NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1 For an overview of the Mediterranean world in this period see A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy. Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 20-83; for Carthage, its history and culture see G. Picard and C. Picard, Carthage (rev. ed.: London, 1987), and S. Lancel, Carthage (Oxford, 1995); for Rome's origins, society and history see T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London, 1995), and M. Crawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow, 1978).

2 On the First Punic War see J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1995), B. Caven, The Punic Wars (1980), pp. 1-84, and A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), pp. 65-140.

3 On the causes of the Second Punic War see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp.

1-28, Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 143-166, and especially J. Rich, ‘The origins of the Second Punic War’, in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 1-37.

4 Sosylus Hannibal's tutor in Greek, Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 13. 3.

5 Hannibal's oath, Polybius 3. 11. 5-12. 4.

6 The size of Hannibal's army, Polybius 3. 35.1, Appian, Hannibalic War 1.4. For a detailed discussion of the army's size at various stages of the campaign see Appendix 1. For a fuller discussion of Punic strategy see Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 130-133, 152-153.

7 Hannibal's character, Polybius 9. 22. 1-26. 11, Livy 22. 4. 2-5. 2.

8 For more detailed accounts and discussions of the campaigns in 218-217 BC, see Lazenby (1978), pp. 29-73, Caven (1980), pp. 98-132, and Goldsworthy (2000), pp. 167-196.

9 For a perceptive discussion of the 'Fabian strategy’ see P. Erdkamp, 'Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy', Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127-147.

CHAPTER 2

1 For good introductions to the development of the Roman army see L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), E. Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army and Allies (Berkeley, 1976), A. Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare (London, 2000), and F. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic (Cambridge, 1960).

2 Polybius' description of the army, 6. 19. 1-42. 6; for a discussion see Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 697-723. The basic study of the evidence for the early Roman army is E. Rawson, 'The literary sources for the pre-Marian Roman Army', Papers of the British School at Rome 39 (1971), pp. 13-31. For the 'reform' of 211, see the unconvincing arguments in M. Samuels, ‘The Reality of Cannae', Militdrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7-31.

3 Polybius 6. 25. 1-11; on the saddle see P. Connolly, 'The Roman saddle', in M. Dawson (ed.), Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War. BAR 336 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 7-27, and A. Hyland, Training the Roman Cavalry (Gloucester, 1993), pp. 45-51.

4 Polybius 6. 24. 1-9.

5 Polybius 6. 23. 1-16; for weapons and armour see M. Feugere, Les Annes des remains de la republique a I'antiquite tardive (Paris, 1993), M. Bishop and J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), and P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981) and 'Pilum, gladius and pugio in the Late Republic', Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 8 (1997), pp. 41-57. On the find of a probable Roman scutum see W. Kimmig, 'Ein Keltenschild aus Aegypten’, Germania 24 (1940), pp. 106-111.

6 On velites Polybius 6. 22. 1-4. On legionary numbers see A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), pp. 50-51.

7 See M. Bell, 'Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army', Historia 14 (1965), pp. 404-422, Goldsworthy, Punic Wars (2000), pp. 53-4, 57-62, and The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD 200 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 138-140, 179-180.

8 See Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (2000), pp. 36-44, 52-3, for an introduction to Roman politics and a discussion of commanders.

9 Various strengths of allied cohorts: 460, Livy 23. 17. 11; 500, Livy 23. 17. 8; 570, Livy 23. 19; 600, Livy 28. 45. We do not know if these were 'paper' or actual strengths.

10 Disputes between joint commanders, see Polybius 3. 70.1-12, 94. 7-10, 100. 1-105. 11.

11 Roman manpower see Polybius 2. 24. 1-17, with discussion in Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 196-203 and P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971).

12 For the Carthaginian military system in general see Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (2000), pp.

30-36; for a discussion of the poor evidence for Punic armies see J. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 14-16; for an interesting discussion of Gallic, Spanish and other tribal contingents in Hannibal's army see L. Rawlings, 'Celts, Spaniards, and Samnites: Warriors in a Soldiers' War', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 81-95. D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars attempts to reconstruct Punic equipment and organisation in some detail and presents a thorough survey of the scant evidence, but inevitably many of his conclusions are highly conjectural.

13 The armies left to defend Spain and Africa, Polybius 3. 33. 5-16.

14 Lonchophoroi, e.g. Polybius 3. 72. 3, 83. 3, 84. 14; equipping Libyans with Roman arms, 3. 87. 3.

15 Marriage alliances between Punic aristocrats and Numidian royalty, e.g. Polybius 1. 78. 1-9, Livy 29. 23. 2-8; in Spain, DS 25. 12, Livy 24. 51. 7, Silius Italicus 3. 97, 106.

16 500 Numidians, Livy 26. 38. 11-14; Libyans at Saguntum, Livy 21. 11. 8; Gauls at Tarentum, Polybius 8. 30. 1; speiras at Cannae, Polybius 3. 114. 4, cf. 6. 24. 5.

17 Emphasis on the greater experience of Hannibal's men compared to the Romans in 218, Polybius 3. 70. 9-11; Spanish units interspersed with Gauls at Cannae, 3. 114. 4; poor march discipline of Gauls, 3. 79. 6-8; Tarentum, 8. 30. 1-4, Livy 24. 9. 16.

CHAPTER 3

1 Polybius' description of Paullus, 3. 107. 8; the Illyrian War, Polybius 3. 19. 13, Livy 22. 35. 3, 40. 349. 11, Frontinus Strategemata 4. 1. 45.

2 The bill to grant Minucius equal power with Fabius, Livy 22. 25. 1-19; Varro’s character and career, 22. 25. 18-26. 4.

3 Livy 22. 34. 2-35. 4; for a discussion suggesting a closer link between Varro and Paullus see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 73-5.

4 For narratives emphasizing factions see B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 20, 83-4, and to a lesser extent Lazenby (1978), pp. 4, 108. H. Scullard, Roman politics 220-150 BC (London, 1951) represents an extreme form of this view.

5 Polybius 3. 107. 9-15 with discussion in F. Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 439_440, 440; Telamon 2. 24. 3, Walbank 1 (1970), p. 199.

6 Livy 22. 36. 1-5; В. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 134-141, and P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), p. 419 are argue for the lower total; vague comments attributed to Paullus, Polybius 3. 109. 5, Hannibal, Livy 22. 40. 7, 41. 5, suggest the higher total, but should not be pushed too far.

7 For Fabius' legions and their origins see Walbank 1, pp. 410-411; Appian Hannibalic War 8 claims that Servilius Geminus had taken over Sempronius Longus’ legions in 217.

8 Livy 22. 38. 2-5; for the sacramentun see B. Campbell, The Emperor and the Roman Army (Oxford, 1984), pp. 19-32.

9 The election of the praetors and their distinguished records, see Livy 22. 35. 5-7.

10 Lazenby (1978), p. 75, and Brunt (1971), p. 419.

11 Polybius 3. 108. 2-109. 13.

12 Livy 22. 38. 6-40. 4, 41. 13, 49. 6-12, cf. Plutarch Fabius Maximus 14-16, Appian, Hann. 17-19.

13 Livy 22. 40. 7-8.

14 See P. Erdkamp, ‘Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy’, Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127-147 for a discussion of the evidence.

15 Plutarch, Lucullus 11. 1; Fabius' cautious and stubborn nature see Plutarch, Fabius Maximus passim, esp. 1 and 25.

16 Hannibal waiting for the harvest to ripen, Polybius 3. 107. 1-2 with comments in Walbank 1 (1970), p. 441; the tradition that the consuls joined the army before Hannibal moved, see Livy 22. 41. 4-43. 8 with comments in Lazenby (1978), p. 76.

17 Polybius’ belief that Hannibal's primary aim in 216 was to fight a battle, 3. 107. 2-3; the Carthaginian spy, Livy 22. 33. 1-2; on intelligence gathering in general see M. Austin and B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995).

18 Livy 22. 40. 6.

19 Gisgo see Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 15. 2-3; the Romans' careful scouting, Livy 22. 44. 1.

20 Polybius 3. 110. 1-3.

21 Polybius 3. 110. 4-11; Lazenby (1978), p. 77 doubted that it would have been impossible for the Romans to withdraw, but does not provide a convincing argument to support this.

22 Polybius 3. 111. 1-11.

23 Polybius 3. 112. 1-5.

24 Polybius 3. 112. 6-113. 1.

CHAPTER 4

1 Polybius 3. 113. 1-6, Livy 22. 45. 5-46. 1.

2 Polybius 3. 112. 1-5, Livy 22. 44. 5-45. 4.

3 For the suggestion that Paullus was in fact in command see P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (1981), pp. 184-6.

4 Polybius’ description of the battlefield, see Walbank, Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 435-8. When I visited the site in the summer of 1999, the actual line of the river conformed to none of the maps I had with me.

5 K. Lehmann, Klio 15 (1917), p. 162, and Klio (1931), pp. 70-99; and H. Delbruck (trans. W. Renfroe), History of the Art of War 1 (Nebraska, 1975), pp. 324-5.

6 J. Kromayer & G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder (1903-31) III, 1, pp. 278-388, followed by inter alia J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), p. 77-8.

7 P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), p. 184.

8 Livy 22. 36. 4.

9 For the general accounts of each side's deployment see Polybius 3. 113. 2-114. 8, Livy 22. 45. 6-9; for a detailed discussion of strengths see Appendix 1.

10 Polybius 3. 117. 8-9; for their possible identity see Lazenby (1978), pp. 79-80, Connolly (1981), p. 187; examples of triarii guarding the camp include Livy 35. 4 and 44. 37, but in contrast to Cannae, in neither case did the army plan to fight a battle.

11 Issus, Polybius 12. 18. 2-4.

12 For a discussion of formations see A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War (Oxford, 1996), pp. 176-183; Vegetius 3.14-15 allocated a frontage of 1m (3 feet) and a depth of 2.1m (7 feet) to a Roman legionary. Elsewhere Polybius claimed that each legionary occupied 1,8m (6 feet) square, but the passage is heavily stylized and seems improbable; 18. 30. 5-11.

13 E.g. Lazenby (1978), pp. 79-80, Connolly (1981), pp. 184-7, and Delbruck (1975), pp. 325-7.

14 Greek practice of putting bravest in the front and rear ranks, see Xenophon, Mem. 3. 19, Aescepiodotus, Tactics 14. 6; on the role of the optio see M. Speidel, The Framework of an Imperial Legion (Cardiff, 1992), pp. 24-6.

15 Delbruck (1975), p. 325.

16 Trebia, Polybius 3. 74. 3-6; Trasimene, Polybius 84. 3-7; Roman emphasis on bia Polybius 1. 37. 7-10.

17 At Metaurus in 207 BC the consul C. Claudius Nero controlled the right, the praetor L. Porcius Licinus the centre and the other consul M. Livius Drusus Salinator the left, in spite of the fact that the battle was fought under his command, Livy 27. 98.

18 Crossing the river in two columns, Polybius 3. 113. 6.

19 Polybius 3. 114. 4

20 Zama, Polybius IS. 9. 1-11. 12, Livy 30. 32. 1-33. 11.

21 Ecnomus as the model for Cannae see W. Tarn, Hellenistic military and naval developments (Cambridge, 1930), p. 165, J. Thiel, A history of Roman sea-power before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam, 1954), pp. 120-1, and Walbank 1 (1970), p. 87, as well as the refutation of this view in J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), pp. 94-5 and p. 185, n. 20.

22 Ennius Fragment 282.

23 Polybius 3. 115. 1, Livy 22. 47. 1. On missile ranges see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 183-190.

24 For an example of a protracted skirmish resulting in few fatalities and no decisive result, Josephus Bellum ludaicum 3. 150-54; studies of twentieth century combat, see S.L.A. Marshall, Men against Fire (New York, 1947), esp. pp. 51-4, 65.

25 Telamon, Polybius 2. 30. 1-4; Galatia, 189 BC, Livy 38. 21; for the supposed reform of 211 and the poor quality of Roman skirmishers before this date, see M. Samuels, 'The Reality of Cannae', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7-31.

26 Livy 22. 49. 1.

27 Polybius 3. 115. 2-4, Livy 22. 47. 1-3; for a discussion of cavalry combat see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 235-244.

28 Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 16, Livy 22. 49. 2-5, Appian Harm. 24.

29 Ticinus, Polybius 3. 65. 5-11; infantry interspersed with cavalry, Caesar Bellum Gallicum 1. 48, 7. 36, 7. 80, Bellum Civile 2. 34, 3. 75, 3. 84, African War 20, 61, 78, and discussion in Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 242-4.

30 Livy 22. 47. 3.

31 Polybius 3. 116. 5, Livy 22. 48. 1-4, Appian, Harm. 20, 22-3.

32 Noise, Polybius 1. 34. 2,15.12.8; importance of appearance, Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 2. 21, Plutarch, Luadlus 27. 5 and discussion in Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 192-7.

33 Polybius 3. 114. 2-4, 115. 5-7, Livy 22. 46. 5-6, 47. 4-5; Germans, Tacitus Germania 3.

34 Gaesatae, Polybius 2. 28. 8, 29. 7-9.

35 On the range of the pilum, see J. Vechere de Reffyre, ‘Les Armes d'Alise’, RA 2 (1864), p. 342, and M. Junkelmann, Die Legionen des Augustus (Mainz, 1991), p. 188;

Josephus Bellwn Judaicum 3. 259, 266, 4. 20. For a detailed study of the use of missiles by Roman infantry see A. Zhmodikov, 'Roman Republican Heavy Infantrymen in Battle (IV—II centuries BC), Historic! 49. 1 (2000), pp. 67-78, and also the comments in Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 192-201.

36 For discussions of infantry combat see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 191-227, and see P. Sabin, 'The mechanics of battle in the Second Punic War’, in Cornell, Rankov and Sabin (1996), pp. 59-79, esp. 64-73; for a detailed discussion of the most extensive set of grave finds see B. Thordeman, Armour from the battle ofWisby 1361. vols. 1-2 (Stockholm, 1939), esp. vol. 1, pp. 94-5, 160-194.

37 Hoplite warfare see V. Hanson, The Western Way of War (New York, 1989), J. Lazenby, The Killing Zone', in V. Hanson (ed.), Hoplites (New York, 1991), pp. 87-109, and A. Goldsworthy, 'The Othismos, Myths and Heresies', War in History 4 (1997), pp. 1-26.

38 Plutarch, Cato the Elder 1; multiple head wounds, see M. Wheeler, Maiden Castle, Dorset (1943), p. 352 as well as Thordeman (1939) passim.

39 Centurions, Polybius 6. 24. 9; senior officers at Cannae, Polybius 3. 116. 1-4, Livy 22.49. 2. For a detailed discussion of the role of Roman commanders at a later period see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 149-163.

40 Livy 22. 47. 5-6.

41 For a full discussion of casualties see Appendix 2.

42 Polybius 3. 115. 6.

43 Polybius 3. 115. 8-10, Livy 22. 47. 7-10.

44 Polybius 3. 116. 5-8, Livy 22. 48. 5-6.

45 E.g. B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 139, Lazenby (1978), p. 84, Connolly (1981), p. 188. For a vivid attempt to reconstruct this final phase see V. Hanson, 'Cannae', in R. Cowley (ed.) Experience of War (New York, 1992), pp. 42-9.

46 E.g. Connolly (1981), p. 187.

47 On the proper behaviour for soldiers and commanders in defeat see N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990).

48 Ranks packed too densely so that the men in front could retreat were always a source of especially high casualties, e.g. Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 5. 43, Tacitus, Annals 2. 20, 14. 37, Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 3. 271-5.

49 Death of Paullus, Polybius 3. 116. 9, Livy 22. 49. 6-12, cf. Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 16.

50 Polybius 3. 117. 1-6, Livy 22. 49. 13-50. 3, 52. 6; for a full discussion see Appendix 2.

CHAPTER 5

1 Livy 22. 51. 5-9; for British casualties on the Somme see M. Middlebrook, The First Day of the Somme (London, 1971), pp. 262-4 and also see Appendix 2.

2 Livy 22. 50. 4-12, 52. 4, and for the lower estimate see Frontinus, Strategemata 4. 5. 7.

3 Polybius 3. 117. 7-12, Livy 22. 52. 1-6.

4 Polybius 3. 117. 2, Livy 22. 50. 3, 52. 7-53. 13.

5 Livy 22. 54. 1-6.

6 Livy 22. 54. 7-56. 8, Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 17-18.

7 Livy 22. 51. 1-4.

8 For useful surveys of the evidence and arguments claiming that it was never Hannibal’s intention to attack Rome see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 85-6, and "Was Hannibal Right?", in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin (edd.) The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, B1CS Supplement 67 (London, 1996), 39-48, and also H. Delbriick (trans. J. Renfroe), History of the Art of War 1 (Nebraska, 1975), pp. 336-44; for arguments based on logistics see J. Shean, 'Hannibal's mules: the logistical limitations of Hannibal's army and the battle of Cannae, 216 BC’, Historia 45 (1996), pp. 159-87.

9 Livy 26. 11. 6.

10 Livy 22. 58. 1-61. 15.

11 See A. Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2000), pp. 216-19, and B.D. Hoyos "Hannibal: What kind of genius?", Greece and Rome 30 (1983), pp. 171-80, esp. 177-8; use of negotiations over casualties to initiate peace talks see Livy 33. 11-12.

12 N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 139-40, Livy 22. 57. 10-12, 61. 14-5, 23. 14. 1-4.

13 Livy 22. 53. 7-9; refusal to negotiate with Pyrrhus, Plutarch, Pyrrhus 18-20.

14 For general accounts of the war after Cannae see Lazenby (1978), p. 87+, B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 140, and Goldsworthy (2000), p. 219; for Postumius' defeat see Polybius 3. 118. 6, Livy 23. 24. 6-13.

15 Livy 23. 12. 1-2.

16 Livy 39. 51

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