CHAPTER 11

Hitler's Last Gamble

"The enemy is at present fighting a defensive campaign on all fronts; his situation is such that he cannot stage major offensive operations. Furthermore, at all costs he has to prevent the war from entering a mobile phase; he has not the transport or the petrol that would be necessary for mobile operations, nor could his tanks compete with ours in the mobile battle."

-British 21st Army Group appreciation, 15 December 1944

y early December, Hitler had assembled twenty-eight divisions for his Ardennes offensive, Operation Wacht am Rhein ("Watch on the Rhine"). This was the largest reserve Germany had been able to accumulate in two years, albeit much weaker than the strike force available when German troops had rolled through the same area in 1940. Factories and repair shops, working furiously, had supplied 1,349 tanks and assault guns in November, and another 950 were delivered in December.' Troops below the level of officers and NCOs, however, often were new to battle.

Delivered to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt complete to the last detail with "NOT TO BE ALTERED" scrawled across it in the Fiihrer's own handwriting, Hitler's plan called for a three-pronged offensive along a seventy-five-mile front between Monschau and Echternach.2 In the north, the Sixth SS Panzer Army was to strike to and then across the Meuse River before heading northwest for Antwerp. In the center, the Fifth Panzer Army was to attack through Namur and Dinant toward Brussels. The German Seventh Army was to reel out a line of infantry divisions to protect the southern flank of the operation.

Despite elaborate German safeguards, Allied intelligence picked up many signs of the build-up but, by and large, dismissed the possibility of a German offensive because of a false preconception: such an attack would be doomed to defeat and therefore irrational to undertake. Hitler was rolling the dice in a bigger game. He hoped that he could drive a wedge deep enough in the Allied camp to induce his enemies to come to terms rather than insist on unconditional surrender.

At its greatest penetration, the Bulge extended sixty miles deep and forty miles wide. By the end of the six-week battle, 600,000 American troops had fought 550,000 Germans. For the most part, the fighting did not turn on the well-planned movements of large formations. Instead, much of it unfolded at the level of small units and individuals-what generals and commentators at the time described as "fluid."3 In a sense, it was the war with which infantry tankers were well familiar.

ABSORBING THE BLOW: THE STORY OF THREE TANK BATTALIONS

Three separate tank battalions, two of them D-Day veterans, were in the thinly held Ardennes sector when Wacht am Rhein blasted out of the fog on 16 December. By the end of the month, another dozen would arrive as the Allies scrambled to block the expansion of the Bulge and lay the groundwork for its annihilation. Most of these battalions were by now experienced outfits with battle-hardened men. The tankers had learned their lessons and paid their tuition in blood. Now they were ready to teach the Germans a thing or two.

Facing the Sixth SS Panzer Army, the 741st Tank Battalion was split between two divisions on the northern shoulder of the German attack zone. The battalion itself was attached to the 2d Infantry Division, but one platoon-expanded to Companies C and D on 16 December-was attached to the neighboring 99th Infantry Division. In the center and directly in the path of the Fifth Panzer Army, the 707th Tank Battalion and 28th Infantry Division were recovering from the trauma of the failed operation at Schmidt the previous month. On the southern shoulder facing the German Seventh Army, the 70th Tank Battalion and 4th Infantry Division were also recuperating from the battering they had suffered in the Hurtgen Forest. The one other infantry division in the line, the untested 106th, was supported by Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division.

Locked and Loaded

The 741st Tank Battalion was supporting offensive operations toward the Roer River dams by the 2d Infantry Division near Wahlerscheid, Germany, when the Sixth SS Panzer Army struck, so the battalion was well prepared for battle.4 The I SS Panzer Corps' plan of attack foresaw three infantry divisions breaking the American lines and opening the road net for the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstan- darte and the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend ("Hitler Youth"), which were to dash for the Meuse River.

The 277th Volksgrenadier Division was to open the path for the Hitler Youth in the Losheimergraben area. The 277th Division had been fighting in the Hiirtgen Forest and was battle seasoned, but it was rated fit just for defensive operations, and only several companies had been trained for offensive operations in smallscale counterattacks. The division's orders were to clear roads through the forest from Hollerath and Udenbreth to the so-called twin villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath and then to capture them.

The 12th SS Panzer Division's main strike force was the 12th Panzer Regiment, which consisted of the 1st Battalion outfitted with Panthers and Mark IVs, and the army's 560th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was equipped with a mix of Jagdpanther tank destroyers mounting an 88-millimeter gun and Jagdpanzer IVs, which carried a long-barreled 75-millimeter gun. The division also fielded a tank destroyer battalion armed with Jagdpanzer IVs. The 25th and 26th Panzergrenadier Regiments provided the division's infantry strength.

The division had been badly chewed up during the summer and fall, and it had been rebuilding inside Germany. When the division's commander, SS Lt. Gen. Hugo Kraas, received his orders for the Ardennes offensive, he informed the High Command that his mostly inexperienced men were not up to the tasks they had been assigned. The young volunteer replacements he had received had undergone very short training, a problem particularly acute among the ranks of the panzergrenadiers. The panzer crews, at least, were mostly seasoned, but fuel shortages had prevented any field training for the infantry with tanks.'

The 277th Volksgrenadier Division attacked toward the twin villages as planned before dawn on 16 December, but even with the commitment of its reserve regiment, it made scarcely any progress against a stiff defense mounted by the U.S. 99th Division's 393d Infantry. About mid-afternoon, the I SS Panzer Corps ordered the 12th SS Panzer Division to commit a reinforced battalion along the road toward Krinkelt to support the 991st Infantry Regiment, which it subordinated to the SS division. Nevertheless, by evening, only the 989th Infantry Regiment had gained much ground into the forest-at a high cost in men. The task of taking the twin villages was turned over to the 12th SS Panzer Division, and the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, minus the 991st Infantry Regiment, was ordered to reorganize 6

While the battle raged in the forest, the 741st Tank Battalion spent the day responding to initial reports of the German offensive. At 1520 hours, the 2d Infantry Division requested that the battalion deploy two platoons of Company A to critical points held by the 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment. At 1724, Division instructed that all of Company C was to operate with the 99th Infantry Division under formal attachment to the 2d Infantry Division's 23d Infantry Regiment. At 2030, Company D was ordered to proceed to Camp Elsenborn to join Company B of the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion. At 2249, Company B and the remaining platoon of Company A were alerted and sent to the area north of Rocherath, where they were to constitute the division reserve.

On 17 December, the 741st Tank Battalion met the full force of the 12th SS Panzer Division attack in the fiercest armor battle experienced by a separate tank battalion during the war. The fight proved that battle-savvy American tankers-all still operating the 75-millimeter Sherman-could take on and beat concentrated German armor, particularly when they enjoyed the advantages of being on the defensive.7

Maj. Gen. Walter Robertson, who commanded the 2d Division, learned from the V Corps at 0730 on 17 December that the Germans had broken through the 99th Division on his right and threatened the rear of his own division. He was ordered to withdraw from the Wahlerscheid area, adjacent to the Siegfried Line, where his assistant division commander, Col. John Stokes, already was working to extricate the 38th Infantry Regiment. The sole escape route for the 2d and 99th Infantry Divisions ran westward through the twin villages and Wirtzfeld and then along a trail to Elsenborn Ridge, which made Krinkelt and Rocherath critical to both sides. Robertson was then to form a defensive line along Elsenborn Ridge, which ran like a wall along the northern shoulder of the German route of advance.

Robertson ordered the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments to pull back; instructed Stokes to take command of units in Rocherath and Krinkelt; and dispatched the 2d Battalion of the 23d infantry, a company of tank destroyers, and a company of medium tanks to Rocherath, Krinkelt, and Wirtzfeld. Only four tanks and three tank destroyers showed up to meet the infantry, and a company of doughboys climbed aboard. The GIs perched atop the back decks of the tanks and tank destroyers as the column churned southward from Sourbrodt.

About 1100 hours, the tanks or tank destroyers (both groups claim the kills) sent by Robertson knocked out three Mark IVs near Wirtzfeld, where earlier in the day panzers and panzergrenadiers had threatened the 2d Division's command post from the south but had been dispersed by antitank guns and tank destroyers already located there. This apparently had been a flank guard of the 1st SS Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe Peiper, and the Germans shied away from Wirtzfeld after encountering sharp resistance there. The American column halted here and set up defensive positions south of Wirtzfeld. Fortunately, by 0825 hours, four platoons from the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion had arrived in Krinkelt, where German troops had begun to infiltrate about 0950, to provide the infantry some means of antitank defense.

As the 38th Infantry Regiment moved south toward Krinkelt and Rocherath, so did the rest of the 741st Tank Battalion. The battalion had been stripped of its light tanks, which were sent to the 1st Infantry Division. With panzers and panzergrenadiers reported massing in Bullingen, all tanks available were instructed to report to the 38th Infantry in the vicinity of Krinkelt. The battalion spread its medium tanks in a rough arc east and south of the twin villages.

As one platoon from Company A and two from Company B moved southwest of Rocherath to a crest overlooking the road to Bullingen, the tanks ran into German armored reconnaissance elements and destroyed an armored car and a half-track. Arriving at the crest, the tanks found defiladed positions and settled down to watch for panzers.

Lt. Victor Miller, a recently arrived replacement platoon commander, led his platoon of Company C to the positions of the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, northeast of Rocherath. A second Company A platoon deployed southeast of Krinkelt; this platoon stayed in place only for several hours before it was pulled back to guard the road from Krinkelt to Wirtzfeld.

Inside Rocherath, every available man was thrown into hasty defenses erected around the tank battalion's command post. The infantry was preparing the bridges on the road to Elsenborn for demolition, which was definitely not a good sign. The twin villages, which merged into one community about the point of the shared church, offered a promising spot for a defender. The villages sat on high ground overlooking the approaches from the south and west, though the terrain was flatter and rolling toward the forest to the east. The streets formed a spider web in which a tank or a man with a bazooka could get the draw on an enemy, and stout houses offered shelter and second-story perches for gunmen.

At midday, the 741st Tank Battalion's S-3 recorded that the situation was developing favorably as American troops recaptured Bullingen, which the 1st SS Panzer Division left ungarrisoned as it drove westward. By the middle of the afternoon, reports were pouring into the 741st Tank Battalion's command post of heavy German tanks supported by infantry approaching from several directions. As the battalion's records dryly state, there was "much shifting of tanks" in order to meet anticipated enemy attacks.

Lt. Joseph Dew and his platoon sat in defensive positions on the northeastern perimeter of Rocherath. The weather was cold and bleak, and eighteen inches of snow blanketed the ground. As frantic messages inundated the radio net, Dew knew that as of 1450 hours, Lt. Victor Miller was engaging Panther tanks a couple thousand yards east of town.'

The 991st Infantry Regiment, still attached to the 12th SS Panzer Division, had fought its way nearly to the edge of the woods outside Krinkelt by daylight on 17 December, and at 0600 hours, it assembled for its first attack on the objective.' Holding the last stretch of woods before the village was the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment. Company I, commanded by Capt. Charles MacDonald, held the trail running toward the twin villages, supported by two of Miller's tanks. Withdrawing soldiers from the 393d Infantry told MacDonald's men that panzers had joined the attack, and it took little imagination to realize they would soon be coming this way.

At about 1100 hours, they did, along with a passel of infantry. Miller told MacDonald he was pulling his two Shermans back to take up better firing positions. Fortunately, the first German attacks were mounted by the foot troops without any artillery or tank support, and they were thrown back. Eventually, however, five Panthers moved forward.

The panzers commenced pounding and driving back Company I, approaching within a few feet of dug in positions and firing directly into foxholes. MacDonald called for Miller's tanks, but they had fallen back all the way to a crossroads at the edge of the forest, and the 3d Battalion's commanding officer agreed with Miller's assessment that the Panthers would make mincemeat of the Shermans. By afternoon, the GIs were running low on antitank munitions and were falling back.

Miller called the 741st Tank Battalion command post for help against three approaching panzers but was told that he was on his own. The Panthers approached the road junction. "There," MacDonald recorded, "the two Shermans ... gave battle."

Soon both Shermans and the lives of Miller and most of the crewmen had been lost, but they had exacted a steep price: two of the hulking panzers were burning, too. Staff Sergeant Crisler assumed command of the platoon on Miller's death and advanced to the spot of the firelight, where he could see the two pairs of knocked-out tanks. Crisler spotted a third Panther and destroyed it while the infantry fell back toward the twin villages."

As darkness approached, the 38th Infantry aligned its 3d Battalion on the ground overlooking the slopes to the south and southeast of the twin villages, while the 2d Battalion, strengthened by a company from the otherwise disintegrating 3d Battalion of the 23d Infantry, formed the left wing northeast of Rocherath. The 1st Battalion, which was badly shot up by artillery while still on the road, was in poor shape when it took up the center of the regiment's line facing generally eastward. The regiment failed to establish contact with a battalion of the 9th Infantry that was supposed to be to its right."

Panzers were on the prowl. That night, Jagdpanzer IVs and infantry attacked from the east and drove Companies B and C of the 38th Infantry, which had not had time to dig in or deploy heavy weapons, out of their positions. At least two jagdpanzers with grenadiers riding on the decks drove toward the church across the street from the 1st Battalion's command post. Regiment denied a battalion request for tank support.12

It appears that a second group of five panzers and panzergrenadiers simultaneously penetrated Rocherath from the south and headed for the church. At about 2100 hours, the SS troops approached the positions of the 3d Battalion's Company K not far from the church. Lt. Col. Olinto Barsanti had ordered his men not to shoot without positive identification because 99th Division troops were still believed to be pulling back through his line.13

Sergeant Dixon's tank, belonging to the 2d Platoon of Company B, was part of a roadblock on the edge of town. Dixon spotted the silhouette of an approaching tank. His gunner was already traversing the turret and the loader hefting a shell when a GI called out not to fire because those were American tank destroyers and infantry withdrawing into town. Seconds later, the tank reached the intersection, and Dixon saw it was German. He saw more panzers behind it and realized it was wisest not to fire because the Americans were outnumbered. The lead Panther and some grenadiers passed by the roadblock into town and penetrated to within 150 yards of the 741st Tank Battalion's command post in Rocherath. Other German infantry set up a machine gun beside the road and sprayed the area of the roadblock. With bullets bouncing off the turret, Dixon pulled his tank back.14

Men in the tank battalion command post could hear German voices, but the enemy moved off. At the command post, Lt. Turner Sheppard gathered tankers who had lost their mounts to form a guard and to spell crews in nearby tanks so they could get some sleep. At 2120 hours, the 3d Battalion's Company K reported that a panzer was firing on it at point-blank range in the vicinity of the church, where its line tied in to that of the 1st Battalion. At 2130 hours, Company K reported that it was being shelled and that tanks and infantry were advancing against it from the east.

By 2145 hours, German troops had reached the 3d Battalion's command post, and a panzer-from which group is unclear-was firing at it with its main gun after having unsuccessfully tried to ram through the wall. Company K called down artillery that destroyed one Panther, and a bazooka team knocked out another. After a forty-five-minute fight, the remaining panzers retreated with the grenadiers, less fifty-two SS men whose corpses Company K counted after the engagement. The attacks at the church had driven a hole between the 1st and 3d Battalions, and the latter was reported disorganized and of doubtful combat value. Companies B and C had retreated all the way to the area of the regimental command post in Rocherath.

Meanwhile, the Jagdpanzer IVs destroyed three Shermans, two from Company A and one from Company B, which were near the church on the highest point of ground. The battalion's after-action report says the tanks were knocked out while on their way to help Company K, but Cpl. Kelly Layman, who was there, tells a different story. The Company B tank was a sitting duck, having run out of fuel. The tankers could hear panzers approaching, and one of the Company A tanks moved out, only to be hit after some fifty yards. The tank caught fire, and the crew bailed out.

The men in the last tank could see the panzer that had done the shooting straight ahead, which seemed like a big problem. An unseen German tank only thirty yards away to the right rear proved to be a bigger one. The Sherman had just backed up ten yards when a 75-millimeter high-explosive round blew off the right track. A second round of high explosive rattled the turret, and when a round slammed through the engine compartment and set the tank on fire, the crew bailed out and ran.

In the midst of the nighttime fight, the headquarters element of the 38th Infantry drove into town, heading for the regimental command post. The column made a left turn and came into full view of a panzer crew, who could see quite well by the light of a burning Sherman. The panzer blasted the lead vehicle, and the headquarters personnel bailed out and crawled to the command post through ditches.

The night of 17 December belonged to the 12th SS Panzer Division, and the I SS Panzer Corps was under the misimpression that the division had taken both of the twin villages. The only incident anyone could recall of shooting a panzer ended in disappointment, as the armor-piercing round bounced off the German armor at a range of only seventy-five yards.15

There was no let-up on 18 December, as three panzers crawled within 100 yards of the 38th Infantry's command post at about 0900 hours. The infantrymen hit two of them with bazookas to no effect, but they finally disabled one Mark V, and M10s from the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion accounted for the other two; the Germans retreated.16

More generally, the day belonged to the 741st Tank Battalion and the other defenders. The tankers' radio net again crackled with furious traffic at 0920 hours. Panzers were grinding into Rocherath down a street approximately 150 yards from the tank battalion command post. Fog and smoke from burning buildings reduced visibility to almost zero." Two deadlined Company B tanks placed in a lane just east of the command post for antitank defense opened fire on the panzers' flanks with devastating effect. When the smoke cleared, these two "disabled" tanks had destroyed five panzers. One surviving German tank continued through town and down the hill on the road to Bullingen, but Sergeants Angelletti and Padgett of Company B maneuvered behind the panzer and destroyed it.

At almost the same moment as the drama near the tank battalion command post, Lieutenant Dew spotted seven enemy tanks advancing toward his position. He ordered his gunner to open fire. Soon one German tank was disabled and four others had been hit, and the enemy withdrew. Dew's crew counted their remaining ammo. They had only four rounds of armor-piercing ammunition left. With visions of six German tanks reappearing, Dew thumbed the radio and reported his plight. Within minutes, crews from other Company C tanks rushed some of their rounds to his position, and the battalion placed a hasty request to the division for three truckloads of ammo-70 percent armor piercing. The battalion called back to Rocherath those of its tanks still scattered in the direction of Bullingen, and by 1100, it had its three medium companies deployed along the edge of the twin villages facing the enemy.

Both the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 38th Infantry reported their command posts to be under tank attack at about the same time. "The fighting was at such close quarters," recalled regimental executive officer Lt. Col. Tom Morris, "that men were throwing hand grenades across the street into buildings that the enemy were occupying opposite to them. Men were captured and recaptured" The 1st Battalion now had some tank support. Shermans from Company B opened up on three Panthers that were menacing the 1st Battalion's command post and destroyed two of them. An infantry officer guided a third Sherman into position 200 yards from a Panther that had been immobilized by a bazooka, and the gunner put a round through the side of the turret. Two other Panthers moved on, and one of them was later knocked out by a Sherman near the 3d Battalion's command post.

Early that afternoon, the Germans came on again, and Dew's crew accounted for two more tanks. But Company C was losing Shermans, too-three that dayand in the confusion, nobody knew how many men from those crews had survived. Major General Robertson, visiting the 38th Infantry's command post, told his assistant division commander by phone at about 1800, "This is a tank battle. If there are any replacements, we could use them as the crews are pretty tired. We could use the [M36 tank destroyers] mounting a 90mm."

At dusk, the tankers were told that they would begin servicing and refueling a few vehicles at a time and would drape bright air-recognition panels across the front armor when pulling back to avoid misidentification. Dew knew that soon his crew would be called out. Shooting and shouting from the forward infantry posi tions snapped him back to watchfulness; it sounded like a tank moving in his direction, and Dew made sure that the gunner had armor-piercing rounds loaded. A dark bulk gradually separated itself from the gloom, and Dew brought his gun to bear and ordered the gunner to open up. Another burning wreck joined his day's tally, but only after Dew's gunner had fired eighteen rounds at it.

Elsewhere in northeast Rocherath, where two Company B platoons had moved, the tankers were surprised by searchlights stabbing out of the dark and seeking their positions. A spotlight fell on a Sherman, and a high-velocity round followed. The lights were mounted on panzers! The Shermans fired up their engines, slammed into gear, and moved to less exposed venues. By now, several buildings nearby were burning, making the task of staying hidden more difficult.

Northeast of the twin villages, the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, with Company K attached, had for two days battled panzers and grenadiers pushing through its positions toward Rocherath. With no tank or tank destroyer support, the GIs had destroyed nearly a dozen panzers during the vicious fighting, which at times played out at ranges of twenty yards, using bazookas, antitank mines, and well-directed artillery barrages. With its companies overrun, the battalion was told to pull back at 1300 hours on 18 December. The commanding officer, Lt. Col. William McKinley, thought it would be impossible because his men were too tightly engaged. That is when a lieutenant from the antitank platoon spotted four Shermans from Company A, 741st Tank Battalion, and asked Lt. Gastano Barcelona, the tank platoon commander, if he would help.

"Hell yes!" replied the tanker, and the infantry lieutenant directed him to the crisis point. McKinley was pleasantly surprised when the tanks arrived, and he quickly sketched out a tank counterattack to cover his men's withdrawal. He knew where four panzers lurked, barring the escape route. He told Barcelona to send two tanks to the right to attract their attention and the other two to the left. The plan worked. The two tanks on the left hit one panzer with three rounds and a second with two. The other two panzers moved off toward Rocherath, and one of the gunners knocked out a third panzer with shots to the rear. The last one "ran like hell" toward the twin villages. The infantry battalion slipped away, reduced in the battle from 600 men to 197 exhausted survivors."

On 19 December, the 12th SS Panzer Division staged one final push before it withdrew its remaining tanks from the twin villages to join a division drive toward Butgenbach. The attack began at 0800 hours supported by a heavy artillery barrage. Sergeant Dixon tangled with some of the last Panthers to enter the narrow streets of Rocherath, as he later recalled:

We found a kraut tank on the opposite side of the building that we were behind. It had two tanks supporting its flanks. To attract the kraut's attention, [Sergeant] Case fired on the left flank from a covered position, while we moved up on the right flank between two buildings, about forty-five yards from the enemy. Corporal Kroeger fired four rounds of AP [armor piercing], which ricocheted off the kraut armor like pebbles falling on a tin roof. Then one of the enemy's supporting tanks fired on us but missed us and hit the building. A piece of shrapnel knocked a hole about the size of a half-dollar in my steel helmet. We immediately backed up and took cover behind a building, and the krauts started an encircling movement on us. We soon found out we were under observation and direct fire from any direction in which we tried to move. We started sweating blood. We called for artillery and additional support, but we thought we'd never get it in time....

The building on our right was in flames, which was to our advantage, as we were hoping for a smoke screen. It finally got fairly thick, and I decided to make a break for it. We took off like a bat out of hell under the cover of smoke. Luckily we reached cover without drawing fire. As we reached cover, the enemy [tank] on our right completed his encirclement by breaking through a stone wall, which put him in direct [line of] fire from Sergeant Mazzio's tank. Mazzio's gunner, Corporal Snike, immediately knocked the tank out, and the situation was relieved entirely. During the excitement, our artillery dropped a round on the turret of a Tiger tank, knocking it out. With the additional support of a Company A tank, the three remaining kraut tanks were knocked out. ...19

At 1440 hours, the division ordered the 741st Battalion's commander, Lt. Col. Robert Skaggs, to withdraw behind Wirtzfeld. The division also put Company C of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion under his command and ordered the armor to act as rear guard to screen the infantry's withdrawal. Skaggs was to destroy all equipment left behind.

Skaggs instructed his companies to ensure protection of the critical Krinkelt- Wirtzfeld road. The tankers fended off German attacks throughout the afternoon and reported the destruction of several more panzers. As if the battalion did not have problems enough, German planes bombed its rear positions at 1600 hours.

At 1810, Dew helped a tank destroyer locate and dispatch yet one more panzer. About two hours later, the rear guard began to extricate itself from Rocherath. At 2030 hours, Company B reported that the last tanks had cleared the town and that the engineers who laid antitank mines behind them were riding the Shermans to safety. The tankers did not withdraw far, and the line held with little flexing in this area.

The 741st Tank Battalion's after-action report recorded:

In the fierce three-day action at Rocherath, tankers of the 741st Tank Battalion proved themselves adept at the art of way-laying and killing Tigers. From well-camouflaged positions, by expert maneuvering and stalking, tank after tank of the enemy forces was destroyed by flank and tail shots of the battalion's gunners. Recapitulation at the end of the encounter showed the battalion as having knocked out twenty-seven enemy tanks, (mostly Mark VIs), one SP [self-propelled] gun, two armored cars, two half-tracks, and two trucks.

In contrast to the number of enemy vehicles destroyed, our tank losses were comparatively small. A total of eight tanks were lost to enemy action.

The recapitulation was a study conducted by the 38th Infantry Regiment's S3, who concluded that seventy-eight German tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed by tanks, tank destroyers, antitank guns, bazookas, and artillery during the period from 17 to 19 December.20

A word about "Tigers" should be added here. In the course of the fighting, tankers, infantrymen, and tank destroyer men repeatedly identified Mark VI Tigers on the German side, and the official U.S. Army history agrees. The 12th SS Panzer Division, however, had no Tigers, only Mark IVs, Panthers, and some Jagdpanther tank killers that, like the Mark VI, mounted the 88-millimeter gun. One must conclude that the American observers were mistaken, though that in no way diminishes the remarkable success of the 741st Tank Battalion.

Amazingly, only eight battalion men died and six were wounded during the furious December fighting.21 The outfit, which had been similarly honored for its heroism on Omaha Beach, received a Presidential Unit Citation for its actions around Rocherath. Equally remarkable, while the 12th SS Panzer Division was throwing itself at the heart of the 2d Division's defenses in the twin villages, the division's flanks had been completely exposed. The 1st Infantry Division's 26th Infantry first closed on the right the afternoon of 18 December, and the arrival of the 9th Infantry Division covered the left on 19 December.22

The lopsided American victory had several causes. The tankers and GIs were combat wise and, on average, far more experienced than the enemy. The twin villages had acted as the spider web that their streets resembled, trapping panzers in vulnerable places where the superior range and killing power of their guns meant little. American artillery support had been available in quantity. Finally, the 12th SS Panzer Division had shown little skill at tank-infantry cooperation, doubtless in part because the members of the team had been unable to conduct field exercises together before the offensive. The panzers and infantry appear to have become separated frequently.

Shattered

Almost everything had gone right for the 741st Tank Battalion-a full swing in the fortunes of war from the battalion's washout on D-Day. But fortune had no such plans for the 707th Tank Battalion, which was now rebuilding after its misadventure at Kommerscheidt.23 The outfit was still training new men and readying replacement equipment. Some of the veterans were on three-day passes.24

Unfortunately, most of the tanks and assault guns in the German Seventh Army and two panzer corps from the Fifth Panzer Army hit the 28th Infantry Divi sion's sector.25 The 28th Division had all three of its regiments in the line to hold its extended front of some thirty miles.

At about 0630 on 16 December, tanks and infantry struck the 110th Infantry, holding in the center of the division's zone along Skyline Drive, and most frontline companies were soon practically surrounded as grenadiers in half-tracks headed toward the regiment's artillery positions. The 26th Volksgrenadier Division had orders to infiltrate around strongpoints, avoid major fights, and head for Clervaux, where the 110th Infantry's headquarters was located. The 2d Panzer Division, attacking to its right, was to charge to Bastogne, and by late afternoon, the first tanks belonging to the Panzer Lehr Division would be across the Our River and fighting on the 26th Volksgrenadier Division's left. The entire 352d Volksgrenadier Division, meanwhile, struck the 109th Infantry Regiment, which held the southern end of the division line, but the volksgrenadiers had no armored support, and the defenders handily repulsed their assaults. On the 28th Division's northern wing, a battalion of infantry from each of the 116th Panzer and 550th Volksgrenadier Divisions-the former supported by seven Panthers-attacked the 112th Infantry Regiment but were driven off.26

The 707th Tank Battalion was in 28th Infantry Division reserve. Assembly areas for direct support of the doughs had been reconnoitered, but no definite assignments to the regiments had been made, so none of the company or platoon commanders had made personal visits to the frontline positions.27 Division alerted the tankers at 0600 hours and reported that the enemy had infiltrated the main line of resistance and attacked at dawn in several sectors. The battalion commander was away, so Maj. R. S. Garner, the executive officer, ordered the battalion to deploy. Garner drove to Clervaux, where the 110th Infantry Regiment's command post was located, and reported to its commander, Col. Hurley Fuller.

Companies A and B were attached to the 110th Infantry Regiment, Company C to the 109th, and Company D to the 112th. The Assault Gun Platoon was tied in with division artillery and ready to fire indirect missions. Fuller ordered Garner to deploy his platoons to reinforce the strongpoints that were still holding out along the front, including the one in Marnach, which lay in the path of the 2d Panzer Division. Two platoons of Company A, one commanded by Lt. Raymond Fleig, set off with a platoon of infantry to fight their way into town. Small-arms fire drove the doughboys to cover in woods along the road, and the tanks rolled right through Marnach without spotting the GIs of Company B and left, much to the dismay of the infantry.

Lt. Richard Payne led his 3d Platoon, Company A, to Hosingen, where he joined Company K, 110th Infantry, in defense of the town, which happened to lie athwart the 2d Panzer Division's intended route of advance and supply line. This small command would hold up the German advance for a critical two days.

Meanwhile, Company B made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Buch- holz, as did Company C in the Diekirch area. Fighting on the first day was mainly against infantry formations, and all 28th Infantry Division strongpoints remained intact when night fell. Only one 707th Battalion tank was temporarily knocked out of action.

Panzers and self-propelled guns belonging to the 3d Panzer Regiment overran Marnach at about midnight, and Fleig was ordered to counterattack with his 1st Platoon and a platoon of infantry. Fire from tanks, panzerfausts, and automatic weapons greeted the Americans when they reached Marnach at 0230. After a thirty-minute fight, Fleig was told to pull back. A second attempt to enter Marnach at 0700 hours also failed.

Two platoons of Company D, which had shifted to help the 110th Infantry Regiment, advanced down Skyline Drive toward Marnach in conjunction with Fleig's attacks from the southwest and ran into direct fire from Mark IVs and Panthers that knocked out eight light tanks on the spot. Most of the men who survived were captured. The company's third platoon was badly shot up when it drove to Urspelt.

The Germans threw tanks into the battle in growing numbers on 17 December, and the 707th Tank Battalion recorded "[h]eavy fighting throughout the sector against overwhelming odds" Lt. Col. Richard Ripple rejoined his battalion to find it hard pressed. Companies A and B battled armor and infantry the entire day, during which the Germans overran Urspelt, Drauffel, Hosingen, and Hoscheid. The 2d Platoon of Company A in Clervaux lost three Shermans in exchange for four Mark IVs when the two forces encountered each other rather suddenly and engaged in a brief, fierce shootout. Called to Clervaux by Colonel Fuller to replace the losses, Fleig had to take a round-about route along the small Clerve River, which runs through Clervaux, and nevertheless ran into a Mark IV before he reached the town. Fleig recalled, "The infantry aboard the tanks dove for cover while the two tanks slugged it out. [My] gunner found a vulnerable spot, and the wreckage of the Mark IV formed an impassable roadblock preventing any German vehicle from getting into Clervaux along the road from Marnach."

In Hosingen, Lieutenant Payne's tankers shuttled to every point of danger, often watching in frustration as their rounds bounced off Panthers. By dusk, German infantry had gotten into the buildings and were attacking from house to house. The tanks set up a perimeter defense around Company K's command post. About 2000 hours, a panzerfaust struck one Sherman, and panzer gunnery set a second ablaze. The remaining tanks were almost out of fuel and ammunition. That night, exfiltration being clearly impossible, the remaining officers decided to surrender.

Company C still faced only infantry in the 109th Infantry's zone. Nevertheless, at 2200 hours, heavy enemy pressure forced the battalion headquarters to withdraw from Wilwerwiltz, which lies just northeast of Wiltz. The 707th Tank Battalion claimed a total of six Mark IV and V tanks and four self-propelled guns knocked out that day. But by evening, the battalion had lost all of its light tanks, sixteen Shermans, and one T2. Wounded enlisted men totaled 14, but 5 officers and 111 enlisted men were listed as missing. Company C was the only line unit that had not been badly mauled.

The remnants of Companies A and B, the battalion's headquarters, and the Assault Gun Platoon were withdrawn to Wiltz on the road to Bastogne and combined into a composite unit on 18 December under the commanding officer of Company B. This force amounted to nine Shermans, all damaged in some way, and five assault guns. Together with the remnants of the 110th Infantry and 28th Division headquarters personnel, the tankers fought off constant heavy attacks throughout the day. Fleig's tank was knocked out during the fighting. Company C and the 109th Infantry withdrew slightly to Diekirch, which was also under heavy pressure. The battalion reported having knocked out one Tiger tank and a halftrack, but it had lost another seven Shermans, with four enlisted men wounded and two officers and twenty enlisted men missing in action.

On 19 December, the defenders of Wiltz found themselves surrounded. The assault guns had been committed to a fierce battle at the Erpeldange crossroads, engaging panzers with their 105-millimeter guns. The tank crews were exhausted, and men fell asleep at any pause in the action. When the assault guns pulled back into town at 1700, three ran out of gas, and there was no more to be had. The other two were sent to defend a bridge, and their crews were never heard from again.

At 2400 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Ripple mounted an unsuccessful effort to break out, after which he ordered all vehicles destroyed and organized personnel into groups under officers with orders to exfiltrate to Boulaide. Company C was ordered to cover the withdrawal of the 109th Infantry to Ettelbruck, a mile and a half southwest of Diekirch, which mission it accomplished at 2330 hours. The 707th Battalion lost fourteen Shermans, six assault guns, and eleven half-tracks, as well as 2 enlisted men wounded, and 15 officers and 131 enlisted men missing in action that day. Lieutenant Colonel Ripple was among those captured while trying to escape from Wiltz.

The battalion's few remaining tanks supported the defense of Vichten, and then Neufchateau, over the next few days, but the 707th Tank Battalion had ceased to exist as a fighting force, as had the 28th Infantry Division.28 In Raymond Fleig's Company A, only a handful of man had escaped death or capture.29 Company B was down to some twenty-five men. Their sacrifice had not been in vain, though, because their tenacious defense had disrupted the German timetable for the capture of the key road junction at Bastogne 30 On 31 December, Lt. Col. H. S. Streeter assumed command of the remnants of the 707th Tank Battalion.

Playing a Tricky Hand

On the Bulge's southern shoulder, the German offensive caught the 70th Tank Battalion with its pants down, but the battalion had the good fortune to face virtually no enemy armor, and its combat experience enabled the tankers to recover quickly3I The battalion had just arrived in Luxembourg after the rugged fighting in the Hurtgen Forest, and many of its tanks were stripped down for complete maintenance and parts replacement. Spares, however, were difficult to come by, which precluded some needed repairs.

All companies of the 70th Tank Battalion were alerted at 1100 on 16 December. Service Company men at once speeded up work on the disassembled tanks, and the few that were ready to roll immediately deployed to support the 12th Infantry Regiment, which was under attack by the 212th Volksgrenadier Division. The 4th Infantry Division line already was beginning to sag under German pressure. Company D was in the best shape, so it moved two platoons forward. Company A contributed a platoon. Company B could field only three Shermans. The tankers found that several companies of the 12th Infantry had been cut off at separate points, and the first day was spent trying to reopen communications lines with mixed success. Company D's M5A1s proved useful for hauling doughs and fighting off German infantry that had no armor support.

The battalion reported on 17 December in its after-action report, "Today was a gray foggy day, and the situation was extremely vague." Tankers had difficulty spotting enemy activity through the dense fog. All communication had been lost with the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, in Osweiler and Dickweiler. Three tanks from Company B were out of radio contact, their fate unknown.

The battalion continued efforts to reach the surrounded doughs, each tank carrying five infantrymen-all that were available. The tanks fought their way into Bergdorf, where the GIs of Company F were isolated. Spotting a large hotel that had been the company command post, the lead tank pumped several 76-millimeter rounds into the building before noticing an American flag being unfurled on the roof. The sixty grinning GIs still holding the hotel met the tankers at the door.

A relief attack on Echternach failed because of a lack of infantry support. At Consdorf, one Sherman manned by two crewmen, assisted by seven cooks, MPs, and stragglers, formed the defense as a German regiment approached. A Sherman from Company B and two light tanks, accompanied by a handful of infantry, arrived just in time to help beat back the first German probe.

On 18 December, task forces from the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions (the latter advancing from the Third Army's zone) arrived to assist the 4th Infantry Division. The 70th Tank Battalion remained committed, and much of the time, the tank radios provided the only means of communication between infantry companies and their battalion command posts. The 70th Battalion deployed half-tracks to strategic locations to act as relay stations, which enabled the battalion to maintain contact with all its tanks.

By 19 December, many 70th Battalion tankers found themselves making tactical advances. The greatest setback was a bazooka ambush that knocked out two and damaged one tank from the 3d Platoon of Company A. Artillery and mortar fire were intense. Two Company B tanks in Osweiler, which lies a mile west of Dickweiler, rocked as buildings collapsed around them. One bathroom-less its tub-was blown away, and the commode and sink came to rest on one tank's rear deck. The crew immediately complained about the lack of bathing facilities.

On 21 December, the 70th Tank Battalion was transferred from the First Army's control to Patton's Third Army. Company C's three remaining tanks moved to the top of a hill north of Consdorf, where they would remain for the next four days; they were so badly in need of maintenance that they could no longer move.

The 70th Tank Battalion fought until 24 December, when it was relieved. The battalion's losses during the Bulge were comparatively light: five Shermans, one M5A1, one half-track, one officer and five enlisted men killed, and three officers and twenty-one enlisted men wounded. Col. R. H. Chance, the commander of the 12th Infantry, praised the battalion for providing "the most outstanding tank support that this infantry regiment has ever witnessed."

HELP ARRIVES

Almost immediately after the German offensive struck, additional tank battalions moved to the threatened sector. Most arrived with their partner infantry divisions, but others were reattached to divisions already in the area.

Staunching the Wound

One of Patton's most famous gestures took place on 18 December when he boldly promised Eisenhower that he would have three divisions moving north to the Ardennes within forty-eight hours (he made good). But the first units to redeploy in response to the crisis came from the north-well-seasoned outfits all, if lacking Patton's fame. The 30th Infantry Division and 743d Tank Battalion arrived on 16 December, and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions (with the 745th and 746th Tank Battalions attached, respectively) followed the next day. The newly arrived 740th Tank Battalion also entered the fray on 19 December.

The 743d Tank Battalion was engaged in rocket-launcher training near Hongen, Germany, on 16 December, when it was alerted to move to the Ardennes 32 Through a cold rain, the battalion conducted an all-night road march south the night of 17 December to take up immediate fighting positions in the vicinity of Malmedy, Belgium. During the march, the column was on the alert for German paratroopers. Enemy aerial activity was intense, and antiaircraft fire speared upward on all sides. As they arrived in Malmedy, companies were divided among the battalions of the 117th Infantry Regiment, which were moving into defensive positions around Malmedy, Masta (a cluster of houses halfway between Malmedy and Stavelot), and Stavelot. Lt. Col. William Duncan, the battalion's commander, set up his command post in a large hotel room. Asked the situation by one of his officers, he replied, "I don't know what the situation is beyond this: The Germans are on the loose and can be expected anywhere anytime. It's our job to find out where they are and then stabilize a line to stop them and hold them" The men knew no more, and rumors spread like wildfire.

When the first tankers from Company B-with three assault guns attachedarrived in Stavelot to join the 1st Battalion, 117th Infantry, they found the Germans already there and in control of the northern half of the town. Lt. Jean Hansen's 3d Platoon moved in and spent the night on one side of the main square with the infantry; the Germans were only about eighty yards away on the other side. Hansen told a battalion officer that he knew nothing about what was going on around him except that the Germans were mighty damn close because they kept shooting at him. The boys of the 1st SS Panzer Division appeared to be suffering some confusion of their own. During the first several hours, three halftracks loaded with German infantry drove into the square; the Americans easily dispatched all these "attacks. 33

In Masta, the 743d Battalion's tanks were strafed by friendly P-47s. At 1900, Duncan was ordered to send a company to Stoumont in support of the 119th Infantry-a task he assigned to Company C.

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The tankers from Company B and C in Stavelot and Stoumont bore the brunt of the fighting on 19 December as the 30th Infantry Division extended the wall sealing off the northern edge of the German salient westward. Not that Company A was having an easy time; as its Shermans maneuvered toward La Gleize-halfway between Stoumont and Stavelot-they encountered Panther and Tiger tanks. One M4 was lost to 88-millimeter fire, but tankers helped a friendly antitank gun knock out a Mark V.

In Stavelot, Hansen's tanks moved up a street to support the doughs, who were trying to eject the SS from the northern part of town. A Tiger tank rounded the corner a mere fifty yards ahead. A friendly tank destroyer fired one ineffective round and scuttled to safety. The lead Sherman fired four armor-piercing rounds at the panzer, but none penetrated even at this close range. The American crew fired a smoke shell and backed around a corner.

Hansen deployed his Shermans to flank the Tiger and gain a side or rear shot, but this German commander knew his business, too. The Mark VI maneuvered constantly to counter the Shermans. Stalemate ensued. The American tanks established an ambush roadblock in case the German decided to come out and fight, but the next day, the two sides were still locked in a Mexican standoff.34

Unfortunately, when Company C arrived in Stoumont, the American line was under fierce attack by SS troops of Kampfgruppe Peiper. The tankers ran into advancing Germans almost immediately upon entering town, as recorded in the after-action report:

The 3d Platoon, Company C, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 119th Infantry, and made an early morning move to Chevron. At about 0615 hours the 1st and 2d platoons with the company commander moved to join the 3d Battalion, 119th Infantry, at Stoumont, Belgium. The tanks reached Stoumont at 0700 hours and went into immediate defensive positions. The 1st Platoon deployed into a position on the high ground at the eastern edge of the town where they joined Company I, 119th Infantry. The 2d Platoon moved into a position at about [map coordinates] and supported Company L, Infantry.

Within the quarter-hour, the enemy counterattacked from the south and east with about forty tanks plus a battalion of infantry with halftracks. Heavy enemy fire consisting of direct, mortar, small-arms, and automatic-weapons fire became intense during the three-hour fight that followed.

Infantry companies I and L began withdrawing toward the north and west. The 2d Platoon, 743d Tank Battalion, knocked out three enemy tanks, two half-tracks, and many enemy doughs as the enemy tried to advance from the east. The 1st Platoon, meanwhile, accounted for two enemy tanks, one half-track, and many enemy infantry who were advancing from the south.

As the 3d Battalion, Infantry, withdrew, the tanks laid down intense fire on the enemy; then the 1st Platoon pulled back by sections with some of the infantry riding on the rear decks of the vehicles. The 2d Platoon supported with fire during the withdrawal of the 1st Platoon, and then it, too, withdrew by sections. As the tanks moved to the rear, they exchanged direct fire with the enemy.35

Company C's tanks were desperately low on ammunition and fuel. The 743d Battalion's tanks withdrew to a makeshift defensive line to the west of Stoumont established by the 119th Infantry.36 At this point, the histories of one of the army's most experienced tank battalions crossed with that of an untested outfit, the 740th, which was engaged in writing its own incredible story.

Can Anybody Spare a Tank?

Back in the States, the 740th Tank Battalion had been organized as a special battalion to be issued top-secret CDL spotlight tanks 37 The battalion never actually received its CDL equipment despite a considerable amount of special training. So Lt. Col. George Rubel, a veteran of North Africa and the battalion's commander, stressed standard tank battalion instruction-especially accurate gunnery-a decision that probably saved the lives of many of his men in December 194438 The 740th Tank Battalion arrived in Belgium in November having no tanks but with an order to convert to a standard tank battalion. The outfit did sport a bold new code name: Daredevil. Rubel borrowed nine Shermans, three M5A1s, and two assault guns from the tank-short First Army to begin retraining. None of the men had ever used the M5A1 or fired a 105-millimeter howitzer.

The battalion, which expected its first combat to take place in January, had tentative orders to join the 99th Infantry Division in the Ardennes. When the German attack struck on 16 December, however, several things occurred. First, the battalion was ordered to turn over all its Shermans to the 745th Tank Battalion. Second, on 17 December, Rubel was informed that the battalion might have to enter battle with its three M5A1s and two assault guns-and with the remainder of the personnel fighting as infantry. Third, on 18 December, the battalion was ordered to the front but was told to salvage what vehicles it could from an ordnance repair depot in Sprimont, Belgium. Upon arrival at the depot, the battalion was shocked to find that only three Sherman tanks were on the "ready for issue" line and that they were short of essential equipment. Of the twenty-five tanks in the park, only fifteen could be made operable, and even these were missing gen erators, starters, breech parts, radios, tools, rammer-staffs, and other items. None had a basic ammo load. Battalion personnel worked all night and until noon the next day cannibalizing tanks to put the fifteen selected into running condition. One tank crew nevertheless headed to battle from Sprimont without a breechblock, ammunition, or.30-caliber machine guns.

Rubel put crews into anything that could fight: M4s, M5A1s, M8 assault guns, two M24 light tanks, two DD Shermans, M7 self-propelled 105-millimeter howitzers, and M36 and M10 tank destroyers. The M24, featuring an improved suspension and a low-velocity 75-millimeter main gun, had begun arriving in the European theater in late 1944 as a replacement for the M5 series, but only a minority of the separate battalions ever received any.

S/Sgt. Charlie Loopey was one tank commander. Loopey had the reputation of being a bit of a playboy back in the States, but he would prove a fearless and steady man in combat 39 He and his crew picked out one of the M36s. Although they had not trained on the equipment, the M36 was a tank-like self-propelled gun mounted on a Sherman chassis. It had a 90-millimeter converted antiaircraft cannon, which was the best antitank weapon in the American arsenal.

Lt. Charles Powers, Loopey's boss and leader of the 2d Platoon of Company C, picked a 75-millimeter Sherman for himself. Powers was a quiet, likeable gentleman who nevertheless was always ready to stand up for his men.4° Powers's platoon moved out for Remouchamps in the late hours of 19 December, following company commander Capt. James "Red" Berry in his jeep. They soon encountered the S-2 of the 119th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, who was on his way to the regimental command post. He related that one battalion of the regiment had been overrun and that the other two were under 50 percent strength and slowly losing ground. He requested assistance and did so again when Lieutenant Colonel Rubel arrived. Rubel noted that he had orders to stay where he was, so at 1400 hours, Maj. Gen. Leland Hobbs, the division's commanding general, appeared with authority from the First Army to attach the 740th Tank Battalion. The tankers moved out immediately.

As they arrived at the 119th Infantry's positions west of Stoumont, the tankers encountered the withdrawing Shermans of the 743d Tank Battalion, whose crews reported that five Panthers were advancing up the Ambleve River road about 1,000 yards distant. "We're low on ammo and fuel!" shouted one withdrawing tanker above the noise. "It's holy hell up there," called another. "Good luck!"

After consulting with regimental commander Col. Edwin Sutherland, it was agreed that the lead tank platoon would attack thirty minutes later at 1600 hours. The infantry were to advance as the tanks came abreast. Sutherland had learned a few things about how to use tanks, and Rubel would comment later, "[T]he cooperation between the battalion and the 119th Infantry was perfect"

Rubel added, "I never had such misgivings in my life. I hated to commit the battalion, and my fears were doubled when I saw the 743d Tank Battalion pulling out with more tanks than we were putting in." Rubel thought the other outfit's tankers just lacked the heart to keep on fighting; surely they could obtain more ammunition. He knew neither the men of the 743d Tank Battalion, nor what they had just been through. Captain Berry observed, "Of course, we were nervous as hell."

Powers and the 2d Platoon spearheaded the attack and advanced up the road toward Stoumont with supporting infantry arrayed to the sides, advancing by bounds as the armor clanked slowly up the road through the drizzly fog. The vehicles ground past two knocked-out panzers. After advancing 800 yards, Powers's loader, who also had his head out a hatch, realized that what he had thought was a brush pile was actually a Panther. He excitedly pointed it out to Powers, who ordered his gunner to fire. The first round hit the shot trap under the gun mantlet, ricocheted downward, killed the driver and bow gunner, and set the Mark V on fire. Another 100 yards on, Powers spotted a second Panther in the fog. This panzer got off several inaccurate rounds. Powers's first shot glanced off the front plate, and his second round jammed in his gun.

Powers desperately waved for Sergeant Loopey to move up, and his M36 tank destroyer advanced just as the Panther clawed closer to get a better shot. "I called [my gunner] for an AP, HE, hell, ANYTHING! Whatever you've got in there!" recalled Loopey. "Our first round hit him on the gun shield and kept him from getting down on us. We threw in several more rounds and blew a hole in his front left edge down low. Sparks flew, and flames shot twenty-five feet in the air!"

Meanwhile, Powers's gunner climbed out of the tank and cleared the jam with a ramrod. Powers resumed the lead and spotted a third Panther. The gunner's first shot blew the muzzle brake off the Mark V, and his next two shots set it on fire as the Panther tried to back away.

After this brisk thirty-minute firefight, the tide turned. The doughs, supported by the 740th Battalion armor spraying German infantry on the hillsides with machine guns, advanced 1,000 yards. Peiper's spearhead would not use this road. Both Powers and Loopey were awarded the Silver Star for their actions.

That night, the tankers ate K rations with cold-numbed fingers, hacked shallow trenches in the frozen soil, and parked their tanks over them to give them shelter as they slept. Surrounded by dug-in doughboys, the men felt secure even as they swapped rumors about Germans in the forest around them.

On 20 December, the battalion and the 119th Infantry attacked to retake Stoumont. One platoon of Company C (which still constituted the battalion's entire tank strength, though a platoon each of Companies A and B were nearly ready), working with the 1st Battalion west of town, ran into a Panther almost immediately. The lead Sherman knocked it out with a round that "opened its muzzle up like a rose" Another tank working with doughboys north of town fell prey to a concealed antitank gun. The infantry reached a sanitarium overlooking Stoumont, where fanatical SS troops screaming "Heil Hitler" backed by panzers counterattacked and recaptured the facility. Three of Captain Berry's tanks helped stop the charge at that point, but after dark, the Germans illuminated the Shermans with flares, and direct fire destroyed two of them.

The next day, Combat Command B of the 3d Armored Division was attached to the 30th Infantry Division to help it clear the Stoumont-La Gleize pocket. During operations that day near a chateau at Stoumont, Lieutenant Powers nailed another Panther from the flank.

That night, Captain Berry conducted a personal reconnaissance to find a way to get tanks up to the sanitarium. Berry found a route and recruited some infantrymen to help construct a makeshift corduroy road. At about midnight, Lieutenant Powers, Loopey, and the commanders of two other tanks negotiated the path to a spot where they could fire through the windows of the sanitarium. This they did, with Berry running from tank to tank to direct the fire. The infantry cleaned out the last resistance on 22 December.

Rubel engaged in another bit of unorthodox equipment requisition and employment several days later during fighting near La Gleize. On 23 December, he dug up a 155-millimeter self-propelled gun, augmented the crew with his cooks, radio operators, and jeep driver, and positioned the weapon on high ground where it could fire into the German defenses over open sights. He ordered his 105millimeter assault guns to keep the Germans' heads down. As he stood on a wall and directed fire, the gun pumped 192 rounds into La Gleize. Prisoners later said they had never experienced anything so terrible."

The Northern Jaw Gains More Teeth

Between 16 and 18 December, the 1st Infantry Division moved into defensive positions between the 99th Division and the 30th Infantry Division. This added one more well-fired brick to the wall along the northern edge of the Bulge.

The 745th Tank Battalion moved into the line with the Big Red One, as usual, and encountered the strongest armor attacks it had yet faced. During the period from 20 to 22 December-when twelve German divisions, seven of them armored, threw a ferocious fresh attack against the northern shoulder defenses along the Malmedy-Butgenbach-Monschau line-Company C alone destroyed thirteen tanks and one self-propelled gun near Butgenbach.42

The 750th Tank Battalion left the 104th Infantry Division behind in defensive positions along the Roer and rolled into the Ardennes on 22 December after an all-night road march. Now attached to the untried 75th Infantry Division, the tankers spent most of their time until mid-January providing a mobile reserve to the infantry regiments. At no time during this period was even an entire company committed to action 43

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Rubel was learning that tank and infantry communities did not always become the tightly knit family portrayed in the official history. On 28 December, he reported to the headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division, to which the 740th Tank Battalion had been attached for an assault southward toward Lierneux, and met with a universally chilly reception. The paratroop officers told him that tanks had usually been more of a hindrance than a help to them because tankers refused to keep up with their men. Rubel, who evoked memories of Patton among some of his men, replied that his boys had come to fight.44 At Rubel's urging, the paratroopers and tankers ran exercises together before attacking on 3 January. Within a few days, the tankers and doughs knew each other's first names, and after their first engagement together, the paratroopers told Rubel that his was the first outfit that they couldn't keep up with 45

The Southern Jaw Clamps Tight

Beginning on 18 December, Patton turned the weight of the Third Army more than ninety degrees and tore into the southern flank of the Bulge. His men moved 125 miles through a blizzard to accomplish this feat, and through 23 December, 133,178 motor vehicles traversed a total of 1,654,042 miles. The III Corps, including the 4th Armored and 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions, attacked on 22 December to relieve the surrounded "Battling Bastards of Bastogne," primarily paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division. German commanders who calculated that Patton would never be able to react so quickly were wrong.46 On the other hand, German intelligence easily detected the Third Army's shift, and by the time Patton's spearhead arrived, the Germans had deployed strong blocking forces on all approach routes.47

The 735th Tank Battalion took part in Patton's remarkable redeployment. 48 On 20 December, Companies A and C were on the east bank of the Saar supporting doughs of the 2d Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, fighting in Saarlantern. Patton had been calling around to get separate tank battalions on the move to the Ardennes.49 At 1230 hours, the battalion received warning orders to move to the vicinity of Stuckange, where the commander was to report to the headquarters of the XX Corps. The battalion was told to move as a unit, which was impossible to do because its elements were engaged with the enemy and spread out across one hundred square miles. The companies were given their routes by special couriers and told to join up as quickly as they could. Sometime after 1500 hours, the battalion halted briefly at a bridge near Bouzanville, which was the first opportunity to discover if all companies had formed up. They had.

The 735th Tank Battalion's march orders were for Luxembourg, where a liaison officer from the 26th Infantry Division informed the battalion of its attachment to that unit and sent the tankers on to Arlon, Belgium. In about twelve hours, the outfit had arrived in its new sector after a sixty-mile, overnight, blacked-out road march that passed through parts of Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The tankers reached their partner units on 21 December and engaged the enemy the next day as the 26th Division pushed northward toward Wiltz, initially meeting light resistance from elements of four volksgrenadier divisions. To the division's left, the 4th Armored Division strove to break through to Bastogne. By 24 December, the infantry and tanks had run into fierce resistance. In a single action on 27 December, German assault guns claimed three of the 735th Tank Battalion's M4A3E2 Jumbos.

Redeployment of tank battalions to unfamiliar infantry divisions reintroduced some of the old problems experienced in Normandy when fighting beside new partners. Despite a concerted effort by the 735th Tank Battalion's commanding officer, Lt. Col. Abe Bock, to work out the terms for tank-infantry cooperation with the headquarters of the 26th Infantry Division, problems due to unfamiliarity arose almost immediately. On 23 December, Company B supported a drive by the 104th Infantry Regiment toward Dellen. The battalion's after-action report described the problem and the tankers' reaction to being forced to risk their lives with strangers:

Very little resistance was met, and the tanks did little firing. The town of Dellen was taken by the tanks as the infantry would not go into it ahead of them. This attitude seemed to be prevalent among the infantry units here. Apparently they do not realize the ease with which tanks can be knocked out in restricted areas such as towns and that they could easily be left without any tank support whatsoever by running them into a trap such as that....

Transfer of the 735th Tank Battalion and its attachment to a new division led inevitably to a feeling of doubt and in some cases to downright confusion on the battlefield. This doubt and confusion is directly traceable to the fact that the two units have different histories and have been confronted by different problems for which they have arrived at different solutions. Infantry-tank cooperation has suffered greatly by the change in attachment-which can only be regained by long association.50

The infantry saw it differently. According to the 104th Infantry, the tanks were completely road-bound. "[Tank] platoons were used in close support of attacking elements of the infantry and not to spearhead the attack."51

The 737th Tank Battalion also participated in the Third Army's counteroffensive. Attached to the 35th Infantry Division near Sarreguemines, the battalion was ordered north on 21 December. The battalion assembled in the vicinity of Detrange, Luxembourg, at 0300 hours on 23 December following a grueling 120mile road march. The equipment was not in its best shape, and tankers worked frantically to perform what maintenance they could in the bitter cold and snow. By noon, the tanks were committed in support of 5th Infantry Division soldiers near Echternach. The 737th Tank Battalion had an unusually positive experience in terms of the rapid integration of tanks and infantry even though the battalion had never fought before with the "Red Diamond" Division. S/Sgt. Clint O'Da- vaney, a platoon sergeant in Company B, exclaimed, "These guys from the 5th are fighting bastards. Ain't it the truth!"52 Maj. Gen. S. Leroy Irwin, commanding the division, recorded in his diary, "New tank battalion is in fairly good shape .1153

By Christmas, Wacht am Rhein was spent as an offensive operation. That day, the 2d Armored Division stopped the 2d Panzer Division at Celles, four miles from the Meuse River. The same day, the 3d Armored Division blocked the 2d SS Panzer Division's drive on Namur. Bastogne still held, and on 26 December, the lead elements of a relief force from the 4th Armored Division punched through. The American lines along the shoulders of the Bulge held firms4 Hitler had coal in his stocking.

Interestingly enough, the tank battalions that had not borne the brunt of the initial German assault suffered low losses during the December fighting, probably because they for once held the advantages of the defender. The 743d Tank Battalion, for example, saw plenty of tough fighting-it knocked out at least six Panthers and Tigers-but lost only one crew of five men killed (and their Sherman) and four men wounded during late December.55

DENOUEMENT

On 3 January 1945, Hitler admitted that his Ardennes offensive no longer offered promise of success. He had shot his last bolt. On 8 January, he authorized a withdrawal to the Ourthe River. Although Operation Nordwind ("North Wind"), a counterstroke against the Seventh Army launched with New Year's, was still unfolding in Alsace, it would burn out within two weeks. The Allies could now turn to the task of overrunning the heart of Germany.56

Field Marshal Montgomery had carefully hoarded the First Army's VII Corps to spearhead the inevitable counterstroke against the German line from the north, an operation that he ordered to commence on 3 January in the general direction of Houffalize-about the midpoint of the Bulge. The corps commander, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, planned to strike with two armored divisions, the 2d and 3d, and follow through with the 84th and 83d Infantry Divisions, which would mop up bypassed resistance. Attached to those divisions were, respectively, the 774th and 771st Tank Battalions. The 75th Infantry Division (with the 750th Tank Battalion attached) would act as the corps reserve. The II SS Panzer Corps, made up of the 2d SS Panzer Division and two volksgrenadier divisions, barred the way.57

Confronting snow or rain, snowdrifts up to four feet deep, bad roads, rough terrain, and German resistance, the armored divisions failed to break through, and the infantry divisions became deeply embroiled in the same frustrating fighting.

Meanwhile, Patton was pressing northward with his III and VIII Corps against similar physical conditions and fierce resistance. In addition to the 6th Armored Division, the III Corps had two veteran infantry divisions-the 26th and 35th, with elements of both supported by the 735th Tank Battalion.

The veteran 90th Infantry Division and 712th Tank Battalion soon joined them after being withdrawn from the Saar region. The tankers moved into the Ardennes on 7 January 1945, arriving at Rippweiler, Luxembourg, after a forty-nine-mile road march over snow-covered roads. The battalion was committed again on 9 January near Berle, Luxembourg. Once again, battle-honed American tankers proved they could beat German armor. On 12 January, for example, camouflaged Shermans of the 2d Platoon, Company B, knocked out six tanks and six self-propelled guns, netting 150 prisoners. The next day, the same platoon knocked out three Panthers and three assault guns. Only three days later, two platoons from Company A, firing from defensive positions on good ground, destroyed eight Panthers and crippled a Tiger.58

On 15 January, troops from the First and Third Armies finally met at Houffal- ize. On 17 January, the First Army was returned to Bradley's 12th Army Group; it could now turn eastward to erase the remnant of the Bulge, adding the V Corps' 30th Infantry Division and 743d Tank Battalion to the effort.

Physical conditions remained atrocious for the men, many of whom had been in the line for nearly a month. The 743rd Tank Battalion's after-action report for 17 January noted that the battalion "had a number of [nonbattle casualty] illnesses not requiring hospitalization, most of these a result of the extreme cold and difficult operating conditions in the tanks which one man, with grim humor, referred to as `Armored Frigidaires."' Advancing in deep woods, the 750th Battalion tankers found that the snow from the trees fell into the open turrets of the tanks in such quantities that crewmen were unable to extract ammunition from the floor racks. Commanders had to keep the hatches open because periscopes were frosted over .51

The crews did the best they could to adapt to these miserable conditions. Lieutenant Colonel Rubel offered a description of the combined affects of carrying infantry and gradually accruing minimal creature comforts:

In [the] attack a tank was a strange looking object. There were usually from ten to twenty men riding on top of it. It was usually towing a trailer loaded down with rations, machine guns, tripods, and the usual miscellany of gear that a combat soldier takes along with him. In addition, the tankers had placed sand bags on the front slope plate of the tank, the sides, and sometimes around the turrets for protection against panzerfausts. Add to this conglomeration the tankers' housekeeping tools, which usually included a liberated heating stove, three or four joints of stovepipe, two or three frying pans, and two or three ordinary black pots. The pots were multipurpose articles. They were used for converting snow into drinking water, washing clothes, cooking food, and pouring gasoline. They were also used as carriers for other smaller articles while en route. The load on the back of the tank usually included, in addition to all the other items mentioned, several extra boxes of .30- and .50-cal ammunition and occasionally the carcass of a deer or cow that had been killed while attacking the tank. The tank thus laden turned out to be an excellent camouflage job. At a distance of fifty yards it was impossible to tell what kind of a vehicle it was-even if you determined that it actually was a vehicle.60

American tankers also adapted to the wintry landscape once the U.S. Army finally began to provide the necessary whitewash. Generally, supplies came very late. The 741st Tank Battalion was notified on 10 January that calcimine had become available." The 743d Tank Battalion was first able to apply coats of lime to its tanks of the line on 11 January 1945.62 The 749th was not able to apply winter camouflage until 19 January.63 The 753d Tank Battalion noted one problem with the improving use of white camouflage by American forces: in fighting on 8 January near Mackwiller in the Seventh Army's zone, tankers experienced difficulty distinguishing between the infantry of the two armies .14

Despite-or perhaps because of-the terrible weather, January generally proved to be a time of relatively low battle casualty rates for the tank battalions in the Ardennes sector. The 743d Tank Battalion, for example, lost seven men killed and three officers and sixteen men wounded, as well as four M4s and four M5A1 s, despite being on the attack and encountering German armor with some frequency (the battalion destroyed nine and captured four Mark IVs and knocked out two Mark Vs).65 The 750th Tank Battalion also attacked during the period and lost only two Shermans and two M5A1s, all to mines.66 The 741st Tank Battalion lost two enlisted men killed and one officer and two enlisted men wounded-and lost no vehicles-during its push south near the Elsenborn Ridge.67 And the 737th Tank Battalion recorded in its after-action report, "Our tanks destroyed one Royal Tiger, two Panthers, eight Mk IV tanks, ten SP vehicles, eight half-tracks, four 75mm [antitank] guns, one 75mm howitzer ... [a]s against a total of eight casualties and five tanks being disabled by enemy action.... All of our tanks had covered thousands of miles and all were equipped with the 75mm gun"

The 740th Tank Battalion, however, lost thirteen Shermans and one M5A1 and was down to an average of seven operational tanks per company at month's end. It also suffered proportionate losses in men (seven killed and twenty-eight wounded).68 The tendency of inexperienced battalions to suffer high losses early in their deployments may account for these figures in part, but the battalion's destruction of four Tigers, one King Tiger, and five other tanks and assault guns underscores the tough fighting the men endured. The 712th Tank Battalion also suffered heavy losses during its deployment into the area, including that of battalion commander Lt. Col. George Randolph, who was killed by shellfire.

Patton, meanwhile, launched an attack he had been pressing Bradley to approve on the base of the Bulge with the XII Corps. He pushed the 4th, 5th, and 80th Infantry Divisions (supported by the 70th, 737th, and 702d Tank battalions, respectively) across the Sauer River on 18 January.69 Commanders had to lead their tanks forward on foot over the icy roads in some cases.70

Because towns offered protection and shelter from the elements, they became the centerpieces of the fighting. The official U.S. Army history credits tanks and tank destroyers during this period with playing an invaluable role for the infantry by blasting German defenders from the sturdy structures. Minefields again became a constant menace, particularly when hidden by a new layer of snow."

Although Hitler had finally recognized that his offensive in the Ardennes had failed, he authorized a withdrawal only as far as the West Wall (except for SS units he transferred to the crumbling Eastern Front) despite the pleas of Rundstedt and Army Group B commander Field Marshal Walter Model that they be permitted to retreat to the east bank of the Rhine. This stubborn decision set the stage for the annihilation of much of the remaining German resources in the West.12 The separate tank battalions would again play their part.

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