Chapter One
With the ‘indefinite but inconspicuous postponement’ of Operation SEALION, the invasion of Britain, on 17 September 1940, Hitler’s attention turned to the defeat of Britain by another strategic route. Wishing to retain the initiative, this resulted in a Peripheral Strategy that aimed to drive Britain into succumbing to German domination before US support became available or the USSR could turn against Germany. The method was for the Axis coalition to attack Britain’s vital interests in the Mediterranean, which Grand Admiral Raeder described as ‘the pivot of Britain’s world empire’, and to deny her use of the strategically important Suez Canal. The Mediterranean sea route via Gibraltar and the Suez Canal was indeed the pivotal link in imperial communications with India, Australasia and Eastern Africa. ‘Deny this route to British shipping and Britain’s position would be untenable’, argued advocates of the Peripheral Strategy.
Execution of this German strategy was, however, not straight-forward, as Mussolini, Hitler’s leading Axis partner, was keen to carve out a new Italian Empire of his own in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. These interests were to prove to be the undoing of a strategy that was of particular appeal to the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Axis politics dictated that compromises had to be made. On the one hand, Il Duce resisted offers of German help and involvement, for example. Operation FELIX, the attack on Gibraltar was cancelled, while on the other hand, Hitler vetoed Italian plans to invade Yugoslavia. This country, along with Rumania needed to be firmly in German hands to secure vital raw materials. Particularly important in the latter country were the Ploesti oil fields, which supplied over fifty percent of Germany’s fuel.
On 28 October, with Hitler’s tacit agreement, the Italian Army crossed the border from their Albanian territory into Greece in a poorly planned and resourced campaign. With a low opinion of the Greeks and their army, Mussolini had erroneously believed that a limited attack, coupled with bombing of Athens, would bring about the disintegration of the small nation: ‘By a hard blow at the start, it will be possible to bring about a complete collapse within a few hours.’
Attacking with ten divisions, half the number recommended by his military commanders, the Greeks, despite being riddled with internal divisions, united emotionally and politically against their invader. The bombing failed to break Greek morale and the poorly equipped and trained Italian troops were soon bogged down in the mountains as the weather deteriorated. Worse still, the Italians were driven back by a counter offensive. One commentator wrote ‘The small, untidy Greek soldier had performed a miracle. What was intended to be a murder now looked like suicide’.
The German dictator.
Meanwhile, Hitler’s interest in the Peripheral Strategy waned as his attention increasingly focussed on the Soviet Union, gradually relegating German activities in the Mediterranean and on the Channel coast to a deception plan. The uneasy pact between Russia and Germany, which had delivered Soviet complicity in the invasion of Poland and neutrality in the case of France in 1940, was under strain. In the face of Stalin’s growing suspicions and demands, along with an increasing likelihood of an impending transatlantic alliance against the Axis, on 5 December 1940, Hitler finally decided that he would have to march east. As an important preliminary, however, he needed to secure his southern flank by stabilising his hold on the Balkans and completing the elimination of Greece. This would also have the benefit of driving the British back out of bombing range of the Ploesti oil fields. Accordingly, on 13 December 1940, he issued Führer Order 20 for Operation MARITA, the invasion of Greece and occupation of Bulgaria, along with Operation STRAFE, the invasion of Yugoslavia. Führer Order 21 for Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of the Soviet Union, followed on 18 December. It was envisaged that the preliminary Balkan operations would last about four weeks, ending in early April allowing BARBAROSSA to begin in May 1941.
The Italian dictator.
A German panzer sweep through a portable anti-tank barrier into Greece during operation MARITA.
Throughout the autumn of 1940, Hitler actively encouraged the Italians to seize the Greek island of Crete, which with the deployment of the tough and resilient Cretan Division to the Albanian front, the island was virtually undefended. In Axis hands, Crete would in turn be available as a base for Axis air and naval forces to strike at Egypt, support operations in North Africa and dominate much of the eastern Mediterranean. Conversely, in British hands Crete would be an important base from which they could mount long range bombing operations against German interests in the Balkans. The Italians, however, did not take the opportunity to seize the lightly defended island. By the time the advantage of seizing Crete was plain to all, with their invasion of the Greek mainland in trouble, the Italians lacked the resources and will to take on the Royal Navy and invade Crete.
Churchill, a long time advocate of a Peripheral Strategy of his own, was alive to the strategic importance of Crete. Initially, therefore, both the Greek and British governments were reluctant to have a British presence on the island in case such a move provoked the Axis. Troops were put on very short notice to move to Crete but Britain’s resources in the Mediterranean were spread extremely thinly.
British commanders in the Mediterranean; Cunningham, Longmore and Wavell.
Priority for available forces, at a time when the country was seeking to replace the equipment lost during the Dunkirk campaign and fighting the Luftwaffe over Britain, was defence of the home base. None the less, Churchill saw the Mediterranean Theatre as not only a threat but also as offering the opportunity to break ‘the intolerable shackles of the defensive’. Consequently, even though the cancellation of SEALION was not apparent and the invasion threat persisted into 1941, as Hitler played up his intentions to invade Britain to cover Operation BARBAROSSA; Churchill dispatched not inconsiderable resources to the Mediterranean.
Britain’s commander in the Middle East, General Archibald Wavell, concentrated his forces to hold the Italians on the direct approach to Egypt from Libya, while consistently performing a juggling act with the scant remaining forces, as successive threats appeared in his patch, including Sudan in the south, Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus in the centre and Iraq in the east. Professor MacDonald summed up the situation when he wrote ‘It was Wavell’s misfortune to fight at a time when British industrial capacity was limited and before American resources were fully mobilised against the Axis’.
The most pressing of all the threats was the 350,000 man Italian ‘Army of the Nile’ and at one time, Wavell had just 36,000 men and seventy-five aircraft available to oppose them. Not only that, the Royal Navy had temporarily lost control of the Mediterranean to the Italian Navy and Air Force, forcing Middle East bound supplies and reinforcements to take the long route around the Cape of Good Hope. Despite this, 76,000 reinforcements arrived from the UK with half as many again coming from India, Australia and New Zealand. With these reinforcements, which were still inadequate for the task, Wavell set about dominating the region and fending off criticism and what he saw as political interference by Churchill.
Wavell’s operations included COMPASS (December 40 – February 41), in which Lieutenant General O’Connor struck the Italian incursions in Egypt’s Western Desert and drove them back across the Libyan border. During the pursuit west, the Allies captured some 25,000 Italian prisoners, 208 field and medium guns, 23 medium tanks and over 200 other vehicles, along with wells and water distilleries that could produce 40,000 gallons a day – for the cost of some 355 casualties. As the advance continued on westwards, General O’Connor advocated finishing the job by pushing on to Tripoli and clearing the Italians out of North Africa. Success in the Western Desert, however, was merely one less thing for Wavell to worry about and he had too few resources, so he could only keep trouble at bay before another problem arose elsewhere. In this case by mid February, maps of North Africa on the walls of his HQ had been replaced by those of Greece.
A field park of captured Italian guns. A portrait of Mussolini glowers at a couple of victorious Tommies.
Informed by decryptions of German Enigma encoded radio traffic, Wavell had received instructions from the Defence Committee to send an expeditionary force to Greece before the Germans invaded the country. By 5 March, preparations for the deployment to Greece were under way stripping resources away from the Western Desert Force that had by now reached Cyrenia in Libya. As we will see, finding men and equipment for Greece further slowed the build-up in Crete.
Lieutenant General Sir Richard O’Connor, left, and General Sir Archibald Wavell, General Officer Commander-in-Chief. They were responsible for victory over the Italians.
The Defences of Crete
As already recounted, early moves to secure Crete against the Axis, despite Greece’s political alignment with Britain, were thwarted by the simple necessity of not giving the Italians an excuse to invade. All that Middle East Forces could spare anyway was a single Alexandria-based, battalion put on a day’s notice to move in the appropriately named Operation SPARROW.
As soon as the Italians invaded mainland Greece on the 28 October, Operation SPARROW was upgraded to two battalions, the leading element of which was at six hours’ notice to move by sea. The revised Operation was called ACTION! A decision was also reached to establish a ‘second Scapa Flow’ in the form of a naval fuelling and arming base at Souda Bay and to protect it with anti-aircraft guns of the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO) and up to a brigade of infantry. To assemble shipping and supplies to make use of the best natural harbour in the eastern Mediterranean would take some months. In the meantime 2 York and Lancs, the leading element of ACTION Force, left Alexandria on 31 October 1940, arriving in Crete the following day amidst a bombing raid on nearby Hania.
The reinforcement of the island pleased the Prime Minister, as he ‘was convinced of the importance of the occupation of Crete’. With the Greek Government’s support, a second wave of reinforcement (2 Black Watch) was dispatched but from the outset it was found that little in the way of resources, food or material of any kind was available for use by the British. This simple factor was a significant brake on the development of the island’s defences throughout the six months before the Germans launched their invasion. Consequently, not only was shipping required for men, weapons and equipment but also for continual re-supply convoys, carrying all nature of stores needed to sustain the garrison.
Brigadier Tidbury and a tri-Service staff on an early recce of Crete.
Having established a presence in Crete, Wavell had to continue his regional juggling act and only a trickle of men and resources made their way to the island. Brigadier Tidbury, the first of a series of short duration commanders, each of whose tenure prevented continuity of approach to the defence of the island, reported that in addition to a lack of local resources ‘… transport and labour were scarce, and road conditions difficult, especially after rain’. Orders were, however, given to prepare infrastructure and stores to support a division-sized garrison in the event of the Greek mainland being overrun.
The problem facing the succession of commanders was not only to maintain an uneasy balance between establishing the necessary logistic infrastructure and building defences but also to define the balance between coastal defence and that of the airfields. The advanced Naval refuelling base at Souda Bay clearly needed both coastal and anti-aircraft defence. The existing airbase at Iraklio and the airfields being developed by the RAF at Maleme, Rethymno and Kastelli needed air defence and being on the coastal strip, defence from amphibious attack as well. With few troops and a lack of resources, neither type of defence could be adequately addressed. The whole issue was, however, bedevilled by narrow single service planning. Facilities would be sited, often without consultation, and then additional ground defences demanded. For example, the RAF at one airfield sited their fuel and ammunition facilities outside the Army’s previously agreed defensive perimeter, necessitating time consuming and resource intensive adjustments being made at the expense of work elsewhere.
A Lewis gun team and Greek gendarmes providing air defence to British capital ships in Souda Bay.
During the period from the Italian invasion of Greece through to the evacuation, the majority of the troops arriving in Crete were from logistic corps and anti-aircraft gunners, with the notable exception of 1 Welch who joined the other two infantry battalions. 1 Welch were eventually to become the CREFORCE reserve. The total of anti-aircraft guns deployed to Crete eventually reached 32 heavy and 36 light guns, against an assessed requirement of 56 and 48 respectively.
Perhaps the greatest shortage of all was in aircraft. The paucity of aircraft with which to defend the airspace over Crete and the surrounding waters, was to cast a very long shadow over the campaign. Those available in the Mediterranean had been forced to fly a 3,000 mile circuitous route across Africa, arriving in Egypt in dire need of refurbishment. The need for strong air forces in Crete (six permanently based fighter squadrons) was, however, recognised but there were simply too few aircraft available to meet all the RAF’s tasks. Anyway, due to the lack of resources to build them, there were insufficient airbases in Crete for the required number of aircraft to operate from. As we will see, serious aircraft losses in the campaign in Greece only exacerbated the problem.
The Greek Campaign
With the Italians being driven back behind their start lines in Greece and deep into Libya, it was inevitable that Germany, their Axis partner, would come to their assistance. Generalleutnant Rommel took the Afrika Korps to Libya and Feldmarschall List’s Twelfth Army was committed to the Balkans. With intelligence indicating an invasion of Greece, Wavell ordered the deployment of a British Expeditionary Force in early March 1941. W Force, so named after its commander Lieutenant General Henry ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, consisted of 1st British Armoured Brigade and the ANZAC Corps comprising 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division. The force totalled some 58,000 men and was to work with three Greek divisions on the Bulgarian front. The 1942 Ministry of Information pamphlet described the aim:
The Allied plan was that the three-and-a-half Greek Divisions on the Metaxas line should fight a delaying action, inflicting what damage they could on the Germans, but that the main defensive position should be held by British and Greek forces on a line running along the high ground west of the Axios Valley [Aliakmon]. There had been no conversations with the Yugoslav staff, but the Yugoslavs were expected to hold the passes along their frontier from Bulgaria.
At dawn on 6 April 1941, the Germans invaded Yugoslavia and northeastern Greece without warning, before General Wilson’s W Force had completed its deployment to the Aliakmon position. Resistance by the Greeks did not last long, even though:
The Greeks fought with astonishing tenacity and bravery. In spite of the most violent attacks by tanks and shock troops and dive-bombers, the Greeks held on, inflicting very severe losses on the enemy. The forts in the Rupel Pass held out for a week.
The Southern Yugoslav Army was quickly defeated by the Waffen SS divisions, and a second route into Greece through the mountain passes lay open. General Wilson adjusted his deployment to counter the immediate threat, but this weakened the main position still further without making the new left flank strong enough to resist for long. The only sound course was to fall back to a position which was less liable to be turned, and the choice fell on a line from Mount Olympus through the Servia Pass, while the passes at Siatista and Klisoura, connecting the Servia-Monastir road with the valley of the upper Aliakmon, were also to be defended. This was to be only the first withdrawal.
With typical German Blitzkrieg momentum and tempo of operations, there was seldom time for one rearward move to be finished before the pressure of events imposed another withdrawal. The campaign took on all the characteristics of a rear-guard action, as the Commonwealth and Greek forces were forced south; the British official historian stated that:
Any hopes of making a prolonged defence on this line were soon dispelled, for the Germans succeeded in crossing the mountains into the upper Aliakmon valley, endangering the Greek armies on the Albanian front and threatening again the left flank of W Force. Lacking the strength with which to restore the situation General Wilson had no choice but to fall back again - this time to Thermopylae, where the peninsula is only some thirty miles wide. This … withdrawal - right across the plain of Thessaly, meant giving up the principal airfields.
Commonwealth troops during the withdrawal in Greece.
A Panzer Mk III in the pass of Thermopylae in April 1941.
General Wilson believed there seemed to be some chance of making a useful stand at Thermopylae, no matter what befell the Greek forces. The Germans, however, could be expected to outflank the position before long. The two divisions of the ANZAC Corps were insufficient to hold the determined enemy attacks on the peninsula, as well as defending the vital points behind them.
At this point, after six months of war ‘the Greek political framework started to crack’. Faced with the inevitability of defeat and the loss of another army, on 17 April Churchill authorised Wavell to evacuate W Force from Greece. ‘Bombed and strafed by day and night’ by Luftwaffeaircraft, Wilson’s men withdrew south. The aim was to head south to the Peloponnese and evacuate as many men as possible. At this point, however, a disturbing development took place. A German airborne operation to capture the Corinth Canal Bridge narrowly failed to cut off W Force’s withdrawal. The presence of Fallschirmjäger in the Balkans came as a stark warning to the defenders of Crete.
Corinth and the Evacuation
The bridge over the Corinth Canal represented a choke point on the Commonwealth line of withdrawal onto the Peloponnese, the capture of which would trap the majority of W Force, probably leading to the almost total destruction of the divisional sized force still in Greece. Securing the vital bridge would also enable the German armoured spearhead to maintain its momentum without a pause to bridge the canal. Despite its importance, however, the troops allocated to the defence of the key bridge were few but it had been prepared as a reserved demolition.
Seeking a quick and conclusive end to the Greek campaign, Hitler and OKW authorised Operation HANNIBAL in order to cutoff the withdrawing British and Allied force. The task, very similar to the seizure of the Albert Canal bridges the previous May was given to Fallschirmjäger Regiment (FJR2) reinforced by a platoon of pioneers (engineers) and a company of medics.
As the attacking Fallschirmjäger left the Larissa airfield, which had been only recently been in British hands, General Wilson crossed the Corinth Canal Bridge two hours before dawn on 26 April 1941. At 0700 hours, the Luftwaffe began an intensive dive bombing attack on the British anti-aircraft defences within a mile of the bridge. This was followed at 0720 by sustained low-level machine-gun and cannon attack from fighter aircraft; the whole aim being to suppress the air defences and to stun the defenders. At 0740 hours, three DFS-230 gliders landed the German pioneers near the bridge, while over a hundred Ju-52 transport aircraft, some as low as 200 feet, began to drop two battalions of FJR 2. Within thirty minutes the force was on the ground. Meanwhile, to interdict Commonwealth reinforcements from Nablion-Argos, 25 miles south of Corinth, German fighters carried out strafing attacks on the Corinth Road.
The Fallschirmjäger dropping at either end of the bridge and promptly attacking, overwhelmed the defenders. Gefreiter Krug recalled:
Flying on to the canal we came up to some heavy anti-aircraft fire. We landed on very stony and uneven ground, which resulted in unusually heavy drop casualties. Our battalion landed on the north side of the canal and our job was to try to stop the enemy coming from the direction of Athens and to take them prisoner if possible.
The Corinth Canal Bridge.
The Corinth Canal was a deep trench, with few crossing points, and barred access to the Peloponnese.
The New Zealand Maoris and the Divisional Cavalry Unit (armoured cars/recce) were amongst the defenders:
During the evacuation, the Carrier Platoon was sent back in company with C Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry, to the Corinth Canal as local protection to anti-aircraft guns. Soon after daylight on the 26th it was in hull-down positions overlooking the canal near Corinth. Most of the crews were enjoying a much-needed rest after the all-night drive when a yell, ‘They’re coming down in parachutes!’ sent the carriers into action. In Corporal Hayward’s words:
‘By this time the parachutists were coming down in dozens and gradually encircling us. At the same time we were being continually and systematically strafed with a string of ME 110s laying down a curtain of fire across the only gap that still remained as a possible escape route towards the hills.’
The sight of the Divisional Cavalry armoured cars already half-way to the hills decided Hayward to make a break through the gap while there was still time. There or four other carriers followed and, after charging through vineyards and over stone walls, got safely away. By this time two carriers had lost their tracks and it was decided to push the others over a cliff and march to an embarkation beach.
The infantry, engineers and the anti-aircraft gunners of the demolition guard, lacking the same mobility were quickly overwhelmed by the Fallschirmjäger. Gefreiter Krug continued:
We soon had so many prisoners that we didn’t know what to do with them! A short time later we were all startled when there was a very loud bang. Looking towards the bridge we saw that it had been blown up and fallen into the canal; some soldiers and a war reporter were killed.
The Commonwealth demolition guard had, however, fought well to keep the Fallschirmjäger at bay and long enough for the Royal Engineers to arm the bridge’s demolition charges and blow the vital structure. The Germans were left holding the site, which had cost them 285 casualties but they had the consolation of cutting off 921 Commonwealth troops, mostly from 4 New Zealand Brigade and 1,450 Greeks. Correctly timing an airborne assault is always difficult and in this case an attack twenty-four or even twelve hours earlier would have delivered a far greater success. The Commonwealth forces were lucky and managed to divert significant numbers to beaches north of the Canal.
The blowing of the Corinth Canal Bridge.
Meanwhile, the Evacuation from Greece was under way and lasted from 24 April 1941 through until the end of the month, with the Germans entering Athens on 27 April. A total of 50,732 men were evacuated (including some Greeks and Yugoslavs) of these, 25,000 were evacuated to Crete, along with 10,000 Greeks who mostly escaped from the mainland through a variety of other means. Crete was used initially as a staging post to ensure the shortest possible turn around for ships and aircraft involved in the evacuation. Hence the island had an unexpected influx of troops.
The Greek Campaign cost Britain and her Allies 11,000 men and crucially for Crete, 8,000 trucks were lost, along with most of W Force’s heavy equipment, including 400 artillery pieces. In some cases soldiers got away with nothing but the clothes they stood up in. Critically, the RAF lost 209 aircraft of all types in Greece, in a situation where RAF losses were already outstripping the arrival rate of new aircraft. With the Luftwaffe operating from bases in mainland Greece the Germans now had air superiority over the Aegean and the northern part of the Libyan Sea, including Crete.
Major General Weston’s Report
With events in Greece deteriorating, the importance of Crete finally grew. Consequently, Major General Weston, Royal Marines, was dispatched to Crete on 15 April for a reconnaissance. In his report, he envisaged two separate problems:
… the defence of the fleet and air bases in the existing circumstances: and the wider aspect of the defence of the island against invasion, when the situation on the mainland has clearly deteriorated to such an extent that an attack on Crete is clearly imminent.
He believed that the land force should consist of two fresh British brigades and that the number of anti-aircraft guns should be increased to the previously recommended level and with regard to the air force, he believed that a third squadron should be based on the island. No sooner had he returned to Alexandria to make his report than General Weston was ordered to go back to Crete to take over command of the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation (MNBDO), which was to defend the port facilities and on 27 April he formally became Commander CREFORCE. Under his command, he had both the MNBDO, which would concentrate on the defence of Souda Bay and Brigadier Chappel’s 14 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed around the island’s principal airfield at Iraklio.
Even though it was assumed that Crete would be attacked, it was not, however, defences that were General Weston’s primary concern on assumption of command but the reception of troops evacuated from Greece. Camps were allocated to the troops but:
These so called camps were a series of areas marked off … each provided with a water supply. Officers and men on arrival from Greece were sent to any of their unit who had arrived previously and who had been organised under their officers. Each camp had a commandant who in turn appointed an adjutant. The only cooking utensils were petrol tins; a very large number of men fed out of tin cans, as there were no mess tins, knives, forks or spoons available in large quantities. Each man was as far as possible issued with one set of clothing and one blanket. About 2,000 Australians were without blankets and they averaged in most cases one razor per platoon.
Many of the troops, especially those who had been sunk en route from Greece to Crete were without even small arms.
The problem of maintaining the force was worsened by ‘useless mouths’, chief of which were 15,000 Italian prisoners but on 5 May General Weston was signalling to HQ Middle East that he had another problem:
There are 10,000 [Commonwealth] other ranks here without arms and little or no employment other than getting in trouble with the civil population. Can these men be evacuated as soon as possible? Excellent relationship exists between Greeks and ourselves but will be imperilled unless we can get rid of surplus personnel.
This was agreed but as a low priority and on the eve of the German invasion, 2,000 surplus personnel remained, along with 14,000 prisoners.
Defence Problems and Plans
It was only once the evacuation from Greece was under way that the defence of Crete against invasion began in earnest. Major General Weston assessed the situation as follows:
The enemy’s sea approach to the island is comparatively easy and he can provide air protection for a sea-borne landing. It is difficult for our navy in the face of air superiority to interfere with a seaborne expedition. It is therefore not improbable that he will attempt a sea-borne expedition in conjunction with an airborne attack in the near future.
Most certainly a public relations photograph showing both Greek and well equipped British soldiers jointly manning a 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun.
He concluded that ‘Iraklio and its airfield, and Hania, with Maleme airfield and Souda anchorage, must be defended at all costs; the loss of either of these areas would prejudice subsequent relief if German forces landed elsewhere on the island’. With regard to troops to hold his vital terrain, Weston believed:
For the defence of Iraklio and of the Souda-Hania-Maleme area, at least three brigade groups of four battalions each, and one motor battalion, in addition to the MNBDO for Souda were necessary.
With both amphibious and airborne threats to contend and air superiority in German hands, the Royal Navy were unlikely to be able to stop invasion convoys at sea, the problem of defence was not going to be simple.
At this point, 30 April 1941, Major General Bernard Freyberg VC, commander of the New Zealand Division, whose troops were now the most numerous on the island, was appointed Commander CREFORCE over Major General Weston; much to the latter’s chagrin. Almost immediately, he received the following MOST SECRET AND MOST IMMEDIATE signal:
German attack Crete by simultaneous airborne reinforcements from seaborne expeditions believed imminent. Scale airborne attack estimated 3,000/4,000 parachutists or airborne troops in first sortie. Two or three sorties per day possible from Greece …All above with fighter escort. Bombing attack to be expected some time prior to arrival air and seaborne troops.
Freyberg commented that he could ‘scarcely believe his eyes’. This information, which was followed by considerable detail, was the result of ULTRA intelligence. In reply, Freyberg, exercising his charter rights to the New Zealand Government signalled his concerns:
Feel it my duty to report military situation in Crete. Decision taken in London that Crete must be held at all costs. Have received appreciation on scale of attack from War Office.
In my opinion, Crete can only be held with full support from navy and air force. There is no evidence of naval forces capable of guaranteeing us against seaborne invasion and air forces on island consist of 6 Hurricanes and 17 obsolete aircraft. Troops can and will fight but as a result of campaign in Greece are devoid of any artillery and have insufficient tools for digging, little transport and inadequate war reserves of equipment and ammunition. Would strongly represent to your Government grave situation in which bulk of NZ Division is placed and recommend you bring pressure to bear on highest plane in London to either supply us with sufficient means to defend island or to review decision Crete must be held. I have of course made my official representation on this matter to C-in-C Middle East.
Major General Freyberg took over General Weston’s plans for the defence of Souda, Maleme, Iraklio and Rethymno as ‘more or less independent sectors’. Now under command of Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division, consisting of Brigadier Hargest’s 5 NZ Brigade (the most complete of the division’s formations) which was holding the Maleme/Palatanias area, the remains of 4 NZ Brigade, under Brigadier Inglis, were holding the area between Galatas and Hania, while an ad hoc brigade, the 10th, under Colonel Howard Kippenberger were deployed between the coast and Galatas. The Australian 19 Brigade was split into two. Half the brigade, under Brigadier Vasey, were on coastal defence duties at Geogioupoli and the other half under the senior commanding officer, Lieutenant Col Campbell, were holding the coastal airstrip and port at Rethymno. Brigadier Chappel’s 14 (British) Brigade, with an Australian battalion under command were to defend the only well developed airfield on the island and hold the nearby port at Iraklio. Major General Weston and the MNBDO was located in the Souda Sector, with about 10,000 men under his command. The CREFORCE reserve was located on the Akrotiri Peninsula, including two Australian battalions. Further details of plans and deployment will be provided in respective chapters and in the order of battle appendix. 6 NZ Brigade had already left for Egypt.
On assuming command Freyberg moved his headquarters from Hania to caves in the Akrotiri Peninsula, just to the east of the town. However, Major General Weston took most of the equipment and staff with him to command his own sector and Freyberg, with his own Divisional Signals Regiment having gone ahead to Alexandria, along with most of his staff officers, had to command with an ad hoc headquarters at a crucial moment. With changes of command and extemporised HQs, one report stated ‘In the six days that I have been here they have moved headquarters, changed the staff, altered the plan twice, and the resultant chaos is beyond description’.
Deployment of the New Zealand Division – 20 May 1941.
On 3 May General Freyberg issued Operational Instruction No. 10, which gave sector commanders their instructions:
POLICY OF DEFENCE
10. Sector Comds will organise their sectors so that, of the troops allotted to the defence of the aerodromes, one third is disposed on or around the landing ground, and two thirds are kept at such a distance that they will be outside the areas which will be attacked in the first instance.
11. Possible landing areas other than aerodromes will also be protected in a similar manner on a similar scale.
12. In addition, possible sea landing places will be watched, and if resources permit, held by troops.
13. It is important that each sector should have a sector reserve.
Major General Bernard Freyberg VC.
Critically, Freyberg took the words forwarded to him by Wavell’s ULTRA controller at face value. The officer who had assessed the original decoded and translated document, put undue emphasis on the amphibious element of the German plans. Consequently, Freyberg’s forces were looking in two directions; the beach and the airfields. In the critical Maleme-Hania sector, New Zealand Battalions were strung out in coastal defence positions, where they were to remain fixed until too late, by faulty interpretation of sound intelligence.
The orders issued by Puttick and his subordinate commanders accurately reflected Freyberg’s concerns about an amphibious landing and his insistence that his troops mount immediate counter-attacks with all available reserves.
Defenders of Crete
Those British troops, both the infantry battalions and support troops, deployed to Crete between November 1940 and March 1941 tended to be well equipped (by British 1940 standards) but were not necessarily experienced. During the months in Crete before the evacuation of Greece they were largely used as a labour force, with little opportunity for training. Being a low priority, few replacement men or equipment items were available for the defence of Crete and a paucity of spare parts led to cannibalisation, particularly of vehicles. The lack of trucks in particular was keenly felt, as the priority of work yo-yoed between defences and building up a logistic infrastructure in the Base Area established between Hania and Souda.
A British Merchant Navy officer, a Cretan civilian and a number of Greek soldiers with a mix of British and Greek helmets.
Running but not defeated.
Once it was apparent that the campaign in Greece was going to end with evacuation, need to build up troop levels in Crete was a considerable problem for the resource starved Field Marshal Wavell. While the antiaircraft guns were mostly complete and accompanied by formed units of gunners, the field artillery equipment he sent was mostly in a parlous state. Of the 100 guns dispatched to Crete, which were a mixture of British, American and captured Italian guns, only 85 were serviceable and only then after some of them, lacking proper sights, were the subject of considerable improvisation. Some of the Gunners who arrived in Crete from the Greek mainland, when presented with ’heaps of junk’, could only manage to coax them into action by making sights up from chewing gum and nails.
The twenty-two tanks available were in a similar state of repair, being worn out by their service in the Western Desert. Two of the six heavier MkII Infantry Tanks (Matildas) were deployed to each of the three airfields as a part of their close defence, where much motoring would not be required, while of the sixteen Light Tanks, six also went to Iraklio, while the remainder formed a reserve in the Souda area.
Shipping bringing this heavy equipment to Crete had to run the gauntlet of air attack at sea and dive bombing if caught in daylight still discharging cargo in Souda Bay. Shipping losses were heavy and for example the ship with the Mark IV Light Tanks of 3rd Hussars had difficulty off-loading her cargo at the limited port facilities and was hit only partly discharged. Some tanks and, more importantly, the Light Aid Detachment were still aboard the partly sunk ship, which was sitting on the bottom of the bay when the Germans attacked. The work of the logistic units including Palestinian pioneers was dangerous and extremely arduous in the prevailing conditions.
If General Freyberg had to make do with a skeleton staff and very little equipment, his formations and units were in the same situation. Few had escaped from Greece with even a small proportion of their equipment and even personal weapons were scarce. Such stocks held in the Souda base were soon distributed and what could be scraped together from the remainder of the Middle East Command was soon similarly exhausted.
The 10,000 Greek soldiers on the island were mainly recruits and cadets, poorly armed with a mixture of weapons and equipment. The exception was more experienced and better armed Gendarme units, organised and equipped as infantry. The capability of the Greek soldier and junior commanders had impressed the British in the mountains but the senior element was considered to be ‘laughably inefficient’. Training teams of New Zealand officers and senior NCOs were attached and made a difference in the few days available.
Given their partly equipped and trained status most of the Greek units were divided up amongst the brigades and given tasks of holding ground inland. When the attack came, some Greek units performed extremely well, especially where they were actively supported by the local population who armed themselves with captured enemy weapons and fought with a ferocity that shocked the Germans.
Having worked hard to organise CREFORCE and work on the island’s defences, Major General Freyberg wrote that ‘Feeling hopeful that we could maul any airborne invaders I sent the following cable to General Wavell:
Have completed plan for the defence of Crete and have just returned from final tour of defences. I feel greatly encouraged by my visit. Everywhere all ranks are fit and morale is high. All defences have been extended and positions wired as much as possible. We have 45 field guns emplaced, with adequate ammunition dumped. Two infantry tanks are at each aerodrome. Carriers and transport still being unloaded and delivered, 2nd Leicesters have arrived and will make Iraklio stronger. I do not wish to be over-confident, but I feel that at least are will give an excellent account. With help of Royal Navy, I trust Crete will be held.’
In summary, the strategic need to defend Crete had been identified in the autumn of 1940 but political and military reasons conspired to ensure that little was done to prepare the island for defence in the months before the evacuation of Greece. At the end of April 1941, Crete was in the front line but Wavell’s problems of resources remained and losses of equipment in Greece prevented proper reinforcement. The only significant body of troops available to reinforce Crete were the evacuees from Greece, whose morale was still largely intact but whose commanders had been mesmerised by the speed of their defeat.
Air photo of a RM 6 inch gun position near Souda. One of a series taken for a camouflage survey.