Post-classical history



THE start of the new century did not, initially at least, appear to promise better things for Edward’s reconquest of Scotland. Indeed, the Scots, buoyed up with their success at Stirling, probably went on to besiege Bothwell, another outwardly impregnable fortress; its constable, Stephen Brampton, later complained bitterly to the king that he and his men endured fourteen months of siege, after which they languished for three years in a Scottish prison.1 If the sieges of Stirling and Bothwell happened consecutively, then the latter probably fell in the spring of 1301, around the time that Edward was planning that year’s campaign. They could, of course, have taken place concurrently but this seems less likely when one considers the resources needed to maintain a Scottish army for that length of time without its size becoming the butt of jokes on the battlements. Even so, the ability of the Scots to reduce such strongholds is quite remarkable, though their success probably says more about the English inability to save them.

There were some good omens for the English, however. On 5 January 1300 the issue of the wardenship of the western march was finally resolved with the appointment of Sir John de St. John to that office. As with Clifford, the area over which his jurisdiction extended was much greater than that originally conferred on Sir Henry Percy. St. John was now captain and royal lieutenant ‘over all the men-at-arms and all affairs of arms, both of cavalry and infantry’ in the sheriffdoms of Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire, in Annandale itself, and the whole Scottish march as far as the western boundary of the sheriffdom of Roxburgh, the beginning of Sir Robert FitzRoger’s jurisdiction. On the other hand, we should not forget that the Scots had their own warden of the western march, Sir Adam Gordon.2

St. John was also given certain confidential instructions. On 25 September 1300, having presumably fulfilled them, he was paid £433 12s. for ‘secret expenses made by him by order of the king and council . . . on 5 January [1300]’.3 These were presumably expended on activities intended to establish English control more effectively throughout the western march. The element of secrecy, and therefore of surprise, was an extremely effective weapon in this war.

Sir John de St. John was a most important acquisition as royal lieutenant. Although a soldier, like Surrey and Clifford, he was also a proven administrator, having served as Edward’s governor of the duchy of Aquitaine (Gascony) at a time when relations with Philip of France reached their nadir. On the outbreak of war between England and France in 1294 over the status of the duchy, St. John led the advance guard, along with the king’s nephew, John of Brittany. Despite the failure of forces to arrive from England, thanks to the outbreak of rebellion in Wales, they were remarkably successful in containing the French until a counter-offensive forced them back. In 1297, however, St. John and many of his battalion were captured by the French and Edward’s lack of credit worthiness meant that the £5000 ransom was not raised until 1298; he made it home just in time to join the king for the Falkirk campaign.4 Sir John was not merely competent, however: the chronicler, Walter of Guisborough, states explicitly that his rule of the duchy had been popular.5 A man of this calibre was sorely needed in Scotland.

St. John could also still call on the services of Sir Robert Clifford, still denied access to Caerlaverock; he agreed to serve in the new warden’s company from 2 January to 24 June 1300 for the handsome sum of 500 marks. Clifford and his men were also permitted to stay in the houses that he had had newly-built in the new pele of Lochmaben ‘without dispute from anyone’. However, he was not allowed to go off on his own business unless St. John agreed and then only if enough of his men-at-arms were left behind. On the other hand, if he couldn’t maintain his own retinue fully, he could leave freely or else reduce the numbers, with a corresponding deduction in payment.6 The safety of the garrison was absolutely paramount but, on the other hand, there was no point in forcing service out of those who had no wish to be there. Ultimately, as Clifford well knew, it was the warden’s job to maintain an effective fighting force, despite the difficulties in providing both wages and food supplies.

There was to be no honeymoon period for the new warden. At the same time as news of St. John’s appointment reached them, the men under his jurisdiction were ordered ‘to hold themselves in readiness to be at Carlisle, properly appointed,7 within eight days of their summons’.8 Though we have no direct evidence for their subsequent activities, the king did make offerings in the chapel of Westminster on 14 February ‘because of good’ – but unfortunately unspecified – ‘rumours in Scotland’.9 The next day, St. John was ordered to maintain at royal wages twenty or thirty men-at-arms (presumably in addition to Clifford’s thirty) and as many hobelars (soldiers on small ponies) as he thought necessary. The use of hobelars, still an unusual occurrence outside Ireland, was wisely seen by the king as crucial in getting to grips with the difficult terrain of Galloway particularly.10

By 1 March St. John was engaged in a military offensive against the ‘rebels’ operating within his jurisdiction. As ever, Abingdon was also placed on red alert at Carlisle, not least because if any castles were captured, or surrendered voluntarily, and it was thought advisable to place an English garrison in them, the receiver was to cover the costs of provisioning them with men, victuals and equipment.11 The eight-days’ summonses were presumably issued at this time, although the power given to St. John and Abingdon on 1 March to punish those who failed to turn up may well be evidence of an understandable war-weariness among those being called upon to fight constantly in Scotland.12

Within two weeks one success can certainly be inferred. On 11 March 1300 offerings were made in the chapel of Berwick castle ‘because of good rumours heard from Scotland’;13 a few weeks later, on 24 March, Sir John Dolive was granted the royal castle of Dumfries. We can therefore presume that this castle had been successfully restored to English control. This was much better news indeed! At the same time, Sir John de St. John was permitted to retain John le Skirmisher and his crew with their galley to victual Dumfries castle. However, silence fell upon St. John’s activities until 22 April when Sir Thomas Borhunte, one of the warden’s knights, arrived at Westminster ‘hastily from parts of Scotland’; fortunately, another messenger arrived on 30 April ‘to reassure him [the king] of the state of the march’, implying perhaps that a Scottish counter-offensive had been repulsed.14

Meanwhile, the struggle to maintain the supply line continued unabated. On 2 May 1300, Edward wrote to his treasurer, Walter Langton, at York, informing him that he had heard from St. John that the victuals at Carlisle were almost all gone. Langton was therefore to arrange immediately for the purveyance being gathered for that year’s campaign in Ireland to be sent as quickly as possible to Carlisle. The Scots were still engaged in a war of attrition against the English garrisons, attacking their lines of supply to make the most of victualling difficulties.15 St. John and his men were not out of the woods yet.

Sir Robert FitzRoger’s position as captain and lieutenant of Northumberland and of the garrisons of Berwick and Wark was confirmed on 1 March 1300, but only for another two months. Yet again all was not well on the victualling front: it was stated in no uncertain terms that ‘. . . it is necessary to have come to Berwick a great store of victuals and other things needed for the support of the men who are staying there and elsewhere in our service for the keeping and defence of the said marches’.16

When FitzRoger’s current contract ran out on 30 April, the king ordered that he was to be persuaded to remain until 23 December. Whatever the inducement, it wasn’t enough: he stayed only until 23 June and no replacement was appointed until around 29 September, when Sir William Latimer was once more described as keeper of Berwick town and warden of the march. Sir Walter Teye was appointed to the former office during the interim but probably had been, and continued to be, in charge of the Berwick town garrison even while the warden technically held that office. Certainly he and FitzRoger had jointly been responsible for the payment of troops in the Berwick garrisons in December 1299.17 The overlapping command structure apparent throughout the English administration probably reflects the need for a number of officials to share these considerable responsibilities, especially since the senior official (warden or receiver) might often need to be elsewhere.

Expeditions against the Scots were not confined to the western march; the Scottish contingent left in the south-east under Umfraville and Keith was still a force to be reckoned with. In April 1300 a skirmish took place at Hawick and five horses belonging to various members of the south-eastern garrisons were killed, though unfortunately we have no idea of the damage inflicted on the Scots.18

Despite such activities, this Scottish force was probably intended merely to contain the English garrisons there and maintain access to and from Selkirk Forest; the real theatre of war, for both sides, was now firmly the south-west, and Galloway in particular. Sir John Kingston, at Edinburgh, provided yet more bad news of Scottish activities, this time to sir Ralph Manton, the royal cofferer, who was becoming increasingly involved in Scottish affairs. The worst came first: on 10 May 1300 a Scottish parliament was held at Rutherglen. The ability of the Scottish government not only to hold such an event, but to do so that far south was concrete proof that Edward’s was not the only administration in Scotland; it was arguably not even the more successful.19

Fortunately, there was good news, from the English point-of view, on the faction-fighting front. A serious quarrel had broken out yet again, this time between the obligatory John Comyn and his senior guardian, the bishop of St. Andrews. Lamberton was supported by the Steward and the earl of Atholl, traditionally Bruce supporters; Carrick himself was nowhere to be seen. The upshot of it all, and presumably the source of the quarrel, was that Sir Ingram d’Umfraville, a Balliol-Comyn man, was chosen as guardian. Bruce no longer seems to have occupied that office, ensuring that the Comyn faction now had almost complete control of Scottish government. It is quite possible that the eclipsing of Bruce and his supporters caused problems in terms of commitment to the war-effort, even if no-one actually changed sides – yet; nevertheless subsequent events suggest that the dominance of one group minimised the need for consensus politics and allowed policy/strategies to be executed more quickly. Men like Atholl and the Steward continued to play a role in Scottish government after Carrick’s withdrawal from power, suggesting that, casting aside hindsight, the Bruce star was considered even by them to be on the wane and Carrick himself was by no means central to Scottish politics.

Of more interest to the English, however, was the news that the earl of Buchan could not attend ‘because he was away in Galloway to treat with the Galwegians’. The Rutherglen parliament was therefore adjourned until 17 December, to be held in the same place, ‘on which day the earl of Buchan and all the great Scotsmen will be there with their power’.20 The Galwegians had a longstanding antipathy towards the centralising tendencies of the kings of Scots; thus, although they joined Wallace during his raids on northern England, their presence was primarily inspired by a traditional interest in such warfare.

Edward himself had recognised the uses to which this separatism might be put, releasing Thomas of Galloway, illegitimate son of the last Celtic lord of Galloway, and issuing a charter of liberties for the region in 1296. Thomas, who had been in prison in the Balliol stronghold of Barnard Castle, was thus being used to underline John Balliol’s loss of the lordship of Galloway, as well as the kingdom itself.21 Most of the region’s important families, such as the MacCans and the Macdoualls, tended to side with Edward after 1296, though it is ironic that he should be regarded as their best hope for regional autonomy. Nevertheless, this is not the same as saying that the English actually controlled this inaccessible part of the country.

The fight for Galloway was therefore just as important to the Scots as it was to Edward. The Bruce lands of Annandale, together with the rest of Dumfriesshire, were coming increasingly under effective English control. The capture of Caerlaverock, which had been planned as far back as August 1299 with the making of siege engines for that purpose, would make that control secure. On the other hand, if Caerlaverock remained in Scottish hands, Dumfries and Lochmaben would continue to operate as mere outposts of English-occupied Scotland and the conquest of Galloway would still elude Edward.

Almost immediately upon his return from his frustrating sojourn at Berwick, Edward set the wheels in motion for the next campaign. This was intended to tackle the three main areas of difficulty which had emerged for the English in southern Scotland: Caerlaverock, Galloway and Selkirk Forest. Demands for purveyance from all over the country went out on 17 January 1300, to arrive at Berwick by 24 June. The large-scale purveyance of victuals had always been unpopular but, after four years of war, resistance was becoming more emphatic. On 2 May 1300 Edward wrote to the treasurer at York, informing him that the 1000 quarters of wheat, 1000 quarters of oats and 500 quarters of malt ordered from the counties of Cambridge and Huntingdon had not been collected because the sheriff of these counties ‘has scarcely anything in his hands with which he could make this purveyance’ (i.e. he had no money to pay for it). Again, these counties were far removed from the war zone and had every incentive to avoid contributing if they could. Equally Yorkshire, which does not seem to have been asked to contribute in this year (presumably because of the extent of the county’s commitment in previous years), nevertheless found 505 quarters of wheat and some small amounts of other goods to send north. As Table 5 indicates, the shortfall between what the king demanded and what actually arrived was fairly serious.

The collection of these victuals was imperative, however, because, as the king knew from experience, a ‘lack of victuals on this journey that we wish to embark on in Scotland would place us in the hands of our enemies or force us to return hastily’. Cambridge and Huntingdon were thus not exempted, though the purveyance was to be made, rather euphemistically, ‘to the least grievance of the people’. In the end the county did provide something, though generally only half of what was demanded.22 Purveyance was also made of the equipment needed to transport these goods to their final destination, from the stores at either Berwick or Carlisle.23

Table 5: Purveyance 1300 – demand and supply

The writs for feudal service had been sent out as early as the end of December 1299.24 The total numbers of men-at-arms actually serving the following summer reached the respectable total of around seventeen hundred men-at-arms but a mere thirteen per cent derived from this traditional feudal source. Of these, only the earl of Gloucester, Sir Hugh Despenser and Sir John Hastings actually fulfilled their service in person: ‘. . . the majority of great men appear simply to have detached some members of their retinue to do it on their behalf, even when they were themselves present on campaign’.

A total of sixteen thousand footsoldiers from Nottingham, Derby and ‘the four most northerly counties’ were summoned to the muster at Carlisle, but only about nine thousand were actually recruited by the commissioners of array. The Welsh were excused ‘because of all the great work which they have done in our service in the past’.25 Although, this may reflect their alleged disloyalty at Falkirk, the evidence for their service in 1298 alone might also suggest that this was nothing less than the truth. A small contingent of around three hundred and sixty Irish soldiers were also present at the siege of Caerlaverock ‘and joined the king in his aimless marching through Galloway’. Edward had also requested the services of three hundred Irish hobelars, whose suitability for the Scottish terrain he had noted in 1299, but he got only a rather ineffectual fourteen.26

As with purveyance, Edward was facing serious problems in keeping numbers up to scratch. The men of the northern counties, who had been on the front line since 1297, were extremely unwilling to serve ‘for they were afraid to leave their homes lest they should be devastated by retaliating raiders’. The men of Durham and Yorkshire ‘constantly mutinied and deserted’. Only the counties of Lancashire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, and, to a limited extent, Chester and Shropshire, ‘seem to have been properly organised and good fighters, and willing to keep the field for more than a few days’.27

Finally, the regularisation of the role of the fleet, prompted by its dismal performance in 1298, was now put into practice. Edward I, as usual, played a major role in giving greater coherence to the basic institution which he had inherited. A total of fifty-seven boats of varying sizes was now to be provided annually by the Cinque Ports for a period of fifteen days at their own costs.28 In 1300 royal accounts show that thirty Cinque Port ships and fifty-nine ships from forty-eight other ports were sent to Scotland. This is also the first year in which mention is made of an admiral – Gervase Alard of Winchelsea. There were also four captains of the fleet, William Pate and Justin Alard of Winchelsea, William Charles of Sandwich and John Hall of Dover.29 Even if the Cinque Ports did not provide the largest contingent, they maintained control of naval operations.

Various nobles also personally owned ships and galleys which they put at the king’s disposal. For example, a safe-conduct was granted in July 1300 to Malcolm le fiz I’Engleys (MacQuillan), who maintained his own private galleys, to allow him to harass the Scots on the western seaboard. MacQuillan, who seems to have had interests, like so many, on both sides of the Irish sea, had been granted Kintyre by Edward in 1296; he thus had every good reason to try to render English control of the north-west a reality, though that was certainly not going to happen in 1300.30 However, in general far too few individuals displayed an interest in sea-power to play a significant role in Edward’s fleet.

The Irish ports of Waterford, Youghall, Ross, Drogheda, Dublin and Cork also had a quota of one ship each to provide as their servitium debitum, with the exception of Cork, which provided two. The ships of Drogheda, which port was conveniently situated for Carlisle, figure most prominently in the transportation of purveyance.

This service was likely to become a great burden for some of the smaller ports since, although the quotas were variable in size, the demand had became almost annual. All ships were to be furnished and kept for fifteen days at the expense of the towns from which they were demanded. If a crew comprised a master, a constable and nineteen men (the minimum for a Cinque Port boat), then the wages alone came to £4 6s. 3d. for each ship, a considerable sum. Quotas of soldiers imposed a similar strain on the shires, but the boroughs must have felt a greater burden since there were fewer of them to provide the service. Equally, as with the shires, the boroughs furthest away from the border must have felt little inclination to shell out for such a far-away conflict. On the other hand, there was money to be made transporting goods both within and without the campaigning season.

As with his armies, the king could not force the ships’ crews to remain in his service any longer than the fifteen days which they owed him if they did not wish to do so. In many cases, fifteen days would be enough time only to travel from their ports of origin to the muster point, particularly since many came from the southernmost counties. Even if the mariners did agree to stay on, they would now be at the king’s wages; it was becoming increasingly difficult to pay them, as well as the rest of the army, for the amount of time required to make an impression on the areas of Scotland still outwith his control.

Three years into the war, Edward was certainly not having it all his own way either in his martial exploits or on the domestic front. Having been rather let off the hook in 1297, when a full-blown crisis in England was averted by the patriotic backlash provoked by the defeat at Stirling Bridge, the English king still had to bargain for support for the Scottish war. This was particularly true in 1300, when a parliament held in March managed to extract a number of ‘royal concessions, known as the Articuli super Cartas, which were clearly part of the price that Edward paid for the grant of a twentieth in this parliament.’ However, the élites were essentially behind their king now; they were merely concerned that there should be no abuse of the law and that local affairs should be run as effectively as possible.31

Edward arrived at Carlisle on 27 June 1300, reaching Caerlaverock on 9 July.32 He and his army were joined there by a considerable force of up to ninety-three men-at-arms, five hobelars, three crossbowmen and nearly fourteen hundred archers drawn from the garrisons of Berwick town, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Lochmaben.33 The south-eastern garrisons lost a total of eight hundred and fifty men from their defence. Although the main area of contention was currently the south-west, there was still a threat to the south-east from Scots operating from Selkirk Forest; the removal of so many men, although doubtless considered necessary, left these garrisons much more vulnerable.

According to the contemporary poem, Le Siège de Karlaverock, a total of ‘three thousand brave men-at-arms’ massed before the castle,34 though this figure probably owes something to poetic licence. The army was divided into four squadrons under the earl of Lincoln, the earl of Surrey, the king, and the prince of Wales.35 Within them were a number of prominent members of Edward’s administration in Scotland, past, present and future, notably Sir Henry Percy, Sir Robert Clifford, Earl Patrick of Dunbar, Sir Richard Siward, Sir Simon Fraser, Sir John de St. John, Sir William Latimer and Sir Alexander Balliol.36

The siege commenced after the arrival of the navy – ‘fortunately’, according to the poet – with engines and provisions, again proving that little could be done without this support. However, despite the stirring account of the brave exploits of the army in the poem, it was the skill of the engineers, who bombarded the castle with a constant stream of missiles, which brought about its submission. The Scots apparently held out for a day and a night and until the following day at terce (9 am), when mounting casualties and the fact that the roof had fallen in persuaded them to give up. Around sixty men survived the siege, to be rewarded, again according to the poet, with a new robe each, though royal records certainly make no reference to this.37 Edward was more in the habit of imprisoning, or worse, any ‘rebel’ Scots who fell into his hands, while the poet’s job was quite clearly to put a chivalric gloss on what was really a rather short and inglorious siege.

The Scottish army was obviously in no position to challenge Edward’s army, but it could still harass it. Between 6 and 9 August, the English were attacked at the mouth of the river Fleet, presumably while foraging for food; a number of horses, including one belonging to a certain Piers Gaveston, were killed.38 The Scots came off worst, however: Sir Robert Keith, Sir Thomas Soules, Robert Baird, William Charteris and Laurence Ramsay were all captured and the king rejoiced that some of his ‘worst enemies’ were now in an English jail.39 Presumably Keith and at least some of the force under his command in Selkirk Forest had moved west as the English advanced into Scotland.

The rest of the Scottish army now moved further west and faced the English from the other side of the Cree. The three Scottish cavalry brigades were, according to Rishanger, commanded by Buchan, Comyn of Badenoch, and d’Umfraville. In an action reminiscent of Falkirk, they fled when the English, divided into three brigades under the earl of Hereford, the king, and his son, Edward of Caernarvon, crossed the river. However, the lack of hobelars to pursue them over such rough terrain prevented the English from inflicting greater damage on the Scottish forces.40

Edward’s original intention was to continue west and then north, since Sir Ralph Manton was sent to Carlisle to enlist more footsoldiers and find extra victuals ‘for the passing of the king to Ayr’. In reality the army returned to England, although Edward did cross the border again in mid-October to oversee the construction of a pele at Dumfries, like the one already built at Lochmaben.41 The lack of resources – both men and supplies – compounded with the lateness of the season were the most likely causes of this change of plan, which included the agreement of a truce. Thus, despite the appearance of an English army in Scotland, and the impotence of the Scots in its presence, Galloway still remained outwith Edward’s control. The situation there is made quite clear in a grant of 11 September 1300, by which Sir John de St. John was given

. . . lands, farms and rents in England to the value of 1000 marks a year, for life or until he can be put in seisin and enjoy the issues and profits of land to that amount in the land of Galloway heretofore granted to him, and which he cannot enjoy at present by reason of the war in that land’.42

The failure of the royal army to progress into Galloway put the onus for an expedition on to St. John’s shoulders to ‘bring to a satisfactory conclusion his [the king’s] business in these parts’. Sir Alexander Convers, a royal clerk more usually attached to the south-eastern garrisons, went with the lieutenant between 18 October and 4 November to pay wages, though there is no evidence to indicate how many men took part.43 The purpose of this enterprise was ‘to receive the men of those parts to the king’s peace’, though surely this was based more on the hope, rather than the firm expectation, that the Galwegians would submit.

Not all the action was in the south-west, however. At the end of August, William Camera (probably one of the Berwick town garrison) lost a horse while in Selkirk Forest with Sir Simon Fraser, suggesting that sporadic expeditions against the Scots using the Forest were still taking place. However, the network of Edwardian officials was further bolstered by a grant of Hermitage castle to Sir Simon Lindsay, already captain in Eskdale and keeper of Liddel castle, on 20 September. The issues of the surrounding area were to be used to ‘provide supplies for himself and his men in our service in parts of Scotland’. The castles of Liddel and Hermitage, forfeited by the Soules family, had subsequently been granted to Sir John Wake, who had recently died. Despite the ostensibly private nature of the grant, Lindsay’s public service ensured that he was given supplies for the castle from the royal store at Berwick as a gift.44

In October two royal clerks were sent to the south-east from the king at Dumfries with instructions for the officials there. Since Sir John de St. John was otherwise occupied in Galloway, they were ordered ‘to make some good expeditions upon Selkirk Forest and elsewhere where they think it good and that they exert themselves to do as well as possible so that the king can have good news of them and that they are always busy with what the king has charged them to do’. Despite the disintegration of his army, Edward was determined to maintain the military pressure on the Scots for as long as possible; he certainly could not feel easy about his garrisons in the south-east unless the threat from Selkirk Forest was finally removed.

The clerks were to return to the king to inform him ‘. . . how they [the constables of Roxburgh and Jedburgh] are undertaking these matters and how they are taking them to heart after they have heard the king’s will’. Finally, Sir Richard Bremesgrave, at the Berwick store, was firmly to inform Sir William Latimer, warden of the eastern march, ‘that by all means he is to stay in these parts to attend to these matters and make expeditions on the forest according to the initial plan, as often and as effectively as possible until he gets further orders from the king’. There is more than a hint here that Latimer, like so many before him, did not relish his position; however, Edward was determined that his work should not be undone and was rather desperately trying to inspire his officials to exert themselves.45

An expedition under Latimer did take place between 26 and 31 October, though there is no evidence that it actually engaged the enemy.46 Other, more drastic, tactics also seem to have been used: Michael Whitton, the head forester at Selkirk, was compensated on 20 November for having ‘recently burned his houses and other property in the forest of Selkirk for the king’s service’. It says much for the growing acceptance of the English presence in the south-east that the leader of the foresters, who fought so heroically on the Scottish side at Falkirk, was now with Edward. He was not alone, either – the men under him were considered equally loyal to the English king.47

At the same time, Bremesgrave accounted for the movement of goods to and from his store. Even though the army was operating in the west, he received a certain amount of the purveyed supplies, most of which went to sustain the garrisons within his jurisdiction. Table 6 indicates the proportions of foodstuffs brought in, compared with the amounts then sold or given away. In the case of wheat and flour particularly, there wasn’t much in it, and more beans and peas seem to have gone out than were actually in the store!

Both Master Richard Abingdon and Sir James Dalilegh, a clerk of sir John Droxford, keeper of the wardrobe, received and issued money, victuals and equipment at Carlisle throughout this regnal year. However, even though there is no clear dividing line, Dalilegh had largely taken over from Abingdon as keeper of the store by August 1300, as the latter became more heavily involved in his exchequer duties.48 The Carlisle store obviously received most of the purveyance since it had to supply not only the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben, but also the army itself. Table 7 indicates just how hand-to-mouth a task that was.

Abingdon, who was still the principal receiver at Carlisle in this regnal year, sold £3247 Is. 1d. worth of victuals, in comparison to Dalilegh’s £862 10s. 4d. worth. Bremesgrave’s receipts, amounting to £1739 2s. 9d., were naturally less because the campaign was in the west. The receivers thus brought in a combined total of £5848 14s. 2d., which still put them ahead of the cost of the victuals at £4063 2s.49

Table 6: Berwick store, 1300

Unlike the second Welsh war, when military accounts were kept separately, it is not possible to assess the exact costs incurred by Edward, and England, during his wars in Scotland. However, it is possible for this regnal year, thanks to the Liber Quotidianus Garderobae; or Daily Wardrobe Book. The garrisons accounted for the largest part of the year’s expenditure at £13,574. Victuals came to £5063. The army which besieged and captured Caerlaverock cost £8,561 in total, and a further £2000 was paid out as compensation for horses lost during the campaign. Thus, out of this year’s total wardrobe expenditure of around £64,000, nearly half (£29,198) was spent on the prosecution of the war.50

Table 7: Carlisle store, 1300

On 30 October 1300, Edward concluded a truce with the Scots, through the mediation of Philip of France, to last until 21 May 1301. This was the first oblique admission on Edward’s part that Scotland was far from conquered; it is also generally regarded as an acknowledgement of the failure of the campaign of 1300.51 Edward agreed to it in principle the previous October, while at Dumfries.52 English activities in the following months had therefore been geared towards bolstering their position before the truce came into effect.

The truce certainly signifies a degree of failure in Edward’s dealings with the Scots; nevertheless, he had made some progress during the campaign of 1300. The fall of Caerlaverock provided security for Dumfries and Lochmaben, even if Galloway itself was still unsafe. Equally, although English garrisons could not make expeditions during a time of truce, they would not lose any ground to the Scots either (although private initiatives on both sides would have been difficult to prevent completely). Edward was always aware of the power wielded by his enormous armies, even if this was largely psychological in nature. Given that he had failed to keep his army together to consolidate his position, the logic of the truce must surely have been to use the gains made in 1300 as the springboard to the final conquest of the south-west the following summer. In the meantime Edward’s officials in Dumfries and Annandale were now able to make their presence felt throughout the areas under their jurisdiction: it is no coincidence that Abingdon’s account for this year included forty ox carcasses sent by the men of Moffat ‘to have peace’.53

It now only remained for the garrisons to be paid and their accounts and stores reviewed. Lochmaben, Dumfries and Caerlaverock were visited by no less than the Treasurer of England, Walter Langton, and Sir John Droxford between 14 and 24 November. Sir Ralph Manton was despatched to Berwick, Edinburgh and Roxburgh at the same time.54 Since this was a period of truce, with (theoretically) no military activity, the numbers in the garrisons, as shown in Tables 1–4 did not need to be as high. Nevertheless, the protection of the south-east was still dependent on a decent-sized force in Berwick town, even if the small standing army had gone. Seven hundred and thirty men served Edward in the Scottish castles held by him (excluding other castles in private hands, such as Dirleton, Liddel and Hermitage) at a total cost of £13 5s. per day. The store at Berwick, without an army to feed, was able to maintain fairly healthy totals in the stores within each of its satellite castles. However, the situation at Dumfries (and presumably Lochmaben) was rather less reassuring, with only twelve barrels of flour remaining, for example.55

Since 1298, the exchequer at York had clearly played an extremely important role in Scottish affairs, governing all financial aspects of the administration of the northern kingdom. This role also renders unlikely the existence of a fully-functioning and independent administration in Berwick. However, Sir Ralph Manton, the king’s cofferer, was playing an increasingly important role within the Edwardian administration, even if he occupied no properly appointed office within it and many of his activities could be regarded as an extension of his duties as a wardrobe clerk. The most important aspect of these duties was the payment of, and accounting with, the royal garrisons. According to the chronicler, Guisborough, Manton was accused by Sir Simon Fraser of avarice when the two met at the skirmish at Roslin in 1303:

You have betrayed the king who made you treasurer,

And me and many others, of whom not one is acquitted

Of the wages which you owe by reckoning and by writing.56

Interestingly, a similar charge was made against Sir Hugh Cressingham, who had officially occupied the office of treasurer. Perhaps both men were unscrupulous in the discharge of their duties, but it is also possible that they were blamed as the messenger, caught within an ever-increasing spiral of debt caused by the war. Fraser, and the other Edwardian military officers, probably viewed the conflict more traditionally, as a route to glory and riches. In reality, as the constant pleas for wage payment and the redundant role of the army at Caerlaverock illustrate rather poignantly, serving in Scotland was both dull and costly.

The truce with the Scots, in operation since 31 October 1300, was due to expire on 21 May 1301. On 1 March 1301 the earls of Surrey and Warwick, Sir Aymer de Valence, Sir John de St. John and Sir Hugh Vere were appointed to ‘treat with the envoys of Philip, King of France, touching the rectification of the disobediences, rebellions, contempts, trespasses, injuries, excesses and losses inflicted by the Scots’. This was hardly conciliatory talk.

The meeting was to be held at Canterbury at mid-Lent (around 8 March), but was later postponed until 16 April. On 26 March, safe-conducts were issued to Sir Adam Gordon, Sir John Inchmartin, Master Nicholas Balmyle, the Scottish chancellor, and Master Thomas Bunkle, as the Scottish representatives.57 However, a week later, the king ordered that, ‘having determined not to renew the truce with the Scots’, a force was to muster at Berwick under his own command, and another at Carlisle under his son, the Prince of Wales. It is seriously to be doubted that Edward ever intended renewing the truce, since preparations for the campaign had begun as early as February.58

On 8 April, with still over a month and a half of the truce to run, the magnates and royal officials of Northumberland were warned to prepare for Scottish attacks on the expiry of the truce, since the king knew ‘not what may result from the conference between the Scots and the French ambassadors now taking place at Canterbury’. Edward knew exactly what would result. His refusal to grant an extension of the truce and his desire for a treaty with the French alone meant that a resumption of hostilities was inevitable. On 25 April Edward finally announced that ‘. . . the parlance to have been lately held at Canterbury between his people and those of the king of France on the affairs of Scotland is broken off to his advantage and the great loss of the French . . .’59

There was certainly some cause for optimism in the English camp, not least because of the increasing evidence for a partial re-establishment of normal government in certain areas under English control. In 1299 Sir Philip Vernay, keeper of Berwick town, Sir John Burdon, sheriff of Berwick, and Sir Robert Hastangs, sheriff of Roxburgh, were all able to hold inquests. Two of these were into lands confiscated from ‘rebels’ and now regranted; in both cases it was also established how much was owed as service to the Berwick exchequer. Even if there was really no exchequer in Scotland, there was clearly an expectation that some issues could now be forthcoming.60 In the same year, Master Richard Abingdon was able to account for the admittedly small sum of £23 13s. 4d. from the issues of Annandale.61

Then, in 1300, the sheriff of Edinburgh, Sir John Kingston, accounted for certain ‘receipts of the king’s money’, including the farms of North Berwick, Tyninghame, Haddington, the town of Edinburgh, Lasswade, Aberlady, Easter Pencaitland, East Niddrie and Lowood, the tolls of Edinburgh town, and the tenth of Inveresk, Lasswade, Roslin, Aberlady, Ballencreiff and Carrington. Other receipts included £16 3s. 4d. as part-payment of a fine owed to the king by the abbey of Newbattle, 30s. from five men of the sheriffdom ‘coming to peace’, and various other fines. The total received was £66 8s. 3d.. Kingston also received a further £25 from the ‘issues of Scotland’, namely the farms of Tranent and Seton, and the sale of hides and grain belonging to certain fugitives in Carrington.

He had also been able to buy victuals and equipment for his garrison from the surrounding area. The purchases were mostly of cattle and interesting items such as ‘ferrets of Dirleton’, while local smiths had also been used to service the mounts of his men-at-arms. With this evidence for the increasingly effective authority of the sheriff of Edinburgh, it is not surprising to find references to ‘captured grain’, to ‘hobelars and archers who were assigned to look after enemies’ beasts at Lowood’, and, finally, to people returning to Edward’s peace.

However, the evidence is not completely one-sided. Although we are certainly not fortunate enough to have fiscal records for the Scottish government, there are some clues to its overall capabilities in the north-east particularly. In 1300, for example, John, earl of Buchan, was able to hold a court in Aberdeen as justiciar of Scotland. John, earl of Atholl, who was in no sense a Comyn man, was named as sheriff of Aberdeen, ‘perhaps indicating that a normal peacetime cross-section of interests still prevailed’. More significantly, it emerged once Edward had re-asserted his authority throughout the kingdom that Comyn of Badenoch had, as guardian, ‘been able to prosecute successfully two pro-English landowners in the area, one of whom was the earl of Strathearn. Comyn’s ability to hold courts and, most importantly, to execute the judgements of these courts, speaks volumes about the success of his regime’. He also seems to have done so independently of his co-guardians.62 It should be quite clear from the above that the Scots maintained firm control of the kingdom north of the Forth.

On 12 May 1301 Sir John de St. John’s appointment as captain and lieutenant of the western march was renewed for the third time, doubtless to Edward’s great relief.63 Nine days previously, he had been empowered ‘to receive the knights and middle men of Scotland to peace, as the king enjoined him viva voce [orally]’, presumably while the lieutenant was pretending to engage in truce negotiations at Canterbury. On various dates between 5 April and 26 May, Sir John Kingston, Sir Robert Hastangs, and Sir Hugh Audley, perhaps already keeper of Selkirk Forest, were all similarly ordered to admit the ‘middle’ or ‘mesne’ men of Scotland to the king’s peace.64

This was an unusual stipulation. Certainly, every English official in Scotland had the authority to receive any Scot to Edward’s peace; however, this deliberate targeting of the ‘middle men’ perhaps indicates an awareness of a change in popular opinion among certain Scots who were now quite fed up with the war. Such orders, issued immediately before the outset of a campaign, were presumably to be used as an amnesty to encourage these small landholders or burgesses, who played an important role in their own communities, to adhere to the English cause. The Scottish government would thus find it much more difficult to exercise their authority in military, administrative and financial matters, even when the majority of the upper nobility were not at Edward’s peace.

Most interestingly, a similar mandate was granted to Sir Gervase Alard, the admiral of the fleet which was now operating in the west. On 6 June he was given

. . . full powers, to last till 1 November, to receive to our peace . . . Alastair of Argyll, John and Duncan, his sons, and Lachlan, son of Alan [MacRuarie], who married Alastair’s daughter, the daughter herself and all their domestics and each of them and also all other husbandmen and middle people of the Scottish isles who wish to come to our peace, except barons, bannerets and other rich and great lords.65

This is the first proper reference to the situation in the north-west of Scotland since 1297, with the exception of the news of Lachlan MacRuarie’s raids on the north of Scotland with Alexander Comyn of Buchan in 1299. Clearly it would be most unwise to presume that such activities had anything to do with adherence to King Edward. The likeliest explanation for the submission of the MacDougalls is the (undocumented) success of the MacDonalds in Edward’s service, or, at least, the view now taken by the former that the only way to regain their position was through the same service. If so, it is likely that they soon changed their minds since the release of King John from papal custody took place only a month or so later, putting a quite different complexion on Anglo-Scottish politics. There is unfortunately no evidence for Admiral Alard’s activities in the north-west over the summer of 1301, although Edward must surely have been prepared to divert the fleet only in the knowledge that the MacDougalls were definitely seeking reconciliation.

The exclusion of the ‘barons, bannerets and other rich and great lords’ is most striking and corresponds to the general principle now being adopted by Edward’s officials in targeting the ‘middling sort’. Certainly, these lords included James the Steward and John Comyn of Badenoch, who were unlikely to submit at this time; it may also be the case that Edward was considerably angered by what he considered the treacherous behaviour of the higher Scottish nobility and was deliberately seeking to isolate them from the communities they represented.

There is no evidence for large-scale submissions in 1301 or, indeed, in any year before 1304, although that may be precisely because the nobility, who tend to monopolise the written record, did not submit until then. Nevertheless, English accounts do make odd references to small anonymous groups who chose to ‘have peace’. It was also asserted by Sir Robert Tilliol, constable of Lochmaben, that the Scots were forcing those in the surrounding area who had submitted to return to the Scottish fold in 1301.66 Equally, the revenues raised in 1300 and 1301 by the sheriff of Edinburgh could only have been achieved if exactly that section of society which Edward was now targeting had accepted the English regime in sufficient numbers.

It is not surprising that the passage of time had persuaded an increasing number of Scots that Edwardian government was here to stay. Certainly, in terms of an overall administration, the system still fell dramatically short of the one set up in 1296; however, it is also clear that the military achievements of the king and his army in 1300 were accompanied by similar, small-scale improvements to the state of the permanent English administration of southern Scotland.

There was no doubt in Edward’s mind, whatever the feelings of his subjects, that yet another campaign would take place in 1301. Not only that, but he intended to raise the stakes even higher by wintering in the north; the Scots would no longer be able to take advantage of an English withdrawal and it was doubtless hoped that even the most recalcitrant would thus realise that continued resistance was futile. However, despite the logic of the strategy, which had certainly worked well in Wales,67 the resources required to persuade men to serve over the winter undoubtedly meant that England was to be asked not only to continue to pay for the reconquest of Scotland, but to pay even more.

This was a high-risk strategy indeed. As an astute politician, Edward doubtless realised that the grievances behind the crisis of 1297, which the defeat at Stirling Bridge so narrowly prevented from becoming a civil war, were not going to go away so long as there was a war to pay for. It was his job as king to sell his military objectives to his own subjects; although the war in Scotland lacked both glory and rich pickings, there was still an element of national pride involved, as the portrayal of Edward I as a king who had brought glory to England through martial exploits in contemporary poems illustrates. On the other hand, there was surely a time-limit to such patriotic feeling: a continued inability to force the inferior Scottish army to a capitulation might raise serious questions about the king’s own abilities and the desirability of endlessly squandering the kingdom’s resources on Scotland.

On 1 March 1301 the inevitable writs for purveyance were issued. The demands made on the northern counties were noticeably smaller than most and must again reflect not only the considerable resources which they had already contributed to the war, but also the devastation inflicted by both sides.68 Since Edward’s forces were to be divided into two, purveyance was required at both Berwick and Carlisle. Also, while half the Irish purveyance was to be sent, as usual, to Skinburness, the port for Carlisle, the other half was to go to a port on the island of Arran, held for Edward since 1298 by Sir Hugh Bisset of Antrim.69 The aim was presumably to bring the whole of Scotland south of the Forth-Clyde line under English control.

This was still easier said than done, however. The northern English counties were not alone in suffering from a dearth of foodstuffs. On 18 April, the demands made on the county of Essex were reduced by reason of ‘a scarcity of oats and malt in that county’. The merchants there also appear to have fallen victim to profiteering during the previous purchase of their goods since those ordered to supervise the collection of this year’s quota informed the king that: ‘As regards payment . . . [they] cannot give their goods with confidence except to persons named, who have power to tax, collect and pay when the time comes’.70

The king arrived at Berwick on 5 July and had his army mustered by 12 July. According to the payroll for the period up to 29 September, it numbered around six thousand eight hundred footsoldiers, with a further two hundred and seventy-two drawn from the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh, Edinburgh and Selkirk Forest. The earl of Angus also provided two hundred archers, presumably from his Northumberland lands.

The king had also negotiated for the service of the Irish nobility, who had not served in Scotland since 1296. Edward’s terms were extremely generous, including the pardon of two-thirds of all debts owed to the exchequer. Even so, the earl of Ulster, the most powerful nobleman in Ireland, still refused to go. However, an Irish force numbering two hundred and twenty-nine men-at-arms, three hundred and five hobelars and nearly fifteen hundred footsoldiers had arrived on Arran by 15 July, to join the Prince of Wales at Ayr soon thereafter. A separate force under Sir Eustace Poer and Sir Thomas Mandeville, numbering forty-five men-at-arms, eighty-six hobelars and one hundred and twenty-eight footsoldiers (most likely sent by the earl of Ulster), probably took part in the siege of Turnberry.71 Though the cavalry and footsoldiers were doubtless welcome, the hobelars were probably of most use as the prince’s army moved into Galloway.

The fleet continued to prove vital to the success of this year’s endeavours. Despite their servitium debitum of fifty-seven, the Cinque Ports were requested to send only twelve ‘good, large ships’. This was perhaps a reflection of their previous good service and the fact that it was becoming so constant; either that, or Edward felt that large vessels of good quality were preferable to a greater number of smaller, inferior boats. Sir Gervase Alard remained as admiral and captain of the Cinque Ports. In addition, the non-Cinque Port ports of Bristol and Haverford were to provide three ships between them, to go with these twelve ships to Dublin by 11 June 1301.72 They would then presumably cross the Irish Sea to Skinburness or Ayr to provide supplies and give aid to the prince of Wales.

Additional summonses were sent to forty-four English, one Welsh and six Irish towns to provide a further sixty-eight ships to join the king at Berwick by 24 June, although two ships from Bristol were included among these also.73 This fleet should therefore have totalled eighty-one ships, although there is no way of knowing exactly how many actually turned up.

Having mustered at Berwick in July, Edward’s army moved west, staying at Peebles for two weeks and arriving at Glasgow on 21 August; attack from Scottish raiding parties remained a problem.74 The more leisurely pace taken by the eastern army may be a reflection of Edward’s rather hopeful desire that his son should attain ‘the chief honour of taming the pride of the Scots’.75 The prince’s army arrived at Ayr in August. On the 25th his father, at Glasgow, heard unspecified ‘good rumours’.76 There is no evidence for a siege at Ayr, nor any reference to a harassing Scottish force, although there may well have been one. Strategically, winning Ayr was a considerable triumph for the English, even if it had taken three years to achieve; direct control had finally been extended right through to the west coast, allowing shipments from Ireland to come directly to Scotland. The Gascon, Sir Montasini de Novelliano,77 became constable of the castle and Sir Edmund Hastings the sheriff. Both had already served in other Scottish garrisons.78Overall keepership of the castle and the sheriffdom was granted to Patrick, earl of Dunbar and March. Though essentially an eastern landowner, Earl Patrick also owned Cumnock castle, twenty miles east of Ayr, and thus maintained an interest in the area.79

The caput of the earldom of Carrick, Turnberry, is some thirteen miles south along the coast from Ayr. This time there was certainly a siege, since the first reference to any English presence there was on 2 September but the king, still receiving ‘good rumours’ at Glasgow, did not hear of its reduction until he was at Bothwell on 5 September at the earliest.80 Its fall, even if only temporary, must have come as a considerable blow to the earl of Carrick.

Around the same time the Comyn castle of Dalswinton, situated around six miles northwest of Dumfries, was given to Sir John Botetourt, who had perhaps been responsible for its capture. However, the wages’ payment for the four men-at-arms sent to garrison it was cancelled, suggesting that the English were not in possession for very long. Certainly Sir Robert Tilliol, the constable of Lochmaben, wrote on 10 September that the Scots, who were attacking him, ‘went to lodge near Dalswinton’. The English were certainly making considerable progress in the reconquest of the south-west but even the 1301 campaign by no means ensured complete security.

The king had now himself settled down to a siege. The barony of Bothwell, including the castle, and other lands in Scotland to the value of £1000 had been granted, in anticipation, to Sir Aymer de Valence on 10 August 1301; Edward’s progress to Lanarkshire was thus deliberately planned. The Scottish owner of Bothwell was the three-year-old Andrew Murray, who was growing up in the north-east. The defenders put up an admirable resistance but had surrendered by 22 September.81 Sadly, nothing is known about the fate of the garrisons of any of the Scottish castles captured by the two English armies in 1301; however, the account of the sheriff of Cumberland notes payments to ‘two knights and thirty-two Serjeants, Scottish prisoners in Carlisle castle, and a constable and eight warders to guard them’ made in regnal year twenty-nine (20 November 1300–19 November 1301).82 It is certainly possible that they came from one or more of these castles. The lack of reference to footsoldiers means that we cannot rule out the possibility that they were summarily hanged.

From September onwards the Scots did their best to counteract English activities in the south-west. There had been further changes in the Scottish administration, with Sir John Soules apparently now acting as sole guardian at the behest of none other than King John himself.83 However, it is to be doubted that the Comyns gave up power so easily, even at the instigation of their sovereign; equally, Scottish resistance would have been almost pointless without their active support.

Sir John Comyn certainly does not seem to have been with the Scottish army in the south-west, but his cousin, the earl of Buchan, led a force, together with Soules, positioned at Loudoun in Ayrshire. Another force under Sir Simon Fraser, Sir Alexander Abernethy and Sir Herbert Morham (presumably having escaped from Edinburgh) lay at Stonehouse near Strathaven. Sir Robert Tilliol, at Lochmaben, sent information on their activities to the king, still at Glasgow. The Scots, controlling the road from Glasgow to Ayr, were clearly hoping to prevent the two English armies from joining up.

So, Sir Simon Fraser had finally joined the Scottish side. He apparently left in dramatic fashion, stealing Sir William Durham’s horse and armour from Wark castle in order to make his escape. The last reference to him in official English documents is as late as 27 June 1301, when £40 was issued to his valet at York as payment for two horses bought from him by the Treasurer.84 The fact that he was to be found leading a Scottish contingent only three months later does admit the possibility that he had been acting as a double-agent; his swift departure from Wark might also suggest that he had just been found out.

There may have been other reasons, however. The fact that Sir Hugh Audley, though not described as keeper of Selkirk Forest until August, was active in the south-east in the spring of 1301 may mean that Fraser had been, or was about to be, removed from office. This, together with Guisborough’s description of the accusations of wage defaulting supposedly levelled by Sir Simon at sir Ralph Manton, suggests that the benefits of English service were no longer obvious to this Scot at least.85

The arrival of both Sir Simon Fraser and Sir Herbert Morham in the Scottish camp in mid-1301 is a good indication that the Scottish position was still regarded positively: there is little point in changing on to the losing side. This assessment was probably based less on Scottish military activity, which was developing into little more than a finger-in-dyke exercise, but rather on increasingly fruitful diplomatic missions. However, the Scottish army still had work to do to prevent English gains from becoming overwhelming.

When the king left Glasgow for Bothwell on 5 September, the two Scottish contingents at Loudoun and Strathaven probably joined together. Certainly a large Scottish force under Soules and Umfraville arrived outside the walls of Lochmaben on 7 September. It numbered, according to Tilliol, ‘forty bannerets, twelve score men-at-arms [and] seven thousand footmen or more’; allowing for inevitable exaggeration, this must have been the main Scottish army.

After attacking the pele for several hours, the Scots withdrew to Annan where they ‘burned and pillaged the country round about’. They returned to Lochmaben the next day but seem to have come off worst since Sir David Brechin and Sir John Vaux were injured ‘and many others were killed and wounded’. There were a couple of English casualties, but the pele again stood firm. Later that day the Scots withdrew to Dalswinton, apparently en route for Nithsdale and Galloway ‘and they are causing to return to them those who came to peace and are collecting a greater force to come to our marches’. The fundamental strength and weakness of the Scottish military position is clearly illustrated by these activities: on the one hand, they could not reduce an English-held castle when it was protected from a long siege by a nearby English army; on the other hand, their harrying tactics did make life extremely difficult for the garrisons, and terrified the local inhabitants. The western march was still clearly in a state of flux, with the loyalties of the native population changing at the approach of an English or a Scottish army. Patriotism was a luxury that many – perhaps most – could little afford.

Tilliol also inadvertently delineated the basic strength and weakness of the English position when he informed the king ‘. . . that you have rejoiced us much with the rescue which you have promised us . . .’ and ‘that your honour shall never be injured by us as long as our victuals last’.86 There is no denying the might of the English military machine; but the Achilles’ heel of the supply line, in this fifth year of war, was still capable of placing much of the reconquest in jeopardy.

Lochmaben’s rescue was presumably not to be effected by the king himself, since he was about to leave for Bothwell. The prince did move south from Turnberry around this time, en route to Loch Ryan, which was nevertheless over ninety miles from Lochmaben.87 Sir John de St. John was at Knockdolian, near Ballantrae, on 14 September. Since this was between Turnberry and Loch Ryan, it seems likely that he and at least some of his thirty men-at-arms88 were with the prince’s army. The withdrawal of St. John’s men from Dumfries and Lochmaben may again have placed those garrisons in a vulnerable position, and one which the Scots were not slow to exploit. However, a contingent under the command of the earl of Lincoln was detached from the young Edward’s army, arriving at Lochmaben by 21 September. The prince was still at Loch Ryan.89 There was little the Scots could do: the presence of these English forces in western Carrick and Annandale forced them to move on.

The south-eastern garrisons were being kept informed of Scottish activities in the west and were aware of the possibility of an enemy attack on the east. Around 13 September Sir Robert Hastangs wrote to the king, having just received a letter from Edward, informing him of the measures being taken by all the English officers in the south-east to repel the Scots. All the remaining soldiers in each sheriffdom were put on a twenty-four-hour alert under the utmost secrecy in order to maintain the initiative against the enemy.90 Nevertheless, the king was becoming edgy about the security of the area, believing that he was not being kept properly informed, and Sir Hugh Audley had to write quickly ‘containing all we know for certain’.

Edward perhaps had some reason to be critical of his officers’ abilities to work efficiently together. On 17 September a meeting had been arranged which Hastangs, his brother, Richard, at Jedburgh, Sir Alexander Balliol, probably already keeper of Selkirk castle, Sir Hugh Audley, and Sir William Durham, the new sheriff of Peebles, were all supposed to attend, with their men, in order to work out a strategy against the Scots. Unfortunately, only the Hastangs brothers and Audley actually turned up, ‘and very few of the country folk, except our foresters, who came loyally and are ready to perform all your commands’. Unsurprisingly, nothing was organised and the king was requested to order the other officers to ‘come quickly since we have things to do’.

The need to send messages to and from Bothwell cannot have done much for either speed or secrecy: it is highly likely that the reluctant Sir William Latimer, captain of the eastern march in 1300, was no longer in that office and there is no doubt that the lack of a coherent command structure in the south-east was causing real problems. However, Edward was well aware of this and Audley and the rest were ordered to await the orders of Sir Walter Burghdon, who had become keeper of Carstairs castle and sheriff of Lanark by 21 September 1301.91 From his position in the middle of the country – an area only recently brought under even nominal English control – he was now well placed to organise the defence of the eastern march against a Scottish attack from the west.

However, there were still problems, particularly with the security of the sheriffdom of Peebles. Situated on the north-western edge of Selkirk Forest, and therefore previously on the periphery of the English-dominated south-east, Sir William Durham’s appointment undoubtedly indicates a degree of English success against the Scots who had previously found easy access to the Forest. It is striking that this increased control took place around the same time as Sir Simon Fraser changed sides and also in the year following the capture of Sir Robert Keith, the Scottish warden of the Forest, though again it must be stressed that any double-dealing on Sir Simon’s part as Edward’s officer cannot be proved.

In the meantime English spies with the Scottish army were busy gathering information for their masters in the south-east. Durham’s spy, who came straight to Peebles from Nithsdale on 21 September, provided the rather inconclusive news that the Scots were still in Galloway, hiding out in Glentrool Forest, but that it was impossible to tell where they were heading. It was also reported that the prince of Wales was on pilgrimage to Whithorn, prompting the Scots to remove relics there to Sweetheart abbey. However, the English seem to have found them and taken them back, indicating that the two forces were still in close proximity to each other.92 Since Sweetheart is only a few miles south of Dumfries, this also implies that English control in the south-west was regarded by the Scots as limited to the immediate environs of the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben.

Sir Alexander Balliol, at Selkirk, informed the king rather peevishly that ‘the writer and fellow keepers of the march are threatened by a possible Scottish raid to destroy the writer’s lands and to seize and defend the forest . . .’ Balliol was lord of Cavers near Hawick in Roxburghshire. Meanwhile, the spies were to keep up their good work, so that royal officers in the east were sufficiently prepared for an attack. In the meantime another meeting ‘to inspect forces’ was arranged for 24 September.93 Although those in the south-east appear rather panic-stricken and disorganised in the face of this threat, the Scottish army also seems to have run out of ideas. Five years of war was taking its toll on both sides.

Ordinarily, September would have seen the beginning of a retreat by the English army, whether or not that had been Edward’s original intention. The decision to remain in Scotland over the winter of 1301/2 naturally put a strain on the administrative machinery already stretched to the limit to provide for the summer campaign. On 14 August various English sheriffs, including those of the northern counties of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland, were ordered ‘to induce merchants and others of those counties who wish to sell victuals and other necessaries by land and sea to the king and his army in Scotland . . .’. These orders were concluded with the thinly-veiled threat that each sheriff was

. . . enjoined to conduct himself so in executing this order that the king may be able to realise that the sheriff has this matter specially at heart and that he desires its speedy and happy expedition, and so that it may not be delayed through lack of victuals and other necessities to the damage of the king, the sheriff and of all the people of the realm.94

Although credit could be used to a certain extent during a campaign, not least to offset wages with payment for victuals, hard cash still had to be transported north. As 1301 progressed, the lack of specie became more and more problematic, reaching a climax in August in a most spectacular fashion. According to a letter to the king, probably from Sir Ralph Manton, the late arrival of £200 ordered by the king before he left Berwick in mid-July provoked a mutiny on 28 August among ‘the foot crossbowmen and archers in the garrison [Berwick], joined by some of the men-at-arms of Sir Ralph FitzMichael, who was with them in Gascony and is their leader and mestre abettour (prime mover) in all riots’.

The next day, despite threats to himself and the men-at-arms with him, Manton ‘rode up the great street, which they were blocking to prevent the guard being mounted’. Though his people were ‘molested . . . most vilely on returning’, the cofferer was able to reach the castle and to place ‘two men-at-arms at each post’. He then ‘consulted Sir Walter Teye [the captain of the town garrison], who said that he didn’t blame the mutineers, for when the earls of England were in the town [presumably with the king in July], they had only got three days’ pay, and were now a month in arrears’. The insinuation here is that most of the hard cash had gone on keeping the quarrelsome aristocrats quiet.

Manton and his men remained on guard at the palisade and were joined the next day (30 August) by Sir John Seton and four valets. Sir Walter then held a meeting in St. Nicholas’ church of all the men-at-arms, who were so far staying out of the mutiny. Each man was asked whether or not he would mount guard and ‘All replied that they would willingly and that they had no concern in the mutiny of the foot’. However, they did sympathise with the mutineers since they agreed to remain at their posts only until the following Friday (1 September). Fortunately, the £200 arrived that same day. The next morning (Thursday) it was counted out in front of the sheriff of Northumberland (who presumably brought it) and part was set aside for the garrisons of Roxburgh and Jedburgh. The rebellious footsoldiers presumably grumbled their way back to their posts.

The Berwick garrison was finally paid on the Friday. Sir Walter had perhaps taken fright, however, since he ordered Manton ‘to pay the whole sum to the garrison and none other’, claiming that this was the meaning of the wording of the king’s letter to him. Manton’s response, with some justification, was that ‘the king always treated Roxburgh, Jedburgh and Berwick as one’. Sir Walter then claimed ignorance until he received more specific instructions from the king, ‘he being only a lay man’, and payment duly went ahead at Berwick only. Manton therefore ‘suffered evil and annoyance through want of this, for in place of Sir Walter only getting £14. 14s., he has taken £36 from him, whereby he has nothing to pay his own people [presumably his guard]’.95

These extraordinary events, taking place at Berwick, the very heart of the English administration, must have been extremely worrying for Edward, though, sadly, we know nothing about his reaction to Manton’s news. There was little point in organising a successful campaign if the English garrisons were in danger of disintegration for lack of money and supplies. Such an appalling eventuality was really only narrowly avoided on this occasion, although the Scots had been able to pick off more vulnerable garrisons suffering similar problems in the past. The route to progress was circuitous indeed.

Things were not looking likely to improve in the immediate future either. On 25 September an anonymous letter – probably from Sir John Droxford, keeper of the wardrobe, in York – was sent to the king describing the overall financial situation, given that two armies, as well as the garrisons, still required maintenance. A total of 2000 marks had been sent to Berwick around 14 September (though presumably to go to the king, rather than to pay the garrisons). Five hundred marks had also been sent to Carlisle to the prince, who ‘greatly needed money’, bringing the total received there also to 2000 marks. The writer now hoped that ‘by Michaelmas [29 September] there will be enough to pay both the king’s army and his son’s, if not otherwise disposed of by the king, and if as much as possible of the ‘proffer’ is taken beforehand’. Without this money, it would apparently ‘be difficult to help . . . Berwick or Lochmaben’, indicating that the writer was aware of the problems at the former garrison and also that they were not unique.96

Manton himself remained in the south-east to organise the garrisons, before returning to the king at Dunipace, about five miles south-east of Stirling, at the beginning of October. In the meantime arrangements were made to strengthen the English forces in Selkirk Forest, in continued anticipation of a Scottish attack. A total of twenty men-at-arms and one hundred and twenty footsoldiers from the garrisons of Berwick and Roxburgh had been sent to Sir Hugh Audley there, along with Sir Thomas Grey97 and his three knights, who were ‘no longer at Ayr with earl Patrick’. This brought the total number of men-at-arms lurking in the Forest to fifty, excluding a further six with the sheriff of Peebles.

Manton had also spoken with the Hastangs’ brothers, Sir Alexander Balliol and Audley himself, instructing them, on behalf of the king, ‘to send out scouts and each warn the other and also the country’. Balliol was still in touch with his spies in the Scottish army and had reassured Sir Ralph that ‘whenever the enemy issue from Galloway, he will know two days before and will warn the king by two or three messengers of what road they take, and so will the others’. The cofferer had not managed to see Sir William Durham, ‘who neither came nor sent an excuse’, but he was to be informed of the king’s commands. It was vitally important that the Scots should not regain a foothold in south-eastern Scotland.

Fortunately, also, Manton had been able to divide ‘£200 of the fine made by Newcastle for the fifteenth among the garrisons of Berwick, Roxburgh, Jedburgh and the Forest, to his best judgement, for fifteen days’ wages’, thereby reducing the likelihood of another mutiny. However, he was not at all happy about the situation generally, telling the king that if he had not gone there himself, ‘all the garrisons on this side would have been scattered for want’. Money from the exchequer had arrived at Berwick on 28 September, but was not as much as he had expected ‘and should have had’. Supplies at Berwick were also getting dangerously low, as he had told Sir John Droxford, who was asked to collect as much as he could everywhere, ‘for your [the king’s] business in Scotland depends much on vivers’.98 Edward could have told Manton that himself.

The situation was not much better in the south-west, where St. John was experiencing the familiar problem of trying to make ends meet, not least because his wages were so greatly in arrears. According to a letter written to Manton on 27 August 1301, he was due money from both the previous financial term (up to 29 May) and the current one (up to 1 November). The money was urgently required because ‘he had great works to do and he is heavily indebted to the poor people of all parts who dolefully beseech him for victuals and other things he has taken from them’.99 St. John had realised, even if his royal master either could or would not, that Edward’s administration would only find real acceptance in Scotland if it was not perceived as oppressive. However, the situation, if anything, deteriorated: according to a letter of 23 October from the Prince of Wales to the treasurer at York, ‘the castles of Lochmaben and Dumfries [were] feebly garrisoned with troops and lacking in victuals and other provisions’.100

Edward was well aware of the options available to him and what would best suit his purpose. He was also not a man to leave any stone unturned in pursuit of his objectives, although he also knew when to give in, in the short term at least. He left Bothwell around 22 September.101 His original intention seems to have been to move westwards to Inverkip, whose owner-in-waiting was the earl of Lincoln. The earl wrote impatiently to the king from Galloway on 21 September and 2 October, ‘understanding that as soon as he has taken Bothwell castle, the king will attempt that of Inverkip’. Lincoln claimed it as part of a grant of the lands of Strathgryfe, forfeited from James the Steward. The initial plan had probably been for the prince’s army to link up with his father’s at Inverkip in a pincer movement; this strategy had been abandoned for quite some time, not least because the prince’s army was now busy making pilgrimages deep in Galloway.102

Unknown to Lincoln, and doubtless to his severe disappointment, the king had also changed his plans and gone north to Dunipace by 27 September.103 The intention now was probably to attack Stirling castle, as Manton’s activities around 30 September also indicate. The cofferer was busy gathering together various engines, engineers and carpenters at Berwick, to be sent west. He had also ordered the sheriff of Northumberland to send north twelve carpenters and twelve masons, though ‘he has not yet one’. On 4 October Sir John Kingston sent various bits and pieces of siege equipment to the king from Edinburgh.104 Other preparations included the building of a road and a bridge near Dunipace and repairs ‘on a bridge beyond a certain river . . . for the passage of the king’s carts there’ (presumably the river Carron).105

Edward remained at Dunipace throughout most of October. On 29 September, several members of the army, perhaps on a foraging trip, encountered a group of Scots at Airth, east of Stirling, and a fight ensued in which two horses on the English side were killed.106 By this time the English army had spent four months in Scotland and intended to remain there for several more. However, finances were dire. On 11 October Edward informed the exchequer of his ‘surprise’, like Manton’s, at how little money had been sent. Therefore, the king complained, he could not pay his men, most of whom had already left, and he could not ‘prevent the daily desertions’ of the rest.107 Edward put the blame for this situation squarely on his officials at York, ordering them to ensure that their inefficiency did not force him to withdraw. That was the wonderful thing about being king: if a certain course of action did not work out, the fault lay with those implementing it, not with the policy itself.

Much of Edward’s ire stemmed from the fact that the lay and clerical taxes – the fifteenth and the tenth – and the usual issues for the Michaelmas term should all have been collected by now. Two days later, on 13 October, the king wrote again to poor Droxford. Referring to Manton’s letter about ‘the state of the king’s supplies’, Edward now required ‘hasty purveyance’ to be made, especially since the prince’s army was now making its way to Dunipace, and the queen and her household had also joined the court for the winter.

Droxford, perhaps well aware of how hard a taskmaster Edward could be, had already left York for London before he received this barrage of complaint. However, the barons of the exchequer opened the second letter and quickly informed the king that 5600 quarters of corn and other supplies were being collected, to arrive at Berwick by Christmas and to be paid for from the Michaelmas issues and the proceeds of the fifteenth. There was an element of disingenuousness to this nevertheless, since the writs ordering the purveyance had only just been sent out. Further purveyance was ordered from Ireland, three-quarters of which was to be sent to Skinburness by 2 February 1302, for the use of the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben; Ayr was to receive the rest.108

However, this did not alter the fact that those in charge of purveyance and the collection of royal revenues required the latter to pay for the former. Thus most of the money raised did not even reach the border, despite the fact that cash was desperately needed for the wages of those serving in both the garrisons and the army: desertion had always been a weakness, but it was now in danger of becoming an epidemic.

On 16 October, a mere three days after the last letter, Edward wrote an even more desperate and irate letter to the exchequer. The lack of money had meant that none of his promises of payment had been kept and desertions continued. But for this, the king wrote in frustration, he would have ‘completed the bridge across the Forth [presumably at Stirling]’. If he had managed to do so ‘this season’, he further lamented, he would have ‘made such exploit against the enemy’ that the reconquest of Scotland would have quickly reached ‘a satisfactory and honourable conclusion’.111 It is tempting to ask which fantasyland Edward was now inhabiting, since he was clearly asking for the impossible: his kingdom’s resources – not to mention the patience of his subjects – were being stretched to the limit. Nevertheless, he had already achieved more than might have been expected through this judicious use of carrot and stick and perhaps it is understandable that he continued to push his luck.

The king now ordered that all money being sent north should come only to him, with the exception of that destined for the garrisons of Dumfries and Lochmaben and others guarding the western march – where the Scots were still active – and the new garrison at Ayr. £1000, which had to be borrowed in York, was sent north immediately. Droxford was still in London, desperately searching for more funds; those in York assured the king that they were constantly urging the sheriffs to expedite the raising of their revenues. They also informed the king that £9789 16s. 5d. assigned from the fifteenth – including £4000 owed as wages for the Welsh soldiers with the prince – was not now to be paid ‘since this seems the only way to save the royal expedition’.109 The English footsoldiers were thus not, in fact, bottom of the list: the Welsh and the Irish footsoldiers held that honour.110

Such desperate measures were perhaps inevitable in the circumstances; however, they had some disturbing implications. On 18 December 1301, letters of credence111 were issued to those in charge of purveyance in the English counties. They were now ordered to explain to those who had ‘granted to the king last year certain corn for his maintenance in Scotland’ that they would not now be paid from the proceeds of the fifteenth, as they had been promised, but would have to wait until the following Midsummer. Alternatively, if they preferred payment now, ‘they are desired to advise and ordain how the king may be best served with the corn that he needs now for his maintenance henceforth’. In other words, money for past service would only be forthcoming in return for further supplies. Payment for these would then be made from the fifteenth at Midsummer 1302 – allegedly. The king did categorically promise that he ‘will pay for the corn that he has ordained to take or that he shall take in the respective counties readily to everyone without making prise of corn by any of his ministers [i.e., that a market price would be paid]’.112

The reference to prise – a royal right to supplies at a fixed low rate, originally intended to feed the household, not the army – was perhaps a veiled threat; nevertheless, Edward had to tread very carefully or face the distinct possibility that provisioning would become even more difficult than it clearly already was.

There was nothing more to be salvaged from this year’s campaign. On 22 October the king informed the exchequer that he was retreating to Linlithgow for the winter, since so many of his troops, ‘both horse and foot’, had deserted and he was ‘in danger of losing’ what he had already won. Yet again he ordered that as much money as possible should be sent north. He declared that he would not accept the ‘excuse’ that ‘it is dangerous to transport large quantities of [coin]’,113 though this was doubtless a genuine concern.

Edward was not alone in his need for cash; the south-western garrisons under Sir John de St. John were still in a desperate situation. On 13 October it was arranged that £25 from Lancashire and £25 from Westmorland and Cumberland would be paid to St. John as part of the 200 marks owed to him. A further £100 from Lancashire was assigned to him on 20 October. A month later, the king ordered that the proceeds of the fifteenth in Cumberland and Westmorland were to be handed over to Dalilegh at Carlisle.114Although there is, unfortunately, no evidence of how much was actually handed over, it is no wonder that other payments from the fifteenth were being cancelled in a desperate attempt to target hard-pressed resources where they were needed most.

In any event, these measures were not enough. On 31 December Edward himself wrote to the exchequer, explaining that ‘since we have heard that Sir John de St. John and the good people who are staying in his company in the garrisons of the castles of Lochmaben and Dumfries, as you know well, have been and still are in great danger and hardships for lack of money’, sufficient amounts were to be sent to St. John as soon as possible.115 The situation was swiftly spiralling out of control and there was little that Edward, or any of his officials, could do.

To add to these undoubtedly pressing difficulties, some rather depressing news was emerging from the continent about Anglo-Scottish affairs. A letter dated 1 October, perhaps again from Manton, informed the king of the removal of King John from papal custody, to which he had been commited in 1299, to his family estates at Ballieul in Picardy.116 The winter of 1301–2 witnessed the zenith of French support for the Balliol cause, although there were others to whom this was of even more concern than King Edward.

The stalemate evident since 1298, when it had become clear that Scotland was not going to fall back into Edward’s lap even after a military defeat, was not broken yet; nevertheless, so long as England was prepared to devote much of its resources to this piecemeal reconquest for the foreseeable future, there was every hope that Scotland would one day yield, not least for the lack of an alternative. On the other hand, there was surely a limit to the patience of the English, and Irish and Welsh, people, who were being asked to expend considerable resources year after year on an enterprise that so far had provided very little return on the investment. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that a lot of time, energy and expense was also required to keep the threat of a diplomatic coup by the Scots at bay. Delaying tactics were certainly used to good effect, but they did not actually resolve anything. Edward’s best hope was to upgrade his activities to a continuous military pressure on his enemies within Scotland, as well as maintaining an effective diplomatic presence on the continent; however, it remained to be seen whether or not there were sufficient resources, or public will, to sustain such pressure. Progress had been made, but the final outcome remained profoundly uncertain.


1 CDS, ii, no. 1867.

2 Ibid., no. 1169.

3 Lib. Quoi., p. 183.

4 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 381–5; J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Stroud, 1996), p. 291.

5 Guisborough, p. 245.

6 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 407–8.

7 I.e., with the correct gear.

8 CPR 1292–1301, p. 484.

9 Lib. Quot., p. 28.

10 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 490; Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 513–4.

11 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 409–10.

12 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 491.

13 It is interesting to note that this implies that the English government regarded Berwick as effectively in England, not Scotland.

14 Lib. Quot., p. 31; Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 360–5; Itin., p. 152; CCR, 1296–1302, p. 334; Lib. Quot., pp. 160, 161.

15 Ibid., p. 129.

16 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 410–12.

17 E159/73, m. 26; Lib. Quot., pp. 139; 145–8.

18 Ibid, pp. 151–152, 178–79.

19 See below, p. 116 for a discussion of the capabilities of the Scottish government.

20 CDS, v, no. 220; G.O. Sayles, ‘The Guardians of Scotland and a parliament at Rutherglen in 1300, SHR, xxiv (1927), pp. 246–50.

21 Barrow, Bruce, pp. 111–2.

22 CDS, ii, no. 1128; Lib. Quot., pp. 106–114; 130–1.

23 Ibid., pp. 105–6; 127–8; 135–6.

24 Parl. Writs i. p. 327.

25 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 484–6; E159/73, m. 16.

26 J. Lydon, ‘The Years of Crisis, 1254–1315’, p. 199; J. Lydon, ‘Irish levies in the Scottish Wars, 1296–1302’, Irish Sword, v (1962), p. 208.

27 Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, p. 296.

28 Murray, The Constitutional History of the Cinque Ports, p. 242. The original Cinque Ports were Hastings, Romney, Hythe, Dover and Sandwich on the south-east coast of England. Their obligations and privileges were then extended to a number of others, the most important of which were Winchelsea and Rye: Ibid., p. 1.

29 Nicolas, A History of the Royal Navy, i, pp. 294–5.

30 CPR, 1296–1302, p. 523.

31 Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 522–5.

32 Itin., p. 158.

33 Lib. Quot., pp. 223, 231; CDS, v, no. 272 (Jedburgh); Lib. Quot., 140–151, 220–223, 243 (Roxburgh); 221, 230, 251, 148; 255, 257; 146–7 (Berwick town); 231–2, 247–256; 140 (Lochmaben).

34 T. Wright (ed.), The Roll of Caerlaverock (London, 1864), p. 26.

35 Ibid., pp. 2, 6, 9, 18.

36 Ibid., pp. 2, 11, 14–15, 18, 25.

37 Ibid., pp. 27–35.

38 Rishanger, pp. 440–1; Lib. Quot., pp. 175, 177–9, 186.

39 Ibid., pp. 76–7; CDS, ii, nos. 1147, 1148, 1159.

40 Rishanger, p. 442; Barrow, Bruce, p. 113.

41 Itin., pp. 161–3.

42 CPR, 1292–1301, pp. 536; 537–8. 1000 marks per annum seems an awfully high value of land even for the whole of Galloway.

43 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 296–8.

44 CDS, ii, no. 1144; Lib. Quot., pp. 115–119.

45 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 296–8.

46 Lib. Quot., pp. 147–8.

47 CDS, v, no. 234; see below, p. 124.

48 Lib. Quot., 9, 12, 99.

49 pp. 8–13, 136.

50 M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), p. 175.

51 Foedera, 1, p. 924; CPR, 1292–1301, p. 541; Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 489–90.

52 The Gascon Calendar of 1322, ed. G.P. Cuttino, Camden Third Series, vol. 1xv (London, 1949), no. 513; see also Prestwich, Edward I, p. 490.

53 Lib. Quot., p. 121.

54 Ibid., pp. 73, 82.

55 Ibid., pp. 153–4, 13, 150–2.; E101/9/25, m. 6.

56 Guisborough, p. 294.

57 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 580; CDS, ii, no. 1244.

58 Ibid., no. 1193; CDS, v, no. 247; CCR, 1296–1302, p. 480.

59 CDS, ii, nos. 1194, 1244.

60 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 428.

61 CDS, ii, no. 1115.

62 Liber S. Thome de Aberbrothoc (Bannatyne Club, 1848–56), i, no. 231; Watson, ‘The Engimatic Lion: Scotland, kingship and national identity in the wars of independence’ p. 26 CDS, ii, no. 1592; Memo. de Parl., no. 296; The cases are undated but probably took place between 1300 and 1303; the bishop of St. Andrews, Sir Ingram d’Umfraville and even Sir John Soules were all guardians at some point during that period.

63 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 592.

64 CDS, ii, no. 1244; CPR, 1292–1301, 585, 592, 595. Audley was first described as keeper of Selkirk Forest in August 1301: E101/9/15, dorso.

65 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 429–30.

66 E101/9/3.

67 See Prestwich, Edward I, pp. 220–4; also, Davies, Owain Glyn Dwr, p. 236.

68 CCR, 1296–1302, p. 480; CPR, 1292–1301, p. 578.

69 CDS, ii, no. 1192; CCR, 1296–1302, pp. 489–90; CDS, ii, no. 1193.

70 CPR, 1292–1301, p. 589.

71 Lydon, ‘Irish levies in the Scottish wars, 1296–1302’, pp. 209–214.

72 CDS, v, no. 247; Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 429–30; CCR, 1296–1302, p. 487.

73 CCR, 1292–1302, pp. 482–3.

74 CDS, ii, no. 1190; Itin., p. 177.

75 CDS, ii, no. 1191.

76 Itin., p. 178; E101/358/6.

77 The Gascon Calendar of 1322, no. 1148.

78 CDS, ii, no. 1236; E101/7/24, m. 1; Lib. Quot., pp. 141, 145.

79 CDS, iv, no. 1829.

80 E101/364/13; E101/358/6; CDS, iv, p. 451. Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 432–3; CDS, ii, no. 1220.

81 Itin., 178; CDS, ii, no. 1178.

82 CDS, ii, no. 1304.

83 Barrow, Bruce, pp. 114–5; N.H. Reid, ‘The Political Role of the monarchy in Scotland, 1249–1329’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Edinburgh, 1984) pp. 180–8.

84 CDS, iv, pp. 450–1; CDS, ii, no. 1317; Barrow, Bruce, p. 121, n.80; CDS, iv, p. 454; E101/9/15, dorso.

85 C.P.R., 1292–1391, p. 585; See above, p. 114.

86 Stevenson; Documents, ii, pp. 431–3.

87 CDS, ii, no. 1233.

88 Sir Thomas Paignel, one of St. John’s knights, had certainly been with the prince at Ayr: CDS, ii, no. 1326; E101/364/13.

89 CDS, ii, no. 1224; CDS, iv, p. 446.

90 Stevenson, Documents, ii, pp. 434–5.

91 CDS, ii, pp. 199, 264; Lib. Quot., p. 146; CDS, v, no. 201; E101/358/6.

92 CDS, ii, no. 1225.

93 CDS, v, no. 257.

94 CCR, 1296–1302, p. 498.

95 CDS, ii, no. 1223.

96 CDS, ii, no. 1228. The proffer was the lay fifteenth and the clerical ninth – a form of property tax on landowners and the church – agreed at the Lincoln parliament of January 1301: Parl. Writs, i, p. 105.

97 This was the father of the Sir Thomas Grey of Heton who later wrote the Scalacronica, a chronicle account of the Anglo-Scottish wars composed in the 1350s, after a spell as a prisoner in Edinburgh castle [see Scalachronica, pp. iii, xv].

98 CDS, ii, no. 1230.

99 Ibid., no. 1218.

100 CDS, v, no. 264.

101 Itin., p. 179.

102 CDS, ii, nos. 1224, 1235, 1290; E101/10/15; G.W.S. Barrow & A. Royan, ‘James Fifth Stewart of Scotland, 1260(?)–1309’, in K. Stringer (ed.), Essays on the Nobility of Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1985), p. 179; Barrow, Bruce, p. 121; Prestwich,Edward I, p. 494; see above, p. 110.

103 Itin., p. 180.

104 CDS, ii, nos. 1230, 1237.

105 CDS, iv, p. 453.

106 CDS, ii, no. 1190.

107 CDS, v, no. 260.

108 Ibid., no. 261; CPR, 1292–1301, pp. 608–9; CPR, 1302–7, p. 2.

109 CDS, v, no. 262.

110 E159/75, m. 10.

111 Warrants issued to those going about royal business to prove that they were entitled to do so.

112 CCR, 1296–1302, pp. 574–5.

113 CDS, v, no. 263.

114 E159/75, mm. 68, 69.

115 Ibid., m. 14.

116 CDS, v, no. 259.

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