Military history

ENDNOTES

Introduction

1 Captain William Whyte, “Will the Queen Die?” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1946, p. 10. In an article arguing for the infantry’s continued importance, Whyte quoted another commentator who claimed that the infantry would soon be “extinct as the dodo bird”; Captain William C. Boehm, letter to the editor, Infantry Journal, September 1947.

2 S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Command in Future War (Alexandria, VA: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), p. 15; Ralph Peters, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” Weekly Standard, February 6, 2006, p. 18.

3 For more on the American notion of war as a logistical or engineering problem, see Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Linn trenchantly identifies three major intellectual groups that have dominated the Army’s thinking since the earliest days of American history. The Guardians see war as primarily a science that is subject to natural laws and principles. In the nineteenth century, they favored coastal defense fortifications; in the twentieth, they argued for missile defense. The Managers think of warfare as a question of national mobilization, resource management, and the employment of overwhelming force. The Heroes argue that the human factor is paramount in war. They believe that battles, and wars, are decided by the fighting spirit of soldiers along with the inspirational leadership that motivates them to fight.

4 Department of Defense Web site, Fiscal Year 2007 Budget by Service; Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 155, 346; August Cole and Yochi Dreazen, “Boots on the Ground or Weapons in the Sky?” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2008, p. A14. The reference to inadequate equipment and weaponry for ground combat soldiers comes from my own Group Combat After Action Interview with Task Force 2-7 Infantry, enlisted soldiers, May 23, 2006. This problem is also general knowledge.

5 I am by no means the first author to make this case about the importance of ground forces. Marshall and Peters have, of course, emphasized these same points, albeit many decades apart. More recently, Daniel Bolger, Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), and Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), all articulated similar arguments.

6 Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Palmer, “Infantry and VT Fires,” Infantry School Quarterly , October 1950, p. 8.

7 The numbers on urban population come from a United Nations habitat study at www.unhabitat.org. According to the study, over half the world’s population lived in urban areas by 2007. For more on the planning of the Iraq War, see Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Vintage, 2007), Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), and Tom Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006).

8 For an excellent, groundbreaking study on killing in combat and its psychological effects, see Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995). Grossman made the salient point that, as a society, we know much about the phenomenon of warfare but very little about actual killing in combat. He equates this to knowing much about relationships but nothing of sex.

9 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991); the World War II statistics come from John C. McManus, The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 154. The other statistics, compiled as of May 14, 2008, are at www.fas.org under “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics.”

10 John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (London: Penguin Books, 1976).

11 The Checkerboard: Newsletter of the 99th Infantry Division Association, February 1993, p. 11.

Chapter 1

1 Task Force 53, After Action Report (AAR), Record Group (RG) 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 49, Folder 3; Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Coleman to Major O. R. Lodge, September 23, 1952, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” RG 127, Box 12, Folder 5; Colonel Edward Craig to Commandant, November 19, 1952, RG 127, Box 12, Folder 5, all at National Archives, College Park, MD; Major O. R. Lodge, The Recapture of Guam (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954), pp. 34-35; Harry Gailey, The Liberation of Guam, 21 July-10 August, 1944 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 87-88.

2 3rd Marine Division, Invasion plan and landing diagrams, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 65, Folder 7, National Archives; Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Kuhn, “The Guam Operation, 21 July-10 August 1944: The Importance of Planning,” U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School Paper, 1947-1948, found at the Gray Research Center (GRC), U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division (USMCHMD), Quantico, VA; Cyril O’Brien, Liberation: Marines in the Recapture of Guam (Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994), pp. 5-8; Robert Arthur and Kenneth Cohlmia, The Third Marine Division (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 142-46; and Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 16-20.

3 3rd Marine Division, Special Report, Medics, Guam Operation, Enclosure I, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 10; “Report on Guam Operations,” Box 50, Folder 8, both at National Archives; Staff Sergeant John O’Neill, personal diary, John O’Neill Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, GRC, USMCHMD; William Morgan, oral history, William Morgan Collection, #30140, Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; the spud locker quote is in Louis Metzger, “Guam 1944,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1994, p. 93.

4 Jack Kerins, “The Last Banzai” (self-published, 1992), pp. 76-77. For the bombardment ship order of battle and their placement off the beaches, see appendix chart in Lodge, Recapture of Guam.

5 3rd Marine Division, “Report on Guam Operations”; Eugene Peterson, unpublished memoir, pp. 76-77, Eugene Peterson Collection, #477, VHP, AFC, Library of Congress; Philip Johnson, unpublished memoir, p. 1, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Johnson. Peterson and his colonel shared the meat loaf that night. Both men agreed that it was the best meal they ate on Guam.

6 3rd Marine Division, D3 (Operations) Comments on Naval Gunfire Support, Annex C, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 9; Task Force 53, AAR, both at National Archives; Philip Crowl, The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Campaign in the Marianas (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1960), pp. 324-25; William Putney, Always Faithful: A Memoir of the Marine Dogs of WWII (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001), pp. 140-41; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 37, 106.

7 3rd Marine Division, D3 Comments on Air Support, Annex D, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 9; Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Spooner, close air support officer, to Major O. R. Lodge, August 12, 1952, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” RG 127, Box 12, Folder 8, both at National Archives; Maury T. Williams, unpublished memoir, no pagination, John G. Balas Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA (hereafter referred to as USAMHI); William Welch, unpublished memoir, in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Welch; Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, p. 324.

8 Major L. A. Gilson to Major O. R. Lodge, February 11, 1952, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” RG 127, Box 12, Folder 8; Admiral Richard Conolly to Commandant, November 12, 1952, also in Publication Background Files, RG 127, Box 12, Folder 5; Lieutenant Colonel Hideyuki Takeda to Marine Corps Historical Center, February 20, 1952, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, RG 127, Box 68, Folder 17, all at National Archives; I. E. McMillan, “Naval Gunfire at Guam,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1948, p. 56; Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 325-26; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 106-07.

9 3rd Marine Division, AAR, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 9; “Report on Guam Operations,” both at National Archives; War Dogs of the Pacific, documentary by Harris Done, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Done; Williams, unpublished memoir, USAMHI; Kerins, “Last Banzai,” p. 79; Bill Conley, interview with the author, March 21, 2008; Henry Shaw, Bernard Nalty, and Edwin Turnbladh, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Central Pacific Drive (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, 1966), pp. 457-58; for more on the physiological effects of fear in combat, see Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman with Loren W. Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (Portland, OR: PPCT Research Publications, 2007), pp. 16-49.

10 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, War Diary, RG 127, Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 57, Folder 11; Unit Report, July 21, 1944, Box 57, Folder 13; 22nd Marine Regiment, Journal, July 21, 1944, Box 61, Folder 1; Tank Company, Special Action Report (SAR), Box 61, Folder 9; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Shaw to Commandant, September 29, 1952, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” Box 12, Folder, all at National Archives; O’Neill, diary, GRC; Shaw et al., Central Pacific Drive, p. 461; O’Brien, Liberation, pp. 11-17; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 47-53.

11 9th Marine Regiment, SAR, RG 127, Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 10; R3 Journal, July 21, 1944, Box 59, Folder 3, both at National Archives; Welch memoir.

12 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, RG 127, Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 10; Operation Report, Box 51, Folder 2; Anthony Frances, “The Battle of Banzai Ridge,” unpublished manuscript, pp. 4-7, USMCHMD, Reference Branch Files; Frank Hall, interview with the author, March 24, 2008; Frank Goodwin, interview with the author, March 25, 2008; Conley interview; Paul Jones, unpublished memoir, p. 19, Paul Jones Collection, #41436, VHP, AFC, Library of Congress; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 40-42. Jones’s memoir provided firsthand context and description that added to my account of the 21st Marines’ ascent up the cliff.

13 3rd Marine Regiment, SAR, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 10; Operation Report, Box 51, Folder 2; Unit Journal, July 21, 1944, Box 58, Folder 5; 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Journal, July 21, 1944, Box 58, Folder 8; Lieutenant Colonel Royal Bastion to USMCHMD, August 23, 1952, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” Box 12, Folder 5, all at National Archives; Pete Gilhooly, interview with the author, March 17, 2008; Mack Drake, unpublished journal, p. 7, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Drake family; Alvin Josephy, The Long and the Short and the Tall: Marines in Combat on Guam and Iwo Jima (Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 1946), pp. 43-45; Gailey, Liberation of Guam, pp. 95-97; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 42-47.

14 Takeda letter, National Archives; Major General Haruo Umezawa and Colonel Louis Metzger, “The Defense of Guam,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1964, p. 38; Lieutenant Colonel Hideyuki Takeda, “The Outline of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Guam Island,” in Lester Dessez Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, GRC. In the quoted passage, Takeda was referring specifically to the 38th Infantry Regiment, but the sentiment applied equally to the entire Japanese garrison.

15 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, War Diary, Journal, July 22, 1944; 22nd Marine Regiment, Journal, July 22, 1944; Tank Company, SAR; Captain Ben Read to Major O. R. Lodge, January 3, 1952, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” Box 12, Folder 8, all at National Archives; Takeda, “Outline of Japanese Defense Plan,” pp. 3, 5; O’Neill, diary, both at GRC; First Lieutenant Millard Kaufman, “Attack on Guam,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1945; Sergeant Boondocks, “Facts from a Foxhole,”Infantry Journal, September 1945, p. 20; Corporal Fred Travis, “75s on Guam,” Field Artillery Journal, April 1945, pp. 233-34; Umezawa and Metzger, “The Defense of Guam,” pp. 40-41; Welch memoir; Shaw et al., Central Pacific Drive, pp. 471-76; O’Brien, Liberation, pp. 17-18; Gailey, Liberation of Guam, pp. 104-06; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 54-56.

16 Takeda letter, National Archives; Umezawa and Metzger, “Defense of Guam,” pp. 41-42; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 79-80; Lieutenant P. W. “Bill” Lanier in a letter printed in the Washington Star, November 26, 1944, claimed to have found hypodermic needles and narcotics on the bodies of several dead Japanese.

17 Provisional War Dog Company, SAR, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 50, Folder 11; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, both at National Archives; War Dogs of the Pacific; Ed Adamski, interview with the author, March 7, 2008; Roger Belanger, interview with the author, March 4, 2008; Frank Goodwin, unpublished memoir, p. 1, in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Goodwin; Goodwin interview; Putney, Always Faithful, pp. 168-69.

18 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, National Archives; Bill Karpowicz, e-mail to author, June 10, 2008; Lanier letter; Kaufman, “Attack on Guam,” p. 61; Bob Glenn, interview with the author, March 31, 2008; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 78-79; Grossman, On Killing, pp. 5-9.

19 3rd Marine Division, Report on Guam Operations and AAR, Provisional War Dog Company, AAR, all at National Archives; War Dogs of the Pacific; Adamski, Goodwin interviews; Putney, Always Faithful, pp. 170-71.

20 3rd Marine Division, D3 (Operations) Journal, July 26, 1944, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 54, Folder 3; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, both at National Archives; Drake, unpublished journal, p. 7; Belanger interview.

21 12th Marine Regiment, SAR, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 59, Folder 8; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR; Lieutenant Colonel R. R. Van Stockum to Lieutenant Colonel Harry Edwards, October 15, 1952, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, “The Recapture of Guam,” Box 12, Folder 7, all at National Archives; Frances, “Battle of Banzai Ridge,” pp. 27-29, USMCHMD; Staff Sergeant James Hague, combat correspondent, untitled article on Banzai Ridge; Jim Headley, interview with the author, March 3, 2008; Walt Fischer, unpublished memoir, p. 3, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Fischer; Walt Fischer, interview with the author, March 18, 2008.

22 3rd Marine Division, D3 Journal, July 26, 1944; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, both at National Archives; Conley interview; Karpowicz e-mail; Lanier letter; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 80-81.

23 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, War Diary, National Archives; O’Neill, diary, GRC; Lieutenant General Alpha Bowser, oral history, USMCHMD; Kaufman, “Attack on Guam,” p. 61; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 78-79, 81; Kerins, “Last Banzai,” pp. 120-24.

24 3rd Marine Division, Report on Guam Operations, D3 Journal, July 26, 1944; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, all at National Archives; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 81, 85.

25 3rd Marine Division, Report on Guam Operations, AAR; 2nd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment, “Account of Action Opposing Nip Breakthrough,” RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 60, Folder 5, all at National Archives; Frank Hough, The Island War: The United States Marine Corps in the Pacific (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947), p. 274.

26 Frances, “Battle of Banzai Ridge,” p. 30, USMCHMD (in June 1945, Frances published part of this paper in the Marine Corps Gazette); Lanier letter; O’Neill, diary, GRC; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, p. 87.

27 3rd Marine Division, AAR; D3 Periodic Report, July 26, 1944, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Guam, Box 54, Folder 3; 21st Marine Regiment, SAR, all at National Archives; Goodwin memoir, interview; Kerins, “Last Banzai,” p. 129.

28 Frances, “Battle of Banzai Ridge,” p. 30, USMCHMD; Jim Headley to author, March 12, 2008.

29 The handbill is reprinted in Sgt. H. N. Oliphant, “Combat in the Marianas,” Yank, October 13, 1944; S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Alexandria, VA: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), pp. 50-84; Grossman, in On Killing, also discusses the reluctance to kill and the psychological cost of doing so. Although Grossman’s book is a brilliant, landmark piece of work, he places way too much emphasis on Marshall’s debunked ratio-of-fire claims. In an earlier book, The Deadly Brotherhood: The American Combat Soldier in World War II(New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 116-21, I discussed the problems with Marshall’s claims and the work of several other historians who have cast doubt on his contentions. Since publishing that book, I have further examined Marshall’s surviving records, and I have interviewed one of the key historians who worked with him during the war, but found no concrete evidence to support his theories. In researching this Guam chapter, I estimate that I have reviewed about five thousand pages of documents and firsthand accounts. Yet I found not one recorded instance of an American refusing to fire his weapon or preferring his own death to killing an enemy soldier.

30 3rd Marine Division, Report on Guam Operations, AAR; Takeda letter, all at National Archives; Lanier letter; Josephy, Long and the Short and the Tall, p. 65; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 86-87.

Chapter 2

1 Joseph Alexander, “What Was Nimitz Thinking?” United States Naval Institute Proceedings , November 1998, pp. 42-47; Alexander, “‘Everything about Peleliu Left a Bad Taste,’” Leatherneck, September 2004, pp. 28-30; Major Jon T. Hoffman, “The Legacy and Lessons of Peleliu,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, pp. 90-91; George Garand and Truman Strobridge, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division, 1971), pp. 63-65; Bill Ross, A Special Piece of Hell: The Untold Story of Peleliu—The Pacific War’s Forgotten Battle (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), pp. 134-41.

2 1st Marine Division, Special Action Report (SAR), Annex A, Infantry, Record Group (RG) 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 298, Folder 19; Sergeant Major Masao Kurihara et al., prisoner interrogations, provided to U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division by Major General Paul Mueller, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 2, all at National Archives, College Park, MD; Interrogation of Colonel Tokechi Tada and Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue regarding the Palau Campaign, both in Rex Beasley Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Major Frank Hough, The Assault on Peleliu (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1950), pp. 192-97, 200-203; Harry Gailey, Peleliu 1944(Annapolis, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983), pp. 37-51; Garand and Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, pp. 66-72; David Green, “Peleliu,” After the Battle, Number 78, 1992, pp. 8-9; Alexander, “‘Bad Taste,’” pp. 28-31; Hoffman, “Legacy and Lessons,” pp. 90-91. In speaking to his postwar interrogators, General Inoue said that another reason he sent General Murai to Peleliu was to make sure that Colonel Nakagawa did not “make any mistakes.” However, General Inoue, according to the interrogator, said this “with a twinkle in his eye” and was probably joking.

3 3rd Fleet, Naval Gunfire Report, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 297, Folder 3; III Marine Amphibious Corps, Operation Report, Enclosure B, Naval Gunfire and Tactics, Box 298, Folder 4; Operation Report, Enclosure G, Naval Bombardment, Box 298, Folder 9; 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex K, Naval Bombardment, Box 298, Folder 19; Rear Admiral George Fort to Major General Orlando Ward, November 15, 1950, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, History Division, Approach to the Philippines, Box 306, Folder 4; Rear Admiral George Fort to Brigadier General Clayton Jerome, March 20, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 1; Admiral Jesse Oldendorf to Jerome, March 25, 1950, Box 6, Folder 2; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Field to Commandant, March 17, 1950,

Box 6, Folder 1; Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Ramsay to Commandant, February 20, 1950, Box 6, Folder 1, all at National Archives; Vice Admiral Theodore Wilkinson to Major General Roy Geiger, August 17, 1944, Roy Geiger Papers, Box 5, Folder 99; Brigadier General Oliver Smith, unpublished memoir, p. 14, Oliver P. Smith Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, both at U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division (USMCHMD), Gray Research Center (GRC), Quantico, VA; Burke Davis, Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller (New York: Bantam, 1991), pp. 190-95; Gailey, Peleliu, pp. 65-68; Garand and Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, pp. 102-05.

4 1st Marine Division, SAR; D3 Journal, September 15, 1944, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 299, Folder 6; 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, History, Box 300, Folder 6; 7th Marine Regiment, AAR, Box 299, Folder 4; Oldendorf to Jerome, all at National Archives.

5 1st Marine Division, SAR, and Annex J, Tanks, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 298, Folder 19, National Archives; Hough, Seizure of Peleliu, pp. 60-64. This description also is derived from my analysis of literally hundreds of firsthand accounts and official reports. Citing them all would be ponderous.

6 1st Marine Regiment, History, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 300, Folder 5; 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, History; 7th Marine Regiment, AAR, all at National Archives; Corporal Leo Zitko to Mom and Dad, Collection Number 68, World War II Letters, Box 40, Folder 3463, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO (hereafter WHMC); Henry Andrasovsky, oral history, Henry Andrasovsky Collection, #23434, and Alexander Costella, unpublished memoir, pp. 7-8, Alexander Costella Collection, #30258, both at Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; William Martin, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Martin.

7 5th Marine Regiment, AAR, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 299, Folder 4, National Archives; E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 59-60; Richard Bruce Watkins, “With the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu: The First Day,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 2004, pp. 63-64. Watkins also posted this account on a Web site, www.brothersinbattle. net: Garand and Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, p. 115.

8 1st Marine Division, SAR, and Annex D, Medical, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 298, Folder 19; III Marine Amphibious Corps, Operation Report, Enclosure J, Medical, Box 298, Folder 13; Captain James Flagg, personal diary, September 15, 1944, Box 307, Folder 12; 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, History, all at National Archives; Lieutenant Commander William Turney, “1st Medical Battalion in Action—Peleliu, 1 May 1944-20 October 1944,” Amphibious Warfare School, 1947-1948, USMCHMD; Leslie Harrold, oral history, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Harrold; Leslie Harrold, conversation with the author, May 5, 2008.

9 1st Marine Division, SAR; 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, both at National Archives; Fred Harris, unpublished memoir, p. 2, Peleliu accounts, Folder #2149, GRC; Charles H. Owen, “Capture of Peleliu: Bravery on the Beach,” World War II, September 1998, pp. 35-40; Russell Davis, Marine at War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp. 29-31; Colonel Dave Grossman with Loren W. Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (Portland, OR: PPCT Research Publications, 2007), pp. 30-49.

10 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, History, Intelligence Section History, all at National Archives; George Hunt, Coral Comes High (New York: Signet, 1946), pp. 56-58; George Peto, interview with the author, April 25, 2008.

11 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, Record of Events, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 300, Folder 8; 1st Marine Regiment, AAR and History, all at National Archives; “Marines of K-3-1 Killed in Action During the Peleliu Operation,” USMCHMD, Reference Branch Files; Braswell Deen, “Trial by Combat!” (self-published), pp. 246-48; Hunt, Coral Comes High, p. 74; Captain George Hunt, “Point Secured,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1945, pp. 39-40; Colonel Joseph Alexander, “Peleliu 1944: ‘King’ Company’s Battle for ‘The Point,’ ” Leatherneck, November 1996, pp. 18-21.

12 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, Record of Events, both at National Archives; Fred Fox to General C. C. Krulak, September 9, 1996; Fox, unpublished memoir, pp. 7-8, both at USMCHMD, Reference Branch Files; Alexander, “Peleliu 1944,” p. 21; Hunt, “Point Secured,” p. 40; Hunt, Coral Comes High, pp. 59-61.

13 1st Marine Regiment, Record of Events, National Archives; Alexander, “Peleliu,” pp. 21-22; Hunt, “Point Secured,” p. 40; Hunt, Coral Comes High, p. 54.

14 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, History, Record of Events, all at National Archives; Fox, unpublished memoir, pp. 9-10, USMCHMD; Alexander, “Peleliu,” pp. 22-23; Hunt, “Point Secured,” p. 40.

15 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, History, National Archives; Fox, unpublished memoir, pp. 12-14, USMCHMD; George Peto, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Peto; Peto interview; Hunt, Coral Comes High, pp. 91-93.

16 1st Marine Regiment, AAR, History, Record of Events, National Archives; Albert Mikel, unpublished memoir, p. 4, Peleliu accounts, #2221; Russell Honsowetz, oral history, both at GRC; Fox, unpublished memoir, pp. 16-18; “Marines of K-3-1 Killed in Action During the Peleliu Operation,” both at USMCHMD; Peto, unpublished memoir, p. 2; Peto interview; Alexander, “Peleliu,” pp. 23-25; Hunt, “Point Secured,” pp. 40-42; Hunt, Coral Comes High, pp. 115-22; Matthew Stevenson, “Personal Perspectives on Peleliu,” Military History Quarterly, Winter 1999, pp. 78-79; Jon Hoffman, Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York: Random House, 2001), pp. 273-80. After the war, Captain Hunt taught at the Marine Corps Education Center in Quantico, VA. With his assistance, the school built an exact replica of the Point and used it to educate young officers on how to assault fortified positions. Not only was this educational process instructive, it preserved the Point battle in Marine Corps lore. Hunt left the Corps and returned to his prewar job with Fortune magazine. Over the years, he wrote many articles about the men of his company. Fred Fox returned to Peleliu, and the Point, four separate times after the war.

17 1st Marine Division, SAR; D3 Journal, September 15, 1944; 5th Marine Regiment, AAR, all at National Archives; Technical Sergeant Joseph Alli, “First Two Days of Hell on Peleliu Described by Marine Combat Correspondent,” dispatch found at USMCHMD, Reference Branch Files. There are literally dozens of accounts of the Japanese tank attack. I have consulted them all but have only listed the ones upon which I relied most heavily.

18 1st Marine Division, SAR; 1st Marine Regiment, History; Major Waite Worden to Commandant, April 6, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 3, all at National Archives; Robert “Pepper” Martin, Time, October 16, 1944; Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary (New York: Berkley, 1984), p. 231; Robert Leckie, Helmet for My Pillow (New York: Bantam Books, 1957), p. 273; Davis, Marine at War, p. 99.

19 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex D, Medical, Annex I, Engineers; Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Drummond to Commandant, March 14, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 1, all at National Archives; George Parker, unpublished memoir, p. 49, George Parker Collection, #5375, Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress; John Arthur Huber, unpublished memoir, p. 8, Peleliu Accounts, #3856, GRC; James W. Johnston, The Long Road of War: A Marine’s Story of Pacific Combat (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 78, 88; Hough, Assault on Peleliu, pp. 94-97; Leckie, Helmet for My Pillow , p. 273; Sledge, With the Old Breed, p. 76; Charlie Burchett, interview with the author, March 6, 1995; Harrold, oral history.

20 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex A, Infantry, Annex B, Intelligence; D2 Journal, September 16, 1944, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 299, Folder 2; 1st Marine Regiment, History, all at National Archives; Peto interview.

21 III Marine Amphibious Corps, Operation Report, Enclosure A, Strength Report, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 298, Folder 5; 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, War Diary, Box 301, Folder 2; 1st Marine Regiment, History; Record of Events, all at National Archives; Parker, unpublished memoir, pp. 50-51, Library of Congress; Brigadier General Gordon Gayle, Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu (Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1996), p. 20; Davis, Marine at War, pp. 103-04. Gene Burns was a professor of mine in graduate school. He told me this story in November 1989.

22 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex L, Air Support, Annex J, Tanks; 2nd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, Operation Report, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 301, Folder 8; Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Stuart to Commandant, April 25, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 3, all at National Archives; Major Richard Kennard, Combat Letters Home (Bryn Mawr, PA: Dorrance & Company, Inc., 1985), pp. 16-17; Davis, Marine at War, p. 104.

23 1st Marine Regiment, History; 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, History; Captain Everett Pope to Commandant, March 8, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 2, all at National Archives; Everett Pope, interview with Rob Taglianetti, USMCHMD, August 3, 2006, interview made available to author by Mr. Taglianetti; Martin, unpublished memoir, pp. 2-3; Ray Davis, The Story of Ray Davis, General of Marines (Fuquay Varina, NC: Research Triangle Publishing, 1995), pp. 68-70; Garand and Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, pp. 146-48, 156-61; Davis, Marine at War, pp. 108-14; Kennard, Combat Letters Home, p. 17; Hoffman, Chesty, pp. 279-87. Many men in the 1st Marines, particularly the C Company survivors, felt that Hill 100 should have been named Pope’s Ridge.

24 Hoffman, Chesty, pp. 284-85; Bill Ross, Special Piece of Hell, pp. 235-40; Peto, unpublished memoir, p. 3; Oliver Butler, unpublished memoir, p. 67, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Butler.

25 Oliver Smith, Ray Davis, Russell Honsowetz, Harold Deakin, oral histories, GRC; Bill Sloan, Brotherhood of Heroes: The Marines at Peleliu, 1944—The Bloodiest Battle of the Pacific War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), pp. 340-41; Dick Camp, Last Man Standing: The 1st Marine Regiment on Peleliu, September 15-21, 1944 (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2008), p. 269; Hoffman, Chesty, pp. 285-88; Davis, The Story of Ray Davis, pp. 72-73; Gailey, Peleliu 1944, pp. 123-124; Ross, Special Piece of Hell, pp. 244-50, 261; Jon Hoffman, “The Truth about Peleliu,” Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2002, pp. 51-54; Stevenson, “Personal Perspectives on Peleliu,” MHQ, pp. 81-82.

26 Smith, Honsowetz, Deakin, oral histories, GRC; Hoffman, Chesty, pp. 296-98; Gailey, Peleliu 1944, pp. 133-35; Ross, Special Piece of Hell, pp. 261-64; Hoffman, “Truth about Peleliu,” pp. 53-54; biography of Major General William Rupertus at www.arlingtoncemetery.net. General Geiger later told General Smith that, had he known about Rupertus’s broken ankle, he would have relieved him before the invasion.

27 Colonel Walter Wachtler to Commandant, March 1, 1950, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 3; Colonel William Coleman to Commandant, no date, Box 6, Folder 1, both at National Archives; Oliver Smith, unpublished memoir, pp. 61-62; Smith, Deakin, oral histories, all at GRC; George McMillan, The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), pp. 318-19; Gailey, Peleliu 1944, pp. 134-35; Kennard, Combat Letters Home, p. 31; Hoffman, Chesty, pp. 281-91; Ross, Special Piece of Hell, pp. 264-72; Davis, Marine at War, p. 116; Hoffman, “Truth about Peleliu,” p. 54. Joe Rosenthal, the famous photographer, witnessed the meeting between Geiger and Puller. In Rosenthal’s opinion, Chesty looked like “a tired guy.”

28 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR, RG 407, Box 12324, Folder 8; 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, History; 1st Marine Division, D2 Journal, September 23, 1944, all at National Archives; Thomas Climie, unpublished memoir, p. 22, World War II Questionnaire #10149; Robert Francis Heatley, “Breathes There a Soldier” (self-published), p. 9, World War II Questionnaire #12720; George Pasula, World War II Questionnaire #4333, all at USAMHI; Honsowetz, oral history, GRC; Peto, unpublished memoir, p. 3, interview; Hoffman, Chesty, p. 289.

29 81st Infantry Division, History of Operations, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 300, Folder 4; 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR, both at National Archives; “The 321st Infantry Regiment from Camp Rucker to Guadalcanal, Angaur, Peleliu, New Caledonia, Leyte and Japan”; Pasula, questionnaire; Heatley, “Breathes There a Soldier,” p. 11, all at USAMHI; Captain Pierce Irby, “The Operations of Company ‘L,’ 321st Infantry (81st Infantry Division) in the Capture of the Island of Peleliu, 23-29 September, 1944, Personal Experience of a Company Commander,” pp. 17-18, Advanced Infantry Officer’s Course, 1948-1949, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia.

30 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, War Diary, RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps Records, Peleliu, Box 301, Folder 5; Operation Report, Box 301, Folder 14; 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR, all at National Archives; Irby, “The Operations of Company ‘L,’ 321st,” pp. 14-17; Robert Ross Smith, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Approach to the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 537-38; Garand and Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations, pp. 197-98; Ross, A Special Piece of Hell, p. 277; Camp, Last Man Standing, pp. 290-91; Smith, oral history, GRC. General Paul Mueller, the commander of the 81st Division, believed, with some justification, that his soldiers never got the credit they deserved for their part in the Battle of Peleliu. He felt that Marine publicity overshadowed the Army’s vital role in the battle. Sensitive to any criticism of his troops, Mueller downplayed K Company’s problems in an April 14, 1950, letter to Brigadier General Clayton Jerome, head of the Corps’ History and Museums Division. Mueller felt that “the incident was exaggerated.” The letter is in the National Archives at RG 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Publication Background Files, Assault on Peleliu, Box 6, Folder 2.

31 81st Infantry Division, History of Operations; 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR; 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex H, Artillery, Annex L, Air Support; 11th Marine Regiment, Operation Report, all at National Archives; General Oliver Smith, “Comments and Recommendations as a Result of the Peleliu Campaign,” Box 22, Folder 5, Oliver Smith Papers; William Burnett, unpublished memoir, p. 9, Peleliu Accounts, #3723, both at GRC; Kennard, Combat Letters Home, p. 25; Staff Sergeant Ward Walker, “Marine Tells of Cave Fighting on Peleliu,” USMCHMD, Reference Branch Files; Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Walt, “The Closer the Better,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1946, pp. 38-39.

32 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR; 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex A, Infantry, Annex J, Tanks; 5th Marine Regiment, AAR; 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Record of Events; Captain James Flagg, diary entries, October 1-10, 1944; Stuart letter, all at National Archives; U.S. Armored School, “Armor in Island Warfare,” p. 86, Donovan Library, Fort Benning; Climie, unpublished memoir, p. 25, USAMHI; Huber, unpublished memoir, pp. 13-14, GRC; Burchett interview.

33 1st Marine Division, SAR, Annex D, Medical; 5th Marine Regiment, AAR; 321st Infantry Regiment, AAR, all at National Archives; Edward Thul, unpublished memoir, p. 12, Edward Thul Collection, #19069, VHP, AFC, Library of Congress; Climie, unpublished memoir, p. 24; Heatley, “Breathes There a Soldier,” p. 11, both at USAMHI; Sledge, With the Old Breed, pp. 129-32, 142-44; Burchett interview.

34 1st Marine Division, SAR; 81st Infantry Division, AAR; 323rd Infantry Regiment, AAR; Terrain and Intelligence Summary, RG 407, Box 12338, Folder 7, all at National Archives; “History of Cannon Company”; “History of E Company,” both with 81st Infantry Division material at USAMHI; The 81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee, The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 200-201; Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 573-75; Gailey, Peleliu 1944, p. 192.

Chapter 3

1 General J. Lawton Collins, interview with Charles B. MacDonald, January 25, 1954, Record Group 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, History Division, The Siegfried Line, Box 184, Folder 4, National Archives, College Park, MD; 1st Lieutenant Harry Condren, “The Fall of Aachen,” located in World War II Combat Interviews Collection #4, microfiche copy of the entire collection in the author’s possession (hereafter referred to as CI); Christopher Gabel, “ ‘Knock ’Em All Down’: The Reduction of Aachen, October 1944,” paper prepared for the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, copy in author’s possession; Captain Monte Parrish, “The Battle of Aachen,” Field Artillery Journal, September/October 1976, pp. 25-27; Charles B. MacDonald, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 280 -308.

2 Derrill Daniel, biography, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, Box 2, Folder 2, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; John Corley file, McCormick Research Center (MRC), Cantigny 1st Infantry Division Foundation, Wheaton, IL; Michael D. Runey, “Chaos, Cohesion, and Leadership: An American Infantry Battalion in Europe, October-December 1944,” Master’s thesis, Pennsylvania State University, pp. 13-17.

3 “Combat in Towns,” RG 407, Entry 427, Box 14193, Folder 1, National Archives; 26th Infantry Regiment, “Battle of Aachen,” Combat Interview, CI-4; Lieutenant Colonel Derrill Daniel, “The Infantry Battalion in Offensive Action, Aachen, 8-20 October 1944,” pp. 3-4, Box 89, MRC; Matthew D. Bacik, “White Battalion Draws Red Blood at Aachen,” unpublished paper, United States Military Academy, p. 3, copy in author’s possession; Gabel, “ ‘Knock ’Em All Down’ ”; Captain Harold Keebaugh, “Offensive Action in Cities,” p. 9, Advanced Infantry Officer’s Course, 1955-1956, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia; “The Battle for Aachen,” After the Battle, Number 42, pp. 6-13.

4 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S2 Journal, October 10-12, 1944; S3 Journal, October 10-12, 1944, all at RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5268, Folder 2, National Archives; Periodic Report 128, “The Ultimatum Presented to the City of Aachen,” CI-4; “1106th Engineer Group South of Aachen,” Combat Interview; “The Fall of Aachen,” both in CI-4; “Aachen: 26th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, Operations in Urban Terrain, October 1944,” copy in author’s possession; John Curran, oral history, MRC; Ed Wilcox, “Battle for Aachen: Death of a City,” Stars and Stripes, October 28, 1944. Technically, at the time the Americans extended their ultimatum, Lieutenant Colonel Maximilian Leyherr, one of Wilck’s regimental commanders in the 246th Volksgrenadier Division, was in charge at Aachen. However, Wilck soon arrived and, as division commander, he assumed responsibility for the defense of Aachen.

5 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S3 Journal, October 13-14, 1944, both at National Archives; 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, October 13-14, 1944, copy in author’s possession; 26th Infantry Regiment Combat Interview, CI-4; Daniel, “Aachen,” pp. 4-5, 7-8, MRC; “Aachen: 26th Infantry, Operations in Urban Terrain”; Bacik, “White Battalion Draws Red Blood,” pp. 6-7; Charles Dye, interview with Doug Canin, July 16, 1992, MRC.

6 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR, National Archives; 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal, October 13-14, 1944; 26th Infantry Regiment Combat Interview, CI-4; “Aachen: 26th Infantry, Operations in Urban Terrain”; Leroy Stewart, unpublished memoir, pp. 58-59, 1st Infantry Division Survey Material, Box 2, USAMHI; Richard Tregaskis, “House to House and Room to Room,” Saturday Evening Post, February 28, 1945, pp. 18-19; Mack Morris, “The Fight for Aachen,” Yank, October 29, 1944, p. 5; Captain L. G. Lawton, “Tank Infantry Team,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 1945, p. 32.

7 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S3 Journal, October 13-14, 1944, both at National Archives; F Company, 26th Infantry Regiment, “The Battle of Aachen,” AAR, Box 89; Daniel, “Aachen,” pp. 8-9, both at MRC; “Aachen: 26th Infantry, Operations in Urban Terrain”; Tregaskis, “House to House and Room to Room,” pp. 19-20.

8 26th Infantry Regiment, S3 Journal, National Archives; “Evacuation of Civilians from Aachen,” CI-4; Dick Lang, oral history; Dye interview, both at MRC; Morris, “The Fight for Aachen,” p. 6.

9 “Mines and Booby Traps in Aachen Operation,” contained in 1106th Engineer Combat Group records, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 14119, Folder 1, National Archives; “1106th Engineer Combat Group South of Aachen”; 26th Infantry, Combat Interview, both in CI-4; Curran, oral history; Dye interview, both at MRC; Stewart, unpublished memoir, pp. 60-63, USAMHI; Captain Amos Cahan, “Battalion Surgeon, Infantry,” Infantry Journal, May 1945, pp. 19-20; Tregaskis, “House to House, Room to Room,” pp. 101-02. The evidence of self-inflicted wounds is recorded in the 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, journal, October 16-20, 1944. All accounts and records agree that veterans were more susceptible to combat fatigue than new men.

10 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S3 Journal, October 15 and 16, 1944, both at National Archives; 26th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview, CI-4; 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, unit journal, October 15 and 16, 1944; Lieutenant Colonel John Corley, “Farwick Park, Aachen,” p. 1, Box 89; Curran, oral history, both at MRC; Runey, “Chaos, Cohesion and Leadership,” pp. 69-78; Charles Whiting, Bloody Aachen (New York: Playboy Press, 1976), pp. 152-55.

11 634th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Daily Reports, RG 407, Box 23602, Folder 1; 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S2 Journal, October 18 through 20, 1944; S3 Journal, October 18 through 20, 1944, all at National Archives; 26th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview, CI-4; F Company, 26th Infantry Regiment, “Battle of Aachen”; “Employment of Armored Vehicles in Street Warfare as seen by an Infantryman,” both in Box 89; Daniel, “Aachen,” pp. 11-12; Corley, “Farwick Park,” pp. 3-4, all at MRC; Stewart, unpublished memoir, pp. 63-65, USAMHI; 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, unit journal, October 18 through 20, 1944; “Aachen: 26th Infantry, Operations in Urban Terrain”; Runey, “Chaos, Cohesion, and Leadership,” pp. 80-84; Tregaskis, “House to House, Room to Room,” p. 102.

12 26th Infantry Regiment, AAR; S3 Journal, October 21, 1944, both at National Archives; 26th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview; “Experiences of Two American Prisoners of War Held in Aachen, Germany,” Combat Interview, both in CI-4; 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, unit journal, October 21, 1944; “Aachen: 26th Infantry, Operations in Urban Terrain”; Runey, “Chaos, Cohesion, and Leadership,” pp. 85-87; Keebaugh, “Offensive Action in Cities,” p. 10; Frederich Koechling, “The Battle of Aachen Sector,” Foreign Military Studies, Box 9, Folder A-989; Stewart, unpublished memoir, pp. 63-64, both at USAMHI; MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 316-20.

Chapter 4

1 99th Infantry Division, After Action Report (AAR), December 1944, Record Group (RG) 407, Entry 427, Box 14120, Folder 1, National Archives, College Park, MD; 99th Infantry Division, “The German Breakthrough,” Combat Interview (CI) #209, located in author’s personal collection; Hugh Cole, The United States Army in World War II: The Ardennes (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1965), pp. 19-47; Walter E. Lauer, Battle Babies: The Story of the 99th Infantry Division in World War II (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1950), pp. 1-12; Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), p. 83. For more on the ASTP program, see Louis Keefer, Scholars in Foxholes: The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., Inc., Publishers, 1988).

2 1st Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Recommendation for Unit Citation, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 14199, Folder 1, National Archives; Lloyd Long to Roger Foehringer, December 15, 1992, World War II Questionnaire #7320, 394th Infantry Regiment Material, Box 2; Milton Kitchens to Roger Foehringer, December 16, 1992, World War II Questionnaire #7065, 394th Infantry Regiment Material, Box 2, both at the United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Major William Kempton, S3, 394th Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain William Fox, January 30, 1945, CI-209; Captain Wesley Simmons, “The Operations of Company K, 394th Infantry (99th Infantry Division), in Defensive Action Near Elsenborn, Belgium, 16-21 December 1944, Personal Experience of a Company Commander,” Advanced Infantry Officer’s Course, 1949-1950, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia.

3 3rd Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview with Master Sergeant Forrest Pogue, January 29, 1945, CI-209; John Thornburg, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, World War II Questionnaire #7315, 394th Infantry Regiment Material, Box 3; John Kuhn, unpublished memoir, p. 157, World War II Questionnaire #7108, 394th Infantry Regiment Material, Box 2, both at USAMHI; Simmons, “The Operations of Company K”; Charles Roland, unpublished memoir, located in the archival collection of the National World War II Museum, New Orleans, LA. He later published this under the title My Odyssey Through History: Memoirs of War and Academe (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2004); William C. C. Cavanagh, The Battle East of Elsenborn & the Twin Villages (South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword Books, Limited, 2004), pp. 39-42. Although the Americans called the railroad station Buckholz Station, it was actually Losheimergraben Station.

4 1st Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Recommendation for Unit Citation, National Archives; 1st Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview with Captain John Howe; 2nd Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview, both in CI-209; 1st Battalion, 394th Infantry, History, World War II Questionnaire #10226, 394th Infantry Material, Box 1; Combs is quoted in “The Fight for Losheimergraben,” Richard H. Byers Papers, Box 1; Danny Dalyai to Charles, February 17, 1991, World War II Questionnaire #6789, 394th Infantry Material, Box 1; Bob Newbrough, unpublished memoir, p. 2, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, Box 4, Folder 2, all at USAMHI; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 34-38; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 82-86; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 169-70; Lauer, Battle Babies, p. 23.

5 1st Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Recommendation for Unit Citation, National Archives; 394th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview; 1st and 2nd Battalion, 394th Infantry Regiment, Combat Interviews, all in CI-209; I SS Panzer Corps, AAR, MS #B-779, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, Box 8, Folder 4; Ralph Gamber to Raphael D’Amico-Geran, no date, World War II Questionnaire #1897, 394th Infantry Material, Box 1; Gamber to Joe Doherty, no date, Battle of the Bulge Historical Foundation Papers, Box 14, 99th Infantry Division Folder; John Hilliard to Dick Byers, February 26, 1990; William Kirkbride, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-3, both in Richard H. Byers Papers, Box 1; Kitchens to Foehringer; Harold Schaefer, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-5, World War II Questionnaire #6787, 394th Infantry Material, Box 3, all at USAMHI; Steve Kallas, oral history, Steve Kallas Collection, #110, Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress (LOC), Washington, D.C. Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 73-86; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 85-86, 90-94. Along the lines of screwups: During the retreat, Colonel Riley rashly ordered his men to abandon their vehicles, rather than reconnoiter, when they encountered machine-gun fire near the twin villages of Krinkelt and Rocherath. As it turned out, a battle was raging in the towns and some of the fire was friendly. The order had the effect of dispersing and disorganizing the survivors of the 394th. In a memoir that is housed in the World War II Museum Archives, Lieutenant Henry Reath, an artillery liaison officer, harshly criticized Colonel Riley for this order.

6 393rd Infantry Regiment, AAR, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 14190, Folder 2, National Archives; 1st Battalion, 393rd Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview with Captain William Fox, January 27, 1945; 2nd Platoon, B Company, 393rd Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain William Fox, January 27, 1945, both in CI-209; Sergeant Ben Nawrocki, “Battle of the Bulge, 1944,” unpublished memoir, pp. 1-5, World War II Questionnaire #7895, 393rd Infantry Material, Box 2; Alvin Boeger, World War II Questionnaire #1637; Roy House, World War II Questionnaire #1499, both in 393rd Infantry Material, Box 1; Bernie Macay to Will Cavanagh, no date, Box 4, Folder 3, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, all at USAMHI; Lionel Adda, The Bulge Bugle, November 1990, pp. 16-17; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 95-98; Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and in Peace (Portland, OR: PPCT Research Publications, 2007), pp. 30-46.

7 393rd Infantry Regiment, AAR, December 1944, National Archives; 3rd Battalion, 393rd Infantry Regiment, Combat Interview with Captain William Fox, January 27, 1945, CI-209; Earl Wiseman to family, no date, World War II Questionnaire #7305; “History of Company M,” World War II Questionnaire #2485, both in 393rd Infantry Material, Box 3, USAMHI; Robert Dettor, diary, December 16, 1944, The Bulge Bugle, November 1994, p. 19; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 96-97.

8 393rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 14189, Folder 2; AAR, December 1944, both at National Archives; Major Elmer Schmierer, S3, 393rd Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain William Fox; 2nd Platoon, B Company, 393rd, Combat Interview; 1st Battalion, 393rd Infantry, Combat Interview; 3rd Battalion, 393rd Infantry, Combat Interview, all at CI-209; “History of Company M,” USAMHI; James Langford, unpublished memoir, pp. 2-4, James Langford Collection, #7983, LOC; Allyn Vannoy and Jay Karamales, Against the Panzers: United States Infantry Versus German Tanks, 1944-1945 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company Publishers, 1996), pp. 238-39; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 88-89; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 99-100. The 1st Battalion of the 393rd withdrew later on December 17.

9 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5366, Folder 1; 393rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History, AAR, December 1944, all at National Archives; all 393rd Infantry Combat Interviews, CI-209; Major General Walter Robertson, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, March 19, 1945; 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Combat Interview; Major Vernon Joseph, XO, 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, March 3, 1945, all at CI-20-21; Long Goffigan, Interview with Charles MacDonald, March 11, 1982, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, Box 2, Folder 3; Ewell Lee Smith to Charles MacDonald, June 23, 1975, Ewell Smith Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; Ewell Lee Smith to Colonel Cecil Roberts, September 10, 1985, Ewell Smith Papers, Box 1, Folder 3, all at USAMHI; Edward Bartkiewicz, oral history, Edward Bartkiewicz Collection, #18257, LOC; Charles MacDonald, Company Commander (New York: Bantam, 1947), pp. 119-22; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 376-77.

10 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit Journal, December 17, 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5368, Folder 1; 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History, December 1944; 741st Tank Battalion, AAR, December 1944; Unit Journal, December 17, 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 16703, Folder 8, all at National Archives; 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Combat Interview, CI-20-21; Ewell Lee Smith, unpublished memoir, pp. 16-2 through 16-4, Ewell Smith Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; Smith to MacDonald, Smith to Roberts, Smith Papers; Ewell Smith to Charles MacDonald, March 26, 1982, Box 2, Folder 3; Hugh Burger to Charles MacDonald, Box 2, Folder 3; Goffigan interview, all in Charles B. MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Bartkiewicz, oral history, LOC; Patrick Hargreaves, “With the Company Commander,” After the Battle, Number 73, pp. 4-10; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 91-98; Vannoy and Karamales, Against the Panzers, pp. 240-42; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 378-80; MacDonald, Company Commander, pp. 122-37. Most of the records list Smith as the commander of K Company during the battle, confirming his recollection that his CO was gone. However, MacDonald, in Company Commander, a book he published in 1947 while the battle was fresh in his mind, wrote about interacting with K Company’s original commander throughout the battle. Yet, forty years later, in A Time for Trumpets, MacDonald listed Smith as the CO. Because of these conflicting accounts, I have elected not to list the original K Company commander’s name.

11 38th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5375, Folder 7, and Box 5376, Folder 3, both at National Archives; “The German Breakthrough, V Corps Sector,” 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interview; 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, Combat Interview; Major William Hancock, Executive Officer, and Staff Sergeant Norman Bernstein, Operations Sergeant, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, March 17, 1945; Robertson interview, all at CI-20-21; Major General Walter Robertson, Record of Events, Box 2, Folder 3; Ralph Steele to Charles MacDonald, June 27, 1983, Box 2, Folder 3; Ralph Steele to Joe Doherty, April 8, 1982, Box 2, Folder 4, all in Charles B. MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 107-11; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 380-81.

12 Statement by First Lieutenant Roy Allen concerning “B” Company, 9th Inf engagement east of Rocherath, Belgium, on 17 and 18 December, 1944; 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Combat Interview; Hancock, Bernstein, Combat Interview, all at CI-20-21; Herbert Hunt, unpublished memoir, pp. 4-13; Herbert Hunt to Charles MacDonald, December 5, 1981, both in Box 2, Folder 5, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Frank Royer, unpublished memoir, pp. 4-5, Frank Royer Collection, #3858, LOC; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 109-11; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn , pp. 110-16; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 380-83; Vannoy and Karamales, Against the Panzers, pp. 244-48. The accounts differ as to what kind of tanks attacked on the evening of December 17. Some claim they were Jagdpanzers; others refer to “Tigers”; still others claim that the Germans attacked with Mark V Panthers. Because of this confusion, I have elected to refrain from describing what sort of tanks attacked. Also, I would be remiss if I did not mention that large elements of the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Frank Mildren were in the twin villages that evening and helped stave off the enemy attack. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I have chosen to focus exclusively on McKinley’s 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry.

13 Allen statement; 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, Combat Interview; Hancock, Bernstein, Combat Interview, all in CI-20-21; “AGF Report No. 559—Comments on Anti-tank Weapons,” p. 4, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia; Lieutenant Colonel Charles McMillan, “Manchus at the Crossroads: Defending the Northern Shoulder of the Bulge,” Army War College Paper; Brigadier General John Hinds, Commander, 2nd Infantry Division artillery to Will Cavanagh, September 30, 1982, Box 2, Folder 3; Steele to MacDonald, Box 2, Folder 3; Hunt, unpublished memoir, pp. 13-15, Box 2, Folder 5; First Sergeant Henry Albin to Scotty, September 14, 1981, Box 2, Folder 5, all in Charles B. MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Royer, unpublished memoir, p. 5, LOC; Edward Murphy, Heroes of World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, 1990), pp. 249-51; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 110-16; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 137-40; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 395-98; Vannoy and Karamales, Against the Panzers, pp. 248-52. McKinley reported that mines destroyed four of the German tanks; bazookas killed eleven; fire wrecked the other two.

14 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History; 38th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories; 1944 History, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5377, Folder 1, all at National Archives; 38th Infantry Regiment, AAR; Lieutenant Colonel Tom Morris, Executive Officer, 38th Infantry, interview with Captain Francis Phelps, February 23, 1945; 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, March 15, 1945, all at CI-20-21; Kenneth Myers, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, Box 13, Folder 7, Battle of the Bulge Historical Foundation; Byron Reburn, World War II Questionnaire #3075, 394th Infantry material, Box 3; Daniel Franklin to Charles MacDonald, Box 2, Folder 3, Charles B. MacDonald Papers, all at USAMHI; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 154-60; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 113-16.

15 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History; 38th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories, National Archives; 3rd Battalion, 23rd Infantry, Combat Interview; 38th Infantry, AAR; Captain Ralph Stallworth, Headquarters Company, 38th Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, February 24, 1945; 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, February 25, 1945; Lieutenant George Adams, Combat Interview with Captain Francis Phelps, February 25, 1945, all at CI-20-21; John Savard, unpublished memoir, pp. 33-35, World War II Questionnaire #7702, 2nd Infantry Division Material, Box 1; Burger to MacDonald, both at USAMHI; John Savard, The Bulge Bugle, February 1992, pp. 15-16; Merrill Huntzinger, Interview with Lesley Reser, Merrill Huntzinger Collection, #6793, LOC; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 399-400; Cavanagh, Battle East of Elsenborn, pp. 156-64.

16 Colonel Richard Schulze to Hubert Meyer, Box 9, Folder 10; C Company, 12th SS Panzer Regiment, 12th SS Panzer Division, unpublished memoirs, Box 9, Folder 10; I SS Panzer Corps, AAR, Box 8, Folder 4, all in Charles B. MacDonald Papers; “Operations of the Sixth Panzer Army,” Foreign Military Studies, Box 5, #A-924, all at USAMHI.

17 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, Summary of Operations, December 1944, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 23715, Folder 3; 741st Tank Battalion, AAR, December 1944; 23rd Infantry Regiment, Unit History; 38th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories, S3 Artillery Reports, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 5383, Folder 5, all at National Archives; Adams Combat Interview, CI-20-21; Captain Halland Hankel, “Operations of Company M, 38th Infantry (2nd ID) in the Vicinity of Krinkelt, Belgium, 17-20 December 1944, Personal Experiences of a Company Commander,” Advanced Infantry Officer’s Course, 1948-1949, found at Box 2, Folder 3, Charles B. MacDonald Papers; Hunt to MacDonald, both at USAMHI; Howard Daniels, Jr., “Tanks Versus the Infantry—No Quarrel,” letter to the editor in Infantry Journal, June 1950, p. 32; Major Robert Bateman, “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor,” Armor, January- February 2001, pp. 11-12; Joseph Kiss, The Bulge Bugle, February 1993, pp. 16-17; Vannoy and Karamales, Against the Panzers, pp. 255-62.

18 99th Infantry Division, AAR; 741st Tank Battalion, AAR; 38th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories, all at National Archives; 99th Infantry Division Combat Interview, CI-209; 2nd Infantry Division Combat Interview; 38th Infantry, AAR; 23rd Infantry Regiment list of casualties, all at CI-20-21; I SS Panzer Corps, AAR; Robertson, Record of Events, both in MacDonald Papers, USAMHI; Harold Etter to Mother, Collection Number 68, World War II Letters, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO; Lauer, Battle Babies, pp. 68-72; MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, pp. 400-402; Vannoy and Karamales, Against the Panzers, pp. 264-72; Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 120-28.

Chapter 5

1 Plans and Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Information, “Analysis of Public Statements on Ten Selected Issues of General William C. Westmoreland,” Record Group (RG) 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 42, Folder 1, National Archives, College Park, MD; Gerard DeGroot, A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War (Essex, England: Longman, 2000), pp. 134-42; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), p. 361; William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 145-50; Brian Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). In my opinion, Westmoreland is an example of a “Manager,” one of the intellectual groups Linn describes as influential in the Army since the early nineteenth century.

2 Lieutenant Colonel John “Skip” Fesmire, oral history, Vietnam Company Command Oral Histories, Box 12, Folder 3; Lieutenant General Harry Kinnard, oral history, Harry Kinnard Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, both at United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Lieutenant General John Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989), pp. 51-92; John Carland, “How We Got There: Air Assault and the Emergence of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965” (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2003), pp. 10-15.

3 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, March 10, 1966, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 3, Folder 2; 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, RG 472, Box 194, Folder 2, both at National Archives; Kinnard, oral history, USAMHI; John Prados, “Operation Masher: The Boundaries of Force,” VVA Veteran Magazine, February/March 2002; Lieutenant General Hal Moore, interview with the author, April 25, 2005; John Carland, The United States Army in Vietnam: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2000), pp. 201-03; Terrence Maitland and Peter McInerney, The Vietnam Experience: A Contagion of War (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 34-35; Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway, We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey to the Battlefields of Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), pp. 157-70. Moore is a legend in the history of the modern U.S. Army. For more on the Battle of Ia Drang, see the classic book he authored with Galloway entitled We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). The book was, of course, the subject of the 2002 feature film We Were Soldiers. Mel Gibson starred as Moore.

4 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, 1966, RG 472, Box 205, Folder 1; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, AAR, January 25 through February 16, 1966, RG 472, Records of the 3rd Military History Detachment, Box 1, Folder 1; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; Charles Kinney, Borrowed Time: A Medic’s View of the Vietnam War (Victoria, Canada: Trafford, 2003), pp. 19-21; Kenneth Mertel, Year of the Horse—Vietnam, 1st Air Cavalry in the Highlands (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), pp. 241-42; Larry Gwin, Baptism: A Vietnam Memoir (New York: Ivy Books, 1999), pp. 185-89; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 203-04; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 35; Tammy Bryant, message board post at www.virtualwall.org. Interestingly enough, although all the records speak of January 25 as an overcast, drizzly morning, General Moore told me that he remembers it as a sunny day.

5 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Operation Masher/White Wing, copy in author’s possession; 1st Cavalry Division, Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia; Kinney, Borrowed Time, p. 23; Moore interview; Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, pp. 403-04.

6 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, AAR, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; Al Hemingway, “ ‘Graveyard’ at LZ 4,” VFW Magazine, January 2004; Prados, “Operation Masher”; Moore interview; Robert Mason, Chickenhawk: A Shattering Personal Account of the Helicopter War in Vietnam (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 266-68; Kinney, Borrowed Time, pp. 23-30, 42; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 203-08; Maitland and McInerney,Contagion of War, pp. 36-40.

7 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, RG 472, Box 339, Folder 1; 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History, RG 472, Box 194, Folder 2; 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, AAR, February 22, 1966; 1st Cavalry Division After Action Critique, March 9, 1966, both in Records of the 3rd Military History Detachment, Box 1, Folder 1; 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History and AAR; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library; Prados, “Operation Masher”; Moore interview; John Laurence, The Cat from Hue: A Vietnam War Story (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. 315; Kinney, Borrowed Time, pp. 29-33; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 207-08; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 42-46. Bruce Crandall eventually earned the Medal of Honor for his courageous actions in the Ia Drang battle. His exploits at Luong Tho are not as well known, but they earned him a well-deserved Distinguished Flying Cross.

8 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Kinnard, oral history, USAMHI; Carland, Stemming the Tide, p. 203; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 46; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 164; Prados, “Operation Masher.” In discussing the name change many years later, Kinnard had an interesting Freudian slip. He mistakenly said that he renamed the operation “White Feather,” which is a common term for surrender. Perhaps, in his mind, the presidential order to change the name equated to a surrender of sorts.

9 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing; 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/ White Wing, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 3, Folder 2, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, 1966, Donovan Library; Moore interview; Swanson Hudson, “Deadly Fight in the Eagle’s Claw,” Eyewitness to War, 2002, p. 85; Edward Hymoff, The First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam (New York: MW Lads Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 66-68; Mason, Chickenhawk, p. 292; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 208-09; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 40-41, 46; Hiner’s account is at www.projectdelta.net. Oddly enough, the Special Forces after action report is missing from the National Archives.

10 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, Organizational History and AAR; 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Fesmire, oral history, USAMHI; Moore interview; Captain Myron Diduryk, “Operations of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in a search-and-destroy mission on 15 February 1966 during Operation White Wing (Eagle’s Claw) in Binh Dinh Province, Republic of Vietnam (Personal Experience of a Company Commander),” Career Officer Class No. 1, February 7, 1967, Donovan Library; Captain Myron Diduryk and Captain Anthony Hartle, “Momentum in the Attack,” Army, May 1967, pp. 35-38; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 208-10; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 46-47; Mason, Chickenhawk, pp. 299-300. Captain Diduryk was killed in 1970, during a subsequent tour of duty in Vietnam.

11 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Captain Robert McMahon, “Operations of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in the Attack upon a Main Force Viet Cong Heavy Weapons Battalion in the Vicinity of Bong Son,South Vietnam, 16-17 February 1966 (Personal Experience of a Company Commander)”; Captain Hubert Fincher, “Operations of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in the Relief of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in Vicinity of Bong-Son, South Vietnam, 16-17 February 1966,” both at Donovan Library; Jack Danner, oral history, Jack Danner Collection, #6052, Veterans History Project (VHP), American Folklife Center (AFC), Library of Congress (LOC), Washington, D.C.; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 211-12; Hymoff, First Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam, pp. 69-70. Danner was executive officer of A Company.

12 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, AAR, Masher/White Wing, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 1, Folder 1; 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, Unit Journal, February 20 through 23, 1966, RG 472, Box 139, Folder 8; Company A, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, AAR, February 25 through March 6, 1966, and February 18 through 25, 1966, both in RG 472, Box 258, Folder 2, all at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; “Honor and Courage: A Combat Chronicle by the Paratroopers of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry,” at www.honorandcourage.net; 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, Organizational History, Donovan Library; Hudson, “Deadly Fight in the Eagle’s Claw,” pp. 85-88; Jim Grayson, e-mail to author, circa 2007; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 212-14. Regrettably, the official history of the People’s Army in Vietnam (called NVA by the Americans), titled Victory in Vietnam, is next to worthless on Masher/White Wing. It contains only a few vague, propaganda-laced paragraphs.

13 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, After Action Comments, March 3, 1966, RG 472, MAC-V J3 Evaluation and Analysis Division, Box 1, Folder 1; 1st Cavalry Division, After Action Critique, both at National Archives; 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, AAR, Donovan Library; 1st Cavalry Division, AAR; Robert Crosson, oral history, Vietnam Veterans Interviews, Box 1, Folder 9, USAMHI; Moore interview; Robert Graham, “Vietnam: An Infantryman’s View of Our Failure,” Military Affairs , July 1984, p. 135; Carland, Stemming the Tide, pp. 214-15; Laurence, Cat from Hue, pp. 342-52; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 48; Moore and Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once, p. 404. With regard to the number of fire missions and shells fired, there is a slight discrepancy between the division artillery after action report and the division after action report. I believe that the artillery report is the better source for this information, so I drew my numbers from it. ARVN forces and the Korean Marines claimed to have killed another 808 enemy soldiers.

Chapter 6

1 Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, “A Strategic Appraisal, Vietnam”; Krulak to General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, no date, both in Box 1, Folder 6, Victor Krulak Papers; Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, Marine Corps oral history interview, June 1970, Box 3, Folder 22, Victory H. Krulak Papers; General William Westmoreland, oral history interview with Marine Corps Historical Center, April 4, 1983, all at U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division (USMCHMD), Gray Research Center (GRC), Quantico, VA; Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), pp. 195-200.

2 Westmoreland, oral history, GRC; Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Damm, “The Combined Action Program: A Tool for the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1998, p. 50; Captain Keith Kopets, “The Combined Action Program: Vietnam,” Small Wars Journal, no date, pp. 1-3; Jim Donovan, “Combined Action Program: Marines’ Alternative to Search and Destroy,” Vietnam, August 2004, pp. 26-29 (Jim also sent me a rough draft copy of his article); Peter Brush, “Civic Action: The Marine Corps Experience in Vietnam, Part I,” located at The Sixties Project Web site; Victor Krulak, obituary, Wall Street Journal, January 3-4, 2009, p. A5; Victor Krulak, First to Fight, pp. 195-200; William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1976), pp. 144-46; 164-66; William Corson, The Betrayal (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), p. 177; Gerald DeGroot, A Noble Cause? America and the Vietnam War (Essex, England: Longman, 2000), p. 156; Michael Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ Other War in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1989), p. 19. The conflict between Westy and the Marine commanders is sometimes portrayed as an interservice rift between the Army and Marines with the Army supposedly being exclusively wedded to conventional, big-unit war, with no interest in pacification. This is demonstrably untrue. From the earliest American intervention in Vietnam to the end of the war, the Army was heavily involved in pacification, primarily through Special Forces units, embedded advisors, mobile advisory teams, and civic action teams. In some instances, Army infantry battalions even carried out combined unit operations with the South Vietnamese Army. For more on the experiences of one unit in such operations, see John C. McManus, The 7th Infantry Regiment: Combat in an Age of Terror (New York: Forge, 2008), pp. 115-16. The difference between the Marines and the Army is that the Corps placed a higher priority on pacification and earmarked more of its regular infantrymen for that purpose.

3 “The Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Record Group (RG) 127, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Records of Units, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), Box 146, Folder 6, National Archives, College Park, MD; Robert Klyman, “The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken,” honors thesis, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1986, copy in author’s possession; Sergeant Frank Beardsley, “Combined Action,” Leatherneck, April 1966, pp. 20-24; Kopets, “Combined Action Program,” p. 4; Lewis Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 105-07; Al Hemingway, Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 22-25; Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1978), pp. 133-38; Graham Cosmas and Lieutenant Colonel Terrence Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1986), p. 139; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 23-27. The combined action units were known, during their various stages of growth, by several names, including CAC (combined action company), JAC (joint action companies), CAG (combined action groups), and CUPP (Combined Unit Pacification Program). For the sake of clarity, I have chosen to refer to them as combined action platoons (CAPs). The complicated administrative history of the program is beyond the purview of this chapter. For more on that aspect of the CAPs, see all the sources listed above.

4 “Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” National Archives; Lieutenant Colonel William Corson, “Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; Staff Sergeant Calvin Brown, oral histories, #707 and 1603, USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; David Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1989, p. 58; Edward Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action Program, Part I,” Marine Corps Gazette, January 1988, p. 37; John Akins, Nam Au Go Go: Falling for the Vietnamese Goddess of War (Port Jefferson, NY: The Vineyard Press, 2005), pp. 51-53; Thomas Flynn, A Voice of Hope (Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press, Inc., 1994), pp. 32-33; Jackson Estes, A Field of Innocence (Portland, OR: Breitenbush Books, 1987), p. 117; Barry Goodson, CAP Mot: The Story of a Marine Special Forces Unit in Vietnam, 1968-1969 (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1997), p. 10; Corson, The Betrayal, pp. 183-84, 193-94; Hemingway, Our War Was Different , pp. 49-51, 105-07; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 31-44.

5 FMFPAC, Operations Report, February 1967, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Corson, “Combined Action Program in Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; Gunnery Sergeant John Brockaway, oral history, #638; First Lieutenant Thomas Eagan, oral history, #707; Staff Sergeant Edward Evans, interview with Corporal Joseph Trainer and other CAP members at Thuy Phu village, #2341; Brown, oral history, #1603, all at USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Major Gary Telfer, Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1984), pp. 188-92; Peterson, Combined Action Platoons, pp. 44-45; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 99, 120.

6 Brockaway, oral history, Thuy Phu village interview, USMCHMD; Jim Donovan, interview with the author, July 3, 2008; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, p. 99; Flynn, Voice of Hope, p. 54; Goodson, CAP Mot, p. 53.

7 “The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; Thuy Phu village interview, both at USMCHMD; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” pp. 60-61; Donovan interview; Peterson, Combined Action Platoons, pp. 44-50. Nearly every report and every study on the program speaks of the language gap as a serious, protracted issue. This point is so beyond dispute that I saw little need to cite them all.

8 Lieutenant General Victor Krulak to Lieutenant General Lew Walt, December 2, 1966, enclosure, comments from the troops, Box 1, Folder 15, Victor H. Krulak Papers, GRC; Eagan, oral history, USMCHMD; Captain Nick Grosz, oral history, Vietnam Company Command Oral History, Box 16, Folder 1, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA (Grosz commanded a combined action company); Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Lieutenant Commander Lawrence Metcalf, “Corpsman Numbah One Bac Si!” Marine Corps Gazette, July 1970, pp. 12-13; Lawrence Metcalf, “The CAP Corpsman,” U.S. Navy Medicine, December 1970, pp. 8-9; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” p. 60; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 122-35; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 116-18. Most scholars agree that the MEDCAPs were the most successful aspect of civic action. Too much of the other American civic action efforts amounted to giveaways that engendered suspicion among the Vietnamese and did little to further the goal of pacification. The Vietnamese did value and appreciate the medical treatment, though. Lieutenant Eck put this best when he remarked: “When you give people material things, you don’t give them much. When you give them yourself, that’s something.” The CAP corpsmen gave generously of themselves.

9 “The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; III Marine Amphibious Force, Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation, 1968, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; Corson, The Betrayal, pp. 183-84; Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp. 187-91. The best single source on the daily patrols, firefights, and general war of wits between the CAPs and the VC is Bing West, The Village(New York: Pocket Books, 2000). The book covers the activities of one CAP in Binh Nghia over the course of several years. As a young officer, West was a participant as well as an observer/chronicler of the team’s actions. Despite being overrun twice, the Binh Nghia CAP succeeded in forging strong ties of kinship with the villagers. Because West’s fine book has been so heavily utilized by other CAP historians, I have chosen to rely upon other, lesser-known sources.

10 Eagan, oral history, USMCHMD; Edward Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: The Fire Next Time, Part Two,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988, pp. 67-73; Palm, “Tiger Papa Three, Part One”; Donovan interview; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 35-37; Goodson, CAP Mot, pp. 222-31, 84-88.

11 FMFPAC, AAR, April 1967; 1st Combined Action Group, AAR, February 1969; III Marine Amphibious Force citation recommendation, all copies in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” Reference Branch Files; “Interview with survivors of CAP 6, 3rd CAG,” oral history, #3222, both at USMCHMD; Jack Shulimson, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Blasiol, Charles Smith, and Captain David Dawson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1997), pp. 620-22; Flynn, A Voice of Hope, pp. 68-73; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 59-60, 86-92; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 56-59; Goodson, CAP Mot, pp. 91-107.

12 Donovan, “Combined Action Program,” pp. 31-32; Charles Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1988), pp. 291-94; Cosmas and Murray, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971, pp. 144-47; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 95-96, 166-69; Goodson, CAP Mot, p. 29; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 60-62.

13 “The Marine Combined Action Program,” National Archives; FMFPAC Monthly Operations Reports and Command Chronologies, 1965-1967 (these reports are of such questionable veracity that they are still known as “Krulak’s Fables”); III Marine Amphibious Force, Command Chronologies, 1965-1966, all copies in author’s possession, courtesy of Annette Amerman; Major R. D. King, “Future of Combined Action,” October 12, 1970; Corson, “Combined Action Program, Vietnam,” both in Reference Branch Files, USMCHMD; T. P. Schwartz, “The Combined Action Program: A Different Perspective,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1999, pp. 64-68; Palm, “Tiger Papa Three: The Fire Next Time,” p. 76; Sherman, “One Man’s CAP,” p. 62; Donovan, “Combined Action Program,” pp. 31-32; Kopets, “The Combined Action Program,” pp. 8-9; Donovan interview; Klyman, “An Alternative Not Taken”; James Trullinger, Village at War: An Account of Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Longman, 1980), pp. 115-32; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports , p. 166; Cosmas and Murray, Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971, pp. 148-49; Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy, p. 105; Hemingway, Our War Was Different, pp. 56, 83, 177-78; Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons, pp. 86-94. The North Vietnamese Army official history, Victory in Vietnam, is completely silent on the combined action platoons. Given the propagandistic tone that is prevalent in much of the work, perhaps this absence of commentary on the CAPs is a veiled recognition that they had some success.

Chapter 7

1 4th Infantry Division, “Battle of Dak To,” After Action Report (AAR), Record Group (RG) 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment, Box 200, Folder 2; General William Westmoreland, National Press Club Press Conference, November 21, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 32, Folder 4; General William Westmoreland message to Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, November 22, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 32, Folder 5; General William Westmoreland to Admiral Sharp, December 10, 1967, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, all at National Archives, College Park, MD; William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 236-38; Victor Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 201; Ted Arthurs, command sergeant major of the 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry, claims in Land with No Sun: A Year in Vietnam with the 173rd Airborne (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006) that the soldiers of his unit coined that unhappy moniker for Dak To; Robert Barr Smith, “A Lousy Place to Fight a War,” Vietnam, October 2005, pp. 28-30; Dale Andrade, “Why Westmoreland Was Right,” Vietnam, April 2009, offers a spirited defense of the general and his attrition strategy. The official People’s Army of Vietnam (NVA) history, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), hardly mentions the 1967 Dak To battle. Some historians believe that the NVA lured the Americans to Dak To so that they would not be in place to oppose the massive Tet Offensive of 1968, which mainly focused on populated areas. The NVA history does not specifically confirm this, though.

2 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, December 9, 1967, AAR, Box 200, Folder 5; 5th Special Forces Group, November 6-December 3, 1967, AAR, Box 200, Folder 6; 173rd Airborne Brigade, “The Battle of Dak To,” AAR, Box 200, Folder 3, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; General William Peers, briefing to MAC-V commander’s conference, December 3, 1967, RG 319, Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William C. Westmoreland Papers, Box 33, Folder 1, this and all previous sources at National Archives; William Peers, oral history, Box 1, Folder 1, William R. Peers Papers, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Barr, “A Lousy Place to Fight a War,” p. 28; Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), pp. 136-38, 166-69; Edward Murphy, Dak To: America’s Sky Soldiers in South Vietnam’s Central Highlands (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007), pp. 56-81, 133-34; Victory in Vietnam, p. 212.

3 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; Major John Ramsay, G3 Air, AAR, Box 200, Folder 6; 4th Infantry Division, Artillery, AAR, Box 200, Folder 3; General Order #404, PFC Clinton Bacon, Army Commendation Medal Citation; General Order #361, Spec-4 Cecil Millspaugh, Bronze Star Medal Citation, Box 205, Folder 6, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Presidential Unit Citation (PUC), RG 472, U.S. Army Vietnam, Adjutant General, Awards Branch, Box 9, Folder 4, this and all previous sources at National Archives; Bill Vigil, interview with the author, April 7, 2008; Steve Edmunds, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-2, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Edmunds; www.ivydragoons.org Web site.

4 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; General Order #4563, PFC Nathaniel Thompson, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #4561, PFC William Muir, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #320, Spec-4 John Kind, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #94, PFC John Trahan, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation, all citations in RG 472, Box 205, Folder 6, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Division, PUC, RG 472, U.S. Army Vietnam, Adjutant General, Awards Branch, Box 9, Folder 4, this and all previous sources at National Archives; Bob Walkowiak, e-mail to the author, March 25, 2008; Robert Babcock, ed., War Stories: Utah Beach to Pleiku (Marietta, GA: Deeds Publishing, 2001), pp. 566-71.

5 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, AAR; G3 Air, AAR; 4th Infantry Division, Artillery, AAR; 4th Aviation Battalion, Box 200, Folder 3; 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion, AAR, Box 200, Folder 3; 4th Infantry Division, Outline and Statistical Summary, Dak To Operation, Box 200, Folder 4; General Order #4502, Captain John Falcone, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #370, Lieutenant William Gauff, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation; General Order #4285, Staff Sergeant Raymond Ortiz, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #1187, Captain John Mirus, Silver Star Medal Citation; General Order #148, Spec-4 Stephen Edmunds, Bronze Star with “V” for Valor Medal Citation, Box 205, Folder 6, all in RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment; 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, PUC, all at National Archives; Walkowiak e-mail; Steve Edmunds, unpublished memoir, pp. 1-3; Larry Skogler, interview with the author, April 18, 2008; Babcock, War Stories, pp. 571-77; www.ivydragoons.orgwww.virtualwall.org, John Falcone entry. Lieutenant Colonel Belknap was killed in a helicopter accident a couple weeks after the Battle of Hill 724. Several Ivy Dragoons told me that the crash destroyed many of the battle records, making 724 somewhat anonymous in the history of the Dak To campaign. I hope that my account has redressed that anonymity somewhat.

6 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR, RG 472, Records of the 29th Military History Detachment, Box 200, Folder 3; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Presidential Unit Citation, Dak To, RG 472, Adjutant General Award’s Branch, Box 5, Folder 9; 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Operation MacArthur, AAR, RG 472, Box 1101, Folder 1, all at National Archives; Thomas McElwain, interview with the author, March 2, 2008; Ken Lambertson, interview with the author, April 9, 2008; David Watson, interview with the author, January 25, 2008; Terrence Maitland and Peter McInerney, The Vietnam Experience: A Contagion of War (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 170-71; Arthurs, Land with No Sun, p. 159; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 56-81, 174-84. Every Task Force Black veteran with whom I spoke was effusive in their praise for McElwain.

7 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, National Archives; Jerry Cecil, interview with the author, January 10, 2008; Ken Cox, interview with the author, April 21, 2008; McElwain interview; Jerry Cecil, e-mail to the author, February 16, 2009; Rick Atkinson, The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point’s Class of 1966 (New York: Owl Books, 1989), p. 241; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 184-88; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 170-71.

8 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, National Archives; McElwain, Cecil, and Cox interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 187-89; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 170-71. The critique on the strategic implications of the defensive tactics is purely my interpretation. McElwain advanced no such opinions.

9 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC; 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Operation MacArthur, AAR, all at National Archives; Ed Kelley, interview with the author, April 4, 2008; Jerry Curry, interview with the author, April 15, 2008; McElwain, Lambertson, Watson interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 190-91; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 171-72. Kelley told me that he has never forgiven himself for bypassing the machine gun and, as of 2008, he still felt enormous guilt about it.

10 John Barnes, Medal of Honor citation material, RG 472, Medal of Honor Awards, Case Files, Box 2, Folder 11; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; McElwain, Cecil, Cox interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 193-94. Cecil received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions.

11 Barnes, Medal of Honor citation material; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Kelley, Curry, McElwain, Lambertson, Cox, Watson interviews; Murphy, Dak To, p. 193. To make sure that the vaporized men would not be listed as missing in action, Curry later signed a sworn statement attesting to the fact that he had seen them die. The after action reports claim that Hardy was hit twice in the chest, rather than three times in various places, as Watson recalled. Because Watson was so close to the captain when he was hit, I have relied on his account.

12 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC; sworn statements of Lieutenant George Brown, Sergeant Robert Lampkin, Spec-4 James Townsend, and Spec-4 Robert Ferry, located within Barnes Medal of Honor citation material, all at National Archives; Jim Stanzak, interview with the author, January 28, 2008; Lambertson, Curry, Watson, Kelley interviews; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 171-73. The grenade that killed Barnes was a Chinese “Chicom” pineapple grenade. By this point in the battle, though, the NVA were also using American grenades. They had captured them when helicopter crews attempted to resupply hard-pressed Task Force Black but, under heavy fire, dropped their loads outside the perimeter, in terrain controlled by the enemy. The Task Force Black survivors have nothing but deep respect for the bravery of the aviators that day, especially Warrant Officer Gary Bass (code-named Flower Power), who routinely risked his life to help the grunts.

13 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC; 1st Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Operation MacArthur, AAR, all at National Archives; Chuck Clutter, interview with the author, January 15, 2008; Jacques “Jack” deRemer, interview with the author, February 8, 2008; McElwain, Kelley, Curry interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 191-93. Every Task Force Black survivor with whom I spoke expressed considerable dislike for Schumacher. In my interview with McElwain, he was quite forthright in describing his disdain for the battalion commander. He also told me that he did not have a very high opinion of Captain Jesmer, whom he thought of as overly cautious and a bit disingenuous. McElwain, and some of his men, resented Task Force Blue’s inability to provide any help on November 11. From the Task Force Black point of view, Jesmer’s unit was only dealing with moderate sniper fire and should have put forth a much more aggressive effort to relieve Task Force Black. Some of the men even told me that, a couple weeks after the battle, a grieving McElwain picked a fight with Jesmer and beat him up at the officer’s club.

14 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, National Archives; Mike Tanner, interview with the author, April 18, 2008; Mike Tanner, unpublished memoir, pp. 67-68, 168, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Tanner; Bill Connolly, interview with the author, July 2, 2008; Lynne Morse, interview with the author, June 17, 2008; McElwain, deRemer interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 200-204; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 173-75. Task Force Black actually lost at least twenty-two killed because the two missing men were the machine gunners whom Staff Sergeant Curry saw disintegrated by a rocket. Apparently two more men were missing as well and many of the survivors were tormented by guilt for years because they thought the missing men might have become POWs. These two men were later confirmed as killed, though. The artillery support on the evening of November 11 disfigured some of the Task Force Black bodies that were lying throughout the battle area. Several of the men said that Captain Hardy’s body was headless when they recovered it the next day. Ivan Pierce, the forward personnel officer, later confirmed this. His job was to process and account for all casualties. He personally saw Hardy’s remains and wrote about this in his memoir, An Infantry Lieutenant’s Vietnam (El Dorado Springs, MO: Capsarge Publishing, 2004), pp. 78-79.

15 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, National Archives; McElwain, Kelley, Stanzak, Watson, Curry, Cecil, deRemer, Lambertson, Clutter interviews; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 204-06; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 174. In the weeks following the battle, McElwain quarreled again with Schumacher when the colonel tried to turn down PFC Barnes’s Medal of Honor citation because “we don’t decorate people who commit suicide.” Fortunately, McElwain did not back down in the face of such disrespectful idiocy and the young soldier received the medal he so richly deserved. McElwain later told me: “I’m kind of surprised that he didn’t relieve me.”

16 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Operation MacArthur, AAR, RG 472, Box 1125, Folder 1; Carlos Lozada, Medal of Honor material, RG 472, Medal of Honor Awards, Box 14, Folder 3; 5th Special Forces Group, Dak To, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Leonard B. Scott, “The Battle for Hill 875, Dak To, Vietnam 1967,” paper prepared for Army War College, USAMHI; Combat Zone: Hill 875, Vietnam, Military Channel documentary, 2007; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 248-58; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 179-80. Typical of many battalion commanders in Vietnam, Steverson was in a helicopter above the action and thus did not have much feel for what was happening on the ground.

17 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, AAR; sworn statements of Spec-4 James Kelley, PFC Anthony Romano, and First Lieutenant Joseph Sheridan, in Carlos Lozada Medal of Honor material; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Combat Zone: Hill 875; John Steer, “True Valor at Hill 875,” Vietnam, June 1990, pp. 42-43; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 261-64; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 180. Lozada left behind a young wife and baby girl.

18 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC; sworn statements of First Lieutenant Bryan McDonough, Staff Sergeant John Gentry, Sergeant Paul Ramirez, Sergeant Jimmy Stacey, and Lieutenant Colonel John Hulme, RG 472, Medal of Honor Awards, Box 23, Folder 18, all at National Archives; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875,” USAMHI; Combat Zone: Hill 875; Kelley interview; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 266-67, 269, 274-75. Scott claims that eleven out of thirteen of the 2nd Battalion medics were killed and the other two wounded. There is no way to be sure when the eleven were killed.

19 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC; 4th Infantry Division, G3 Air, AAR, all at National Archives; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875,” USAMHI; Combat Zone: Hill 875; Clarence Johnson, interview with the author, February 1, 2008; Steer, “True Valor at Hill 875,” pp. 43-44; Lawrence Okendo, Sky Soldier: Battles of Dak To (self-published, 1988), pp. 107-08; Atkinson, Long Gray Line, pp. 248-50; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 272-82; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 180-81. As of this writing, the identity of the pilot and plane that made the tragic mistake at Hill 875 is still not definite. 2nd Battalion records claim that F-100 Super Sabres and A-1Es provided the close air support that day, indicating that the Air Force was responsible. Other accounts claim that the plane was a Marine jet. Because there is still no certainty over this, I felt that my account should reflect that. In the summer of 2008, while researching the friendly fire bombing at the National Archives, I met Joe Nigro, a Vietnam veteran and retired police officer who is also investigating the incident, but without definitive information. For the sake of closure for the veterans, he is hoping to find the elusive answers.

20 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Captain Ron Leonard, oral history, Vietnam Company Command Oral History, Box 21, Folder 8 (Leonard commanded Bravo Company); Scott, “Battle for Hill 875,” both at USAMHI; Combat Zone: Hill 875; 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Battle of Dak To, Hill 875, AAR, copy in author’s possession; Johnson interview; Rocky Stone, e-mails to author, January 8 and 10, 2008; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 277-94.

21 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, National Archives; 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Hill 875, AAR; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875,” USAMHI; Connolly, Morse interviews; Stone, e-mails to author, January 8 and 10, 2008; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 298-03; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 182.

22 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875”; Leonard, Peers, oral histories, all at USAMHI; 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Hill 875, AAR; Connolly, Morse, Tanner interviews; Tanner, unpublished memoir, pp. 75-77; Stone, e-mails to author, January 8, 10, and 12, 2008; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 304-11; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, p. 182.

23 4th Infantry Division, AAR; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875”; Leonard, oral history, both at USAMHI; 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Hill 875, AAR; George Wilkins, interview with the author, March 10, 2008; Larry Cousins, interview with the author, February 26, 2008; Hal Birch to the author, March 14 and May 4, 2008 (Birch was the commander of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry); Connolly, Tanner interviews; Tanner, unpublished memoir, pp. 83-87; Stone, e-mails to author, January 10 and 12, 2008; Al Undiemi, e-mail to author, January 11, 2008; “Dak To: The Battle for Hill 875, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division,” after action report and firsthand accounts compiled by Roger Hill, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Mr. Hill; Murphy, Dak To, pp. 315-20; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 182-83.

24 Public Statements of General William Westmoreland, RG 472, Box 42, Folder 1; General William Westmoreland, National Press Club, Q&A, November 21, 1967, Box 32, Folder 4, both in Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History, William Westmoreland Papers; 4th Infantry Division, AAR; G3 Air, AAR; Division Artillery, AAR; Peers Briefing; Outline and Statistical Summary; 173rd Airborne Brigade, Dak To, AAR; PUC, all at National Archives; Scott, “Battle for Hill 875”; Leonard, Peers, oral histories, all at USAMHI; 4th Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, Hill 875, AAR; Bill Ballard, interview with the author, January 22, 2008; Tanner, Morse, Connolly, Wilkins, Cousins interviews; Tanner, unpublished memoir, pp. 88-89; Dennis Lewallen, e-mail to author, January 9, 2008; Hill, “Dak To: Battle for Hill 875”; Birch to author, May 4, 2008; Stone, e-mails to author, January 8, 10, and 12, 2008; Undiemi, e-mail to author, January 11, 2008; Major George P. Long, S3, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, “Battle for Dak To,” pp. 41-43, in Lieutenant Colonel Albert Garland, A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam(New York: Jove Books, 1983); Murphy, Dak To, pp. 321-32; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 238-39; Maitland and McInerney, Contagion of War, pp. 182-83. Rocky Stone was one of the men who adamantly opposed the turkey dinner as an insult to the memory of dead comrades. For the next forty years, he had trouble even eating turkey, much less sitting down to Thanksgiving dinner with his family. After the passage of several decades, he could finally bring himself to enjoy a Thanksgiving meal with the family, but he insisted that they eat ham.

Chapter 8

1 United States General Accounting Office, “Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives: Operation Desert Storm, Evaluation of the Air Campaign,” pp. 19-41 (June 1997); Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bolger, “What Happened at Khafji: Learning the Wrong Lesson,” paper prepared for the Army War College, United States Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, PA; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 227-28; Alex Vernon, Most Succinctly Bred (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006), p. 44; Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Forces from World War II Through Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 367-74; Stephen Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2002), p. 455; Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), p. 1. For a reasonably balanced, albeit slightly air-centric look at air power in the war, see Lieutenant Colonel Jerome Martin, “Victory from Above: Air Power Theory and the Conduct of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.” As of this writing, Bolger is a two-star general in command of the 1st Cavalry Division.

2 Robert Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993), pp. 15-36; William Hartzog, American Military Heritage (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2001), pp. 220-24; Frank Shubert and Theresa Krauss, general eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2001), pp. 208-15; Allan Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 644-52. For a close look at what the transformation to an all-volunteer force was like in one mechanized infantry unit, see my own The 7th Infantry Regiment: Combat in an Age of Terror, the Korean War Through the Present (New York: Forge, 2008), pp. 170-74.

3 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-21.71, “Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), available on www.globalsecurity.org; Kurt Dabb, rifleman, Alpha 2-7 Infantry, Desert Storm, interview with the author, June 13, 2001; Rick Averna, commander, Charlie 2-7 Infantry, Desert Storm, interview with the author, June 25, 2001; Bradley Fighting Vehicle, personal knowledge; Daniel Bolger, Death Ground: Today’s American Infantry in Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999), pp. 126-29.

4 Colonel Michael Krause, Ph.D., “The Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991”; 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, After Action Report (AAR), Gulf War Collection, Box 1, Folder 5, both at USAMHI; Richard Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting,” Armor, May-June 1992, pp. 11-17; Daniel Davis, “2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment at the Battle of 73 Easting,” Field Artillery, April 1992, pp. 48-53; Vince Crowley, “Ghost Troop’s Battle at 73 Easting,” Armor, May-June 1991, pp. 7-12; Douglas Macgregor, Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp. 139-81. Macgregor was S3 of Cougar Squadron, the parent unit for both Eagle and Ghost Troops; Alberto Bin, Richard Hill, and Archer Jones, Desert Storm: A Forgotten War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 193-99; Thomas Houlahan, Gulf War: The Complete History (New London, NH: Schrenker Military Publishing, 1999), pp. 325-32; Atkinson, Crusade!, pp. 441-48; Scales, Certain Victory, pp. 1-5; Bourque, Jayhawk!, pp. 325-31. McMaster holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina and is a leading scholar on the American war in Vietnam. As of this writing, he is a brigadier general with a distinguished record of combat command, not just in the Gulf War but in the Iraq War as well.

5 Father (Captain) David Kenehan, personal diary, February 26-27, 1991, Box 1, Folder 1, David Kenehan Papers; Lieutenant Colonel James Hillman, “Task Force 1-41 Infantry: Fratricide Experience in Southwest Asia,” Army War College Paper; “1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Desert Shield/Desert Storm History,” all at USAMHI; Captain Douglas Robbins, “Operation Desert Storm: Battle of Norfolk, Scout Platoon, Task Force 5-16, 1ID”; First Lieutenant Donald Murray, “Desert Storm Monograph”; Captain James Petro, “Operations of the 5th Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division) During Breaching Operations of the Iraqi Main Defenses, 24-28 February 1991,” all at Donovan Library, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia; John S. Brown, “Desert Reckoning: Historical Continuities and the Battle for Norfolk, 1991,” U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI; Colonel Lon Maggart, “A Leap of Faith,” Armor, January-February 1992, pp. 24-32; Steve Vogel, “‘Fast and Hard’: The Big Red One’s Race Through Iraq,” Army Times, March 25, 1991, pp. 2, 13; “Hell Night: For the Second Armored Division It Was No Clean War,” Army Times, October 7, 1991, pp. 8, 14-18, 24, 69; Scott Rutter, commander, Charlie 2-16 Infantry, Desert Storm, interview with the author, February 10, 2008; Houlahan, Gulf War, pp. 333-54; Scales, Certain Victory, pp. 276-84; Bourque, Jayhawk! , pp. 331-37. Houlahan’s study is particularly strong on the fratricide incidents. Rutter was not in the Norfolk battle, but his perspective as an infantry company commander in the same division enhanced my understanding of the battle.

6 Captain Daniel Stempniak, “The Battle of the Al Mutlaa Police Post, 26 February, 1991,” Donovan Library, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Ms. Genoa Stanford; J. Paul Scicchitano, “Eye of the Tiger,” Army Times, June 10, 1991, pp. 18, 61; Stephen Bourque and John Burdan, “A Nervous Night on the Basrah Road,” Military History Quarterly, Autumn 1999, pp. 88-97; Al Santoli, ed., Leading the Way: How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military, an Oral History (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 337-39; Richard Swain, “Lucky War”: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997), p. 265; Bolger, Death Ground, pp. 118-52.

7 Lieutenant Colonel John Garrett, CO, and Major Craig Huddleston, XO, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, March 5, 1991, Box 170, Folder 3; Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Hannigan, CO, and Major Brad Washabaugh, S3, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, March 5, 1991, Box 170, Folder 4; Task Force Ripper, group interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, March 11, 1991, Box 165, Folder 7; Task Force Papa Bear, combat engineers, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, no date, Box 165, Folder 15, all at oral history collection, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Quantico, VA; John Admire, “The 3rd Marines in Desert Storm,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1991, pp. 69-71; Major General Michael Myatt, “Close Air Support and Fire Support in Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Marine Corps Gazette, May 1998, pp. 72-73; Staff Sergeant Lee Tibbetts, “Squad Leader Awarded Medal for Gallantry,” Marines, March 1992, pp. 23-24; Otto Kreisher, “Marines’ Minefield Assault,” Military History Quarterly, Summer 2002, pp. 6-15; Otto Lehrack, ed., America’s Battalion: Marines in the First Gulf War (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2005), pp. 168-95; Bin et al., Desert Storm, pp. 159, 165-71; Santoli, Leading the Way, pp. 322-26.

8 Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hancock, personal narrative, Frank Hancock Papers, Box 1, Folder 2; Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hancock, “North to the Euphrates: Part One, the Taking of Cobra,” Army War College Paper; Colonel Tom Hill, 1st Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division AAR, Gulf War Collection, Box 1, Folder 6, all at USAMHI; Captain Mark Esper, “The Screaming Eagles of Desert Storm,” Donovan Library; Sean Naylor, “Flight of Eagles: The 101st Airborne Division’s Raids into Iraq,” Army Times, July 22, 1991, p. 14; Lieutenant General Edward Flanagan, Lightning: The 101st in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1994), pp. 165-201; Thomas Taylor, Lightning in the Storm: The 101st Air Assault Division in the Gulf War (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1994), pp. 305-79; Houlahan, Gulf War, pp. 241-51; Santoli, Leading the Way, pp. 332-33; Bolger, Death Ground, pp. 75-97.

9 Bolger, “What Happened at Khafji,” Army War College Paper, USAMHI; Lewis, The American Culture of War, pp. 374, 386-91. Modern insurgent groups have often employed jungles and mountains quite effectively. Usually, they only come to power, though, when they seize control of cities or waterways. Fidel Castro’s Cuban revolutionary movement and the Viet Cong are classic examples of this.

Chapter 9

1 Owen West, “Dispatches from Fallujah,” July 30, 2004, www.slate.com. Most of this passage is derived from a mixture of common knowledge and my own opinion. The Cheney quote is at www.wikiquote.com. The best single book on the planning and initial execution of the Iraq War is Tom Ricks’s Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006). The Schwarzkopf quote is from page 83 of that book.

2 Gunnery Sergeant Mark Oliva, “Shutting Down Fallujah,” Leatherneck, June 2004, p. 18; Jonathan Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?” Naval Institute Proceedings , January 2005, pp. 1-2; Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam Books, 2005), pp. 26-63; David Danelo, Blood Stripes: The Grunt’s View of the War in Iraq (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), pp. 88-90; Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts (New York: Vintage, 2005), pp. 345-48. Like most religions, Islam also forbids the mutilation of bodies. At the prodding of the Americans, Fallujah’s sheiks, imams, and elders publicly condemned the mutilations, but they refused to denounce the terrorists in their midst. This reflected popular opinion in Fallujah, which was quite anti-American and, at this point, supportive of the insurgents.

3 Eric Schmitt, “Marines Battle Guerrillas in Streets of Fallujah,” New York Times, April 9, 2004; Sergeants Earl Catagnus, Jr. & Brad Edison & Lance Corporals James Keeling & David Moon, “Infantry Squad Tactics: Some of the Lessons Learned During MOUT in the Battle for Fallujah,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 2005, pp. 80-82; Ross Simpson, “Fallujah: A Four-Letter Word,” Leatherneck, February 2005, pp. 16-19; Captain Michael Skaggs, “Tank-Infantry Integration,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2005, pp. 41-42; Patrick Finnigan, interview with the author, February 23, 2008; West, No True Glory, pp. 63-68; Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 360-66. Several years after being wounded in Fallujah, Finnigan was still finding fragments in his body. I told him that I knew many World War II veterans who still had pieces in their bodies sixty years after the fact.

4 Bing West, “The Road to Haditha,” Atlantic Monthly, October 2006; Christine Hauser, “War Reports from Civilians Stir up Iraqis against U.S.,” New York Times, April 14, 2004; Christine Hauser and Jeff Warzer, “Siege Defined on Stones Set in Haste in the Dirt,” New York Times, April 28, 2004; Edward Wong, “Battle for Fallujah Rouses the Anger of Iraqis Weary of the U.S. Occupation,” New York Times, April 22, 2004; John Burns, “U.S. Pummels Rebel Positions as Fierce Clash Shakes Fallujah,” New York Times, April 28, 2004; Ilario Pantano with Malcolm McConnell, Warlord: No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006), pp. 197-99; West, No True Glory, pp. 68-73, 90-93, 118-21.

5 Ross Simpson, “In the Crosshairs: USMC Snipers in Iraq,” Leatherneck, June 2004, pp. 24, 27; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Marines in Fallujah Still Face and Return Relentless Fire,” New York Times, April 14, 2004; Finnegan interview; Milo Afong, Hogs in the Shadows: Combat Stories from Marine Snipers in Iraq (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2007), pp. 98-112; West, No True Glory, pp. 172-77. For a good discussion of the moral struggle inherent in sniping, see Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), pp. 108-10, 254-55. For his effective sniping, Finnigan earned a Navy Commendation Medal with a Combat “V” for Valor.

6 Adnan Khan, “After the Siege,” McLean’s, May 17, 2004; Paul Quinn-Judge, “Life on the Front Lines,” Time, May 10, 2004; Finnigan interview; Pantano, Warlord, pp. 199, 232; Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 368-69; Afong, Hogs in the Shadows, pp. 111-12; West, No True Glory, pp. 208-25. Bellon was a high school classmate and football teammate of mine at Chaminade College Preparatory in St. Louis.

7 Lieutenant Colonel Willard Buhl, interview with Captain Steven “Joe” Winslow, October 28, 2004, declassified oral history at U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division (USMCHMD), Quantico, VA; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon to Dad, November 8, 2004, originally posted at www.thegreenzone.com, copy in author’s possession; Gunnery Sergeant Matt Hevezi, “‘Battle for Fallujah: They’ve Chosen a Path of Violence,’” Leatherneck, December 2005, pp. 40-42; Lieutenant General John Sattler and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr: The Battle of Fallujah, Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, pp. 12-14; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; “The Battle for Fallujah,” at www.talkingproud.us; Donald Wright and Timothy Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, the United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp. 345-51; West, No True Glory, pp. 227-32.

8 Major General Richard Natonski, interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Way, March 16, 2005; Colonel Craig Tucker, interview with Major Steven “Joe” Winslow, August 11, 2006; Lieutenant General John Sattler, interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Way, April 8, 2005; Buhl interview, all at USMCHMD; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; “Battle for Fallujah,” at www.talkingproud.us; Kendall Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I: The U.S. Army in Operation Al Fajr, an Oral History (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007), pp. 4-8, 159; West, No True Glory, pp. 250-60. By the time of the Tucker interview, Winslow had been promoted to major.

9 Colonel Michael Shupp, interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Way, March 27, 2005; Sattler, Natonski, Tucker interviews, all at USMCHMD; Richard Oppel, Jr., “Early Target of Offensive Is a Hospital,” New York Times, November 8, 2004; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 14-19; Matt Matthews, Operation Al Fajr: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), pp. 13-36; David Bellavia with John Bruning, House to House: An Epic Memoir of War(New York: Free Press, 2007), pp. 47-48; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 8-10; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 344-52; West, No True Glory, pp. 257-67. The Americans used several names for the Iraqi Army soldiers who fought with them at Fallujah: Iraqi Intervention Force, Iraqi National Guard, and Iraqi Armed Forces. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to call them the Iraqi Army.

10 Shupp interview, USMCHMD; Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell, interview with the author, January 11, 2008; Task Force 2-2 Infantry, “Operation Phantom Fury,” AAR; Unit Journal and Timeline, copies in author’s possession, courtesy of LTC Newell; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon to Dad, November 20, 2004, www.thegreenzone.com, copy in author’s possession; Hevezi, “‘They’ve Chosen a Path of Violence,’” pp. 42-43; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 20-23; Patrick O’Donnell, We Were One: Shoulder to Shoulder with the Marines who took Fallujah (New York: DaCapo, 2006), pp. 62-63; Gary Livingston, Fallujah with Honor: First Battalion, Eighth Marines in Operation Phantom Fury (North Topsail Beach, NC: Caisson Press, 2006), pp. 37-38; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, p. 39; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 60-62, 73-75; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 92-94; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 250-52. Command Sergeant Major Faulkenberg was killed on the first night of the battle. He was leading a group of Iraqi soldiers into the city, under intense fire, when a bullet caught him just above the right eye. He later died at the battalion aid station.

11 Gunnery Sergeant Duanne Walters, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 6, 2005; Shupp, Tucker, Natonski interviews, all at USMCHMD; TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; “Battle for Fallujah,” at www.talkingproud.us; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 73-77; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 352-55; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 74-96; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 39-45; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 9-10, 52-57, 91-95, 144-45; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 229-31, 251-54; Livingston, Fallujah, with Honor, pp. 44-45. For the diagnosis of acoustic trauma, I consulted my wife, Nancy, an audiology clinician with a doctorate (Aud.) in her field. The Americans took significant criticism in world media reports for using white phosphorous, as if they were employing some sort of new and heinous chemical weapon. The criticism only increased when the State Department ignorantly denied that the commanders at Fallujah were using it. Army and Marine spokesmen readily admitted its use, and they were anything but apologetic about it. For those who knew anything about modern American military history, the employment of white phosphorous was nothing new.

12 TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; Michael Ware, “Into the Hot Zone,” Time, November 22, 2004, p. 35; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 21-22; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-11; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 31-32, 254-57; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 112-27, 144-63; Grossman, On Killing, pp. 87-93, 282-85; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 353-54; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 44-46. By 2004, most squad leaders and team leaders were equipped with portable and/or headset radios to communicate with other leaders at the platoon and company level.

13 Sattler, Natonski, Shupp, Tucker interviews, all at USMCHMD; TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, journal and timeline; Newell interview; Toby Harnden, “70 Insurgents Killed in Mosque Battle,” London Daily Telegraph, November 11, 2004; Toby Harnden, “A Cat Ate the Face of a Corpse,” Spectator, November 20, 2004; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 56-61, 227-28, 302-04; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 32-34, 155-57, 257-60; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 191-201; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 45-47. The senior commanders, Marine and Army, all seemed to appreciate the respective strengths and weaknesses of their units. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Newell fully understood that his mechanized formations would penetrate Fallujah faster than the Marine light infantry and he planned for that. General Sattler understood the very same thing—he had requested the two Army mech battalions because of their capabilities, albeit with the expectation that his Marines would end up clearing most of Fallujah’s buildings. The negative perceptions about Marine and Army capabilities came mainly from junior officers and NCOs who were not as well versed in the big picture.

14 Ware, “Into the Hot Zone,” pp. 32-36; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-12, 256-59; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 259-69; Grossman, On Killing, pp. 114-37; Bellavia, House to House, pp. 201-72. Lawson’s quotes are from a CNN interview. Multiple firsthand accounts from Bellavia about this harrowing experience are posted on www.youtube.com. According to Bellavia, the men in the hell house were Palestinians who were affiliated with Hezbollah. He and the other grunts found drug paraphernalia that indicated the insurgents had shot themselves up with atoprine and epinephrine, drugs that produced a stimulant effect roughly similar to PCP (angel dust). This was common in Fallujah and it made the mujahideen especially hard to kill. Bellavia earned a Silver Star and Bronze Star for his actions in Iraq. He also was nominated for the Medal of Honor. The status of his case is pending. He left the Army in 2005.

15 TF 2-2 Infantry, AAR, timeline and journal; Ilana Ozernoy, “Taking It to the Mean Streets, Fallujah, Iraq,” U.S. News & World Report, November 22, 2004; Ilana Ozernoy and Julian Barnes, “Taking Fallujah: U.S. Forces Strike Iraq’s Hard-core I nsurgents,” U.S. News & World Report, November 22, 2004; Janet Reitman, “Surviving Fallujah,” Rolling Stone, March 10, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rutter, USA (Ret.), interview with the author, February 10, 2008; Newell interview; Camarda’s recollections are posted at www.fallenheroes.com; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 354-57; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 47-57; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-13, 148-53, 244-49; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume II, pp. 116-21; 202-04; 294-300, 306-12. Rutter commanded an infantry company in the Gulf War and an infantry battalion in 2003, during the initial invasion of Iraq. He subsequently retired and covered Fallujah for FoxNews. In that capacity, he was in the middle of the insurgent ambush that claimed Iwan’s life, and he was kind enough to confirm for me many of the details related by other eyewitnesses. Another battalion surgeon, Commander Richard Jadick of 1/8 Marines, also located his aid station close to the fighting in hopes of providing rapid treatment to save as many lives as possible. See his book On Call in Hell: A Doctor’s Iraq War Story (New York: NAL/Caliber, 2007), for many powerful details about his experiences in Fallujah.

16 First Lieutenant Tim Strabbing, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Corporal Matthew Spencer, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Corporal Frances Wolf, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Shupp, Buhl interviews, all at USMCHMD; Major Joe Winslow, interview with the author, August 4, 2008; Lieutenant Colonel Dave Bellon to father, November 20, 2004, copy in author’s possession; Colonel Gary Anderson, “Fallujah and the Future of Urban Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 2004, p. 57; Bing West and Owen West, “Victory in Fallujah,” Popular Mechanics, August 2005; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 80-87; Brad Kasal and Nathaniel Helms, My Men Are My Heroes: The Brad Kasal Story (Des Moines, IA: Meredith Books, 2007), pp. 166-67; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 10-13, 52-56; West, No True Glory, pp. 268-73; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 79-81, 89-95, 107. The reporter was Kevin Sites, an experienced war correspondent affiliated with NBC News. The shooter was a scout sniper attached to Lieutenant Strabbing’s platoon. The description of Marine grunts comes from my own observations.

17 First Lieutenant John Jacobs, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Sergeant Joseph Nazario, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Lance Corporal Justin Boswood, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tim Crowley, October 21, 2005; Wolf interview, all at USMCHMD; Staff Sergeant Nathaniel Garcia, “Battalion Tells Squad Leader ‘You’ve Done Enough,’ ” Leatherneck, February 2005, pp. 25-26; Jed Babbin, “Forty Minutes in Fallujah,” American Spectator , May 2005, pp. 18-22; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 82-87; Patrick O’Donnell, multiple conversations with the author, circa 2008-2009; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 82-90, 165-81, 221-23; Kasal and Helms, My Men Are My Heroes, pp. 200-280; West, No True Glory, pp. 293-303.

18 Staff Sergeant Shawn Ryan, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Lieutenant Trustin Connor, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Captain Vaughn, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 7, 2005; Buhl, Strabbing, Shupp, Walters, Boswood interviews, all at USMCHMD; Winslow interview; Bellon letter; “Tanks and Doughboys,” Infantry Journal, July 1945, pp. 8-10; First Lieutenant Carin Calvin, “The Assaultman in the Urban Environment,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005, pp. 30-31; West and West, “Victory in Fallujah”; Catagnus et al., “Infantry Squad Tactics,” pp. 87-89; Kasal, My Men Are My Heroes, pp. 169-80; O’Donnell, We Were One, pp. 69-70, 107.

19 First Sergeant Miller, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Corporal Ricardo Orozco, interview with Captain Stephen “Joe” Winslow, January 8, 2005; Natonski, Shupp, Buhl, Boswood interviews, all at USMCHMD; Winslow interview; Lieutenant General John Sattler, interview with Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “Second Battle of Fallujah: Urban Operations in a New Kind of War,” Field Artillery Journal, March-April 2006, pp. 4-7; Tim Dyhouse, “Fallujah: Battle for the ‘City of Mosques,’” VFW, February 2005, pp. 12-14; Ilana Ozernoy, Amer Saleh, and Julian Barnes, “Destroying It to Save It? With the Insurgents Routed, the Next Task Is to Rebuild Fallujah,” U.S. News & World Report, November 29, 2004; Rod Nordland and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Rules of Engagement,” Newsweek, November 29, 2004; Sattler and Wilson, “Operation Al Fajr,” pp. 22-24; Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?”; Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 55-60; West, No True Glory, pp. 315-24; Gott, ed., Eyewitness to War, Volume I, pp. 12-16; Wright and Reese, On Point II, pp. 356-58; Matthews, Operation Al Fajr, pp. 75-79; Bellavia, House to House, p. 273; Ricks, Fiasco, pp. 398-405.

Chapter 10

1 James Cross, “What Is the Army’s Job?” Military Review, June 1956 (although Cross wrote in the 1950s, his words apply very well to the early twenty-first century); David Bolgiano, “Deadly Double Standards,” Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2007; Peter Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 345-46; Tom Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 144; Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 387-88. The Washington Post estimated that IEDs caused 61 percent of American deaths. A French study estimated that they caused 41 percent. As a rough estimate, I have chosen to split the difference.

2 “AIF Cells Operating in Tikrit” (the Americans called the insurgents Anti Iraqi Forces, or AIF); “Enemy Threat”; “Tikrit Tribal Breakdown”; “2-7 Infantry, Dispersion of Forces”; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, personal biography, multiple conversations circa 2004-2006; A/2-7 Infantry Summary of Operations During OIF III; B/2-7 Infantry, After Action Report (AAR), these and all subsequent documents in author’s possession, courtesy of 2-7 Infantry; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 22, 2006; Ricks, Fiasco, p. 233. The information on the 7th Infantry Regiment’s lineage comes from my own personal knowledge as the official regimental historian. For more on the unit’s compelling battle history, see my two books on the topic: The 7th Infantry Regiment: Combat in an Age of Terror, the Korean War Through the Present (New York: Forge, 2008), and American Courage, American Carnage: The 7th Infantry Chronicles, the 7th Infantry Regiment’s Combat Experience, 1812 Through World War II (New York: Forge, 2009). During the Iraq War, every company had a nickname, such as “Rage” or “Bushmasters.” To avoid confusion, I have chosen to refer to all of the companies in this chapter by their designated names, rather than their nicknames.

3 D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR; F/2-7 Infantry, AAR; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; A/2-7 Infantry, Summary of Operations; First Lieutenant Jon Godwin to family and friends, July 25, 2005, copy of this and all subsequent letters in author’s possession, courtesy of Lieutenant Godwin; 2-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 23, 2006; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; The Cottonbaler: 7th Infantry Regiment Association, Spring 2005, p. 7; Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” copy of this paper in author’s possession.

4 A/2-7 Infantry, AAR; D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR and Memorandum for Easy Co 2-7 IN transition into 2-7 IN and missions in Iraq, May 19, 2006; “2-7 Infantry, Company Mission Set,” “Daily Operations,” and “Troop to Task Schedule”; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; conversation with Specialist Dan Driss, May 2006.

5 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; “7th Infantry Regiment: Fallen Soldiers, 2005”; Captain Diogo Tavares, casualty notifications, 2005; PFC Travis Anderson, Sergeant Kurtis Arcala, Lieutenant David Giaimo, Sergeant Carl Morgain, Private Wesley Riggs, biographies; Godwin to family and friends, September 26, 2005. Tavares was 2-7’s rear detachment commander back at Fort Stewart, Georgia. One of his responsibilities was to notify families and the public of battalion casualties.

6 “Tikrit Tribal Breakdown”; A/2-7 Infantry, AAR; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, update, April 2, 2005; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; Anna Badkhen, “Colonel’s Toughest Duty,” San Francisco Chronicle , October 14, 2005; “Unity Pulls Battalion Through Anxiety, Loss,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 31, 2005; Godwin to family and friends, April 11, 2005.

7 “IA Takes Over”; “IA Conducts Counterinsurgency Ops”; “Iraqi Police Partnership”; “2-7 AO Attacks, Pattern Analysis”; “2-7 AO MSR Attacks”; “Operation Able Delaware (Elections)”; A/2-7 Infantry, AAR, Summary of Operations; B/2-7 Infantry, AAR; C/2-7 Infantry, AAR; D/2-7 Infantry, AAR; E/2-7 Infantry, AAR; 2-7 Infantry, Officer’s interview; Enlisted interview; Godwin to family and friends, April 18, May 8 and 16, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Todd Wood, comments, The Cottonbaler , Spring 2006, p. 6, Wood conversations. In my group interviews, the enlisted soldiers were significantly more skeptical and cynical than the Cottonbaler officers about the quality of Iraqi Army soldiers and policemen. Thus, in my assessment, I tried to strike a balance between the differing shades of opinion.

8 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Major Ike Sallee; 3-7 Infantry, Officer’s Group Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 22, 2006; 3-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group 1 Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 23, 2006; Lieutenant Reeon Brown and Sergeant First Class Joe Benavides, letter to the author, March 4, 2005; First Sergeant Michael Shirley, e-mail to Father Phil Salois, March 11, 2005, copy in author’s possession, courtesy of Fr. Salois; Captain Ike Sallee to Roland and Team Alpha, March 26, 2005, copy in author’s possession as a member of Team Alpha; Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”; Captain Irvin Oliver, Jr., “Death Before Dismount: A Relic,” Armor, July- August 2006, pp. 11-14.

9 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; 3-7 Infantry, Enlisted Group 2 Combat After Action Interview with the author, May 24, 2006; Officer’s interview; Enlisted, Group 1 interview; Staff Sergeant Jason Vandegrift, e-mail to author, May 4, 2005; Captain Ike Sallee to Attack Families, June 2, 2005, copy in author’s possession; Sallee to Roland and Team Alpha; Richard Chin, “Army Captain Knows Firepower Alone Won’t Win War,” Knight-Ridder Newspapers, August 20, 2005. Alpha Company’s nickname was “Attack.” As with 2-7 Infantry, the enlisted soldiers of 3-7 were more skeptical than the officers about the usefulness and dedication of the ISF men. Everyone respected the MOI commandos, though.

10 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; Officer’s interview; Enlisted, Group 2 interview; Lieutenant Colonel Funk, update, circa June 2005; Funk, memorial services speeches; Captain Eric Hooper, casualty notifications, 2005; “7th Infantry Regiment Fallen Soldiers, 2005”; Vandegrift e-mail; Sallee to Attack Families; T. J. Pignataro, “Two Soldiers from Area Are Killed,” Buffalo News, April 22, 2005; First Lieutenant Ken Segelhorst, “Small-Unit Kill Teams and IED Interdiction,” Armor, January- February 2008, pp. 26-33. Hooper was the rear detachment commander for 3-7 during the deployment.

11 A/3-7 Infantry, Unit History; Officer’s interview; Enlisted Group 1 interview; Enlisted Group 2 interview; Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles”; Colonel Ed Cardon and Command Sergeant Major Louis Torres, 4th Brigade update, October 17, 2005; Lieutenant Colonel Funk, update, November 8, 2005; Nancy Youssef, “Fatal Shooting of Teacher Illustrates Why Iraqis Fear U.S. Convoys,” Knight-Ridder, June 16, 2005; “Fatal Error Deepens Mistrust of U.S.,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 6, 2005; Captain David Connolly, “Media on the Battlefield: ‘A Nonlethal Fire,’” Infantry, May-June 2004, pp. 31-37. The Youssef story included a heartbreaking portrait photo of the slain teacher and her widowed husband.

Epilogue

1 Department of Defense Web site, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget by Service; Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Let’s Have Flexible Armed Forces,” editorial, Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2009; Richard Lardner, “Aging Air Force Wants Big Bucks Fix,” Associated Press, February 18, 2008; August Cole and Yochi Dreazen, “Boots on the Ground or Weapons in the Sky?” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2008; Ann Scott Tyson, “Army, Marines to Seek More Troops,” Washington Post, December 13, 2006; John Keller, “2010 DOD Budget Proposes Increases for Navy, DARPA Spending; Army Faces Big Cuts,” Military & Aerospace Electronics, May 22, 2009; Ralph Peters, “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs,” Weekly Standard, February 6, 2006, p. 18; Tom Donnelly, “The Army We Need,” Weekly Standard, June 4, 2007, pp. 21-28; Brian Mockenhaupt, “The Army We Have,” Atlantic, June 2007, pp. 86-99; S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Command in Future War (Alexandria, VA: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), pp. 208-09. As of early 2008, the Army’s active duty strength was about 512,000 soldiers. Mockenhaupt, in his research, found that among seventeen- to twenty-four-year-olds, the prime group the Army relies upon for its recruits, only three in ten are eligible for service under Army standards. The rest are disqualified for physical, mental, or criminal reasons. The pool of available infantry recruits is obviously, then, even smaller and more elite.

2 David Watson, e-mail to the author, January 4, 2008; Robert Harriman, e-mail to the author, March 4, 2008; Robert Kaplan, “Modern Heroes,” editorial, Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2007; Lieutenant Donald Taggart, “You’re Part of the Infantry,” Infantry, July 1944, p. 21; Charles Edmunson, “Why Warriors Fight,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1944, pp. 3-10; Adrian Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II Through Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 457.

3 Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, “On Sheep, Wolves, and Sheepdogs,” extracted from On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace (Portland, OR: PPCT Publications, 2007).

If you find an error or have any questions, please email us at admin@erenow.org. Thank you!