PROLOGUE · WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DAY MAKES
1. It was announced: “Daihon’ei Kaigun bu Happyo,” December 8, 1941, http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/sp/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001400296_00000.
2. Life was becoming monochromatic: Masaki Hiroshi, Chikakiyori, in Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (5) Ichioku no “Shintaisei,” ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1989), 277.
3. In the autumn of 1940, the sixty-year-old complained: Nagai Kafu, Kafu Zenshu (24) (Iwanami Shoten, 1994), 428–29.
4. These righteous women admonished: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (5), 276–77.
5. A man who was a second grader: Tomaru Shigeru, “Rajioten no Mae wa Hitodakari,” in “Watashi no Junigatsu Yoka,” ed. Nishiha Kiyoshi, http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/senso/19411208.htm#tomaru.
6. Aboard an overcrowded train: Nagai Kafu, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2) (Iwanami Bunko, 1987), 159.
7. One of the most distinguished poets: Kato Yoshiko, Saito Mokichi no Jugonen Senso (Misuzu Shobo, 1990), 124.
8. The thirty-six-year-old novelist: Yomiuri Shimbun, Kensho Senso Sekinin (1) (Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2006), 55.
9. Indeed, that war started: Note, however, that Japan had informed Russia of the termination of its diplomatic relations, and warned that it retained the freedom to act independently, four days prior to the actual attack.
10. Takeuchi Yoshimi, a thirty-one-year-old Sinologist: Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Daitoa Senso to Warera no Ketsui (Sengen),” Chugoku Bungaku 82 (1942): 482–84.
11. A nine-year-old in a rice-growing village: Yaoki Iijima, as told to Geneva Cobb Iijima “Growing Up in Old Japan” (self-published memoir, 2010), 19.
12. A young man working for Mitsubishi: Suzuki Shun, “Fuan to Yatta to iu Kimochi,” in “Watashi no Junigatsu Yoka,” http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/senso/19411208.htm#suzuki.
13. The isolationist opposition with which: Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 312.
14. Hawaii must have seemed almost like: This point is emphasized in December 7th, the United States Navy propaganda film from 1943 directed by John Ford and Gregg Toland.
15. That night, Churchill: Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, vol. 3 of The Second World War (London: Cassell, 1950), 540.
16. “Our elite Imperial Army and Navy”: Tojo Hideki, “Oomikotonori wo Haishi Tatematsurite,” http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/jpnews/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001300464_00000&seg_number=001.
17. True, Tojo is famous: Konoe Fumimaro, Heiwa e no Doryoku (Nihon Denpo Tsushinsha, 1946), 94.
18. According to his aide and son-in-law: Hosokawa Morisada, “Konoeko no Shogai,” in Konoe Nikki (Kyodo Tsushinsha, 1968), 150.
19. On December 22, just two weeks after: Yomiuri Shimbun, Kensho Senso Sekinin, (1), 56.
20. One doctor’s wife in her forties: Takahashi Aiko, quoted in Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6) Taiheiyo Senso, ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1990), 54.
21. Kafu, awakened by the neighbors’ shouting: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 253–54.
22. Kafu, who claimed: Ibid., 255.
23. After the victory: Marius B. Jansen, “Monarchy and Modernization in Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (August 1977): 617.
24. One of postwar Japan’s leading political scientists: Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. and trans. Ivan Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 88–89.
25. As a coolheaded political analyst: Yamamoto to Navy Chief Nagano, September 29, 1941, quoted in Gomikawa Junpei, Gozen Kaigi (Bunshun Bunko, 1984), 9.
CHAPTER 1 · RUMORS OF WAR
1. It immediately boosted its support: “Informal Conversations Between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941,” May 19, 1942, in U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan, 1931–1941(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 2:326.
2. “Compared to half a year ago”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 140.
3. Within a few months, he would write: Ibid., 146.
4. In a letter addressed: Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1952), 2:1258.
5. In Grew’s analysis: Ibid., 1257.
6. “One should be greatly alarmed”: “Konoe Naikaku no Dekibae,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 1937.
7. Konoe took it upon himself: Fujiwara Akira, Showa no Rekishi (5) (Shogakukan, 1994), 91–92.
8. But Konoe was, in the words: Ashida Hitoshi, falsely attributed to “Hitoshi Asa,” quoted in Otto D. Tolischus, “Synthesis of Japan,” New York Times, August 3, 1941.
9. In the summer of 1937: Ikeda Sumihisa, quoted in Fujiwara, Taiheiyo Senso (5), 108.
10. Konoe charged that the Guomindang’s: Konoe Fumimaro, “Kokuminseifu wo Aite to sezu” (January 16, 1938), Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabi ni Shuyomonjo (2) (Hara Shobo, 1966), 386.
11. “I have neither obvious enemies”: Yamaura Kan’ichi, “Konoe Shuhen no Henkan,” Kaizo (November 1938), 120.
12. It was Marquis Saionji Kinmochi: Saionji Kinkazu, Kizoku no Taijo (Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1995), 153.
13. Saionji, a practical man: Ibid., 135–37.
14. He said that those countries: Konoe Fumimaro, “Eibei Hon’i no Heiwa Shugi wo Haisu,” reprinted in Sengo Nihon Gaikoronshu (Chuo Koronsha, 1995), 52.
15. Saionji also reproached him: Hosokawa, “Konoeko no Shogai,” 122.
16. Commenting on the rising anti-Japanese sentiments: Konoe Fumimaro, Sengo Obei Kenbunroku (Chuko Bunko, 1981), 138.
17. As Saionji remarked to his grandson: Saionji Kinkazu, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku “Sugisarishi Showa” (Ipec Press, 1991), 160.
18. “Why should anyone be punished”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 145.
19. Correspondents were sent to war zones: Osaka Asahi, September 22, 1941; Osaka Mainichi, November 22, 1941.
20. The number of men qualified for military service: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (4) Nicchusenso e no Michi, ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1989), 237.
21. One soldier, Ushiotsu Kichijiro: All accounts related to Soldier U are from Ushiotsu Kichijiro, “Jibunshi,” http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/taikenki/ushiotsu/.
22. “How dreamy they are”: Quoted in Fukada Yusuke, Bibonare Showa: Suwa Nejiko to Kamikazego no Otokotachi (Bunshunbunko, 1985), 124.
23. Shortly after its formation, the association convoked a conference: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 39.
24. Whenever a notice from the distribution center: David J. Lu, Japan: A Documentary History (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 448.
25. In a meeting the day before the pact was signed: “Sumitsuin Honkaigi Giji Gaiyo” (September 26, 1940), B1-176 (KK24-5), 2-3, at http://d-arch.ide.go.jp/kishi_collection/b1.html.
26. But Ishii could not dissuade Konoe: “Matsumoto Joyaku Kyokucho ‘Nichidokui Sangokujoyaku ni kansuru Sumitsuin Shinsaiinkai Giji Gaiyo’ ” (September 26, 1940), B1-173 (KK24-5), 38, at ibid.
27. Konoe followed up on his swaggering posture: Toyoda Jo, Matsuoka Yosuke: Higeki no Gaikokan (2) (Shincho Bunko, 1983), 362.
28. Apparently flustered upon reading the telegram: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 53.
29. According to Kido’s journal entry: Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Nikki (2) (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1980), 870.
30. Resources in the Dutch East Indies had to be gained: Boeicho Boeikenshusho Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho: Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (4) (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1974), 110; Osugi Kazuo, Shinjuwan e no Michi: Kaisen, Hisen Kokonotsu no Sentakushi (Kodansha, 2003), 221.
CHAPTER 2 · THE RETURN OF DON QUIXOTE
1. Courtesy of Joseph Stalin: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 190–91.
2. All railway stations in Berlin had been adorned: Saionji, Kizoku no Taijo, 82.
3. “To shake hands with Germany is”: Kase Toshikazu, Senso to Gaiko (2) (Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1975), 104.
4. He was one of the rare people: Hitler’s translator Paul Schmidt to Matsuoka’s secretary, quoted in Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 433.
5. His Oregon classmates were impressed: Toyoda Jo, Matsuoka Yosuke: Higeki no Gaikokan (1) (Shincho Bunko, 1983), 106.
6. In his fifties, he would revisit the place of his adolescence: James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 419.
7. On the podium, Matsuoka abandoned his prepared text: Stewart Brown, “Japan Stuns World, Withdraws from League,” United Press, February 24, 1933.
8. Reporting from Geneva, the United Press correspondent described: Ibid.
9. “Currently, no one sees the significance of it”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (1), 538–49.
10. The same assistant also revealed: Ibid., 24–25.
11. On that fateful day when Matsuoka announced: Brown, “Japan Stuns World.”
12. For about a year afterward, he traveled: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 181.
13. “I don’t think that party politics is the only way”: Ibid., 182.
14. As the president of the South Manchurian Railway: Hayasaka Takashi, Shikikan no Ketsudan: Manshu to Attsu no Shogun Higuchi Kiichiro (Bungei Shinsho, 2010), 131–49.
15. “Diplomacy is power, my dear young man”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 190–91.
16. “You must really support Prince Konoe”: Ibid., 70–71.
17. “You see, I am an Asian”: Ibid., 197.
18. When Japanese and Soviet delegates took turns: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 35.
19. “Matsuoka is an able man!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 234.
20. According to a journalist who accompanied Matsuoka: Ibid., 236.
21. When he first heard about the Draft Understanding: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 105.
22. He was convinced that the proposal: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 46.
23. But most of those in the room: “Dai 21-kai Renraku Kondankai,” April 22, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), ed. Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo, Shimada Toshihiko, and Tsunoda Jun (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1988), 410–11.
24. Nomura kept apologizing: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:411.
25. On April 16, Hull asked Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:407.
26. In early May, he complained to a Foreign Ministry official: Tajiri Akiyoshi, quoted in Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 514.
27. One of the more conspicuous changes involved: “Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State,” May 12, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:420–25.
28. When he had just returned from the United States: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (1), 107–8.
29. When Hull complained to Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 11, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:416.
30. Hull murmured to himself: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 257.
31. For instance, Hull had said he could negotiate: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:407.
32. But in a personal exchange with Nomura: Ibid., 409.
33. As one army officer on the general staff: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 400.
CHAPTER 3 · THE BEGINNING OF IT ALL
1. His lesser-known Un Bal à Yeddo: Julia Meech-Pekarik, The World of the Meiji Print: Impressions of a New Civilization (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 149.
2. Okura Kihachiro, an eccentric: Ibid., 154.
3. “We are your Supreme Commander-in-Chief”: Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 705–6.
4. Erwin von Bälz, a German physician: Jansen, “Monarchy and Modernization in Japan,” 614.
5. In the words of one historian: Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 619–20.
CHAPTER 4 · THE SOLDIER’S DILEMMAS
1. This was true even in an all-boys preparatory school: Masuda Masao, “Senjika no Morioka Chugaku,” http://morioka-times.com/topics/bungei/senjika/senji2.html.
2. Fuchida Mitsuo, a bomber pilot: Fuchida Mitsuo, Shinjuwan Kogeki Sotaicho no Kaiso: Fuchida Mitsuo Jijoden (Kodansha, 2007), 20–22.
3. “Japanese victories stirred up my enthusiasm”: Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography: With Musings on Recent Events in India (London: John Lane, 1939), 16.
4. “I entered the navy with the great ambition”: Yamamoto Yoshimasa, Chichi, Yamamoto Isoroku (Kobunsha, 2001), 21.
5. When he first started playing catch: Ibid., 22–23.
6. In the black leather-bound pocket agenda: Ibid., 125–30.
7. Whenever young Japanese asked him: Ibid., 25.
8. Knowing that the supreme commander: Sheldon Garon, State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 158.
9. “Had the government resigned”: Hayashi Kyujiro, Manshujihen to Hoten Soryoji (Hara Shobo, 1978), 145–46.
10. Yonai kept Japan from the unseemly alliance: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 162.
11. “The historically isolationist United States”: Hando Kazutoshi, Shikikan to Sanbo (Bunshun Bunko, 1992), 109.
12. When Yamamoto heard the news: Ibid., 131.
13. When Grew wrote to Hull: “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” January 27, 1941, 711.94, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:133.
14. In early February 1941: Genda Minoru, Shinjuwansakusen Kaikoroku (Bunshun Bunko, 1998), 11–23.
CHAPTER 5 · GOOD RIDDANCE, GOOD FRIENDS
1. Throughout the performance, Kase Toshikazu: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 45.
2. When news of the German offensive: Ibid., 44.
3. “Do you really think we can”: Inose Naoki, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen (Bunshun Bunko, 1986), 181.
4. “Matsuoka has been likely bribed by Hitler”: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, ed. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller (Bunshun Bunko, 2010), 67.
5. “I would if I were”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 33.
6. “Germany and Italy have been preparing”: “Dai 21-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 3, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 412.
7. “Roosevelt is keen to go to war”: “Dai 22-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 8, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 415; emphasis added.
8. Hull summarily dismissed it: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 7, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:412.
9. On April 16, the day Washington decided: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:406.
10. The Roosevelt administration had predicated: “Informal Conversations Between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941,” May 19, 1942, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:328.
11. While commending the earnest efforts: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” June 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:485–86.
12. “Heroes change their minds decisively”: “Dai 36-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 460.
13. Then, in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador: Kase Toshikazu Kaisoroku (1) (Yamate Shobo, 1986), 179.
14. The next day, June 15, 1941: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 142–43.
15. “People these days”: Ibid., 145.
16. “I have taken occasion to speak to you”: Winston S. Churchill, “The Fourth Climacteric,” June 22, 1941, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/809-the-fourth-climacteric.
17. Roosevelt felt the same: Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940–1941 (New York: Penguin, 2008), 302–4.
18. When Nomura called on Hull: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” June 22, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:493.
CHAPTER 6 · JAPAN’S NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM
1. On June 23, 1941, the day after Germany attacked: “Doitsu no tai Sobieto Senso ni kakawaru Nihonseifu no Tachiba ni tsuiteno Joho wo Hokoku seyo,” June 23, 1941, no. 6058/6897, in Shimotomai Nobuo and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu (Kadokawa Shoten, 1992), 321.
2. His mission, as he once summed it up: Richard Sorge, “Zoruge no Shuki (2),” October 1941, in Gendaishishiryo (1) (Misuzu Shobo, 1962), 180.
3. Sorge efficiently recruited members: “Zoruge wo Chushin toseru Kokusaichobodan Jiken,” in Gendaishishiryo (1), 4–21.
4. He recalled that his close contact: Ozaki Hotsumi, “Ozaki Hotsumi no Shuki (1),” June 1943, in Gendaishishiryo (2) (Misuzu Shobo, 1962), 5.
5. He said that Shanghai: Ibid., 8.
6. Sorge described their relationship: Sorge, “Zoruge no Shuki (2),” 160.
7. “Those people [Smedley and Sorge] were”: Ozaki, “Ozaki Hotsumi no Shuki (1),” 8.
8. When Guillain caught sight: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 162–63.
9. Ozaki later said that he had associated: Ozaki, “Shuki (1),” 12–13.
10. If, for example, one division or section: Hatano Sumio, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991), 24.
11. The navy, too, had its middle-ranking hawks: Hando, Shikikan to Sanbo, 101.
12. Ishikawa would later boast: Yoshida Toshio, Kaigun Sanbo (Bunshun Bunko, 1993), 293.
13. The navy’s chief of staff, Nagano Osami, summarized: The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, ed. James William Morley, trans. David A. Titus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 109.
14. Five decades later, Ishii Akiho, a bakuryo officer: Ishii Akiho, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.
15. “This matter requires speedy action”: “Dai 32-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 445–46.
16. Vice Army Chief Tsukada became adamant: “Dai 33-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 26, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 456.
17. “You are telling me that we ought to”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 157–59.
18. He became uncharacteristically inarticulate: “Dai 33-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 26, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 456.
19. He said he understood the broad strategic logic: “Dai 34-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 27, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 457.
20. “My foretelling for the near future”: “Dai 36-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 460.
21. “Why not postpone [the southern Indochinese takeover]”: Ibid.
22. “Imperial conferences,” Hirohito once said: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 56.
23. On July 2, the greatest concern for Hara: The Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 128.
24. “Going to [occupy] Thailand or Indochina requires”: “Dai 25-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 22, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 418.
25. Sawamoto Yorio, the vice navy minister: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 101.
26. He said to the leaders: “Gozen Kaigi,” July 2, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 464–66. All the following quotations from this conference are from the same source.
27. When the proposal was introduced: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 277.
28. He later recalled: “Dai 43-kai Jinmon Chosho,” March 17, 1942, in Gendaishishiryo (1), 287.
29. Sorge noted: “Dai 41-kai Jinmon Chosho,” March 11, 1942, in Gendaishishiryo (1), 275.
30. Sorge knew which one to trust: Communication Nos. 163, 165, 166, and 167, July 10, 1941, in Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 322; emphasis in the original.
31. “Are we really ready”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 102.
CHAPTER 7 · A QUIET CRISIS IN JULY
1. The nation was informed: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 73.
2. He remarked to Secretary of the Interior: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 300.
3. Matsuoka, understandably, was upset: “Dai 38-kai Renraku Kondankai,” July 10, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 471.
4. “Hull’s oral statement should in fact”: “Dai 39-kai Renraku Kondankai,” July 12, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 472–74. All the following quotes from this conference are taken from this source, unless indicated otherwise.
5. “Why are you military men”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 538.
6. The novelist Nogami Yaeko speculated: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 76.
7. As usual, Kafu was more perspicacious: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 147.
8. Visiting Toyoda before Japan’s formal announcement: “Joho Kokan Yoshi,” July 26, 1940, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 484.
9. In a liaison meeting on July 24: “Dai 41-kai Renraku Kaigi,” July 24, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 488.
10. The next day’s log definitively repeated: Hatano, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan, 117.
11. “We had no inkling that the United States would”: Takada Toshitane, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.
12. According to Welles, he then made: “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State,” July 24, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:529.
13. He immediately went to see Toyoda: “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” July 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:535.
14. He “fully recognized”: Ibid., 536.
15. As far as the existing records show: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 315.
16. He said he tried: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 71.
17. But rather than suggesting a Japanese withdrawal: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 895–96.
CHAPTER 8 · “MEET ME IN JUNEAU”
1. Ishii Hanako, a woman with luminous, feline eyes: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 166–67.
2. On the day Germany opened fire on the Soviet Union: Ibid., 159–60.
3. But doubt persisted among some observers: “Josei no Suii ni tomonau Teikoku Kokusaku Yoko,” July 2, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 467.
4. Konoe responded to Arita on August 3: Correspondence, August 3, 1941, Kensei Shiryoshitsu Shushu Monjo, no. 1159, National Diet Library.
5. The Republican administration, maintaining that: Kate Zernike, “Senators Begin Debate on Iraq, Visions in Sharp Contrast,” New York Times, June 22, 2006.
6. “The ‘war’ that’s mentioned in the July 2 policy”: Hatano, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan, 118.
7. A collector of rumors: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 144.
8. On July 26, he wrote to one of his most trusted advisers: Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, July 26, 1941, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX3/T32D01.HTML.
9. Army Minister Tojo’s support was more qualified: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 320.
10. Foreign Minister Toyoda, without referring to the specifics: Toyoda to Nomura, telegram 162, August 12, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 162.
11. From August 9 to 12, the U.S. cruiser Augusta: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 315–17.
12. They were greatly influenced by the positive view: Ibid., 308.
13. Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark: Ibid., 304.
14. Hull reported that Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” August 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:554–55.
15. The president responded in even broader terms: “Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” August 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:556–57.
16. Over the meal, Ozaki asked: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 231.
17. “I have made a big mistake”: Ibid., 208.
18. The original English text: “The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt,” August 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:573.
19. Roosevelt complimented: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” August 28, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:571.
20. The ambassador was encouraged because: Ibid., 572.
21. He described the likely composition: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” August 28, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:576–78. All the following quotations from the meeting are from this source.
CHAPTER 9 · AN UNWINNABLE, INEVITABLE WAR
1. The institute was opened in April 1941: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 45. Originally published in 1983, this book includes interviews conducted with surviving members of the institute.
2. He responded with due deference: Ibid., 76–78.
3. The guidelines presented to the researchers: Ibid., 119.
4. His own ministry’s War Economy Research Office: Akimaru Jiro, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.
5. “This is, after all, a desktop exercise”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 193–94.
6. The instructor Horiba Kazuo, an army man: Ibid., 122.
7. Kafu noted that Okubo was rumored: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 118.
8. The president, now echoing Hull: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” September 3, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:588–89.
9. But Konoe took heart: “President Roosevelt’s Reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” September 3, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:592.
10. Though the countries they led: The characterizations of Roosevelt are from Steven Casey, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,” in Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars, ed. Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 217–18.
11. An August 29 journal entry by an officer: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 145–46.
12. “What idiots they are in Washington!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 331.
13. Ishii believed the likely sequence: Ibid., 331–32.
14. “The empire is getting skinnier”: “Dai 50-kai Renraku Kaigi,” September 3, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 507-8. All quotations from this conference are from this source.
15. “Tomita [the chief cabinet secretary] should have coordinated”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 211.
16. “That would be impossible”: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, ed. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller (Bunshun Bunko, 2010), 74.
17. Displaying the incisiveness: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 86–87.
18. “I speak broadly on behalf”: Ibid., 87.
19. He asked Nagano the same question: Hando, Shikikan to Sanbo, 122.
20. The emperor recited: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 87.
21. Afterward, Grew wrote a lengthy report: “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” September 6, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:604–6.
CHAPTER 10 · ONE LAST OPPORTUNITY
1. “The United States in the end demands”: Quoted in Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 346–47.
2. But instead, he told Sugiyama: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 170.
3. The navy also intensified its preparations: Ibid., 170–71.
4. When Germany invaded Denmark: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 312.
5. By sending professional soldiers: Ibid., 313.
6. The Greer, a U.S. destroyer: Ibid., 319.
7. “This was piracy”: Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat 18: On the Greer Incident,” September 11, 1941, http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3323.
8. Roosevelt had confirmed his oratorical genius: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 322–24.
9. After hearing from Sorge: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 220.
10. Hull replied that this proposal: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” September 10, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:613–14.
11. The banker and amateur diplomat: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 349.
12. Negotiating a U.S.-Japanese understanding without settling: “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles),” October 13, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:685.
13. If Konoe had proposed: Matsumoto Shigeharu, Konoe Jidai: Janarisuto no Kaiso (2) (Chuko Bunko, 1987), 200; emphasis added.
14. He sent a telegram to Tokyo: Nomura to Toyoda, telegram 865, September 28, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo (Hara Shobo, 1978), part 1, 320.
15. “The general staff is an organ”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 351.
16. That evening, Saionji and Ozaki dined: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 236.
17. Unlike most others, they could still: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 55.
18. “The timing of the opening of war”: “Dai 55-kai Renraku Kaigi,” September 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 528–29.
19. A bakuryo officer in the War Guidance Office: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 172–73.
20. “If the military insists on the October 15 deadline”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 909.
21. “You are the one who called”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 174.
22. In a lengthy eleven-point communication: “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” September 29, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:649.
23. He suggested as much in a carefully cushioned double-negative supposition: Ibid., 650.
24. Grew, aware of this, insisted: Ibid., 647.
25. “If the United States continues to deliberately misread”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 362.
26. True, in trying to oust Matsuoka: “Dai 32-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 446.
27. A fanatical believer in Japan’s inherent greatness: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 553.
28. “The likely prospect might be war”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 177.
29. Hence his assessment to Nagano: Ibid., 187.
30. Oikawa responded: Ibid., 182.
31. He was handed a statement urging Japan: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” October 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:658.
32. Hull then asked Japan to present: Ibid., 660.
33. Most emphatically, there would be no summit: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” October 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:655.
34. Nomura was repeatedly: Ibid.
35. Nomura was also told: Ibid., 656.
36. Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama warned: “Dai 57-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 4, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 530.
37. In January 1946, in a roundtable discussion: Excerpts of the conference are quoted in Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 183–86.
38. On October 5, the navy held a top-level meeting: Ibid., 190.
39. The October 5 entry of the War Guidance Office journal: Ibid., 188.
40. “The United States demands us to leave”: Ibid., 189.
41. They agreed that the Army General Staff should: Ibid., 191–92.
42. According to Vice Minister Sawamoto, Oikawa was: Ibid.
43. The army’s War Guidance Office log: Ibid., 190–91.
44. The navy’s unusually frank admission: The Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 213.
45. In a cabinet meeting, Tojo announced: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 360.
46. Oikawa replied: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 197.
47. But even he could not help occasionally: Ibid., 193–94.
48. “We absolutely cannot do that”: Ibid., 198–200. All the following quotes from this meeting are taken from this source, unless otherwise indicated.
49. Jumping into the abyss was: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 94.
50. “We’ve lost tens of thousands of lives”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 365.
51. In early October, the commander in chief of Japanese forces: Ibid., 367.
52. Hull’s damning postwar assessment: Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 2:1054.
53. “We must continue to seek a diplomatic settlement”: “Gosho Kaigi,” October 12, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 531–33.
54. “It’s not up to the military to say”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 203–4.
55. “If I am allowed to be brutally frank”: “Gosho Kaigi,” 532.
CHAPTER 11 · A SOLDIER TAKES OVER
1. “The fall of Xuzhou! The fall of Xuzhou!”: rebroadcast in a television documentary, NHK Supesharu “Nihonjin wa Naze Senso e to Mukattanoka” (3), February 27, 2011.
2. “How utterly bizarre”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 146.
3. “But Ambassador Nomura is an able man”: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 223–24.
4. Now, for a change, Konoe spoke: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 212.
5. “I believe the prime minister’s argument”: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 95–96.
6. The speech went as follows: “Kakugi ni okeru Rikugun Daijin Setsumei no Yoshi,” October 14, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 533–34.
7. Tojo, going right against the theatrical, hard-hitting prowar tone: “Rikugun Daijin Setsumeigo Kyuchu ni Okeru Kido, Tojo Kaidan Yoshi,” October 14, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 535.
8. “The navy minister doesn’t say”: Ibid.
9. “I’ve got some awful news!”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 220.
10. One day in early October, Kafu chatted: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 153–54.
11. “Minister, you cornered Prince Konoe”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 85–87.
12. Hirohito covered for his subject’s embarrassing silence: Ibid., 87.
13. “No pain, no gain, wouldn’t you say?”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 918.
14. “I gather that you [Tojo] have now received”: Ibid., 917.
15. “I do not have any problem reexamining the issue”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 388.
16. “I have three things to say to you”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 217.
CHAPTER 12 · WINDING BACK THE CLOCK
1. He did not mince his words: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 233–34.
2. Nagano, who had commented earlier: “Dai 59-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 23, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 537–38. All of the quotes from this conference are taken from this source.
3. In preparing new data to be presented: Nakahara Shigetoshi, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.
4. Nagano declared: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 246–47.
5. When Suzuki was invited to share his views: “Dai 62-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 27, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 539.
6. According to its research: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 249.
7. These overwhelming figures were: Ibid., 421.
8. Later, when he was ninety-three: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 184.
9. So Suzuki simply skated over: “Dai 62-kai Renraku Kaigi,” 539.
10. The Army General Staff record of October 27: Ibid., 540.
11. “Unless we decide quickly”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 402.
12. The War Guidance Office of the Army General Staff noted: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 256.
13. They declared at the meeting: “Dai 63-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 28, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 541.
14. On the material front: Ibid.
15. “Our economy would survive”: “Dai 65-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 541–48. All of the other quotes from this conference are taken from this source.
16. He was also surprised that the navy had not come: Togo Shigenori, Jidai no Ichimen: Taisen Gaiko no Shuki (Chuko Bunko, 1989), 318–19.
17. Shimada confided in Vice Navy Minister: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 402.
CHAPTER 13 · ON THE BRINK
1. “I intend to take the third route”: “Tojo Rikusho to Sugiyama Socho tono Kaidan Yoshi,” November 11, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 548–49. All of the quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.
2. Humiliated, Sugiyama asked Shimada: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 284.
3. He asked the navy leaders impatiently: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 550–51.
4. “Well, my dear Yamamoto”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 407.
5. Pilots had been superbly trained: Fuchida, Shinjuwan Kogeki Sotaicho no Kaiso, 104–8.
6. “Couldn’t the deadline be extended”: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” 551–52.
7. He also questioned the chiefs of staff on some technical issues: The Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 264.
8. “If we just stand by with our arms folded”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 413.
9. “President Roosevelt is taking advantage”: “Gozen Kaigi,” November 5, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 573.
CHAPTER 14 · “NO LAST WORD BETWEEN FRIENDS”
1. “There is no last word between friends”: Kurusu Saburo, Homatsu no Sanjugonen (Chuko Bunko, 2007), 88.
2. “In this dangerous emergency”: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 331.
3. He went on to say that in his estimation: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 26–27. All of the following quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.
4. The escalation, in his words, came about: Ibid., 221–22.
5. “The negotiations at hand represent”: Togo to Nomura, telegram 725, November 4, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 385.
6. The president made no specific references: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 10, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:718.
7. When Wakasugi Kaname, the minister-counselor, visited: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 13, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:730–31.
8. “If the situation allows”: Nomura to Togo, telegram 1090, November 14, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 428.
9. Hull had not accepted: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941,” in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:734.
10. “If we are to work out a peaceful settlement”: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 15, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:732–34.
11. On November 16, Togo responded: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 422.
12. In Tokyo, Togo had given him: Sato Motoei, “Togo Gaisho wa Nichibei Kaisen wo Soshi Dekita,” Bungei Shunju (March 2009): 313.
13. He was dismissive of Kurusu’s: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:740.
14. Hull had said in a previous meeting: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 14, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:733.
15. Whatever the reason, Hull’s opinion of Kurusu: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:742–43.
16. Looking back in 1948: Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2:1062.
17. Tojo’s policy speech in the Diet: See http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/jpnews/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001300461_00000&seg_number=002.
18. Despite U.S.-German hostilities: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 326.
19. Hull impressed on the Japanese envoys: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 18, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:745–50. All of the other quotes from the meeting are taken from this source.
20. Kurusu sent a message to Tokyo: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 96–97.
21. Walsh congratulated Kurusu on the near completion: Ibid., 98.
22. He expressed his view that an agreement: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 19, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:751.
23. In Togo’s mind, Nomura’s action was a typical case: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 338.
24. “There is absolutely no room for such maneuver”: Togo to Nomura, telegram 798, November 20, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 467.
CHAPTER 15 · THE HULL NOTE
1. Togo had prohibited its immediate use: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 105.
2. Thus he presented Hull with his personal note: “Draft Letter Handed by Mr. Saburo Kurusu to the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:756–57.
3. “You came all this way, Ambassador”: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 106.
4. “Please, do take care of yourself”: Ibid.
5. Hull’s memorandum of his tête-à-tête: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:756.
6. He said that oil purchased by Japan: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 22, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:757.
7. Hull wondered why there was: Ibid., 758.
8. Why had Japan “pushed everything”: Ibid., 761.
9. But there were to be: Togo to Nomura, telegram 812, November 22, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 478–79.
10. On the evening of November 25: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 368–70.
11. Hull’s own postwar explanation: Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2:1081.
12. Based on this intercepted communication: Henry Stimson, quoted in notes, Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 558.
13. Roosevelt’s secretary of war: Ibid.
14. These were crystallized in the third, fourth, and fifth points: “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan,” November 26, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:769.
15. Even though the outline was marked: The Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 313.
16. Kurusu expressed his grave fear: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 26, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:766.
CHAPTER 16 · JUMPING OFF THE HIGH PLATFORM
1. “I was struck by despair”: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 375.
2. For those restlessly itching: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 463.
3. Until the arrival of the note: Togo Shigehiko, Sofu Togo Shigenori no Shogai (Bungei Shunju, 1993), 278.
4. “This is terribly written indeed!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 464.
5. Yoshida told Togo that whatever the true intentions: Ibid.
6. Despite having warned his closest advisers: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 111–12.
7. He and his government were grateful: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:770–72. All of the quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.
8. “They would be ground to powder”: Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 539.
9. “If Japan is to join the war”: “Gozen Kaigi,” November 5, 1941, 569–570.
10. “Excuse me for speaking my mind”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 481.
11. “Is there any time left for diplomacy?”: “Dai 74-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 29, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 592.
12. He concluded his message with a plea that: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 121.
13. The lord keeper of the privy seal would have none of it: Ibid., 122.
14. “The navy cannot afford to fight”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 928.
15. “If I did not approve of war, Tojo would resign”: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 89–90.
16. “Naval strategies are everything”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 483.
17. Shimada, in order to: Ibid.
18. “We aim to demolish the Far Eastern bases”: “Dai 69-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 15, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 585.
19. Finally, Hirohito gave his approval: “Gozen Kaigi,” December 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 596.
EPILOGUE · THE NEW BEGINNING
1. After he had finished reading: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” December 7, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:787.
2. Before his departure for Washington: The Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 19.
3. In a communication from Tokyo on November 28: Togo to Nomura, telegram 844, November 28, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 505–6.
4. Togo’s exact words read: Togo to Nomura, telegram 878, December 3, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 530.
5. That Kurusu and Nomura delivered the message: For a critical exploration of the debate, see Takeo Iguchi, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Japanese Perspective, trans. David Noble (International House of Japan, 2010).
6. Kurusu immediately recalled his interview: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 164.
7. “Which one’s Kurusu?”: Ibid., 139.
8. “I want to leave something more tangible”: Ibid., 211.
9. Prince Takamatsu, more straightforward: Ibid., 167.
10. At the prime minister’s luncheon: Ibid.
11. “Sponge cakes, dumplings, pastries”: Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 336.
12. “We must be losing the war”: Iijima, “Growing Up in Old Japan,” 20.
13. And this pattern was perpetuated: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 143.