-81,” UACA. Guggenberger’s unsubstantiated claims were relatively minor compared to those of some of his comrades

in the Mediterranean. Fraatz and Guggenberger knew each other well, having been

involved in several operations together, including the near-destruction of convoy SC.42.

23. Details from Guggenberger interview and John Hammond Moore, The Faustball Tunnel (Random House, 1978), pp. 17-19.

24. Guggenberger “Personalnachweis,” UACA.

25. Peter Cremer, U-333: The Story of a U-Boat Ace (Bodley Head, 1984), p. 137.

26. For more on the mine incident and related information, see Edwin P. Hoyt, The Death of the U-Boats (Warner, 1988).

27. Ibid. Cf. Ladislas Farago, The Tenth Fleet (Obolensky 1962), pp. 198-199.

28. Guggenberger interview and Folder “U-513” in UACA, especially “Bericht des Kommandanten Fritz Guggenberger uber die Versenkung U-513.” Helmut Schmoeckel in

Menschlichkeit im Seekrieg? (Mittlei 1988), p. 148, indicates that as many as 20 men may have initially survived according to observations by American planes overhead. At any

rate, five hours later only seven were still alive. American sources, in contrast to

Guggenberger’s observations, claim that Whitcomb made two hits instead of only one.

Farago, The Tenth Fleet, p. 199.

29. Moore, Faustball Tunnel.

30. Guggenberger was chosen over Topp because the former had sunk no Norwegian

vessels during the war and thus was politically more acceptable for the post in Oslo.

31. Information from letter in UACA by Jürgen Heinze to fellow Knight’s Cross holders,

dated 29 August 1994, as well as Crew 34’s Crew-Briefe (newsletters) Nos. 120 (3/88),

121 (1/89) and 127 (1/91), all in author’s files.

Victor Otto Oehrn: The Ace With No Name

1. Victor Oehrn’s surname is occasionally misspelled as “Ohm,” which is logical when the rules of the German language are followed. See, for example, Barrie Pitt, The U-Boats

(New York: Time-Life Books, 1979). However, Oehrn himself uses the “oe” construction,

and he traces his name not to German roots but to Nordic ones. Oehrn, he wrote, comes

from the Swedish word Oem, which means “eagle.”

2. Oehrn letter, August 23, 1992.

3. For a detailed discussion of the motives behind naval service in Germany between the wars, see Eric Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler: The Story of Crew 34 (Praeger 1991).

4. Oehrn letter, March 18, 1992.

5. Ibid., letter, November 7, 1991. Oehrn is in error on one point: the Karlsruhe did not circumnavigate the globe in 1934-35.

6. Ibid., letter, July 17, 1991.

7. Oehrn, Navigare Necesse Est, unpublished memoirs.

8. There is evidence that morale wasn’t as bad as many believe. “I don’t think that there was a low morale due to the torpedo deficiencies,” wrote Jürgen Oesten, who at that time

was commander of U-61, “[but] we were furious and we did put the blame on that fat

Admiral Goetting who was in charge of the ‘Torpedo-Inspektion.” Oesten letter, July 16,

1996. Oehrn agrees with Oesten’s assessment. “Our torpedo problems were not easy, but I

cannot say that in the submarine crews the morale was low.” Oehrn letter, July 17, 1991.

9. Oehrn’s first war patrol began on May 15, 1940 and ended June 9, 1940. During this patrol he sank the Erik Frisell (5,066 GRT), damaged the Dunster Grange (9,494), and sank the Kyma (3,994), Sheaf Mead (5,008), Uruguay (3,425), Brazza (10,387), JuIien(177), Marie Jose (2,477),Telena (7,406) [later salvaged], Ioanna (950), and Snabb (2,317). All tonnage data is taken from Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes, 1939-1945 (Naval Institute Press, 1983).

10. Karl Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days (New York, 1959), p. 102.

11. Oehrn’s second war patrol began on August 1, 1940, and ended August 30, 1940.

During this patrol he sank the Upway Grange (9,130 GRT), Keret (1,718), Severn Leigh (5,242), Brookwood (5,100), HMS Penzance (1,025), Blairmore (4,141), Yewcrest (3,774), and Theodoros T. (3,409). Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes.

12. The sinking of the Severn Leigh is described by Oehrn in the first volume of his brief and as yet unpublished memoirs, Navigare Necesse Est. To this author’s knowledge,

Oehrn’s version is not contradicted by any published source. Oehrn also claims that the

Severn Leigh incident was used against Dönitz at Nuremberg.

13. Oehrn’s third war patrol began on September 25, 1940 and ended October 22, 1940.

During this patrol he sank the Corrientes (6,863 GRT)-.—credit for this sinking is shared with Hans Jenisch of U-32- Georges Mabro (2,555), Samala (5,390), Heminge (2,499), British General (6,989), and Stangrant (5,804).

14. Oehrn’s combined total for his three patrols was just over 100,000 GRT. This qualified him for the Knight’s Cross and also placed him in 28th place on the tonnage list for U-boat commanders in World War II. Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes. As is the case with

many commanders, these figures are sometimes misstated. Franz Kurowski, in Knight’s

Cross Holders of the U-Boat Service (NY, XXXX), p. XX, for example, states incorrectly that Oehrn conducted only two patrols and sank 108,000 GRT.

15. Oehrn, letter, July 17, 1991.

16. Oehrn has some interesting insights as to Hans-Joachim Rahmlow, a much-derided figure in the U-Bootwaffe community According to Oehrn, Rahmlow was “two years

younger than I, but we weren’t really well acquainted. A classmate of his once told me that he was a most sensible and courteous man. Obviously Personnel made a serious mistake in

assigning him as a U-boat commander, and Dönitz too, though he didn’t know him. When

we heard about the loss of the boat and the capture of the cypher equipment, we only

knew what the enemy was reporting. We talked about it a lot, but Dönitz only said: ‘we

know too little about the circumstances of his loss. Without more information we cannot

judge the commander.” Oehrn, letter October 11, 1991.

17. Ibid., letter, May 18, 1991.

18. Ibid.; Victor Oehrn, Dönitz Nähe Gesehen (Dönitz Up Close), unpublished memoirs.

19. Oehrn, letter, May 18, 1991.

20. “Rommel,” wrote Oehrn in July 17, 1991 letter, “was a military commander gifted by God.” In his memoirs and correspondence, Oehrn shows a great admiration for Erwin

Rommel, and compares him on more than one occasion to Karl Dönitz.

21. Ibid., May 18, 1991.

22. Oehrn, Navigare Necesse Est.

23. The extent to which National Socialism permeated the German military is an explosive subject, although further examination of Victor Oehrn’s politics is not within the purview

of this essay. Two of Oehrn’s statements are of interest on this subject. “Hitler would

never have come to power (legally) without the Treaty of Versailles,” he wrote in 1992.

“Six million out of work. The merchant fleet taken away. Reparations without end. Finally

the people just rebelled!” Oehrn letter, March 18, 1992. Later that same year, Oehrn wrote:

“I am no blind nationalist; but I do know what is meant by language, culture, religion, and the blood in our veins!” Ibid., July 12, 1992. The idea of a war against Bolshevism was

not uncommon in the U-Bootwaffe or in Germany: “I was convinced until the end of the

war,” wrote fellow U-boat ace Erich Topp, “that we were fighting for a just cause, for a

united Europe and against Communism.” Topp letter, July 8, 1991.

24. Oehrn did not know it then, but Renate had told Dönitz that she would wait ten years if necessary to marry Oehrn. It was something, Dönitz told them later, that helped him get

through his own ten years in Spandau Prison.

25. The first stop for most U-boat crewmen captured by the British was the London

District Cage (LDC) in Kensington. There the men were presented with encyclopedic

accounts of their lives and interviewed by skilled interrogators who often succeeded in

extracting something of value. After days or in some cases weeks, the men were sent to a

POW camp in Britain, and eventually to Canada or the United States. Mahdi, which

usually processed captured army personnel, was not as well equipped as the LDC to deal

with U-boat officers.

26. Erich Topp, foreword to Jordan Vause, U-Boat Ace: The Story of Wolfgang Lüth

(Naval Institute Press, 1990). It is tempting to speculate what would have happened to

Oehrn had he not been captured in Africa. Rommel, of course, would have had little need

of Oehrn’s services, and it is more probable than not that Oehrn would have been back at

BdU in time for the fierce winter fighting of 1942-43, during which many believe the

Battle of the Atlantic reached its apogee. His record leads one to believe that Oehrn might have been able to plan more effectively some of the individual operations, although it is

unknown whether his clear head and common sense would have led him to recognize that

German naval codes had been compromised. His presence, however, would not have

altered the course of events. Given his continuing desire for sea duty and the lack of

experienced commanders, he might have received his wish for a second boat (as he had

been promised when removed from command of U-37). Many of the veterans Dönitz later

returned to the sea themselves never returned, for the front in 1943 was far more

dangerous than it had been in 1940, when Oehrn had earned his Knight’s Cross.

27. Dönitz had become Kriegsmarine commander-in-chief (OKM) on January 30, 1943, after the fall into disfavor and gentle ouster of his predecessor, Erich Raeder.

28. One of Oehrn’s temporary positions during this time was that of FdU-Mitte, based in Kiel and responsible for all “invasion reserve” boats. Subsequent events determined that

this position was a useless one, but it may well have violated the terms of his repatriation.

Peter Hansen letter, August 16, 1996.

29. Oehrn, Dönitz Nähe Gesehen.

30. Oehrn describes both the Tirpitz episode and his advice about Dönitz’s messages in Oehrn, Dönitz Nähe Gesehen. Typical of these radio transmissions, which have long been a point of controversy was the one Dönitz made on New Year’s Eve 1944, in which he

said: “The battle for freedom and justice for our peoples continues. It will see us pitted

inexorably against our enemy. The Führer shows us the way and the goal. We follow him

with body and soul to a great German future. Heil our Fúhrer!” Peter Padfield, Dönitz: The Last Führer (New York, 1984).

31. Oehrn, Dönitz Nähe Gesehen. Dönitz was arrested after this conversation. He was tried and convicted at Nuremberg as a war criminal and sentenced to ten years in prison.

32. These two volumes are Navigare Necesse Est, a short autobiography, and Dönitz Nahe Gesehen (Dönitz Up Close), which describes Oehrn’s work with the Grand Admiral in

some detail. Because of a previous arrangement with Oehrn, this author is unable to quote

from these documents at this time.

33. Oehrn, letters, January 15, 1992, and May 29, 1992.

34. Jürgen Oesten, letter, July 16, 1996; Otto Kretschmer, quoted in Peter Hansen letter, August 16, 1996.

Heinz-Wilhelm Eck: Siegerjustiz and the Peleus Affair

1. “Bescheinigung,” Eck, Heinz, Deutsche Dienststelle (WASt), Berlin.

2. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, p. 7, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London, and Bodo Herzog, Deutsche U-Boote, 1906-1966 (Pawlak, 1990), pp. 255-257.

3. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 6-7, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

4. Ministry of War Transport, “Return of British Members of the Crew…” WO235/5

(604), Public Record Office, London.

5. Antonios Cosmas Liossis, Statement, September 1, 1944, and Roco Said, Statement, 16

August 1944, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

6. Roco Said, Statement, August 16, 1944, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

7. Antonios Cosnias Liossis, Statement, September 1, 1944, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

8. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 2, pp. 12-13; Day 3, p. 18, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

9. Ibid., Day 1, p. 16, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

10. “Officer-in-Charge, Naval Section, JICAME to Director of Naval Intelligence,”

Memorandum June 8, 1944, “U-852, Shooting of Survivors by,” RG38, Records of the

CNO, Records of ONI, National Archives, Washington, DC.

11. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, p. 16, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

12. Ibid., Day 2, pp. 7-10, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

13. Ibid., p. 9, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

14. Ibid., p. 17, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

15. Ibid., Day 3, p. 18, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

16. Ibid., pp. 3 & 13, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

17. Ibid., p. 4, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

18. Antonios Cosmas Liossis, Statement, September 1, 1944, W0235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

19. Ibid.

20. Roco Said, Statement, August 16, 1944, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office,

London.

21. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 28-29, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 24, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

24. Ibid., pp. 12 & 15, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

25. Ibid.

26. “Officer-in-Charge, Naval Section, JICAME to Director of Naval Intelligence,”

Memorandum June 8, 1944, “U-852, Shooting of Survivors by,” RG38, Records of the

CNO, Records of ONI, National Archives, Washington, DC.

27. “Kriegstagebuch, BdU, 1-15 März 1944,” Microfilm Publication T 1022, Roll 4065, PG30342, National Archives, Washington, DC.

28. “Kriegstagebuch, BdU, 1-14 April 1944,” Microfilm Publication T 1022, Roll 4065, PG30344, National Archives, Washington, DC, and L.C.F. Turner et al., War in the

Southern Oceans (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 248.

29. J. Torrence Rugh, “Report of Prisoners’ Interrogations,” 26 July 1944, Josef Schilling

Interrogation, RG226, Records of the OSS, National Archives, Washington, DC,

30. Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 248.

31. J. Torrence Rugh, “Report of Prisoners’ Interrogations,” July 26, 1944, Esper Günter

Interrogation & Alex-Heinz Rümmler Interrogation, RG226, Records of the OSS,

National Archives, Washington, DC.

32. Antonios Cosmas Liossis, Statement, September 1, 1944, and Roco Said, Statement, 16 August 1944, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

33. Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 251.

34. Ibid.

35. “Miscellaneous Intelligence from Sundry Sources,” July 26, 1944, RG226, Records of the OSS, National Archives, Washington, DC.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 251.

40. Alfred M. de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945 (University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 321, note 58.

41. Turner, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 251.

42. “Officer-in-Charge, Naval Section, JICAME to Director of Naval Intelligence,”

Memorandum June 5, June 8 & June 9, 1944, RG38, Records of the CNO, Records of

ONI, National Archives, Washington, DC.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. thid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. “Charge Sheet,” Peleus Trial Transcript, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

53. Ibid.

54. de Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945, pp. 320-321, note 58;

“Persönliche Akten Harold Todsen, Max Pabst, Albrecht Wegener, & Gerd-Otto Wulf,”

Bestand R22, Reichjustizministerium, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Peleus Trial Transcript,

Day 1, p. 2, W0235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

55. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 1, pp. 4-6, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

56. “Warrant No. V.W.3/1945-46,” Peleus Trial Transcript, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

57. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 1, pp. 4-6, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid., pp. 9-14, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

60. Zayas, The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945, p. 320, note 58.

61. Ibid., pp. 250-253.

62. LCdr. Dudley Morton, “USS Wahoo, Third War Patrol, Report of,” p. 5, RG38, Records of the CNO, U.S. Submarine War Patrol Reports, National Archives, Washington,

DC; George Gilder & Lytel Sims, War Fish (Little Brown & Co., 1958), pp. 100-101; and Richard H. O’Kane, Wahoo: The Patrols of America’s Most Famous Submarine (Presidio, 1987), pp. 153-154.

63. Capt. Robert R. Buckley, Jr., At Close Quarters: PT Boats in the U.S. Navy, (GPO, 1962), p.181; Newsweek, March 15, 1943, p. 18; and Life, March 22, 1943, p. 28.

64. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 4, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

65. Ibid., Day 1, p. 5, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

66. Arno Spindler, Der Krieg zur See, 1914-1918: Der Handelskrieg mit U-Booten (G.S.

Mittler & Sohn, 1931), pp. 250-255.

67. Oberleutnant z. S. Crompton, U-41: Der Zweite Baralong-Fall (Verlag August Scherl, 1917), pp. 47-54.

68. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 6, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

69. Ibid., Day 1, p. 12, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

70. Ibid.

71. Mauer Mauer and Lawrence J. Paszek, “Origin of the Laconic Order,” Air University Review (March-April 1964), pp. 26-37. Eventually, the French rescued some 1,111

survivors from the Laconia. I. C. B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to World War II (New York, 1995), p. 662.

72. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 2, p. 12, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

73. Ibid., p. 15, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

74. Ibid. pp. 16-17, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., Day 3, p. 2, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 4, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

79. Ibid.

80. For an excellent history of the development of Bomber Command’s strategic bombing offensive, see Max Hastings, Bomber Command (Dial Press, 1979). The de-housing

decision is discussed on pp. 127-132.

81. Herzog, Deutsche U-Boote, 1906-1966, pp. 255-256; and Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 6-7, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

82. Ibid., p. 7, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., pp. 8-9, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., p. 10, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

87. Ibid., p. 14, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

88. Ibid., p. 15, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 24, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

91. Ibid.

92. To get some idea of the social and cultural circumstances that may have played a role in forming Lenz’s philosophy, see Eric Rust, Naval Officers Under Hitler: The Story of

Crew 34 (Praeger, 1991). Though not a member of Crew 34, Lena was nonetheless a

product of the same system.

93. Dr. Wegner’s reference to his friendship with the Bishop irritated the Judge Advocate.

It is interesting to note that Bishop Bell was Britain’s most outspoken opponent to Bomber

Command’s area bombing policy. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, p. 31, WO235/5 (604),

Public Record Office, London, and Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 177.

94. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, pp. 30-31, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

95. John Cameron, The Peleus Trail (William Hodge & CO., 1948), pp. 167-183.

96. Ibid.

97. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 3, p. 31, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

98. Ibid., pp. 30-38, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., Day 4, p. 6, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

101. Cameron, Peleus Trial, pp.183-187.

102. Peleus Trial Transcript, Day 4, pp. 9, 12-13, 25, 26, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. New York Times, October 21, 1945.

106. “Death Warrant” November 12, 1945, and “Return of Warrant,” November 30, 1945, WO235/5 (604), Public Record Office, London.

107. Karl-Wilhelm Grützemacher, Letter to the Author, October 17, 1996.

108. Rust, Crew 34, p. 106, and Horst Bredow, Letter to the Author, December 12, 1995.

Because of the controversy over the trial and execution of Eck, few Germans are willing

to take a public stand on the issue, and few were willing to speak with the author about

this case. Those who wrote or spoke with me have insisted on remaining anonymous. The

recent publication of Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York, 1996), has not helped the situation—especially where an American researcher is concerned.

109. Cameron, Peleus Trial, p. xiv.

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