Notes

PROLOGUE  ·  WHAT A DIFFERENCE A DAY MAKES

1It was announced: “Daihon’ei Kaigun bu Happyo,” December 8, 1941, http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/sp/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001400296_00000.

2Life was becoming monochromatic: Masaki Hiroshi, Chikakiyori, in Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (5) Ichioku no “Shintaisei,” ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1989), 277.

3In the autumn of 1940, the sixty-year-old complained: Nagai Kafu, Kafu Zenshu (24) (Iwanami Shoten, 1994), 428–29.

4These righteous women admonishedShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (5), 276–77.

5A man who was a second grader: Tomaru Shigeru, “Rajioten no Mae wa Hitodakari,” in “Watashi no Junigatsu Yoka,” ed. Nishiha Kiyoshi, http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/senso/19411208.htm#tomaru.

6Aboard an overcrowded train: Nagai Kafu, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2) (Iwanami Bunko, 1987), 159.

7One of the most distinguished poets: Kato Yoshiko, Saito Mokichi no Jugonen Senso (Misuzu Shobo, 1990), 124.

8The thirty-six-year-old novelist: Yomiuri Shimbun, Kensho Senso Sekinin (1) (Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2006), 55.

9Indeed, that war started: Note, however, that Japan had informed Russia of the termination of its diplomatic relations, and warned that it retained the freedom to act independently, four days prior to the actual attack.

10Takeuchi Yoshimi, a thirty-one-year-old Sinologist: Takeuchi Yoshimi, “Daitoa Senso to Warera no Ketsui (Sengen),” Chugoku Bungaku 82 (1942): 482–84.

11A nine-year-old in a rice-growing village: Yaoki Iijima, as told to Geneva Cobb Iijima “Growing Up in Old Japan” (self-published memoir, 2010), 19.

12A young man working for Mitsubishi: Suzuki Shun, “Fuan to Yatta to iu Kimochi,” in “Watashi no Junigatsu Yoka,” http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/senso/19411208.htm#suzuki.

13The isolationist opposition with which: Robert Dallek, Franklin DRoosevelt and American Foreign Policy1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 312.

14Hawaii must have seemed almost like: This point is emphasized in December 7th, the United States Navy propaganda film from 1943 directed by John Ford and Gregg Toland.

15That night, Churchill: Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, vol. 3 of The Second World War (London: Cassell, 1950), 540.

16“Our elite Imperial Army and Navy”: Tojo Hideki, “Oomikotonori wo Haishi Tatematsurite,” http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/jpnews/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001300464_00000&seg_number=001.

17True, Tojo is famous: Konoe Fumimaro, Heiwa e no Doryoku (Nihon Denpo Tsushinsha, 1946), 94.

18According to his aide and son-in-law: Hosokawa Morisada, “Konoeko no Shogai,” in Konoe Nikki (Kyodo Tsushinsha, 1968), 150.

19On December 22, just two weeks after: Yomiuri Shimbun, Kensho Senso Sekinin, (1), 56.

20One doctor’s wife in her forties: Takahashi Aiko, quoted in Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6) Taiheiyo Senso, ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1990), 54.

21Kafu, awakened by the neighbors’ shouting: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 253–54.

22Kafu, who claimed: Ibid., 255.

23After the victory: Marius B. Jansen, “Monarchy and Modernization in Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (August 1977): 617.

24One of postwar Japan’s leading political scientists: Masao Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, ed. and trans. Ivan Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 88–89.

25As a coolheaded political analyst: Yamamoto to Navy Chief Nagano, September 29, 1941, quoted in Gomikawa Junpei, Gozen Kaigi (Bunshun Bunko, 1984), 9.

CHAPTER 1  ·  RUMORS OF WAR

1It immediately boosted its support: “Informal Conversations Between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941,” May 19, 1942, in U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan1931–1941(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), 2:326.

2“Compared to half a year ago”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 140.

3Within a few months, he would write: Ibid., 146.

4In a letter addressed: Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years1904–1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1952), 2:1258.

5In Grew’s analysis: Ibid., 1257.

6“One should be greatly alarmed”: “Konoe Naikaku no Dekibae,” Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 1937.

7Konoe took it upon himself: Fujiwara Akira, Showa no Rekishi (5) (Shogakukan, 1994), 91–92.

8But Konoe was, in the words: Ashida Hitoshi, falsely attributed to “Hitoshi Asa,” quoted in Otto D. Tolischus, “Synthesis of Japan,” New York Times, August 3, 1941.

9In the summer of 1937: Ikeda Sumihisa, quoted in Fujiwara, Taiheiyo Senso (5), 108.

10Konoe charged that the Guomindang’s: Konoe Fumimaro, “Kokuminseifu wo Aite to sezu” (January 16, 1938), Gaimusho, Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabi ni Shuyomonjo (2) (Hara Shobo, 1966), 386.

11“I have neither obvious enemies”: Yamaura Kan’ichi, “Konoe Shuhen no Henkan,” Kaizo (November 1938), 120.

12It was Marquis Saionji Kinmochi: Saionji Kinkazu, Kizoku no Taijo (Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1995), 153.

13Saionji, a practical man: Ibid., 135–37.

14He said that those countries: Konoe Fumimaro, “Eibei Hon’i no Heiwa Shugi wo Haisu,” reprinted in Sengo Nihon Gaikoronshu (Chuo Koronsha, 1995), 52.

15Saionji also reproached him: Hosokawa, “Konoeko no Shogai,” 122.

16Commenting on the rising anti-Japanese sentiments: Konoe Fumimaro, Sengo Obei Kenbunroku (Chuko Bunko, 1981), 138.

17As Saionji remarked to his grandson: Saionji Kinkazu, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku “Sugisarishi Showa” (Ipec Press, 1991), 160.

18“Why should anyone be punished”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 145.

19Correspondents were sent to war zonesOsaka Asahi, September 22, 1941; Osaka Mainichi, November 22, 1941.

20The number of men qualified for military serviceShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (4) Nicchusenso e no Michi, ed. Harada Katsumasa, Ozaki Hotsumi, Matsushita Keiichi, and Mikuni Ichiro (Kodansha, 1989), 237.

21One soldier, Ushiotsu Kichijiro: All accounts related to Soldier U are from Ushiotsu Kichijiro, “Jibunshi,” http://www.rose.sannet.ne.jp/nishiha/taikenki/ushiotsu/.

22“How dreamy they are”: Quoted in Fukada Yusuke, Bibonare Showa: Suwa Nejiko to Kamikazego no Otokotachi (Bunshunbunko, 1985), 124.

23Shortly after its formation, the association convoked a conferenceShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 39.

24Whenever a notice from the distribution center: David J. Lu, Japan: A Documentary History (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 448.

25In a meeting the day before the pact was signed: “Sumitsuin Honkaigi Giji Gaiyo” (September 26, 1940), B1-176 (KK24-5), 2-3, at http://d-arch.ide.go.jp/kishi_collection/b1.html.

26But Ishii could not dissuade Konoe: “Matsumoto Joyaku Kyokucho ‘Nichidokui Sangokujoyaku ni kansuru Sumitsuin Shinsaiinkai Giji Gaiyo’ ” (September 26, 1940), B1-173 (KK24-5), 38, at ibid.

27Konoe followed up on his swaggering posture: Toyoda Jo, Matsuoka Yosuke: Higeki no Gaikokan (2) (Shincho Bunko, 1983), 362.

28Apparently flustered upon reading the telegram: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 53.

29According to Kido’s journal entry: Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi Nikki (2) (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan, 1980), 870.

30Resources in the Dutch East Indies had to be gained: Boeicho Boeikenshusho Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho: Daihon’ei Rikugunbu, Daitoa Senso Kaisen Keii (4) (Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1974), 110; Osugi Kazuo, Shinjuwan e no Michi: Kaisen, Hisen Kokonotsu no Sentakushi (Kodansha, 2003), 221.

CHAPTER 2  ·  THE RETURN OF DON QUIXOTE

1Courtesy of Joseph Stalin: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 190–91.

2All railway stations in Berlin had been adorned: Saionji, Kizoku no Taijo, 82.

3“To shake hands with Germany is”: Kase Toshikazu, Senso to Gaiko (2) (Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1975), 104.

4He was one of the rare people: Hitler’s translator Paul Schmidt to Matsuoka’s secretary, quoted in Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 433.

5His Oregon classmates were impressed: Toyoda Jo, Matsuoka Yosuke: Higeki no Gaikokan (1) (Shincho Bunko, 1983), 106.

6In his fifties, he would revisit the place of his adolescence: James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 419.

7On the podium, Matsuoka abandoned his prepared text: Stewart Brown, “Japan Stuns World, Withdraws from League,” United Press, February 24, 1933.

8Reporting from Geneva, the United Press correspondent described: Ibid.

9“Currently, no one sees the significance of it”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (1), 538–49.

10The same assistant also revealed: Ibid., 24–25.

11On that fateful day when Matsuoka announced: Brown, “Japan Stuns World.”

12For about a year afterward, he traveled: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 181.

13“I don’t think that party politics is the only way”: Ibid., 182.

14As the president of the South Manchurian Railway: Hayasaka Takashi, Shikikan no Ketsudan: Manshu to Attsu no Shogun Higuchi Kiichiro (Bungei Shinsho, 2010), 131–49.

15“Diplomacy is power, my dear young man”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 190–91.

16“You must really support Prince Konoe”: Ibid., 70–71.

17“You see, I am an Asian”: Ibid., 197.

18When Japanese and Soviet delegates took turns: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 35.

19“Matsuoka is an able man!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 234.

20According to a journalist who accompanied Matsuoka: Ibid., 236.

21When he first heard about the Draft Understanding: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 105.

22He was convinced that the proposal: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 46.

23But most of those in the room: “Dai 21-kai Renraku Kondankai,” April 22, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), ed. Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo, Shimada Toshihiko, and Tsunoda Jun (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1988), 410–11.

24Nomura kept apologizing: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:411.

25On April 16, Hull asked Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:407.

26In early May, he complained to a Foreign Ministry official: Tajiri Akiyoshi, quoted in Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 514.

27One of the more conspicuous changes involved: “Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State,” May 12, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:420–25.

28When he had just returned from the United States: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (1), 107–8.

29When Hull complained to Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 11, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:416.

30Hull murmured to himself: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 257.

31For instance, Hull had said he could negotiate: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:407.

32But in a personal exchange with Nomura: Ibid., 409.

33As one army officer on the general staff: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 400.

CHAPTER 3  ·  THE BEGINNING OF IT ALL

1His lesser-known Un Bal à Yeddo: Julia Meech-Pekarik, The World of the Meiji Print: Impressions of a New Civilization (New York: Weatherhill, 1986), 149.

2Okura Kihachiro, an eccentric: Ibid., 154.

3“We are your Supreme Commander-in-Chief”: Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 705–6.

4Erwin von Bälz, a German physician: Jansen, “Monarchy and Modernization in Japan,” 614.

5In the words of one historian: Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 619–20.

CHAPTER 4  ·  THE SOLDIER’S DILEMMAS

1This was true even in an all-boys preparatory school: Masuda Masao, “Senjika no Morioka Chugaku,” http://morioka-times.com/topics/bungei/senjika/senji2.html.

2Fuchida Mitsuo, a bomber pilot: Fuchida Mitsuo, Shinjuwan Kogeki Sotaicho no Kaiso: Fuchida Mitsuo Jijoden (Kodansha, 2007), 20–22.

3“Japanese victories stirred up my enthusiasm”: Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography: With Musings on Recent Events in India (London: John Lane, 1939), 16.

4“I entered the navy with the great ambition”: Yamamoto Yoshimasa, Chichi, Yamamoto Isoroku (Kobunsha, 2001), 21.

5When he first started playing catch: Ibid., 22–23.

6In the black leather-bound pocket agenda: Ibid., 125–30.

7Whenever young Japanese asked him: Ibid., 25.

8Knowing that the supreme commander: Sheldon Garon, State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 158.

9“Had the government resigned”: Hayashi Kyujiro, Manshujihen to Hoten Soryoji (Hara Shobo, 1978), 145–46.

10Yonai kept Japan from the unseemly alliance: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 162.

11“The historically isolationist United States”: Hando Kazutoshi, Shikikan to Sanbo (Bunshun Bunko, 1992), 109.

12When Yamamoto heard the news: Ibid., 131.

13When Grew wrote to Hull: “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” January 27, 1941, 711.94, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:133.

14In early February 1941: Genda Minoru, Shinjuwansakusen Kaikoroku (Bunshun Bunko, 1998), 11–23.

CHAPTER 5  ·  GOOD RIDDANCE, GOOD FRIENDS

1Throughout the performance, Kase Toshikazu: Kase, Senso to Gaiko (2), 45.

2When news of the German offensive: Ibid., 44.

3“Do you really think we can”: Inose Naoki, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen (Bunshun Bunko, 1986), 181.

4“Matsuoka has been likely bribed by Hitler”Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, ed. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller (Bunshun Bunko, 2010), 67.

5“I would if I were”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 33.

6“Germany and Italy have been preparing”: “Dai 21-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 3, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 412.

7“Roosevelt is keen to go to war”: “Dai 22-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 8, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 415; emphasis added.

8Hull summarily dismissed it: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” May 7, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:412.

9On April 16, the day Washington decided: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” April 16, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:406.

10The Roosevelt administration had predicated: “Informal Conversations Between the Governments of the United States and Japan, 1941,” May 19, 1942, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:328.

11While commending the earnest efforts: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” June 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:485–86.

12“Heroes change their minds decisively”: “Dai 36-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 460.

13Then, in a meeting with the Soviet ambassadorKase Toshikazu Kaisoroku (1) (Yamate Shobo, 1986), 179.

14The next day, June 15, 1941: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 142–43.

15“People these days”: Ibid., 145.

16“I have taken occasion to speak to you”: Winston S. Churchill, “The Fourth Climacteric,” June 22, 1941, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/809-the-fourth-climacteric.

17Roosevelt felt the same: Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World1940–1941 (New York: Penguin, 2008), 302–4.

18When Nomura called on Hull: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” June 22, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:493.

CHAPTER 6  ·  JAPAN’S NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM

1On June 23, 1941, the day after Germany attackedDoitsu no tai Sobieto Senso ni kakawaru Nihonseifu no Tachiba ni tsuiteno Joho wo Hokoku seyo,” June 23, 1941, no. 6058/6897, in Shimotomai Nobuo and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu (Kadokawa Shoten, 1992), 321.

2His mission, as he once summed it up: Richard Sorge, “Zoruge no Shuki (2),” October 1941, in Gendaishishiryo (1) (Misuzu Shobo, 1962), 180.

3Sorge efficiently recruited members: “Zoruge wo Chushin toseru Kokusaichobodan Jiken,” in Gendaishishiryo (1), 4–21.

4He recalled that his close contact: Ozaki Hotsumi, “Ozaki Hotsumi no Shuki (1),” June 1943, in Gendaishishiryo (2) (Misuzu Shobo, 1962), 5.

5He said that Shanghai: Ibid., 8.

6Sorge described their relationship: Sorge, “Zoruge no Shuki (2),” 160.

7“Those people [Smedley and Sorge] were”: Ozaki, “Ozaki Hotsumi no Shuki (1),” 8.

8When Guillain caught sight: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 162–63.

9Ozaki later said that he had associated: Ozaki, “Shuki (1),” 12–13.

10If, for example, one division or section: Hatano Sumio, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan (Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991), 24.

11The navy, too, had its middle-ranking hawks: Hando, Shikikan to Sanbo, 101.

12Ishikawa would later boast: Yoshida Toshio, Kaigun Sanbo (Bunshun Bunko, 1993), 293.

13The navy’s chief of staff, Nagano Osami, summarizedThe Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, ed. James William Morley, trans. David A. Titus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 109.

14Five decades later, Ishii Akiho, a bakuryo officer: Ishii Akiho, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.

15“This matter requires speedy action”: “Dai 32-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 445–46.

16Vice Army Chief Tsukada became adamant: “Dai 33-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 26, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 456.

17“You are telling me that we ought to”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 157–59.

18He became uncharacteristically inarticulate: “Dai 33-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 26, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 456.

19He said he understood the broad strategic logic: “Dai 34-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 27, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 457.

20“My foretelling for the near future”: “Dai 36-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 460.

21“Why not postpone [the southern Indochinese takeover]”: Ibid.

22“Imperial conferences,” Hirohito once saidShowa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 56.

23On July 2, the greatest concern for HaraThe Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 128.

24“Going to [occupy] Thailand or Indochina requires”: “Dai 25-kai Renraku Kondankai,” May 22, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 418.

25Sawamoto Yorio, the vice navy minister: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 101.

26He said to the leaders: “Gozen Kaigi,” July 2, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 464–66. All the following quotations from this conference are from the same source.

27When the proposal was introduced: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 277.

28He later recalled: “Dai 43-kai Jinmon Chosho,” March 17, 1942, in Gendaishishiryo (1), 287.

29Sorge noted: “Dai 41-kai Jinmon Chosho,” March 11, 1942, in Gendaishishiryo (1), 275.

30Sorge knew which one to trust: Communication Nos. 163, 165, 166, and 167, July 10, 1941, in Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 322; emphasis in the original.

31“Are we really ready”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 102.

CHAPTER 7  ·  A QUIET CRISIS IN JULY

1The nation was informedShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 73.

2He remarked to Secretary of the Interior: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 300.

3Matsuoka, understandably, was upset: “Dai 38-kai Renraku Kondankai,” July 10, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 471.

4“Hull’s oral statement should in fact”: “Dai 39-kai Renraku Kondankai,” July 12, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 472–74. All the following quotes from this conference are taken from this source, unless indicated otherwise.

5“Why are you military men”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 538.

6The novelist Nogami Yaeko speculatedShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 76.

7As usual, Kafu was more perspicacious: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 147.

8Visiting Toyoda before Japan’s formal announcement: “Joho Kokan Yoshi,” July 26, 1940, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 484.

9In a liaison meeting on July 24: “Dai 41-kai Renraku Kaigi,” July 24, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 488.

10The next day’s log definitively repeated: Hatano, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan, 117.

11“We had no inkling that the United States would”: Takada Toshitane, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.

12According to Welles, he then made: “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State,” July 24, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:529.

13He immediately went to see Toyoda: “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” July 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:535.

14He “fully recognized”: Ibid., 536.

15As far as the existing records show: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 315.

16He said he tried: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 71.

17But rather than suggesting a Japanese withdrawal: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 895–96.

CHAPTER 8  ·  “MEET ME IN JUNEAU”

1Ishii Hanako, a woman with luminous, feline eyes: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 166–67.

2On the day Germany opened fire on the Soviet Union: Ibid., 159–60.

3But doubt persisted among some observers: “Josei no Suii ni tomonau Teikoku Kokusaku Yoko,” July 2, 1941, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 467.

4Konoe responded to Arita on August 3: Correspondence, August 3, 1941, Kensei Shiryoshitsu Shushu Monjo, no. 1159, National Diet Library.

5The Republican administration, maintaining that: Kate Zernike, “Senators Begin Debate on Iraq, Visions in Sharp Contrast,” New York Times, June 22, 2006.

6“The ‘war’ that’s mentioned in the July 2 policy”: Hatano, Bakuryotachi no Shinjuwan, 118.

7A collector of rumors: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 144.

8On July 26, he wrote to one of his most trusted advisers: Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, July 26, 1941, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/PSF/BOX3/T32D01.HTML.

9Army Minister Tojo’s support was more qualified: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 320.

10Foreign Minister Toyoda, without referring to the specifics: Toyoda to Nomura, telegram 162, August 12, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 162.

11From August 9 to 12, the U.S. cruiser Augusta: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 315–17.

12They were greatly influenced by the positive view: Ibid., 308.

13Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark: Ibid., 304.

14Hull reported that Nomura: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” August 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:554–55.

15The president responded in even broader terms: “Oral Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” August 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:556–57.

16Over the meal, Ozaki asked: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 231.

17“I have made a big mistake”: Ibid., 208.

18The original English text: “The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt,” August 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:573.

19Roosevelt complimented: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” August 28, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:571.

20The ambassador was encouraged because: Ibid., 572.

21He described the likely composition: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” August 28, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:576–78. All the following quotations from the meeting are from this source.

CHAPTER 9  ·  AN UNWINNABLE, INEVITABLE WAR

1The institute was opened in April 1941: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 45. Originally published in 1983, this book includes interviews conducted with surviving members of the institute.

2He responded with due deference: Ibid., 76–78.

3The guidelines presented to the researchers: Ibid., 119.

4His own ministry’s War Economy Research Office: Akimaru Jiro, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.

5“This is, after all, a desktop exercise”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 193–94.

6The instructor Horiba Kazuo, an army man: Ibid., 122.

7Kafu noted that Okubo was rumored: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 118.

8The president, now echoing Hull: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” September 3, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:588–89.

9But Konoe took heart: “President Roosevelt’s Reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” September 3, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:592.

10Though the countries they led: The characterizations of Roosevelt are from Steven Casey, “Franklin D. Roosevelt,” in Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars, ed. Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 217–18.

11An August 29 journal entry by an officer: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 145–46.

12“What idiots they are in Washington!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 331.

13Ishii believed the likely sequence: Ibid., 331–32.

14“The empire is getting skinnier”: “Dai 50-kai Renraku Kaigi,” September 3, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 507-8. All quotations from this conference are from this source.

15“Tomita [the chief cabinet secretary] should have coordinated”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 211.

16. “That would be impossible”: Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, ed. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller (Bunshun Bunko, 2010), 74.

17Displaying the incisiveness: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 86–87.

18“I speak broadly on behalf”: Ibid., 87.

19He asked Nagano the same question: Hando, Shikikan to Sanbo, 122.

20The emperor recited: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 87.

21Afterward, Grew wrote a lengthy report: “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew),” September 6, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:604–6.

CHAPTER 10  ·  ONE LAST OPPORTUNITY

1“The United States in the end demands”: Quoted in Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 346–47.

2But instead, he told Sugiyama: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 170.

3The navy also intensified its preparations: Ibid., 170–71.

4When Germany invaded Denmark: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 312.

5By sending professional soldiers: Ibid., 313.

6The Greer, a U.S. destroyer: Ibid., 319.

7“This was piracy”: Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fireside Chat 18: On the Greer Incident,” September 11, 1941, http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3323.

8Roosevelt had confirmed his oratorical genius: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 322–24.

9After hearing from Sorge: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 220.

10Hull replied that this proposal: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” September 10, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:613–14.

11The banker and amateur diplomat: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 349.

12Negotiating a U.S.-Japanese understanding without settling: “Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles),” October 13, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:685.

13If Konoe had proposed: Matsumoto Shigeharu, Konoe Jidai: Janarisuto no Kaiso (2) (Chuko Bunko, 1987), 200; emphasis added.

14He sent a telegram to Tokyo: Nomura to Toyoda, telegram 865, September 28, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo (Hara Shobo, 1978), part 1, 320.

15“The general staff is an organ”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 351.

16That evening, Saionji and Ozaki dined: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 236.

17Unlike most others, they could stillShowa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 55.

18“The timing of the opening of war”: “Dai 55-kai Renraku Kaigi,” September 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 528–29.

19bakuryo officer in the War Guidance Office: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 172–73.

20“If the military insists on the October 15 deadline”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 909.

21“You are the one who called”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 174.

22In a lengthy eleven-point communication: “The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State,” September 29, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:649.

23He suggested as much in a carefully cushioned double-negative supposition: Ibid., 650.

24Grew, aware of this, insisted: Ibid., 647.

25“If the United States continues to deliberately misread”: Toyoda, Matsuoka Yosuke (2), 362.

26True, in trying to oust Matsuoka: “Dai 32-kai Renraku Kondankai,” June 25, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 446.

27A fanatical believer in Japan’s inherent greatness: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 553.

28“The likely prospect might be war”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 177.

29Hence his assessment to Nagano: Ibid., 187.

30Oikawa responded: Ibid., 182.

31He was handed a statement urging Japan: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),” October 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:658.

32Hull then asked Japan to present: Ibid., 660.

33Most emphatically, there would be no summit: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” October 2, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:655.

34. Nomura was repeatedly: Ibid.

35. Nomura was also told: Ibid., 656.

36Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama warned: “Dai 57-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 4, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 530.

37In January 1946, in a roundtable discussion: Excerpts of the conference are quoted in Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 183–86.

38On October 5, the navy held a top-level meeting: Ibid., 190.

39The October 5 entry of the War Guidance Office journal: Ibid., 188.

40“The United States demands us to leave”: Ibid., 189.

41They agreed that the Army General Staff should: Ibid., 191–92.

42According to Vice Minister Sawamoto, Oikawa was: Ibid.

43The army’s War Guidance Office log: Ibid., 190–91.

44The navy’s unusually frank admissionThe Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 213.

45In a cabinet meeting, Tojo announced: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 360.

46Oikawa replied: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 197.

47But even he could not help occasionally: Ibid., 193–94.

48“We absolutely cannot do that”: Ibid., 198–200. All the following quotes from this meeting are taken from this source, unless otherwise indicated.

49Jumping into the abyss was: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 94.

50“We’ve lost tens of thousands of lives”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 365.

51In early October, the commander in chief of Japanese forces: Ibid., 367.

52Hull’s damning postwar assessment: Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 2:1054.

53“We must continue to seek a diplomatic settlement”: “Gosho Kaigi,” October 12, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 531–33.

54“It’s not up to the military to say”: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 203–4.

55“If I am allowed to be brutally frank”: “Gosho Kaigi,” 532.

CHAPTER 11  ·  A SOLDIER TAKES OVER

1“The fall of Xuzhou! The fall of Xuzhou!”: rebroadcast in a television documentary, NHK Supesharu “Nihonjin wa Naze Senso e to Mukattanoka” (3), February 27, 2011.

2“How utterly bizarre”: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 146.

3“But Ambassador Nomura is an able man”: Shimotomai and NHK Shuzaihan, Kokusai Supai Zoruge no Shinjitsu, 223–24.

4Now, for a change, Konoe spoke: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 212.

5“I believe the prime minister’s argument”: Konoe, Heiwa e no Doryoku, 95–96.

6The speech went as follows: “Kakugi ni okeru Rikugun Daijin Setsumei no Yoshi,” October 14, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 533–34.

7Tojo, going right against the theatrical, hard-hitting prowar tone: “Rikugun Daijin Setsumeigo Kyuchu ni Okeru Kido, Tojo Kaidan Yoshi,” October 14, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 535.

8“The navy minister doesn’t say”: Ibid.

9“I’ve got some awful news!”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 220.

10One day in early October, Kafu chatted: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 153–54.

11“Minister, you cornered Prince Konoe”: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 85–87.

12Hirohito covered for his subject’s embarrassing silence: Ibid., 87.

13“No pain, no gain, wouldn’t you say?”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 918.

14“I gather that you [Tojo] have now received”: Ibid., 917.

15“I do not have any problem reexamining the issue”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 388.

16“I have three things to say to you”: Saionji, Saionji Kinkazu Kaikoroku, 217.

CHAPTER 12  ·  WINDING BACK THE CLOCK

1He did not mince his words: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 233–34.

2Nagano, who had commented earlier: “Dai 59-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 23, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 537–38. All of the quotes from this conference are taken from this source.

3In preparing new data to be presented: Nakahara Shigetoshi, television interview, NHK Supesharu: Gozen Kaigi, August 15, 1991.

4Nagano declared: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 246–47.

5When Suzuki was invited to share his views: “Dai 62-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 27, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 539.

6According to its research: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 249.

7These overwhelming figures were: Ibid., 421.

8Later, when he was ninety-three: Inose, Showa Jurokunen Natsu no Haisen, 184.

9So Suzuki simply skated over: “Dai 62-kai Renraku Kaigi,” 539.

10The Army General Staff record of October 27: Ibid., 540.

11“Unless we decide quickly”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 402.

12The War Guidance Office of the Army General Staff noted: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 256.

13They declared at the meeting: “Dai 63-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 28, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 541.

14On the material front: Ibid.

15“Our economy would survive”: “Dai 65-kai Renraku Kaigi,” October 30, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 541–48. All of the other quotes from this conference are taken from this source.

16He was also surprised that the navy had not come: Togo Shigenori, Jidai no Ichimen: Taisen Gaiko no Shuki (Chuko Bunko, 1989), 318–19.

17Shimada confided in Vice Navy Minister: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 402.

CHAPTER 13  ·  ON THE BRINK

1“I intend to take the third route”: “Tojo Rikusho to Sugiyama Socho tono Kaidan Yoshi,” November 11, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 548–49. All of the quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.

2Humiliated, Sugiyama asked Shimada: Gomikawa, Gozen Kaigi, 284.

3He asked the navy leaders impatiently: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 550–51.

4“Well, my dear Yamamoto”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 407.

5Pilots had been superbly trained: Fuchida, Shinjuwan Kogeki Sotaicho no Kaiso, 104–8.

6“Couldn’t the deadline be extended”: “Dai 66-kai Renraku Kaigi,” 551–52.

7He also questioned the chiefs of staff on some technical issuesThe Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 264.

8“If we just stand by with our arms folded”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 413.

9“President Roosevelt is taking advantage”: “Gozen Kaigi,” November 5, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 573.

CHAPTER 14  ·  “NO LAST WORD BETWEEN FRIENDS”

1“There is no last word between friends”: Kurusu Saburo, Homatsu no Sanjugonen (Chuko Bunko, 2007), 88.

2“In this dangerous emergency”: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 331.

3He went on to say that in his estimation: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 26–27. All of the following quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.

4The escalation, in his words, came about: Ibid., 221–22.

5“The negotiations at hand represent”: Togo to Nomura, telegram 725, November 4, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 385.

6The president made no specific references: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 10, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:718.

7When Wakasugi Kaname, the minister-counselor, visited: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 13, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:730–31.

8“If the situation allows”: Nomura to Togo, telegram 1090, November 14, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 428.

9Hull had not accepted: “Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 15, 1941,” in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:734.

10“If we are to work out a peaceful settlement”: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 15, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:732–34.

11On November 16, Togo responded: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 422.

12In Tokyo, Togo had given him: Sato Motoei, “Togo Gaisho wa Nichibei Kaisen wo Soshi Dekita,” Bungei Shunju (March 2009): 313.

13He was dismissive of Kurusu’s: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:740.

14Hull had said in a previous meeting: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 14, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:733.

15Whatever the reason, Hull’s opinion of Kurusu: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 17, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:742–43.

16Looking back in 1948: Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2:1062.

17Tojo’s policy speech in the Diet: See http://cgi2.nhk.or.jp/shogenarchives/jpnews/movie.cgi?das_id=D0001300461_00000&seg_number=002.

18Despite U.S.-German hostilities: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 326.

19Hull impressed on the Japanese envoys: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 18, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:745–50. All of the other quotes from the meeting are taken from this source.

20Kurusu sent a message to Tokyo: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 96–97.

21Walsh congratulated Kurusu on the near completion: Ibid., 98.

22He expressed his view that an agreement: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 19, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:751.

23In Togo’s mind, Nomura’s action was a typical case: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 338.

24“There is absolutely no room for such maneuver”: Togo to Nomura, telegram 798, November 20, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 467.

CHAPTER 15  ·  THE HULL NOTE

1Togo had prohibited its immediate use: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 105.

2Thus he presented Hull with his personal note: “Draft Letter Handed by Mr. Saburo Kurusu to the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:756–57.

3“You came all this way, Ambassador”: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 106.

4“Please, do take care of yourself”: Ibid.

5Hull’s memorandum of his tête-à-tête: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 21, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:756.

6He said that oil purchased by Japan: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 22, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:757.

7Hull wondered why there was: Ibid., 758.

8Why had Japan “pushed everything”: Ibid., 761.

9But there were to be: Togo to Nomura, telegram 812, November 22, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 478–79.

10On the evening of November 25: Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 368–70.

11Hull’s own postwar explanation: Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 2:1081.

12Based on this intercepted communication: Henry Stimson, quoted in notes, Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 558.

13Roosevelt’s secretary of war: Ibid.

14These were crystallized in the third, fourth, and fifth points: “Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan,” November 26, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:769.

15Even though the outline was markedThe Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 313.

16Kurusu expressed his grave fear: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” November 26, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:766.

CHAPTER 16  ·  JUMPING OFF THE HIGH PLATFORM

1“I was struck by despair”: Togo, Jidai no Ichimen, 375.

2For those restlessly itching: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 463.

3Until the arrival of the note: Togo Shigehiko, Sofu Togo Shigenori no Shogai (Bungei Shunju, 1993), 278.

4“This is terribly written indeed!”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 464.

5Yoshida told Togo that whatever the true intentions: Ibid.

6Despite having warned his closest advisers: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 111–12.

7He and his government were grateful: “Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” November 27, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:770–72. All of the quotes from this meeting are taken from this source.

8“They would be ground to powder”: Churchill, The Grand Alliance, 539.

9“If Japan is to join the war”: “Gozen Kaigi,” November 5, 1941, 569–570.

10“Excuse me for speaking my mind”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 481.

11“Is there any time left for diplomacy?”: “Dai 74-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 29, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 592.

12He concluded his message with a plea that: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 121.

13The lord keeper of the privy seal would have none of it: Ibid., 122.

14“The navy cannot afford to fight”: Kido, Kido Koichi Nikki (2), 928.

15“If I did not approve of war, Tojo would resign”Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, 89–90.

16“Naval strategies are everything”: Osugi, Shinjuwan e no Michi, 483.

17Shimada, in order to: Ibid.

18“We aim to demolish the Far Eastern bases”: “Dai 69-kai Renraku Kaigi,” November 15, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 585.

19Finally, Hirohito gave his approval: “Gozen Kaigi,” December 1, 1941, in Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Bekkan), 596.

EPILOGUE  ·  THE NEW BEGINNING

1After he had finished reading: “Memorandum of a Conversation,” December 7, 1941, in U.S. Department of State, Papers, 2:787.

2Before his departure for WashingtonThe Final Confrontation, ed. Morley, 19.

3In a communication from Tokyo on November 28: Togo to Nomura, telegram 844, November 28, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 505–6.

4Togo’s exact words read: Togo to Nomura, telegram 878, December 3, 1941, in Gaimusho, Nichibei Kosho Shiryo, part 1, 530.

5That Kurusu and Nomura delivered the message: For a critical exploration of the debate, see Takeo Iguchi, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Japanese Perspective, trans. David Noble (International House of Japan, 2010).

6Kurusu immediately recalled his interview: Kurusu, Homatsu no Sanjugonen, 164.

7“Which one’s Kurusu?”: Ibid., 139.

8“I want to leave something more tangible”: Ibid., 211.

9Prince Takamatsu, more straightforward: Ibid., 167.

10At the prime minister’s luncheon: Ibid.

11“Sponge cakes, dumplings, pastries”Showa Nimannichi no Zenkiroku (6), 336.

12“We must be losing the war”: Iijima, “Growing Up in Old Japan,” 20.

13And this pattern was perpetuated: Nagai, Tekiroku Danchotei Nichijo (2), 143.

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