Modern history

Notes

Upstream, Downstream, All Around the Stream

All of the oil world is divided into three. The “upstream” comprises exploration and production. The “midstream” are the tankers and pipelines that carry crude oil to refineries. The “downstream” includes refining, marketing, and distribution, right down to the corner gasoline station or convenience store. A company that includes together significant upstream and downstream activities is said to be “integrated.”

By generally accepted theory, crude oil is the residue of organic waste—primarily microscopic plankton floating in seas, and also land plants—that accumulated at the bottom of oceans, lakes, and coastal areas. Over millions of years, this organic matter, rich in carbon and hydrogen atoms, was collected beneath succeeding levels of sediments. Pressure and underground heat “cooked” the plant matter, converting it into hydrocarbons—oil and natural gas. The tiny droplets of oil liquid migrated through small pores and fractures in the rocks until they were trapped in permeable rocks, sealed by shale rocks on top and heavier salt water at the bottom. Typically, in such a reservoir, the lightest gas fills the pores of the reservoir rock as a “gas cap” above the oil. When the drill bit penetrates the reservoir, the lower pressure inside the bit allows the oil fluid to flow into the well bore and then to the surface as a flowing well. “Gushers”—or “oil fountains” as they were called in Russia—resulted from failure (or, at the time, inability) to manage the pressure of the rising oil. As production continues over time, the underground pressure runs down, and the wells need help to keep going, either from surface pumps or from gas reinjected back into the well, known as “gas lift.” What comes to the surface is hot crude oil, sometimes accompanied by natural gas.

But as it flows from a well, crude oil itself is a commodity with very few direct uses. Virtually all crude is processed in a refinery to turn it into useful products like gasoline, jet fuel, home heating oil, and industrial fuel oil. In the early years of the industry, a refinery was little more than a still where the crude was boiled and then the different products were condensed out at various temperatures. The skills required were not all that different from making moonshine, which is why whiskey makers went into oil refining in the nineteenth century. Today, a refinery is often a large, complex, sophisticated, and expensive manufacturing facility.

Crude oil is a mixture of petroleum liquids and gases in various combinations. Each of these compounds has some value, but only as they are isolated in the refining process. So, the first step in refining is to separate the crude into constituent parts. This is accomplished by thermal distillation—heating. The various components vaporize at different temperatures and then can be condensed back into pure “streams.” Some streams can be sold as they are. Others are put through further processes to obtain higher-value products. In simple refineries, these processes are primarily for the removal of unwanted impurities and to make minor changes in chemical properties. In more complex refineries, major restructuring of the molecules is carried out through chemical processes that are known as “cracking” or “conversion.” The result is an increase in the quantity of higher-quality products, such as gasoline, and a decrease in the output of such lower-value products as fuel oil and asphalt.

Crude oil and refined products alike are today moved by tankers, pipelines, barges, and trucks. In Europe, oil is often officially measured in metric tons; in Japan, in kiloliters. But in the United States and Canada, and colloquially throughout the world, the basic unit remains the “barrel,” though there is hardly an oil man today who has seen an old-fashioned crude oil barrel, except in a museum. When oil first started flowing out of the wells in western Pennsylvania in the 1860s, desperate oil men ransacked farmhouses, barns, cellars, stores, and trashyards for any kind of barrel—molasses, beer, whiskey, cider, turpentine, salt, fish, and whatever else was handy. But as coopers began to make barrels specially for the oil trade, one standard size emerged, and that size continues to be the norm to the present. It is 42 gallons. The number was borrowed from England, where a statute in 1482 under King Edward IV established 42 gallons as the standard size barrel for herring in order to end skulduggery and “divers deceits” in the packing of fish. At the time, herring fishing was the biggest business in the North Sea. By 1866, seven years after Colonel Drake drilled his well, Pennsylvania producers confirmed the 42-gallon barrel as their standard, as opposed to, say, the 31½-gallon wine barrel or the 32-gallon London ale barrel or the 36-gallon London beer barrel. And that, in a roundabout way, brings us right back to the present day. For the 42-gallon barrel is still used as the standard measurement, even if not as a physical receptacle, in the biggest business in the North Sea—which today of course is not herring, but oil.

Prologue

1. Randolph S. Churchill, Winston Churchill, vol. 2, Young Statesman, 1901–1914 (London: Heinemann, 1968), p. 529 (“bully”); Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vol. 1 (New York: Scribners, 1928), pp. 130–36.

2. Interview with Robert O. Anderson.

Chapter 1

1. “George Bissell: Compiled by his Grandson, Pelham St. George Bissell,” Dartmouth College Library; Paul H. Giddens, The Birth of the Oil Industry (New York: Macmillan, 1938), p. 52, chap. 3; Harold F. Williamson and Arnold R. Daum, The American Petroleum Industry, vol. 1, The Age of Illumination, 1859–1899 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1959), pp. 23–24. Giddens and Williamson and Daum are basic sources. Paul H. Giddens, Pennsylvania Petroleum, 1750–1872: A Documentary History(Titusville: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), p. 54 (“Seneca oil”); J. T. Henry, The Early and Later History of Petroleum (Philadelphia: Jas. B. Rodgers Co., 1873), pp. 82–83; Henry H. Townsend, New Haven and the First Oil Well(New Haven, 1934), pp. 1–3 (“curative powers” and poem).

2. Gerald T. White, Scientists in Conflict: The Beginnings of the Oil Industry in California (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1968), pp. 38–45 (on Silliman); Petroleum Gazette, April 8, 1897, p. 8; Paul H. Giddens, The Beginnings of the Oil Industry: Sources and Bibliography (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), pp. 23 (“I can promise”), 62 (“unexpected success”); Giddens, Beginnings of the Oil Industry: Sources, pp. 33–35, 40 (“hardest times”), 38, 8 (“turning point”); B. Silliman, Jr., Report on the Rock Oil, or Petroleum, from Venango Co., Pennsylvania (New Haven: J. H. Benham’s, 1855), pp. 9–10, 20.

3. Abraham Gesner, A Practical Treatise on Coal, Petroleum, and Other Distilled Oils, ed. George W. Gesner, 2d ed. (New York: Baillière Bros., 1865), chap. 1; Henry, Early and Later History of Petroleum, p. 53; Kendall Beaton, “Dr. Gesner’s Kerosene: The Start of American Oil Refining,” Business History Review 29 (March 1955), pp. 35–41 (“new liquid hydrocarbon”); Gregory Patrick Nowell, “Realpolitik vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the World Oil Cartel, 1860–1939” (Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1988), pp. 104–8; Business History Review, ed., Oil’s First Century (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1960), pp. 8 (“coal oils”), 19 (“impetuous energy”).

4. R. J. Forbes, Bitumen and Petroleum in Antiquity (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1936), pp. 11–21, 57 (“incredible miracles”), 92 (“eyelashes”), 95–99; R. J. Forbes, Studies in Early Petroleum History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1958), pp. 150–53; R. J. Forbes, More Studies in Early Petroleum History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 20 (“unwearied fire”), 71 (“pitch and tow”).

5. S. J. M. Eaton, Petroleum: A History of the Oil Region of Venango County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: J. B. Skelly & Co., 1865), pp. 211–13; Beaton, “Dr. Gesner’s Kerosene,” pp. 44–45.

6. “Brief Development of the Petroleum Industry in Penn. Prepared at the Request of and Under the Supervision of James M. Townsend,” D-14, Drake Well Museum (“Oh Townsend”).

7. E. L. Drake manuscript, D-96, Drake Well Museum, p. 4 (“I had made up my mind”); Herbert Asbury, The Golden Flood: An Informal History of America’s First Oil Field (New York: Knopf, 1942), pp. 52–53 (Drake to Townsend); Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 30–31, 59–61 (“Yankee”).

8. Forbes, More Studies in Early Petroleum History, p. 141 (“light of the age”); Giddens, Beginnings of the Oil Industry: Sources, pp. 81–83 (Bissell to wife), 59 (“I claim”); Leon Burr Richardson, “Brief Biographies of Buildings—Bissell Hall,” Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, February 1943, pp. 18–19; Henry, Early and Later History of Petroleum, p. 349 (“name and fame”); Townsend, “Brief Development,” D-14, Drake Well Museum (“whole plan”); Giddens, Pennsylvania Petroleum, p. 189 (“milk of human kindness”).

9. Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 71 (“hive of bees”), 169, 95 (“mine is ruined”).

10. Paul H. Giddens, The American Petroleum Industry: Its Beginnings in Pennsylvania! (New York: Newcomen Society, 1959), p. 28; Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 87, 123–24 (“profits of petroleum” and “assailed Congress”), chap. 9.

11. Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, p. 137 (“smells”); William C. Darrah, Pithole: The Vanished City (Gettysburg, Pa., 1972), pp. 34–35 (“liquor and leases” and “vile liquor”), 230–31; Giddens, American Petroleum Industry, p. 21 (song titles); Paul H. Giddens, Early Days of Oil: A Pictorial History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 17 (“Oil on the brain”).

12. Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 375–77, 759 (“hidden veins”), app. E; August W. Giebelhaus, Business and Government in the Oil Industry: A Case Study of Sun Oil, 1876–1945 (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1980), p. 2.

13. Andrew Cone and Walter R. Johns, Petrolia: A Brief History of the Pennsylvania Petroleum Region (New York: D. Appleton, 1870), pp. 99–100 (“Oil Creek mud”); Henry, Early and Later History of Petroleum, p. 286; Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 125–26 (“oil and land excitement”); Samuel W. Tait, Jr., The Wildcatters: An Informal History of Oil-Hunting in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), pp. 26–31.

14. John J. McLaurin, Sketches in Crude Oil, 3rd ed. (Franklin, Penn., 1902), 3d ed., pp. 316–21; Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 182–83 (“favorite speculative commodity”); John H. Barbour, “Sketch of the Pittsburgh Oil Exchange,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 11 (July 1928), pp. 127–43.

Chapter 2

1. John D. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1909), p. 81 (“I’ll go no higher”); Allan Nevins, Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist (New York: Scribners, 1953), vol. 1, pp. 35–36 (“I ever point”). Nevins remains the standard biographical source.

2. David Freeman Hawke, John D.: The Founding Father of the Rockefellers (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 2–6, 27; Grace Goulder, John D. Rockefeller: The Cleveland Years (Cleveland: Western Reserve Historical Society, 1972), p. 10 (“trade with the boys”); John K. Winkler, John D.: A Portrait in Oils (New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), p. 14; Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 10–14 (“something big” and “methodical”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, p. 46 (“intimate conversations”).

3. Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, p. 19 (“Great Game”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 81 (“All sorts”), 21 (“bookkeeper”); John Ise, The United States Oil Policy (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 48–49.

4. Edward N. Akin, Flagler: Rockefeller Partner and Florida Baron (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1988), pp. 3–18, 19 (“competition” and “Keep your head”), 27 (“A friendship”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 11 (“vim and push”), 13 (“walks”), 19; John T. Flynn, God’s Gold: The Story of Rockefeller and His Times (London: George Harrap & Co., 1933), p. 172 (“bold, unscrupulous”); John W. Martin, Henry M. Flagler (1830–1913): Florida’s East Coast Is His Monument! (New York: Newcomen Society, 1956), pp. 8–11 (“American Riviera”).

5. John G. McLean and Robert W. Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1954), pp. 59–63; W. Trevor Halliday, John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937): Industrial Pioneer and Man (New York: Newcomen Society, 1948), p. 14 (“standard quality”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 80–83 (“Who would ever”), 97 (“independently rich”), 99–100 (“idea was mine”); Hawke, John D., pp. 44–46, 54 (“independence of woman”); Dictation by Mr. Rockefeller, June 7, 1904, Rockefeller family, JDR, Jr., Business Interviews, Box 118, “S.O. Company—Misc.” folder, Rockefeller archives (“It was desirable”).

6. Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 107 (“cruelest”), 117 (“Monster” and “Forty Thieves”), 128, 114–15 (“newspaper articles” and “private contracts”), 104 (“try our plan”), 172 (“mining camp”); Chester McArthur Destler, Roger Sherman and the Independent Oil Men (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 28, 34 (“but one buyer”), 37 (“dry up Titusville”).

7. David Freeman Hawke, ed., John D. Rockefeller Interview, 1917–1920: Conducted by William O. Inglis (Westport, Conn.: Meckler Publishing, 1984), pp. 4 (“cut-throat”), 6 (“safe and profitable”); Hawke, John D., pp. 79 (“war or peace”), 106 (“good sweating”), 170 (“brass band”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 216 (“feel sick”), 224 (“barrel famine”), 223 (“Morose”); Akin, Flagler, p. 67 (“blankets”); McLean and Haigh, Integrated Oil, p. 63.

8. Archbold to Rockefeller, September 2, 1884, Box 51, Archbold folder (1.51.379), Business Interests, 1879–1894, RG 1.2, Rockefeller archives; Jerome Thomas Bentley, “The Effects of Standard Oil’s Vertical Integration into Transportation on the Structure and Performance of the American Petroleum Industry, 1872–1884” (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1976), p. 27.

9. Archbold to Rockefeller, August 15, 1888, Box 51, Archbold folder (1.51.378), Business Interests, 1879–1894, RG 1.2, Rockefeller archives; Destler, Roger Sherman, pp. 85 (“overweening”), 95 (“Autocrat”), 132 (“gang of thieves”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, p. 337 (“Rockefeller will get you”).

10. Interview with Mr. Rogers, 1903, T-003, Tarbell papers (“every foot” and inheritance); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 132–34 (“pleasant” and “clamorer”); C. T. White folder (87.1.59), Box 134, Business Interests, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., papers, Rockefeller archives (stockholding); Ralph W. Hidy and Muriel E. Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) vol. 1, Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), p. 6 (“You gentlemen”).

11. Flynn, God’s Gold, p. 131 (“everything count”); Standard Oil—Rachel Crothers Group, T-014, Tarbell papers (espionage); Halliday, Rockefeller, p. 20; Hawke, John D., p. 50 (“Hope if”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 6 (“not… easiest of tasks”), 10 (“just how fast”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, p. 324 (“smarter than I”).

12. Goulder, Rockefeller, p. 223 (“wise old owl”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 331, 326 (“expose as little”), 157 (“wonder how old”), 337 (“anxiety”), 328 (“ten letters”); vol. 2, p. 427 (“unemotional man”); Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York: McClure, Phillips & Company, 1904), vol. 1, pp. 105–06.

13. Vinnie Crandall Hicks to Ida Tarbell, June 29, 1905, T-020 and Marshall Bond to Ida Tarbell, July 3, 1905, T-021, Tarbell papers (“Sunday school” and “Buzz”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 25–26; Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 84 (“dentist’s chair”), 91–95 (“poulets” and “life principle”), 193–94 (“best investment” and “spare change”); William Manchester, A Rockefeller Family Portrait, from John D. to Nelson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), pp. 25–26; Flynn, God’s Gold, pp. 232–35, 280.

14. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, p. 58 (“volume”); Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, p. 320 (“length of life”); Catherine Beecher and Harriet Beecher Stowe, The American Women’s Home or Principles of Domestic Science (New York: J. B. Ford, 1869), pp. 362–63 (“explosions”).

15. Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 526 (“gas bill”), 678, 249 (“sewing circles”); Gerald Carson, The Old Country Store (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 188 (“lively country store”).

16. Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 177–78 (“Our business” and “drink every gallon”), 8; Paul H. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana): Oil Pioneer of the Middle West (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 2 (“vanishing phenomena”); S. Cornifort to Archbold, June 27, 1885, Box 51, Archbold folder (1.5.379), Business Interests, 1879–1894, R.G. 1.2, Rockefeller archives (“one hundred to one”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, p. 3; Edgar Wesley Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders: A History of Exploration for Oil (Tulsa: American Association of Petroleum Geologists, 1975), pp. 124–26.

17. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana), pp. 2–7 (“skunk juice”); Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 7–9; Hawke, John D., pp. 182–83 (“conservative brethren”), 185; Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 3, 101 (“Buy”).

18. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana), p. 19 (“entirely ignorant”); Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 279 (Seep), 87; Gilbert Montagu, The Rise and Progress of the Standard Oil Company (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1903), p. 132 (“best possible consensus”).

19. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences, pp. 60 (“large scale”), 29; Halliday, Rockefeller, pp. 10 (“instinctively realized”), 16 (“conceived the idea”); Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 120–21, 38–39 (Mineral Resources); Destler, Roger Sherman, pp. 47 (“body and soul”), 192; Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 54, 78, 129 (“success unparalleled”); J. W. Fawcett, T-082, Tarbell papers.

20. Lockhart interview, p. 3, T-003 (with Rogers interview), Tarbell papers (“Give the poor man”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, p. 402 (“day of combination”); vol. 2, pp. 379–87; Mark Twain with Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today(New York: Trident Press, 1964), pp. 271 (“giant schemes”), 1; Flynn, God’s Gold, pp. 4–5; Tarbell, History of Standard Oil, vol. 2, p. 31 (“cut to kill”).

Chapter 3

1. Giddens, The Birth of the Oil Industry, pp. 96–98 (“Yankee invention”); Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 488–89 (“drill”); J. D. Henry, Thirty-five Years of Oil Transport: Evolution of the Tank Steamer (London: Bradbury, Agnew & Co., 1907), pp. 5, 172–74; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 122–23 (“forced its way”).

2. Giddens, Birth of the Oil Industry, p. 99 (“safe to calculate”); Robert W. Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), chaps. 1 and 2, pp. 41–46 (“pillars” and “walnut money”); Boverton Redwood, Petroleum: A Treatise, 4th ed. (London: Charles Griffen & Co., 1922), vol. 1, pp. 3–9 (Marco Polo), 36–46; Forbes, Studies in Early Petroleum History, pp. 154–62; John P. McKay, “Entrepreneurship and the Emergence of the Russian Petroleum Industry, 1813–1883,” Research in Economic History 8 (1982), pp. 63–64.

3. Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders, pp. 4,150; Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 108 (“Oil King”), 149 (“Nobelites”); J. D. Henry, Baku: An Eventful History (London: Archibald, Constable & Co., 1905), pp. 51–52; Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 637–41 (“difficulty”), 517; W. J. Kelly and Tsureo Kano, “Crude Oil Production in the Russian Empire, 1818–1919,” Journal of European Economic History 6 (Fall 1977), pp. 309–10; McKay, “Entrepreneurship,” pp. 48–55, 87 (“greatest triumphs”).

4. Charles Marvin, The Region of Eternal Fire: An Account of a Journey to the Petroleum Region of the Caspian in 1883, new ed. (London: W. H. Allen, 1891), pp. 234–35 (“chimney-pot”); Sidney Pollard and Colin Holmes, Industrial Power and National Rivalry, 1870–1914, vol. 2 of Documents of European Economic History (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), pp. 108–10 (“American kerosene”); C. E. Stewart, “Petroleum Field of South Eastern Russia,” 1886, Russia File, Oil, Box C-8, Pearson papers; Tolf,Russian Rockefellers, pp. 80–86 (“main point” and “speculation”); Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, p. 519 (“2000 miles”); Bertrand Gille, “Capitaux Français et Pétroles Russes (1884–94),” Histoire des Enterprises 12 (November 1963), p. 19; Virginia Cowles, The Rothschilds: A Family of Fortune (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), chaps. 7–8; Henry, Baku, pp. 74, 79.

5. Archbold to Rockefeller, August 19, 1884, and July 6, 1886, Archbold folder (1.5.381), Box 51, Business Interests, 1878–1894, R.G. 1.2, Rockefeller archives. Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 47–48 (“fountains”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, p. 116; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 138–39 (“Russian competition”).

6. Archbold to Rockefeller, July 6, 1886, Archbold folder (1.5.381), Box 51, Business Interests, 1879–1894, R.G. 1.2, Rockefeller archives; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 147–53 (poem and “competitive commerce”); Henry, Baku, p. 116; Tolf,Russian Rockefellers, pp. 96–97, 107–09; Nicholas Halasz, Nobel: A Biography of Alfred Nobel (New York: Orion Press, 1959), pp. 3–5 (“dynamite king”), 211–13.

7. Robert Henriques, Marcus Samuel: First Viscount Bearsted and Founder of the ‘Shell’Transport and Trading Company, 1853–1927 (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), pp. 74–75 (“go-between”), 44 (“lovely day”). Henriques is not only a biography of Samuel but also the most complete work on the origins of Shell. Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 19–20 (“Shady Lane”).

8. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 80 (“powerful company”), 96, 83, 112 (“Hebrew influence”), 108 (“to block”); Henry, Thirty-five Years of Oil Transport, pp. 41–47.

9. “Petroleum in Bulk and the Suez Canal,” Economist, January 9, 1892, pp. 36–38; Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 109–11 (“got cheaper”), 138–40 (“wire handles”); Henry, Thirty-five Years of Oil Transport, p. 50; R. J. Forbes and D. R. O’Beirne, The Technical Development of the Royal Dutch/Shell, 1890–1940 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957), pp. 529–30.

10. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 52–54 (“two brothers”).

11. Archbold to Rockefeller, December 15, 1891, Frank Rockefeller folder, Box 64; Archbold to Rockefeller, July 13 (“quite confident”), July 22, 1892, Archbold folder (1.51.381), Box 51, Business Interests, 1878–1894, R.G. 1.2, Rockefeller archives. Gille, “Capitaux Français et Pétroles Russes,” pp. 43–48 (“crisis”); Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 116–17 (“on behalf”); F. C. Gerretson, History of the Royal Dutch, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), p. 35. Gerretson’s 4-volume work extensively details the rise of Royal Dutch.

12. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 1, pp. 22 (“earth oil”), 89–90 (“won’t bend”), 129–34 (“do not feel” and “mighty storm”), 163–65 (“Half-heartedness” and “stagnate”), 171 (“things go wrong”), 224 (“object of terror”), 174 (“pretend to be poor”).

13. Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 261–67 (Standard reps in East Indies, “Every day,” “Dutch obstacles” and “sentimental barrier”); Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 1, pp. 282–84 (“into its power”); vol. 2, p. 48 (“pity”); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 181 (“Dutchman”), 184 (“still open”).

Chapter 4

1. Gerald T. White, Formative Years in the Far West: A History of Standard Oil of California and Its Predecessors Through 1919 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962), pp. 199, 267, 269.

2. Harold G. Passer, The Electrical Manufacturers, 1875–1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 180–81 (“fuzz on a bee”); Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric Lamp Industry: Technological Change and Economic Development from 1800 to 1947(New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 68–69; Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 55, 73, 176, 227 (“Londoners”); Leslie Hannah, Electricity Before Nationalization (London: Macmillan, 1979), chap. 1.

3. James J. Flink, America Adopts the Automobile, 1895–1910 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 42–50 (“Get a horse,” “skeptical” and “theme for jokers”), 64 (“automobile is the idol”); John B. Rae, American Automobile Manufacturers: The First Forty Years(Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1959), pp. 33 (“Horseless Carriage fever”), 31; George S. May, A Most Unique Machine: The Michigan Origins of the American Automobile Industry (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1975), pp. 56–57; Allan Nevins, Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company, vol. 1 (New York: Scribners, 1954), pp. 133, 168, 237, 442–57.

4. Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 569–81; Arthur M. Johnson, The Development of American Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public Policy, 1862–1906 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 173–83 (“gloved hand”); Austin Leigh Moore, John D. Archbold and the Early Development of Standard Oil (New York: Macmillan, [1930]), pp. 197–202 (“champions of independence”).

5. White, Standard Oil of California, pp. 8–13 (“fabulous wealth” and “without limit”).

6. Patillo Higgins Oral History, II, pp. 7–9; Carl Coke Rister, Oil! Titan of the Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), pp. 3–5, 34, 56–59; James A. Clark and Michael T. Halbouty, Spindletop (New York: Random House, 1952), pp. 4–5, 22, 27, 38–42 (“Tell that Captain”); John O. King, Joseph Stephen Cullinan: A Study of Leadership in the Texas Petroleum Industry, 1897–1937 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), pp. 12–21, 17 (“Dash and push”). F. Lucas to E. DeGolyer, May 6, 1920, 1074 (“visions”); John Galey to E. DeGolyer, August 22, 1941, 535, DeGolyer papers. Mody C. Boatwright and William A. Owen, Tales from the Derrick Floor (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), p. 14 (“Dr. Drill”); W. L. Mellon and Boyden Sparkes, Judge Mellon’s Sons (Pittsburgh, 1948), pp. 148–50 (“bewitched”); Robert Henriques, Marcus Samuel, p. 346 (“example”)

7. Allen Hamill Oral History, I, pp. 20–21 (“Al!”), 34; James Kinnear Oral History, I, pp. 15–19, II, p. 16; T. A. Rickard, “Anthony F. Lucas and the Beaumont Gusher,” Mining and Scientific Press, December 22, 1917, pp. 887–94; Rister, Oil!, pp. 60–67; Clark and Halbouty, Spindletop, pp. 88–89 (“X-ray eyes”); Burt Hull, “Founding of the Texas Company: Some of Its Early History,” pp. 8–9, Collection 6850, Continental Oil, University of Wyoming.

8. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 353 (“pioneers”), 341–45 (“magnitude” and “opponent”), 349, 350 (“failure of supplies”); Harold F. Williamson, Ralph L. Andreano, Arnold R. Daum, and Gilbert C. Klose, The American Petroleum Industry, vol. 2, The Age of Energy, 1899–1959 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 16, 22; Clark and Halbouty, Spindletop, pp. 100–1.

9. Mellon, Judge Mellon’s Sons, pp. 153–162 (“epic card game” and “real way”), 269 (“We’re out”), 276–78 (“just about as bad” and “good management”), 274–75 (“main problem”); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 462–66 (Samuel’s diary).

10. Mellon, Judge Mellon’s Sons, pp. 272–73 (“Standard made the price,” “at the mercy” and “by your leave”), 282 (“marketable”), 284 (“hitch onto”); John G. McLean and Robert Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, pp. 78–79; King, Cullinan, p. 179 (“throwed me out”). On the fate of the pioneers: Rickard, “Anthony F. Lucas,” p. 892; Oil Investors Journal, March 1, 1904, p. 3 (“Owing” and “milked too hard”); Clark and Halbouty, Spindletop, pp. 123–27 (“whole honor”); Thomas Galey, “Guffey and Galey and the Genesis of the Gulf Oil Corporation,” January 1951, P448 (Gulf Oil), Petroleum Collection, University of Wyoming (“Difficult times” and “lost track”); Al Hamill to Thomas W. Galey, February 21, 1951, P448 (Gulf Oil), Petroleum Collection, University of Wyoming (“dribble”).

11. August W. Giebelhaus, Sun Oil, 1876–1945, pp. 42–43 (“five cents”).

12. Curt Hamill Oral History, II, p. 29 (“Hogg’s my name”); Robert C. Cotner, James Stephen Hogg (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959), pp. 437–39 (“Northern men”); King, Cullinan, pp. 107 (“Tammany”), 180–82 (“time will come”), 186 (“butt into everything”), 190–94 (“Texas deals” and “boarding-house brawl”).

13. With the development of Gulf Coast and California output, Standard’s control of domestic crude production fell from 90 percent in 1880 to between 60 and 65 percent in 1911. Business History Review, ed., Oil’s First Century (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1960), pp. 73–82; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 416, 473, 462; Joseph A. Pratt, “The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil,” Journal of Economic History 40 (December 1980), pp. 815–37; Ida Tarbell, All in the Day’s Work (New York: Macmillan, 1939), p. 215 (“no end of the oil”).

Chapter 5

1. Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 213–14 (“craze” and “Our friends”); Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases, 1890–1911 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 25 (“Clam”), 52–58 (“Democratic Leader”), 63, 90 (Republic Oil ads); Pratt, “Petroleum Industry in Transition,” p. 832 (“blind tigers”).

2. Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 276–78; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 231–32 (“gentlemen”); Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), pp. 45–46, 645.

3. E. V. Cary to J. D. Rockefeller, November 8, 1907, 1907–1912 folder, Box 114, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Business Interests, Rockefeller archives; Moore, Archbold, pp. 48–49 (“go ahead” and “hard job”), 17 (“God is willing”), 53 (“oil enthusiasm”), 119 (“not… entirely philanthropic”), 109 (“one flash”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 1, pp. 117–18 (“$4 a barrel”); vol. 2, pp. 285–86 (“really a bank”), 293–94 (three simple rules), 457, n. 8 (“We told him”); Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, p. 67 (“unfortunate failing”).

4. Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, and Public Policy, 1860–1897 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 312 (“great moral…battle”); Lewis L. Gould, Reform and Regulation: American Politics, 1900–1916 (New York: John Wiley, 1978), pp. 17, 23 (“trust question”); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR (New York: Vintage, 1955), pp. 169, 185–86 (“critical achievement”); Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 1895–1904 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 7; Kathleen Brady, Ida Tarbell: Portrait of a Muckraker(New York: Seaview/Putnam, 1984), pp. 120–23 (“great feature” and “new plan of attacking”). H. H. Rogers complained to Ida Tarbell that he could not understand how Harper’s could have published William Demarest Lloyd’s Wealth Against Commonwealth, as he “had known Harry Harper socially very well.” Tarbell’s own theory was that “it was the very desire to keep the Standard Oil people out of society that had something to do with the Harpers publishing that book.” Interview with H. H. Rogers, T-004, Tarbell papers.

5. Brady, Ida Tarbell, pp. 115 (“holding people off”), 110 (“playing cards”), 123 (“Well, I’m sorry”); Tarbell, All in the Day’s Work, pp. 19, 204 (“Pithole”), 207 (“Don’t do it”).

6. Joseph Siddell to Ida Tarbell, T-084 (“most interesting figure”); Standard Oil—Rachel Crothers Group, T-014, p. 3 (“confession of failure”), Interviews with H. H. Rogers, T-004 (“ask us to contribute”), T-003 (“made right”), T-001, T-002, Tarbell papers. Albert Bigelow Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1912), pp. 971–73 (“stop walking” and “affairs of a friend”), 1658–59 (“best friend”); Justin Kaplan, Mr. Clemens and Mark Twain (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 320–23 (“out for the dollars”); Tarbell, All in the Day’s Work, pp. 217–20 (“born gambler” and “we were prospered”), 211–15 (“by all odds”), 10 (“as fine a pirate”), 227–28; Albert Bigelow Paine, ed., Mark Twain’s Letters (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1917), pp. 612–13 (“only man I care for”); Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, p. 662; Brady, Ida Tarbell, pp. 125–29 (“straightforward narrative”); “Would Miss Tarbell See Mr. Rogers,” Harper’s Magazine, January 1939, p. 141.

7. Standard Oil—Rachel Crothers Group, T-014, p. 13, Tarbell papers (“turned my stomach”); Brady, Ida Tarbell, pp. 137–57 (“very interesting to note,” “most remarkable,” McClure’s comments, “guilty of baldness,” “lady friend” and Rockefeller’s response); Tarbell, History of Standard Oil, vol. 1, p. 158; vol. 2, pp. 207, 60, 230, 288 (“loaded dice”), 24; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 652 (“more widely purchased”), 663; Tarbell, All in the Day’s Work, p. 230 (“never had an animus”); Hawke, Rockefeller Interview, p. 5 (“Miss Tar Barrel”).

8. Gould, Reform and Regulation, pp. 25–26 (“steamroller,” “meteor” and “wring the personality”), 48 ($100,000 donation); Tarbell, All in the Day’s Work, pp. 241–42 (“muckraker” and “vile and debasing”); George Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900–1912 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 131–32 (“levees”), 124; Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1931), pp. 350–51 (“read every book” and “Darkest Abyssinia”); United States Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, Campaign Contributions, 62d Congress, 3d Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1913), vol. 1, p. 133; vol. 2, pp. 1574, 1580; Moore, Archbold, p. 260 (1906 visit to TR).

9. Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, pp. 133, 140 (“Every measure”), 136 (“biggest criminals”). Starr J. Murphy to J. D. Rockefeller, September 7, 1907 (“Administration has started”); Telegram, W. P. Cowan to J. D. Rockefeller, August 3, 1907, 1907–1912 folder, Box 114; Starr Murphy to J. D. Rockefeller, July 9, 1907, Standard Oil Company—Misc. folder, Box 118, J.D.R., Jr., Business Interests, Rockefeller archives. White, Standard Oil of California, p. 373 (“inordinately voluminous”); Moore,Archbold, pp. 295 (“forty-four years”), 220 (“Federal authorities”); Goulder, Rockefeller, pp. 84 (“insolence” and “inadequacy”), 204–5 (Rockefeller on golf course); John K. Winkler, John D.: A Portrait in Oils (New York: Vanguard, 1929), p. 147.

10. David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New York: Putnam, 1937), p. 66 (“signal triumphs”); Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly, pp. 150, 156–57 (“I have also”); White, Standard Oil of California, p. 377 (“No disinterested mind”);New York Times, May 16, 1911; Moore, Archbold, p. 278 (“one damn thing”).

11. Giddens, Standard of Indiana, pp. 123–35 (“office boys”); Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 380–81 (“young fellows”); Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, vol. 1, pp. 416, 528, 713–14; White, Standard Oil of California, pp. 378–84.

12. Giddens, Standard of Indiana, pp. 141–63 (Burton).

13. Moore, Archbold, p. 281; Nevins, Study in Power, vol. 2, pp. 383 (Roosevelt), 404–5.

Chapter 6

1. Robert Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 158 (“Mr. Abrahams”), 272 (“mere production”), 163 (“great disadvantage”), 165 (“berserk”).

2. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 186–212 (correspondence), 267 (“tremendous role”), 272; Williamson and Daum, Age of Illumination, pp. 336–37.

3. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 300–23.

4. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 319–35, 176–79, 223, 234, 298–99; Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 1, pp. 121, 126, 177, 238–39; vol. 2, pp. 324–27, 89, 92–146; Forbes and O’Beirne, Royal Dutch/Shell, p. 65.

5. Interview with John Loudon; Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 330–31 (“nervous condition”), 333; Henri Deterding, An International Oilman (as told to Stanley Naylor), (London and New York: Harper & Brothers, 1934), pp. 28–30 (“lynx-eye” and “go a long way”), 37 (“sniftering”), 9–10 (“Simplicity rules”); Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 1, pp. 199–202 (“first-rate businessman”); vol 2, pp. 173–74 (“not aiming” and “heart and soul”); Robert Henriques, Sir Robert Waley Cohen, 1877–1952 (London: Secker & Warburg, 1966), p. 98 (“charm”); Lane to Aron, January 11, 1912, Rothschild papers (“terrible sort”).

6. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 2, pp. 191–94 (“battledore” and “joint management”); Archbold to Rockefeller, October 15, 1901, GDR to JDR, October 15, 1901, 1877–1906 folder, Box 114, Business Interests, J.D.R., Jr., Rockefeller archives (“There is here”).

7. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 2, pp. 195–201 (“no solution” and “cordially”), 234–38 (“Neither of us” and “Delay dangerous”); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 400–3 (“sincere congratulation”).

8. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 2, pp. 187–88 (“not…worth a white tie”), 244–45 (“rightly and fairly”); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 436–41 (Lane’s critique), 446–52 (“rage,” “ten Lord Mayors” and “Twenty-one years”), 470.

9. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 2, pp. 298–301 (“seize one’s opportunities”), 345–46 (Deterding and Samuel); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 495 (“disappointed man”), 509 (“genius”); Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 83; Henriques, Waley Cohen, pp. 129–48, chaps. 8–10; Deterding, International Oilman, p. 114 (“our chairman”).

10. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 3, pp. 303 (“wipe us out”), 297–98 (“I am sorry”), 307 (“To America!”); Kendall Beaton, Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the United States (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), pp. 123 (“Oil Capital”), 126 (“weare in America!”).

11. Geoffrey Jones and Clive Trebilcock, “Russian Industry and British Business, 1916–1930: Oil and Armaments,” Journal of European Economic History 11 (Spring 1982), pp. 68–69 (“too hurried development”); Serge Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. and ed. Abraham Yarmolinsky (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1921), pp. 27–29, 125, 198 (“imported mediums”), 183 (“‘Byzantine’ habits”), 247 (“tangle”), 279; Theodore Von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1974), pp. 255, 122–23, 250; A. A. Fursenko, Neftyanye Tresty i Mirovaia Politika (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 42–43. On Baku unrest, see Richard Hare, Portraits of Russian Personalities Between Reform and Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 305; Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 151–55 (“revolutionary hotbed”); Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 37, 59–60; Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 47; Ronald G. Suny, “A Journeyman for the Revolution: Stalin and the Labour Movement in Baku,” Soviet Studies 23 (January 1972), p. 393.

12. Witte, Memoirs, pp. 189 (“monkeys”), 250 (“Russia’s internal situation”); Deutscher, Stalin, p. 66 (“hour of revenge”); Solomon M. Schwarz, The Russian Revolution of 1905: The Workers’Movement and the Formation of Bolshevikism and Menshevikism, trans. Gertrude Vaka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 301–14; Adam B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks & the Intellectual (New York: Collier Books, 1965), pp. 219, 227; J. D. Henry, Baku, pp. 157–59 (Adamoff), 183–84 (“flames”); K. H. Kennedy,Mining Tsar: The Life and Times of Leslie Urquhart (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), chaps. 2 and 3; Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 3, p. 138; Hidy and Hidy, Standard Oil, p. 511; Ulam, Stalin, pp. 89–98; Suny, “Stalin,” pp. 394, 386 (“unlimited distrust”).

13. A. Beeby Thompson, The Oil Fields of Russia (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son, 1908), pp. 195–97, 213; Maurice Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1–45; Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 183–85; Lane to Aron, December 21, 1911 (“I can assure you”), December 13, 1911 (“his intention”), Rothschild papers; V. I. Bovykin, “Rossiyskaya Neft’i Rotshil’dy’,” Voprosy Istorii 4 (1978), pp. 27–41; Suny, “Stalin,” p. 373 (“journeyman for the revolution”).

Chapter 7

1. Henry Drummond Woolf, Rambling Recollections, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1908), p. 329 (“well versed”); Charles Issawi, ed., The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 20 (Persian finances); R. W. Ferrier,The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, The Developing Years, 1901–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 28 (“Shah’s prodigality”); T. A. B. Corley, A History of the Burmah Oil Company, 1886–1927 (London: Heinemann, 1983); Geoffrey Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: Macmillan, 1981). The books by Ferrier, Corley, and Jones—all making extensive use of corporate and government archives—are the best works on their respective subjects.

2. Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 29 (“capitalist”), 31 (“riches”), 35–36 (“morning coffee”). On D’Arcy, see ibid., pp. 30–32; Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 96–97; Henry Longhurst, Adventure in Oil: The Story of British Petroleum (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1959), pp. 18–19, 25; David J. Jeremy and Christine Shaw, eds., Dictionary of Business Biography (London: Butterworths, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 12–14. On the de Reuter concessions, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 100–34, 210–14.

3. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 3 (“chessboard”), 8, 22 (“Insurance”), 325–28 (“ragamuffins”); Arthur H. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), pp. 280 (“elderly child”), 268 (“vassalage”), 328 (“detestable”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 39 (“ready money”), 43 (“no umbrage”); Hardinge to Lansdowne, January 29, 1902, FO 60/660, PRO (“Cossacks”); Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), chap. 4 and pp. 235–42.

4. Issawi, Economic History of Iran, p. 41 (“far-reaching effects” and “soil of Persia”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 131–32; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 43 (“wild-catting”), 107.

5. Hardinge, Diplomatist, pp. 281, 273–74 (“Shiahs”), 306–11; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 57 (“expedite”), 65 (“heat,” “Mohamedan Kitchen” and “Mullahs”).

6. Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 59–62 (“Every purse” and “keep the bank quiet”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 97–99 (“éminence grise”), 133; Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 98–103 (“Glorious news”).

7. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 442–44 (“menace” and “Monroe Doctrine”). Lansdowne to Curzon, December 7, 1903, FO 60/731 (“danger”); Cargill to Redwood, October 6, 1904, ADM 116/3807, PRO. Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 99–102 (“imperial,” “patriots” and “coincided exactly”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 133–34 (“British hands”).

8. A. R. C. Cooper, “A Visit to the Anglo-Persian Oil-Fields,” Journal of the Central Asian Society, 13 (1926), pp. 154–56 (“thousand pities”); Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 444–45; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 67, 86 (“beer and skittles”), 79 (“dung” and “teeth”); Arnold Wilson, S. W. Persia: A Political Officer’s Diary, 1907–14 (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 112.

9. Wilson, S. W. Persia, p. 27 (“dignified” and “solid British oak”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 79 (“reasonable” and “beasts”), 96 (“type machine”), 73; Corley, Burmah Oil, p. 110 (“amuse me”).

10. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 80–85 (“luxury of Monarchs”); Gene R. Garthwaite, “The Bakhtiar Khans, the Government of Iran, and the British, 1846–1915,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (1972), pp. 21–44; Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 83 (“nightingale” and “Baksheesh”), 85 (“importance attached”). Harold Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930), p. 171 (“spontaneous infiltration”); Spring-Rice to Grey, April 11, 1907, FO 416/32, PRO (“great impetus”); Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, pp. 475–500.

11. Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 86–88 (“last throw,” “cannot find” and “Psalm 104”), 96 (“stupid action”); Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 128–39 (“go smash,” “abandon operations,” “telling no one” and “may be modified”); Wilson, S. W. Persia, pp. 41–42 (“endure heat”).

12. Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 105–6 (“making public,” “corns” and “immense benefit”), 98 (“great mistake”), 103 (“signing away”), 113 (“just as keen”). While Ferrier places the value of D’Arcy’s shares at £895,000, Corley puts them at £650,000—still a healthy return after all. Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 112 and Corley, Burmah Oil, p. 142. On Anglo-Persian’s operations after the stock issue, see Wilson, S. W. Persia, pp. 84, 103 (“spent a fortnight”), 211–12; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 152–53 (“one chapter”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 142, 144 (“serious menace”), 147; Corley, Burmah Oil, p. 189 (“hell of a mess”).

Chapter 8

1. Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 59; John Arbuthnot Fisher, Memories (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), pp. 156–57; Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 399–402; John Arbuthnot Fisher, Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, vol. 1, ed. Arthur J. Marder (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 45 (“oil maniac”), 275 (“goldmine” and “bought the south half”).

2. Fisher, Memories, p. 116 (“God-father of Oil”); Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919, vol. 1, The Road to War, 1904–1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 14 (“mixture”), 205 (“tornado”), 19 (Edward VII), 45; Fisher, Fear God, vol. 1, pp. 102 (“Full Speed”), 185 (“Wake up”); Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 268 (“Golden rule”); R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher (Garden City: Doubleday, 1929), vol. 2., pp. 157–59.

3. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 416 (“naval question”), 417 (“freedom”), 457 (“strident”), 221–29 (“world domination,” “mailed fist” and “weary Titan”); Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), pp. 40–57, 127; Samuel Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 16, 18.

4. William H. McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society Since A.D. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 277 (“technological revolution”); Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. 1, pp. 71, vii, 139 (“pensions”); Williamson, Politics of Grand Strategy, pp. 236, 238. For domestic German politics, see Volker Berghahn, “Naval Armaments and the Social Crisis: Germany Before 1914,” in Geoffrey Best and Andrew Wheatcraft, eds., War, Economy, and the Military Mind(London: Croom Held, 1976), pp. 61–88. Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 1, Youth, 1874–1900 (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 1888–89.

5. Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2, Young Statesman, 1901–1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 494 (“nonsense”), 518–19 (“Indeed”).

6. Churchill, Young Statesman, pp. 545–47 (“whole fortunes”); Churchill, World Crisis, vol. 1, pp. 71–78 (“intended to prepare,” “important steps” and “veritable volcano”); Fisher, Memories, pp. 200–1 (“precipice”); Henriques, Marcus Samuel, p. 283; Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 1926 (“How right”).

7. Churchill, Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3, pp. 1926–27.

8. Fisher, Fear God, vol. 2, p. 404 (“Sea fighting”); Churchill, World Crisis, vol. 1, pp. 130–36 (on his decision).

9. Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 158; Jones, State and British Oil, p. 170; Corley, Burmah Oil Company, p. 186; Fisher, Fear God, vol. 2, pp. 451 (“betrayed”), 467 (“no one else”); Mackay, Fisher, pp. 437–38; Churchill, Young Statesman, pp. 567–68; Churchill,Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3, p. 1929 (“My dear Fisher”).

10. Fisher, Memories, pp. 218–20 (“d—d fool”); Lord Fisher, Records (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), p. 196; Mackay, Fisher, p. 439 (“overwhelming advantages”); Fisher, Fear God, vol. 2, p. 438 (“don’t grow”).

11. Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 94 (“Champagne Charlie” and “decorous”); Jeremy and Shaw, Dictionary of Business Biography, vol. 2, pp. 639–41; Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 184, 205; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 96 (“Old Spats”), 151–52 (“Jewishness,” “Dutchness,” “under the control” and “moderate return”).

12. Bacon, Fisher, vol. 2, p. 158 (“do our d—st”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 164 (“embracing as it did” and “pecuniary assistance”), 151 (“Shell menace”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 170–73 (“commercial predominance” and “Evidently”).

13. Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 166–67 (“speculative risk”); Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900–1920 (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 47–48 (“keeping alive”); Churchill, Churchill, vol.2, Companion Volume, part 3, pp. 1932–48; Corley, Burmah Oil, p. 191; Asquith to George V, July 12, 1913, CAB 41/34, PRO (“controlling interest”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 181–82.

14. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, July 17, 1913, pp. 1474–77 (Churchill statement); Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 187, 191–95 (“scrap heap”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 195–96 (“thoroughly sound,” “perfectly safe” and “national disaster”).

15. Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 185; Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 195–97; Churchill, Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3, p. 1964.

16. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, June 17, 1914, pp. 1131–53, 1219–32; Bradbury to Anglo-Persian Oil Company, May 20, 1914, POWE 33/242, PRO; Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 199 (Green-way’s question).

17. Henriques, Marcus Samuel, p. 574; Churchill, Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3, pp. 1951 (“Napoleon and Cromwell”), 1965 (“Good Old Deterding”); Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 4, p. 293.

18. Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 4, p. 185; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 144, 12 (“premier cru”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 196; Churchill, World Crisis, p. 137; Churchill, Churchill, vol. 2, Companion Volume, part 3, p. 1999 (war order).

Chapter 9

1. William Langer, “The Well-Spring of Our Discontents,” Journal of Contemporary History 3 (1968), pp. 3–17; McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp. 334–35; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 110–111, 124–25 (German general); W. G. Jensen, “The Importance of Energy in the First and Second World Wars,” Historical Journal 11 (1968), pp. 538–45. Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918(London: Metheun, 1967), pp. 38–39.

2. Basil Liddell Hart, A History of the World War, 1914–1918 (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), chap. 4, especially pp. 86–87, 115–22 (“No British officer,” “coups de téléphone,” “not commonplace” and “forerunner”); Henri Carré, La Véritable Histoire des Taxis de La Marne (Paris: Libraire Chapelot, 1921), pp. 11–39 (“How will we be paid?”); Robert B. Asprey, The First Battle of the Marne (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 127 (“Today destiny”), 153 (“going badly”).

3. Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914–1918, pp. 38–39 (“This isn’t war”); Liddell Hart, The World War, pp. 332–43 (“antidote,” “eyewitness,” “black day” and “primacy”); Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories, 1914–1918 (London: Hutchinson, [1945]), p. 679; J. F. C. Fuller, Tanks in the Great War, 1914–1918 (London: John Murray, 1920), p. 19 (“present war”); Churchill, World Crisis, vol. 2, (New York: Scribners, 1923) pp. 71–91 (“caterpillar”… “tank”); A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 122; Francis Delaisi, Oil: Its Influence on Politics, trans. C. Leonard Leese (London: Labour Publishing and George Allen and Unwin, 1922), p. 29 (truck over the locomotive).

4. Liddell Hart, The World War, pp. 457–60 (“good sport”), 554–59; Harald Penrose, British Aviation: The Great War and Armistice, 1915–1919 (London: Putnam, 1969), pp. 9–12 (“Since war broke out”), 586 (“necessities of war”); Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler, The World in the Crucible, 1914–1919 (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 301–4 (“Battle of Britain”); Jensen, “Energy in the First and Second World Wars,” pp. 544–45; Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea, 1914–1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 296–97.

5. F. J. Moberly, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918 (London: HMSO, 1923), vol. 1, p. 82 (“little likelihood”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 263 (“build up”); Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 125–26; Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 239, 253 (“All-British Company”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 182–83.

6. Corley, Burmah Oil, p. 258, chap. 16; Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp. 593–619; Henriques, Waley Cohen, pp. 200–40; P. G. A. Smith, The Shell That Hit Germany Hardest (London: Shell Marketing Co., [1921]), pp. 1–11; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 187–202; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 250, 218 (“to secure navy supplies”); Slade, “Strategic Importance of the Control of Petroleum,” “Petroleum Supplies and Distribution” and “Observations on the Board of Trade Memorandum on Oil,” August 24, 1916, CAB 37/154, PRO.

7. Henriques, Waley Cohen, pp. 213–20; Times (London), January 14, 1916, p. 5; May 26, 1916, p. 5; G. Gareth Jones, “The British Government and the Oil Companies, 1912–24: The Search for an Oil Policy,” Historical Journal 20 (1977), pp. 654–64; C. Ernest Fayle, Seaborne Trade, vol. 3, The Period of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (London: John Murray, 1924), pp. 465, 175–76, 319, 371, 196–97; George Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), vol. 2, The Resurgent Years, 1911–1927 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), pp. 221–23; Beaton, p. 100.

8. Jones, “British Government and the Oil Companies,” pp. 661, 665; Paul Foley, “Petroleum Problems of the War: Study in Practical Logistics,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 50 (November 1927), pp. 1802–3 (“out of action”), 1817–21; Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (London: Heinemann, 1930), vol. 2, p. 288 (“Germans are succeeding”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 248–49 (Walter Long); Henry Bérenger, Le Pétrole et la France (Paris: Flammarion, 1920), pp. 41–55; Edgar Faure, La Politique Française du Pétrole (Paris: Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1938), pp. 66–69; Pierre L’Espagnol de la Tramerye, The World Struggle for Oil, trans. Leonard Leese (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1924), chap. 8; Eric D. K. Melby, Oil and the International System: The Case of France, 1918–1969 (New York: Arno Press, 1981), pp. 8–20 (“as vital as blood”).

9. Mark L. Requa, “Report of the Oil Division 1917–19” in H. A. Garfield, Final Report of the U. S. Fuel Administrator (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1921), p. 261; Gerald D. Nash, United States Oil Policy, 1890–1964 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), p. 27. On American oil policy making during World War I, see Dennis J. O’Brien, “The Oil Crisis and the Foreign Policy of the Wilson Administration, 1917–1921” (Ph.D.: University of Missouri, 1974), chaps. 1–2 and Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During World War I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

10. Joseph E. Pogue and Isador Lubin, Prices of Petroleum and Its Products During the War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1919), pp. 13–33, 289; Rister, Oil!, pp. 120–34. On the coal shortage, see David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 122–24 (“Bedlam”) and Seward W. Livermore, Politics Is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson and the War Congress, 1916–18 (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), pp. 68–69, 86–88. Requa, “Report of the Oil Division,” p. 270 (“no justification”); White, Standard Oil of California, p. 542. For auto growth, see Beaton, Shell, p. 171; White, Standard of California, p. 544. H. A. Garfield, Final Report of the U.S. Fuel Administrator, p. 8 (“walk to church”).

11. Ludendorff, War Memories, pp. 287–88 (“As I now saw”), 358–59 (“did materially”); Liddell Hart, The World War, pp. 345–50; Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, pp. 157–60; Times (London), December 5, 1916, p. 7; Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State pp. 79–85 (“No efforts”); Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 233–35. On Norton-Griffiths, see R. K. Middlemas, The Master-Builders (London: Hutchinson, 1963), pp. 270–83 (“dashing,” nicknames and “blasted language”); Mrs. Will Gordon, Roumania Yesterday and Today (London: John Lane, 1919), chap. 9 (“sledgehammer”); New York Times, January 16, 1917, p. 1; February 20, 1917, p. 4. On the effects on Germany, see Fayle, Seaborne Trade, vol. 3, pp. 180–81 (“just the difference”). After the war John Norton-Griffiths was recognized as a “world famous engineer” and contractor. In 1930, he was directing his firm’s project of raising the height of the Aswan Dam. A conflict developed with the local Egyptian authorities on the type of steel he had ordered and whether he would be liable for a very large penalty—also with possible great injury to his professional reputation. As was his wont, at 7:45 in the morning on September 27, 1930, he took out a surf boat from his hotel at San Stefano, near Alexandria, and paddled out to sea. A little later, an associate looked out from the hotel and saw Norton-Griffiths’s boat floating empty. Observers saw a man swimming or floating at a little distance away. Another boat, dispatched to investigate, recovered the body. It was Empire Jack, “the man with a sledgehammer,” with a bullet wound through his right temple—a suicide. Times (London), September 28, 1930, p. 12; September 29, 1930, p. 14; New York Times, September 28, 1930, II, p. 8, September 29, 1930, p. 11.

12. Erich Ludendorff, The Nation at War, trans. A. S. Rappoport (London: Hutchinson, 1936), p. 79; Z. A. B. Zeman, ed., Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 107, 134–35; Ronald Suny, The Baku Commune 1917–1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 284–85 (“we agreed” and “plunderers”), 328–43; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917–1921 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951), pp. 136–46 (“destroy”); Moberly, Campaign in Mesopotamia, vol. 4, pp. 182–212; Ludendorff, War Memories, pp. 659–60 (“serious blow”); Anastas Mikoyan, Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, vol. 1, The Path of Struggle, ed. Sergo Mikoyan, trans. Katherine T. O’Connor and Diane L. Burgin (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, 1988), pp. 505–9.

13. Ludendorff, War Memories, p. 748; Schmitt and Vedeler, World in the Crucible, p. 272; Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, p. 93; Fayle, Seaborne Trade, vol. 3, pp. 230, 402; Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 85; Henriques, Marcus Samuel, p. 624. On the speeches, see Times (London), November 22, 1918, p. 6; Delaisi, Oil, pp. 86–91 (Curzon); Bérenger, Le Pétrole et la France, pp. 175–80.

Chapter 10

1. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series, vol. 4, pp. 452–54, 521; FRUS: Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. 5, pp. 3–4, 760, 763, 804; David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, vol. 2 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), pp. 1037–38.

2. Confidential Memorandum of Negotiations with Turkish Petroleum Company, July 15–August 5, 1922, pp. 1–3, 800.6363/T84/48, RG 59, NA; Marian Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 12–80; Edward Mead Earle, “The Turkish Petroleum Company: A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy,” Political Science Quarterly 39 (June 1924), 267 (“Talleyrand”); V. H. Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” Historical Journal 13 (1970), p. 277.

3. Ralph Hewins, Mr. Five Percent: The Story of Calouste Gulbenkian (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958), pp. 15–16 (“academic nonsense”), 24 (“fine and consistent”), 11 (“hand”), 188 (Kenneth Clark); Financial Times, July 25, 1955 (“granite”); Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, p. 300; Nubar Gulbenkian, Portrait in Oil (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 85 (“very close”); “Memoirs of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, with Particular Relation to the Origins and Foundation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited,” March 4, 1948, 890.G.6363/3–448, pp. 6–7 (“wild cat”), 11 (“not, in any way”), RG 59, NA.

4. Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 86–93, 170–71 (Foreign Office Agreement); Hewins, Mr. Five Percent, p.81.

5. Kent, Oil and Empire, pp. 109, 121–26; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), pp. 188–95; Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921 (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956); Jones, State and British Oil, p. 198; Helmut Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910–1928 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 37; Rothwell, “Mesopotamia in British War Aims,” pp. 289–90 (Hankey and Balfour); William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 71–72 (Lansing); Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, pp. 1022–38.

6. Melby, France, pp. 17–23 (Clemenceau’s grocer); Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920 (London: Athlone Press, 1969), p. 154; Paul Mantoux, Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 Mars–28 Juin 1919), vol. 2 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955), pp. 137–43; Jones, State and British Oil, p. 214; C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, vol. 2 (London: Cassell, 1927), p. 194 (“dog-fight”); Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, First Series, vol. 8, pp. 9–10.

7. Melby, France, pp. 67 (“entirely French”), 100–4 (“industrial arm”); Richard Kuisel, Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 31–32 (“instrument” and “international difficulties”), 25 (“Anglo-Saxon”).

8. Kendall Beaton, Shell in the United States, pp. 229–32; B. S. McBeth, British Oil Policy, 1919–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 1985), p. 41. Waley Cohen to Director, Petroleum Dept., May 15, 1923, FO 371/13540; Proposed Combination of Royal Dutch Shell, Burma Oil, and Anglo-Persian Oil Companies, Notes of Meeting, November 2, 1921, W11691, FO 371/7027; Cowdray to Lloyd-Greame, February 14, 1922, POWE 33/92; Watson to Clarke, October 31, 1921, POWE 33/92, PRO. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, March 18, 1920, vol. 126, no. 28, cols. 2375/6; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 223–26 (“over-production,” “every action” and “Hottentots”); Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 372–80 (“whole revenue” and “did not go”); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 20–23.

9. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 5, The Prophet of Truth, 1922–1939 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 8–17 (“shall not starve”); Corley, Burmah Oil, pp. 298–307; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 5, Companion Volume, part 1, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), pp. 54–55 (Churchill on Baldwin), 68–69; Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 382–85 (“His Majesty’s Government”).

10. Mark Requa, Letter to the Subcommittee on Mineral Raw Materials, Economic Liaison Committee, May 12, 1919, Baker Library, Harvard Business School; John DeNovo, “The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918–1920,”American Historical Review (July 1956), pp. 854–76; O’Brien, “Oil Crises and the Foreign Policy of the Wilson Administration,” p. 176 (Wilson); National Petroleum News, October 29, 1919, p. 51 (“two to five years”); Guy Elliott Mitchell, “Billions of Barrels Locked Up in Rocks,” National Geographic, February 1918, pp. 195 (“gasoline famine”), 201 (“no man who owns”); George Otis Smith, “Where the World Gets Oil and Where Will Our Children Get It When American Wells Cease to Flow?”National Geographic, February 1920, p. 202 (“moral support”); Washington Post, November 18, 1920 (nine years and three months); George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals: A Study of the Mineral Factor in the World Position of America in War and in Peace(New York: D. Appleton, 1919), p. 304 (“within a year”). In 1919, David White, chief geologist of the United States Geological Survey, alarmed at “the widening angle between the flattening curve of production and the rising curve of consumption” in the United States, fixed total recoverable reserves at 6.7 billion barrels. David White, “The Unmined Supply of Petroleum in the United States,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers, February 4–6, 1919. John Rowland and Basil Cadman, Ambassador for Oil: The Life of John First Baron Cadman (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1960), pp. 95, 97. Requa to Adee, May 13, 1920, 800.6363/112; Manning to Baker, March 8, 1920, 811.6363/35; Fall to Hughes, July 15, 1921, 800.6363/324; Memorandum for the Secretary, March 29, 1921, 890g.6363/69; Merle-Smith to the Secretary, February 11, 1921, 800.6363/325; Millspaugh Memorandum, April 14, 1921, 890g.6363/T84/9, RG 59, NA. Scientific American, May 3, 1919, p. 474; Cadman to Fraser, December 2, 1920, 4247, Cadman papers (“I don’t expect”); Cadman, Notes, Meeting at Petroleum Executive, June 16, 1919, GHC/Iraq/D1, Shell archives; Memorandum on the Petroleum Situation, with Dispatch to HM Ambassador, April 21, 1921, POWE 33/228, PRO.

11. United Kingdom, Admiralty, Geographical Section of Naval Intelligence Division, Geology of Mesopotamia and Its Borderlands (London: HMSO, 1920), pp. 84–86, insisted on a “cautious estimate” for the oil potential of the region. FRUS, vol. 2, pp. 664–73; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 223, 221; De Novo, “Aggressive American Oil Policy,” pp. 871–72; Bennett H. Wall and George S. Gibb, Teagle of Jersey Standard (New Orleans: Tulane University Press, 1974), p. 130; Michael Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918–1928 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), p. 165; Nash, United States Oil Policy, p. 53. Heizer to Ravndal, January 31, 1920, 800.6363/134; Millspaugh Memorandum, November 26, 1921, 890g.6363/134; Tyrrell to Gulbenkian, October 10, 1924, with Wiley to Secretary of State, March 13, 1948, 890 g.6363/3–448 (“instrumental”), RG 59, NA.

12. WWC to Dearing, May 12, 1921, and Memorandum for the Secretary on Proposed Combination of American Oil Companies, 811.6363/73; Bedford to Hughes, May 21, 1921, 890.6363/78. NA 890g.6363/T84: Hoover to Hughes, April 17, 1922, 96; Hughes to Teagle, August 22, 1922, 41a; Allen Dulles Memorandum, December 15, 1922, 81, RG 59. Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 98 (“queer looking”); Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920–1933 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 189.

13. Wall and Gibb, Teagle, pp. 168 (“Boss”), 31–32 (“Come home”), 48–49 (“cigar”), 63–66 (“frequently changes”), 71–72 (“shoes” and “not going to drill”), 176–78 (“present policy”). On the Jersey reorganization, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962) chap. 4, p. 173.

14. NA 890g.6363: Confidential Memorandum of Negotiations with Turkish Petroleum Company, July 15–August 5, 1922, T84/48; Wellman to Hughes, July 24, 1922, 126; Piesse to Teagle, December 12, 1922, T84/62, RG 59.

15. Fromkin, Peace, pp. 226 (“ripper”), 306; Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1971 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), 2d ed., pp. 61–64 (Lansing), 68 (“vacant lot”); Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 64, 45, 112; Stivers, Supremacy and Oil, p. 78 (“supported”); Briton Cooper Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 467–69; Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, Cmd. 1061, 1920, p. 94, cited in Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 437. Wheeler to Secretary of State, February 2, 1922, 890 g.6363/72. NA 890g.6363/T84: Wadsworth Memo, September 18, 1924, 167; Dulles to Millspaugh, February 21, 1922,31; Randolph to Secretary of State, March 25, 1926, 214; Allen Dulles Memorandum, November 22, 1924, 208 (“cocked hat”), RG 59. Edith Penrose and E. F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development (London: Ernest Benn, 1978), pp. 56–74; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 295–97; “Memoirs of Gulbenkian,” p. 25 (“eyewash”); J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. 2, A Documentary Record, 1914–1956 (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 131–42.

16. “Memoirs of Gulbenkian,” pp. 15 (“oil friendships”), 16 (“we worked”), 28 (“hook or…crook”); Hewins, Mr. Five Percent, p. 161 (“persnickety” and “overbearing”); Gulbenkian, Portrait in Oil, pp. 130–39 (“children”), 38–39 (“medical advice”), 94; Henriques, Waley Cohen, pp. 285–86; Financial Times, July 25, 1955; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 298–301; Kuisel, Mercier, p. 34; Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 216 (“most difficult”). NA 890g.6363/T84: Allen Dulles Memorandum, January 19, 1926, 236; Houghton to Secretary of State, January 27, 1926, 238; Allen Dulles to Secretary of State, November 11, 1924, 176; Wadsworth Memo, September 18, 1924, pp. 8, 167; Swain to Dulles, December 8, 1925, 245 (“How would you like it”); Piesse to Teagle, January 19, 1926, 284; Oliphant to Atherton, January 12, 1926, 239, RG 59, NA. On the Teagle-Gulbenkian luncheon, Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 215 and Memorandum of Dulles conversation with Teagle, September 18, 1924, 167, pp. 4–5, RG 59, NA.

17. “Memorandum for Submission to the Foreign Office Setting Out Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian’s Position,” June 1947, pp. 3–4, POWE 33/1965, PRO; Daniel 3:4–6 (“fiery furnace”); FRUS, 1927, vol. 2, pp. 816–27. NA 890g.6363/T84: Allen Dulles Memo, December 2, 1925, 244; Wellman to Dulles, October 8, 1925, 224; Wellman to Secretary of State, April 1, April 11, April 28, 1927, 271, 272, 273; Wadsworth Memo, October 3, 1927, 279; Randolph to Secretary of State, October 19, 1927, 281.

18. William Stivers, “A Note on the Red Line Agreement,” Diplomatic History, 7 (Winter 1983), pp. 24–25; Hewins, Mr. Five Percent, p. 141 (“old Ottoman Empire”); Jones, State and British Oil, p. 238. NA 890g.6363/T84: Agreement D’Arcy Exploration Company Limited and Others and Turkish Petroleum Company, July 31, 1928, 360; Wellman to Shaw, December 7, 1927, 292, January 31, 1928, 297; Shaw to Wellman, December 27, 1927, 293. The Quai d’Orsay and Foreign Office Maps are with Wellman to Shaw, March 22, 1928, 307, RG 59, NA. Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 209 (“bad move!”); Gulbenkian, Portrait in Oil, pp. 98–100.

Chapter 11

1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 155–68, 386–87 (“genuine adventure”); New York Times, July 6, 1920, sec. 4, p. 11.

2. Kendall Beaton, Shell, p. 171 (“century of travel”); Williamson et al., Age of Energy, pp. 443–46; Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteen-Twenties (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1931), p. 164 (“Villages”); Jean-Pierre Bardou, Jean-Jacques Chanaron, Patrick Fridenson, James M. Laux, The Automobile Revolution: The Impact of an Industry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

3. Warren C. Platt, “Competition: Invited by the Nature of the Oil Industry,” National Petroleum News, February 5, 1936, p. 208 (“new way”); McLean and Robert Wm. Haigh, The Integrated Oil Companies, pp. 107–8; Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana), pp. 318–20, 283; Thomas F. Hogarty, “The Origin and Evolution of Gasoline Marketing,” Research Paper No. 022, American Petroleum Institute, October 1, 1981; Walter C. Ristow, “A Half Century of Oil-Company Road Maps,” Surveying and Mapping 34 (December 1964), pp. 617 (“uniquely American”); Beaton, Shell, pp. 267–79 (“careful in their attendance” and Barton on gasoline); Bruce Barton, The Man Nobody Knows (Indianapolis: Grosset & Dunlap, 1925), pp. iv, v, 140.

4. Beaton, Shell, pp. 286–87; United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufacturers, High Cost of Gasoline and Other Petroleum Products, 67th Congress, 2d and 4th sessions (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923), p. 28 (“manipulate oil prices”); John H. Maurer, “Fuel and the Battle Fleet: Coal, Oil, and American Naval Strategy, 1898–1925,” Naval War College Review 34 (November-December 1981), p. 70 (“failure of supply”). So concerned about supply (and price) was Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels that he argued that the United States government should follow Winston Churchill’s lead with Anglo-Persian and go directly into the oil business. John De Novo, “Petroleum and the United States Navy Before World War I,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 61 (March 1955), pp. 651–52. Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp. 16–17 (“supply laid up”), 3–4 (“looked like a President” and “harmony”). On Albert Fall, Bruce Bliven, “Oil Driven Politics,” The New Republic, February 13, 1924, pp. 302–3 (“Zane Grey hero”); David H. Stratton, “Behind Teapot Dome: Some Personal Insights,” Business History Review 23 (Winter 1957), p. 386 (“unrestrained disposition”); Noggle, Teapot Dome, p. 13 (“not altogether easy”); John Gunther, Taken at the Flood: The Story of Albert D. Lasker (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 136–37 (“it smells”); J. Leonard Bates, The Origins of Teapot Dome: Progressives, Parties, and Petroleum, 1909–1921 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

5. On Harry Sinclair, Sinclair Oil, A Great Name in Oil: Sinclair Through 50 Years (New York: F. W. Dodge/McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 13–20, 45. Noggle, Teapot Dome, pp. 30 (“oleaginous nature”), 35, 51–57 (“my…friends” and “illness”), 71–72 (“teapot”), 79, 85 (“little black bag”), 201 (“can’t convict”); M. R. Werner and John Star, The Teapot Dome Scandal (London: Cassell, 1961), p. 146; Edith Bolling Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1939); pp. 298–99 (“Which way”); Bliven, “Oil Driven Politics,” pp. 302–3 (“shoulder deep”); Norman Nordhauser, The Quest for Stability: Domestic Oil Regulation, 1917–1935 (New York: Garland, 1979), p. 20 (oil lamp); William Allen White, A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin Coolidge (New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 272–77; J. Leonard Bates, “The Teapot Dome Scandal and the Election of 1924,” American Historical Review 55 (January 1955), pp. 305–21.

6. Giddens, Standard of Indiana, pp. 366–434 (the battle); M. A. & R., “Continental Trading Co. Ltd.,” March 10, 1928, J.D.R., Jr., Business Interests, Rockefeller Archives; Brady, Ida Tarbell, pp. 210, 232 (Tarbell and Rockefeller, Jr.). On John D. Rockefeller, Jr., see Collier and Horowitz, Rockefellers, pp. 79–83, 104–6.

7. Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 485 (Teagle), 429–30; Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders, pp. 449–57, 502–20, 460; Institution of Petroleum Technologists, Petroleum: Twenty Five Years Retrospect, 1910–1935 (London: Institution of Petroleum Technologists, 1935), pp. 33–73; Henrietta M. Larson and Kenneth Wiggins Porter, History of Humble Oil and Refining Company: A Study in Industrial Growth (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 139–42, 276; Frank J. Taylor and Earl M. Welty, Black Bonanza: How an Oil Hunt Grew into the Union Oil Company of California (New York: Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 201; E. L. DeGolyer, “How Men Find Oil,” Fortune, August 1949, p. 97; Walker A. Tompkins, Little Giant of Signal Hill: An Adventure in American Enterprise (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 2; United States Federal Trade Commission, Foreign Ownership in the Petroleum Industry (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923), p. x (“rapidly depleted”).

8. Literary Digest, June 2, 1923, pp. 56–58 (“nearest approach”). Doherty to Smith, February 2, 1929 (“worse than Satan”); Doherty to Veasey, August 13, 1927 (“extremely crude”), Doherty papers. Doherty to Roosevelt, August 14, 1937, Oil, Official File 56, Roosevelt papers; Erich W. Zimmermann, Conservation in the Production of Petroleum: A Study in Industrial Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 97 (“do likewise”), 122–24; Nordhauser, Quest for Stability, pp. 9–18; Williamson et al., Age of Energy, pp. 317–19; Nash, United States Oil Policy, pp. 82–91; Leonard M. Fanning, The Story of the American Petroleum Institute (New York: World Petroleum Policies, [1960]), pp. 68,104–9 (“crazy man”); Linda Lear, “Harold L. Ickes and the Oil Crisis of the First Hundred Days,” Mid-America 63 (January 1981), p. 12 (“barbarian”); Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, et. al. v. Unit Operations of Oil or Gas Pools (New York: American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, 1948), pp. 179–186 (“If the public”).

9. Williamson et al., Age of Energy, p. 311 (“supremacy”); Zimmermann, Conservation, pp. 126–28 (“commodity”); Larson and Porter, Humble, pp. 257–63 (“production methods”); Henrietta Larson, Evelyn H. Knowlton, and Charles H. Popple, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), vol. 3, New Horizons, 1927–50 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 63–64, 88; Giebelhaus, Sun, p. 118 (“My father”).

10. Rister, Oil!, pp. 244–46, 255, 293–97; Hartzell Spence, Portrait in Oil: How the Ohio Oil Company Grew to Become Marathon (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 118–29; Phillips Petroleum Company, Phillips: The First 66 Years (Bartlesville: Phillips Petroleum, 1983), p. 67; United States Federal Trade Commission, Prices, Profits, and Competition in the Petroleum Industry, United States Senate Document No. 61, 70th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1928), pp. 108–16; McLean and Haigh,Integrated Oil Companies, pp. 90–91; Williamson et al., Age of Energy, pp. 394–97; Beaton, Shell, pp. 259–60.

11. SC7/G-32, Shell papers; Larson and Porter, Humble, pp. 307–9 (“industry is powerless”); Roger M. Olien and Diana D. Olien, Wildcatters: Texas Independent Oilmen (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1984), p. 52 (Tom Slick); Nordhauser, Quest for Stability, pp. 55 (“rather foolish”), 58; Nash, United States Oil Policy, pp. 102–3.

12. Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, Cambridge Energy Research Associates, “The Reintegration Impulse: The Oil Industry of the 1990s,” Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report, 1987; Larson and Porter, Humble, pp. 72–75; Gibb and Knowlton,Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 42, 414; Wall and Gibb, Teagle, pp. 140–41, 249; Giddens, Standard of Indiana, chap. 9, p. 318; McLean and Haigh, Integrated Oil Companies, pp. 95–102; Phillips, First 66 Years, p. 37 (Phillips); Beaton, Shell, pp. 298–330, 353.

13. McLean and Haigh, Integrated Oil Companies, p. 105 (“protection”); Ida M. Tarbell, The New Republic, November 14, 1923, p. 301 (“crumbling”); FTC, Prices, Profits and Competition, pp. 22–23, xvii–xix (“no longer unity”).

14. Beaton, Shell, pp. 206–7 (Deterding); FTC, Prices, Profits and Competition, p. 29; FTC, Foreign Ownership, p. 86 (“parties foreign”); Ralph Arnold to Herbert Hoover, September 22, 1921, Millspaugh to Dearing, September 24, 1921, 811.6363/75 (“viciously inimical”), RG 59, NA; Taylor and Welty, Union Oil, pp. 176–78; Phillips, First 66 Years, p. 31; Giddens, Standard of Indiana, pp. 238–40; Wall and Gibb, Teagle, pp. 261–65 (“sunkist”).

15. Doherty to Veasey, August 6, 1927; Doherty to Smith, January 26, 1929; Doherty to Smith, February 2, 1929, Doherty papers.

Chapter 12

1. Middlemas, Master Builders, pp. 169, 178 (“Dame Fortune” and “autocrat”), 211 (“move sharply”), 217 (“craven adventurer”); Jonathan C. Brown, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Investment: British Development of Mexican Petroleum 1889–1911,”Business History Review 61 (Autumn 1987), p. 389 (“Poor Mexico”); Pearson to Body, April 19, 1901, Box C-43, LCO-2313, Pearson papers (“oil craze”); Pan American Petroleum, Mexican Petroleum, (New York: Pan American Petroleum, 1922) pp. 13–28, 185–214; J. A. Spender, Weetman Pearson: First Viscount Cowdray (London: Cassell, 1930), pp. 149–55 (“entered lightly” and “superficial”).

2. Memorandum, October 7, 1918 (“peace of mind”), Cowdray to Cadman, May 8, 1919 (“carry indefinitely”), Royal Dutch/Shell file, Box C44, Pearson papers; Egan to Frost, memo attached, April 23, 1920, p. 4, 811.6363/352, RG 59, NA; Robert Waley Cohen, “Economics of the Oil Industry,” in Proceedings of the Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 1924, p. 13; Beeby-Thompson, Oil Pioneer, p. 373; Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 186. Some years later, the Pearson deputy who had originally noted the oil seepages in Mexico commented, “Had the Chief not missed the train connection at Laredo, he would have stepped from one railway carriage to another, gone into a drawing-room compartment—and, as usual, opened his bags containing his books, gone on working, with the exception perhaps of a few minutes in looking at the local paper in search of foreign news–and would thus have missed getting into the oil excitement at Laredo and San Antonio. Such was the coincidence which decided our going into Mexican oil.” J. B. Body, “How We Went into Oil,” Nov. 21, 1928, Box C43-LCO-2312, Pearson papers.

3. Lufkin to Dearing, April 20, 1921, 800.6363/253; Subcommittee on Mineral Raw Materials, Economic Liaison Committee, “The Petroleum Policy of the United States, p. 11, July 11, 1919, 811.6363/45; “The General Petroleum Situation,” February 19, 1921, pp. 32–33, 800.6363/325, RG 59, NA. Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 364–65; George Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America: Nationalist Movements and State Companies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 16–18; N. Stephen Kane, “Corporate Power and Foreign Policy: Efforts of American Oil Companies to Influence United States Relations with Mexico, 1921–28,” Diplomatic History 1 (Spring 1977), pp. 170–98; Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942, trans. Muriel Vasconcellos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), pp. 24–99; O’Brien, “Oil Crisis and the Foreign Policy of the Wilson Administration,” chaps. 4–6.

4. FTC, Foreign Ownership, pp. 11–13 (“fight for new production”); “General Petroleum Situation,” February 19, 1921, p. 44, 800.6363/325, RG 59, NA; Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919–1976 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 4–5, 20 (“scoundrel”), 38 (“Monarch”); Thomas Rourke, Gomez: Tyrant of the Andes (Garden City, N.Y.: Halcyon House, 1936), chap. 11.

5. Philip, Oil and Politics in Latin America, pp. 13–15; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 384–90 (“malaria” and “spent millions”); B. S. McBeth, Juan Vicente Gomez and the Oil Companies in Venezuela, 1908–1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 17–19, 67, 91–108; Gerretson, Royal Dutch, vol. 4, p. 280; Owen, Trek of the Oil Pioneers, pp. 1059–60 (“mirage”); Edwin Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. 36–41; Ralph Arnold, George A. Macready and Thomas W. Barrington, The First Big Oil Hunt: Venezuela, 1911–1916 (New York: Vantage Press, 1960), pp. 19, 343, 54, 164, 285.

6. McBeth, Gomez and the Oil Companies, pp. 114, 163–68; Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 115–16 (“not live forever”), 507, n. 51; Giddens, Standard Oil of Indiana, pp. 489–93; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, p. 384 (“nonproducing”); Jonathan C. Brown, “Jersey Standard and the Politics of Latin American Oil Production, 1911–1930,” in John D. Wirth, ed., Latin American Oil Companies and the Politics of Energy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1985), pp. 38–39.

7. Wall and Gibb, Teagle, p. 222 (“bargain basement”); Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 209–11 (“be cleared”); Minutes of Meeting Held at Britannic House, November 26, 1919, Russian file 2, Box C-8, Pearson papers (“establishment”); Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers, pp. 211–17.

8. Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 332–35 (“no other alternative”); Richard H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1920, vol. 3, The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 93–99 (“every inch” and “Curzon!”), 117 (“swine”); E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923, vol. 3 (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 352 (“cannot by our own strength” and “quarter”), 349 (“best spies”). NA 861.6363: Teagle to Hughes, August 19, 1920, 18; “Double Victory,” 49 (“liquid gold”); Bedford to Hughes, May 11, 1922, 59; Bedford memo, 22; Bedford memo, December 1920, 31, RG 59. Times (London), December 22, 1920; Jones, State and British Oil, pp. 211–12 (“several good seats”). For the nationalization, William A. Otis, The Petroleum Industry in Russia: Supplement to Commerce Reports (Washington: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Mineral Division, 1924) and “Baku Consolidated Oilfields Position of British Property in Russia,” Times (London), December 23, 1920.

9. FRUS, 1922, vol. 2, p. 773; FRUS, 1923, vol. 2, pp. 802–04; Tolf, Russian Rockefellers, pp. 221–24; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 340–47 (“sick child,” “participation” and “look back”); Wall and Gibb, Teagle, pp. 222–25 (“old fashioned”), 350–53 (“encourage the thief,” “new hopes” and “so glad”). NA 861.6363: Teagle to Bedford, telegram, July 19, 1922, 84; Sussdorf to Hughes, July 27, 1922, 88, September 19, 1922, 104; unsigned memorandum with Poole memo, October 6, 1922, 112; DeVault memo, October 8, 1923, 169; Deterding telegram, February 1926, 262 (Deterding to J.D.R., Jr.), RG 59.

10. Deterding to Riedemann, October 20, 1927 (“neither honor nor” and “enormous events”), 5–5–35 file, case 6, Oil Companies papers; Financial Times, January 16, 1928; Gibb and Knowlton, Standard Oil, vol. 2, pp. 352–56 (“thinking people” and “buried Russia”). NA 861.6363: Kelley memo, February 8, 1927, 222; Memo of conversation with Sir John Broderick, Feb. 4, 1928, 239 (“hot water” and “lost his head”); Tobin to Secretary of State, June 18, 1928—Standard Oil Company/4 (“suddenly attacked”); Whaley to Kellogg, March 14, 1928, 240, RG 59. Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 118 (“more unrighteous”); Joan Hoff Wilson, Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918–1933 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), app. D.

Chapter 13

1. Olien and Olien, Texas Independent, pp. 15–16 (oil promotion pitches), 56–57 (“trendologist”); James A. Clark and Michael T. Halbouty, The Last Boom (Texas: Shearer Publishing, 1984), pp. 4–9 (“treasure trove” and “Medicine Show”), 43 (“Every woman”), 31–32 (“I’ll drink”), 67 (“not an oil well”), 80 (“fires!”); Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders, p. 857; Oral History interview with E. C. Laster, Texas History Center.

2. Henderson Daily News, October 4, 1930; Olien and Olien, Texas Independent, pp. 57–58 (“teakettles”); Clark and Halbouty, Last Boom, pp. 67–72 (“second Moses”); Larson and Porter, Humble, pp. 451–54; Nordhauser, Quest for Stability p. 72; Harry Hurt III, Texas Rich: The Hunt Dynasty from the Early Days Through the Silver Crash (New York: Norton, 1981), chaps. 3, 5; C.M. Joiner, et al. v. Hunt Production Company, et al., No. 9650, “Plaintiff’s Original Petition,” November 25, 1932; “Deposition of H. L. Hunt,” January 16, 1933, pp. 44 (“flying start”), 83 (“had traded”); “Additional statement of C. M. Joiner,” January 16, 1933, District Court of Rusk Country, Texas. Dad Joiner’s discovery was, thereafter, an exceedingly sore point with professional geologists. “The discovery of the East Texas field,” wrote Wallace Pratt, Jersey’s chief geologist in 1941, “is popularly credited to chance. The fact that the well was drilled by an itinerant wildcatter, on a location recommended by a pseudo-geologist, would seem to justify the verdict of a chance discovery, without the benefit of geology. But reflect on the further fact that for fifteen years geologically directed exploration had been carried on in the immediate locality…persistent geologic exploration had narrowed down the possible territory still to be drilled to a width of not more than about ten miles.” Humble, Shell, Atlantic, and other companies had already drilled scores of wells, and Humble had more than 30,000 acres under lease in what turned out to be the East Texas field. “The work had progressed until only a very narrow gap remained untested. Dad Joiner’s discovery well just had to be located in this gap to avoid the existing dry holes. Does geology deserve any credit for this accomplishment?” Pratt to DeGolyer, July 10, 1941, 1513, DeGolyer papers.

3. David F. Prindle, Petroleum Politics and the Texas Railroad Commission (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 24 (“suicide”); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Unitization of Oil and Gas Fields in Texas: A Study of Legislative, Administrative, and Judicial Politics (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1986), pp. 48–50 (“deadly threat”); Lear, “Harold Ickes,” pp. 6–7; Nordhauser, Quest for Stability, pp. 66–67 (“physical waste”), 85; Frederick Godber, “Notes of Visit to America,” May–June 1931, SC 7/G 30/12, Shell papers; Rister, Oil!, p. 264 (“one dollar”); Nash, United States Oil Policy, pp. 124, 116; Williamson et al., The Age of Energy, p. 561.

4. Clark and Halbouty, Last Boom, pp. 168–73 (“insurrection,” “rebellion,” “worms” and “hot enough”); Olien and Olien, Texas Independent, p. 55 (“economic waste”); Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders, p. 471 (“water drive”); Larson and Porter, Humble, pp. 475–76 (“tooth and claw”).

5. Graham White and John Maze, Harold Ickes of the New Deal: His Private Life and Public Career (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 98 (“plump”), 174 (“Resignation”), 48 (“restless”), 31 (“pick losers”), 116 (“slaved away”), 104–7 (“oil-besmeared”); T. H. Watkins, Righteous Pilgrim: The Life and Times of Harold L. Ickes, 1874–1952 (New York: Henry Holt, 1990), part 6; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, vol. 1, The First Thousand Days, 1933–36 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 82 (“ghost of Albert B. Fall”).

6. Ickes to Roosevelt, May 1, 1933 (“demoralization” and “ten cents”), Doherty to Roosevelt, May 12, 1933 (“collapse”); Moffett to Roosevelt, May 31, 1933, Oil, Official File 56, Roosevelt papers. Lear, “Harold Ickes,” p. 10 (“unprecedented authority”); Ickes,Secret Diary, vol. 1, pp. 31–32 (“beyond the control” and “crawling”); Ickes to Hiram Johnson, May 31, 1933, Box 217, Ickes papers; Harold L. Ickes, “After the Oil Deluge, What Price Gasoline?” Saturday Evening Post, February 16, 1935, pp. 5–6 (“age of oil”).

7. Ickes, “After the Oil Deluge,” p. 39 (“cunning”). Roosevelt to Rayburn, May 22, 1934 (“wretched conditions”); Grilling to Pearson, telegram, with Ickes to McIntyre, June 9, 1934 (“hot oil boys”); Personal Assistant to McIntyre, October 19, 1934 (“heaven and earth”); Cummings to Roosevelt, December 30, 1934 (“good progress”), Oil, Official File 56, Roosevelt papers. Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 1, pp. 65 (“broad powers”), 86 (“prepared the allocation”); Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, pp. 51–53; Nordhauser, Quest for Stability, p. 124 (“now to doomsday”); James A. Veasey, “Legislative Control of the Business of Producing Oil and Gas,” in Report of the 15th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1927), pp. 577–630.

8. Thompson to Roosevelt, n.d., 1937 (“this treaty”); Ickes to Roosevelt, May 4, 1935, Oil, Official File 56, Roosevelt papers. Joe S. Bain, The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, pt. I, Market Structure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 60–66; Zimmermann, Conservation, p. 207; Wilkins, Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, pp. 210–11; Fanning, American Petroleum Institute, pp. 133–36; Lieuwen, Petroleum in Venezuela, pp. 56–60; United States Department of Commerce,Minerals Yearbook, 1932–1933 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1933), p. 497 (tariff).

9. Thompson to Roosevelt, n.d., 1937, Oil, Official File 56, Roosevelt papers (“cooperation and coordination”); McLean and Haigh, Integrated Oil Companies, p. 113; Robert E. Hardwicke, “Market Demand as a Factor in the Conservation of Oil,” in First Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law (New York: Matthew Bender, 1949), pp. 176–79; Nordhauser, Quest for Stability, p. 127; Williamson et al., Age of Energy, pp. 559–60.

Chapter 14

1. “Particulars Regarding Achnacarry Castle, Season 1928,” SC7/A24, Shell archives (Malcolm and Hillcart); Daily Express, August 13, 1928 (“no warning”); Wall and Gibb, Teagle, pp. 259–61 (“hellions”).

2. Loxley and Collier minutes, April 4, 1930, N2149/FO 371/14816, PRO; Deterding to Riedemann, Oct. 20, 1927, 5–5–35 file, case 6, Oil Companies papers; Jones, State and British Oil, p. 236; Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, p. 306; Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, 2d. ed. (London: Methuen, 1976), chaps. 2, 4, 7; Wilkins, Multinational Enterprise.

3. Rowland, Cadman, p. 55 (Cadman’s academic opponent). Cadman discussion with Fisher, Barstow et al., February 1928, T161/284/533045/2; Hopkins to Chancellor of Exchequer, February 10, 1928, T161/284/533048/1 (“alliance”); Committee on Imperial Defense, Proposed Agreement, February 16, 1928, T8/T10, T161/284/33045/2; Treasury and Admiralty, “Anglo-Persian Oil Company: Scheme of Distribution in the Middle East,” T161/284/533048/1 (“irritability,” “long run” and “similar alliances”); Churchill to Hopkins, February 12, 1928, T161/284/533048 (“singularly inopportune”); Oliphant minute, Feb. 15, 1928, A1270/6, FO 371/12835; Barstow and Packe to the Treasury, March 15, 1928, T161/284/33045/2; Wilson to Waterfield, February 13, 1928, T161/284/533048/1 (“amalgamation”), PRO. Ferrier, British Petroleum, pp. 514, 510.

4. Weill to the Baron, March 5, 1929, 132 AQ 1052, Rothschild papers; United States Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, part 8 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), pp. 30–33 (“AsIs”), 35–39 (“problem,” “destructive” and “Association”)—hereafter Multinational Hearings; Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, pp. 308–9; U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, The International Petroleum Cartel: Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C.: 1952)—hereafter FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, pp. 199–229; Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 513; Jones, State and British Oil, p. 236; Tolf,Russian Rockefellers, p. 224.

5. Campbell to Cushendun, October 29, 1928, A7452/1270/45, FO 371/12835; Jackson to Broderick, September 26, November 17, 1930, A6632, FO 371/14296, PRO. FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, p. 270 (“fringe”); Kessler to Teagle, September 13, 1928, “misc.” file, case 9, Oil Companies papers (“figures”).

6. Roy Leigh, “Interview with Deterding,” February 18, 1930, SC7/G32, Shell archives; Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 39–51 (“local arrangements” and “local cartels”). Sadler to Harden et al., March 2, 1931, 6–9–18 file, case 1 (“abrogated”); Sadler memo to Teagle, June 15, 1931, “misc.” file, case 9 (“great sacrifice” and “price war”), Oil Companies papers. Weill to the Baron, March 14, 1930, 132 AQ 1052; March 23, 1932, 132A AQ 1052, p. 572 (“bad everywhere”), Rothschild papers. Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, p. 311; John Cadman, “Petroleum and Policy,” in American Petroleum Institute, 13th Annual Meeting: Proceedings, 1932; FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, pp. 235–50.

7. Shuckburgh minute, January 15, 1934, F.W.S., December 12, 1933, Petroleum Dept. Memorandum, January 12, 1934, p. 4, W 488, FO 371/18488, PRO; Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 51–70 (on economies); FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, pp. 255, 264 (“standardized”), 266. Teagle to Kessler, August 14, 1931, “various nos.” file, case 2; Harden memo, January 19, 1935, 12–1–3 file, case 6; Sadler memo, June 15, 1931, case 9 (“ambition”); Riedemann to Teagle, June 26, 1935, and extract from June 6, 1935, Executive Committee meeting, 4–2–9 file, case 4; to Harper, September 29, 1933, Brown Envelope, case 9; “Gulf, SONJ, others” file, case 1, Oil Companies papers. Deter-ding to Riedemann, November 4, 1936, SC7/A14/1 (“much needed munitions”); Emmert to Parker, December 21, 1934, SC7/A12 (“unanimously opposed” and “private walls”); Godber to Agnew, December 31, 1934, SC7/A12, Shell archives. Peter F. Cowhey, The Problems of Plenty: Energy Policy and International Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 90–93.

8. Wilkins, Multinational Enterprise, pp. 234–38 (“defensive manner,” “failure to cooperate” and “90 percent political”); Shuckburgh minute, January 15, 1934, F.W.S., December 12, 1933, Petroleum Dept. Memorandum, January 12, 1934, p. 4 (“general tendency”), W 488, FO 371/18488 PRO; Harden memo, January 19, 1935, file 12–1–3, case 6 (“nationalistic policies”), Oil Companies papers.

9. Peter J. Beck, “The Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute of 1932–33,” Journal of Contemporary History 9 (October 1974), pp. 127–43; Rowland, Cadman, pp. 123–33; Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 610 (“suspicion”); Stephen H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 3d. ed., pp. 59–60 (“Persianization”).

10. Jonathan C. Brown, “Why Foreign Oil Companies Shifted Their Production from Mexico to Venezuela During the 1920s,” American Historical Review 90 (April 1985), pp. 362–85; Roosevelt to Daniels, February 15, 1939, Official File 146, Roosevelt papers; Meyer, Oil Controversy, pp. 102, 127–54; Philip, Oil and Politics, p. 211.

11. O’Malley, “Leading Personalities in Mexico,” March 15, 1938, A 1974/26, FO 371, PRO (“obsidian eyes,” “chief” and “bugbear”); William Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 403–22; Meyer, Oil Controversy, pp. 152–56 (“conquered territory”); Anita Brenner, The Wind That Swept Mexico: The History of the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), p. 91. Body to DeGolyer, March 21, 1935, 128 (“quite Red”); DeGolyer to McCollum, August 23, 1945, 1110 (DeGolyer and Holman), DeGolyer papers. J. B. Body, “Aguila,” August 2, 1935, pp. 4, 6, box C44, Pearson papers; Philip, Oil and Politics, pp. 206–9 (“incapable” and “half a Bolshevik”); Clayton R. Koppes, “The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation,” Journal of American History 69 (June 1982). Assheton letter, February 21, 1934, A 1947, FO 371; Murray to Foreign Office, September 17, 1935, A8586, FO 371/18708 (manager’s fulminations), PRO. Deterding to Riedemann, November 4, 1936, SC7/A14/1, Shell archives. On other Latin America confrontations, see Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy, 1919–1948 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985), pp. 69–77, 91–96 and Herbert S. Klein, “American Oil Companies in Latin America: The Bolivian Experience,” Inter-American Economic Affairs 18 (Autumn 1964), pp. 47–72.

12. Philip, Oil and Politics, p. 218 (“Men without respect”). Gallop to Eden, June 17, 1937, 149/16/31/37, FO 371/20639 (“notorious but sincere”); Memo, “Regarding the Circumstances Attending Expropriation,” A 2306/10/26, FO 371/21464; O’Malley to Foreign Office, December 27, 1937, A9313, FO 371/20637; Murray to Foreign Office, February 6, 1937, A1623, FO 371/20639 (“advisers and officials” and “completely unanimous”); O’Malley to Foreign Office, March 8, 1938, A1835, FO 371/21463, PRO. Godber to Starling, May 25, 1938, SC 7/G3/1, Shell archives; Meyer, Oil Controversy, pp. 158–70; FRUS, 1938, pp. 724–27; on Cardenas’s program, see Antología de la Planeación en México (1917–1985), vol. 1, Primeros Intentos de Planeación en Mexico (1917–1946) (Mexico City: Ministry of Budget and Planning, 1985), p. 207.

13. Shell archives, SC7/G3: Davidson to Godber, 3; Godber to Starling, October 27, 1938, 4; Legh-Jones to Coleman, August 25, 1938, 3 (“precedent”); Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hackworth, August 24, 1938, 3; Telephone conversation with New York, June 27, 1938, 1; Wilkinson to Godber with memo, August 30, 1938, 3. Roosevelt to Daniels, February 15, 1939, OF 146, Roosevelt papers (“fair compensation”). Hohler to Halifax, Aug. 28, 1938, A 7045/10/ 26, FO 371/21476; Davidson to Godber, March 5, 1940, FO 371/24215; Petroleum Department, “The Expropriation by the Mexican Government of the Properties of the Oil Companies in Mexico,” April 8, 1938, FO 371/21469 (“doubtful sources” and “Mexican policy”); Committee of Imperial Defense, “Expropriation of the Properties of the Oil Companies in Mexico,” May 1938, 1428–B, A3663, FO 371/29468; “Mexican Oil Dispute,” October 11, 1940, A4486/57/26, FO 371/24216; Note by the Oil Board, May 9, 1938, A 3663/10/26/21469; Memorandum, “The Mexican Oil Question,” December 1, 1938, pp. 2, 18, A 8808/10/26, FO 371/21477 (“paramount consideration”), PRO.

14. Meyer, Oil Controversy, pp. 219–24 (“Julius Caesar”). Halifax to Cadogan, June 11, 1941, A4467, FO 371/26063; Cadogan to Halifax, June 12, 1941, FO 371/26063 (“put ideas”), PRO. Philip, Oil and Politics, p. 34; Arthur W. MacMahon and W. R. Dittman, “The Mexican Oil Industry Since Expropriation II,” Political Science Quarterly 57 (June 1942), pp. 169–78.

Chapter 15

1. Archibald H. T. Chisholm, The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: A Record of the Negotiations (London: Frank Cass, 1975), pp. 5–6, 93–95, 161; Thomas E. Ward, Negotiations for Oil Concessions in Bahrein, El Hasa (Saudi Arabia), the Neutral Zone, Qatar, and Kuwait (New York: privately printed, 1965), pp. 11, 255; H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabian Oil Ventures (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1964), p. 98 (“bluff, breezy”).

2. Fox to Secretary of State, June 24, 1933, 890F.6363/Standard Oil Co./17, RG 59, NA (“mischief”). Meeting Relating to Oil in the Persian Gulf, April 26, 1933, paragraph 16, POWE 33/241/114869 (“rover”); Interview Regarding Koweit Oil Concession, January 4, 1934, P.Z. 145/1934; p. 4, POWE 33/242/114864 (not… “particularly satisfactory”), PRO. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, pp. 42, 98–99; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, p. 161 (“Father of oil”); Ward, Negotiations, pp. 23–26.

3. Randolph to Secretary of State, May 19, 1924, 741.90G/30; August 15, 1924, 890G.6363/T84/164; November 26, 1924, 890G.6363/T84/189, RG 59, NA. Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 127 (“little room”), 162; Ferrier, British Petroleum, p. 555 (“devoid”).

4. Ballantyne to Gibson, December 16, 1938, P.Z. 8299/38, POWE 33/195/114869, PRO; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 106–9, (“not… anypromise” and “pure gamble”), p. 13; Jerome Beatty, “Is John Bull’s Face Red,” American Magazine, January 1939 (“worst nuisance”).

5. P. T. Cox and R. O. Rhoades, A Report on the Geology and Oil Prospects of Kuwait Territory, June 11, 1935, 638–107–393, Gulf archives; Standard Oil of California, “Report on Bahrein and Saudi Concessions,” December 5, 1940, 3465, DeGolyer papers; Ward, Negotiations, pp. 80–81 (“New York Sheikhs”); Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 13–14 (“greasy substance”); Frederick Lee Moore, Jr., “Origin of American Oil Concessions in Bahrein, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia” (Senior thesis, Princeton University, 1951), pp. 22–34; Irvine H. Anderson, Aramco, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, 1933–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 22–23.

6. Stone and Wellman to Piesse, October 5, 1928, Brown to Piesse, November 12, 1928, 5–5–35 file, Case 6, Oil Companies papers; Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, pp. 26–27 (“clause” and “interests”).

7. Bahrein Oil Concession and U.S. Interests, Rendel Memo, May 30, 1929, E 2521/281/91, FO 371/13730/115395, PRO; Standard Oil of California, “Report on Bahrein and Saudi Concessions,” December 5, 1940, pp. 7–9, 21–22, 3465, DeGolyer papers.

8. Dickson to Political Resident, April 27, 1933, POWE 33/241/114869, PRO (“astute Bin Saud”); H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabian Jubilee (London: Robert Hale, 1952), p. 49; Elizabeth Burgoyne, ed., Gertrude Bell: From Her Personal Papers, 1914–1926(London: Ernest Benn, 1961), p. 50 (“well-bred Arab”).

9. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 5, 75; Karl S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia: With an Account of the Development of Its Natural Resources, 3d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 144–54; Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 2 (Mubarak), p. 136 (“our advantage”); H. St. J. B. Philby, Sa’udi Arabia (London: Ernest Benn, 1955), pp. 261–68 (“thirty thousand”), 280–92; Christine Moss Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 211 (“neutral zones”); David Holden and Richard Johns, The House of Saud (London: Pan Books, 1982), pp. 51, 80.

10. Clive Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925–1939: The Imperial Oasis (London: Frank Cass, 1983), pp. 114–20.

11. Mohammed Almana, Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980), p. 90.

12. Kim Philby to Monroe, Oct. 27, 1960, file 3, box 23, Philby papers; Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 54; Kim Philby, My Secret War (MacGibbon & Kee, 1968), p. 99; Almana, Arabia Unified, pp. 153, (“true replica”), 151; Elizabeth Monroe, Philby of Arabia(London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 158–62 (“how nice”); Philby, Oil Ventures, p. 126 (“traditional western dominance”); H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabian Days: An Autobiography (London: Robert Hale, 1948), pp. 282–83, 253 (“I was surely”); Memo to S. Wilson, Offices of the Cabinet, August 13, 1929, CO 732/41/3 (“Since he retired”), PRO; Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, p. 194 (“humbug”).

13. Diary of Crane visit to Jidda, February 25–March 3, 1931, chap. 9 of Edgar Snow manuscript, Crane papers; Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 175–77 (“Oh, Philby”); “Oil Negotiations,” file 3, box 29, Philby to Crane, Dec. 29, 1929, file 2, box 16, Philby papers (“one of his eyes”).

14. Notes on Sheikh Ahmad’s Trip to Raith, Enclosure 2 in No. 44, April 6, 1932, E 2469/27/25, FO 406/69/115218, PRO; H. S. Villard, Memo of Conversation with Twitchell, November 1, 1932, 890 F.6363/10, RG 59, NA.

15. Lombardi to Philby, January 30, 1933, Philby to Hamilton, March 4, 1933, Aramco/Socal files, Philby papers; Loomis to Secretary of State, October 25, 1932, 890 F.6363/Standard Oil of California/1, RG 59, NA; Almana, Arabia Unified, pp. 191–99 (Suleiman); Ryan to Warner, March 15, 1933, E 1750/487/25, POWE 33/320/114964, PRO (“stage is set”).

16. Hamilton to Philby, February 28, 1932 (“get in touch”); Philby to Lees, Dec. 17, 1932 (“disposed to help”); Philby to Loomis, April 1, 1933, Aramco/Socal files, Philby papers. Twitchell to Murray, March 26, 1933, 890 F.6363/Standard Oil Co./9, RG 59, NA; Philby, Oil Ventures, p. 83 (“It is no good”); Wallace Stegner, Discovery: The Search for Arabian Oil (Beirut: Middle East Export Press, 1974), p. 19.

17. Philby, Oil Ventures, p. 106 (“did not need”); Philby to Hamilton, March 14, 15, 1933, Aramco/Socal files, Philby papers. Ryan to Warner, March 15, 1933, E 1750/487/25, POWE 33/320 (“pig in a poke”); Jedda Report for April 1933, May 9, 1933, E 2839/902/25, FO 4061/71, PRO. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, pp. 58–60, 73–75; Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp. 43–47, 238.

18. Twitchell to Philby, March 26, 1933; Philby to Loomis, April 1, 1933; Hamilton to Suleiman, April 21, 1933, Aramco/Socal files, Philby papers. Telegram from Ryan, May 30, 1933, E 2844/ 487/25, POWE 33/320/114964, PRO; Contract between Saudi Arabian Government and Standard Oil Company of California, May 29, 1933, with Loomis to Hull, May 2, 1938, 890F.6363/Standard Oil Co./97, RG 59, NA; Philby, Oil Ventures, pp. 100 (“unfortunate impasse”), 119 (“pack up”), 99 (“detente”), 124 (“pleasure”); Wilkins, Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, p. 215.

19. Chancery to Department, August 24, 1933, E 5455/487/25, CO 732/60/10/115125, PRO; Philby, Oil Ventures, pp. 125 (“thunderstruck”), 46–48; Monroe, Philby, pp. 208–9 (Kim Philby).

20. Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 19 (“stab to my heart”), 176 (“flank” and “sphere”). Ryan telegram, June 1, 1933, E 3073/487/25, POWE 33/320/114964; Rendel, Tour in the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia, February-March 1937, CO 732/79/17/115218 (“dangerous policy”); Letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, December 13, 1927, P1341, CO 732/33/10; Warner memo, November 2, 1932, E 5764/121/91, FO 371/16002/115578 (“jackal”); Rendel to Warner, February 3, 1933, POWE 33/241/114869 (“frittering away”), PRO.

21. Biscoe to Foreign Office, October 29, 1931, No. 18, FO 371/15277/115659; Bullard to Halifax, Chapter I–Arabia, January 10, 1939, E246/246/25, FO 406/77, PRO. R. I. Lawless, The Gulf in the Early 20th Century: Foreign Institutions and Local Responses(Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1986), pp. 91–92; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 19, 37; Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 61–71; Fatimah H. Y. al-Abdul Razzak, Marine Resources of Kuwait: Their Role in the Development of Non-Oil Resources (London: KPI Limited, 1984), pp. 59–60; Committee for the Study of Culture Pearls, Report on the Study of the Mikimoto Culture Pearl (Tokyo: Imperial Association for the Encouragement of Inventions, 1926).

22. Admiralty, Oil Concession in Kuwait, March 15, 1932, FO 371/16001/115578; Rendel memo, Proposed Koweit Oil Concession, January 30, 1932, FO 371/160001/115578 (“protection”); Political Resident to Secretary of State for India, February 7, 1932, FO 371/16001, 115578 (“losing influence”); Oliphant to Vansittart, January 20, 1932, FO 371/16001/115578; Oliphant to Wakely, January 22, 1932, FO 371/16001/115578 (“oil war”); Oil in Koweit re: Cabinet Conclusions, April 6, 1932, E 1733/121/91, FO 371/16002/115578; Simon to Atherton, April 9, 1932, E 1733/121/91, FO 371/16002/115578; Oliphant to Secretary of State, April 11, 1932, FO 371/16002/115578 (“Americans are welcome”), PRO.

23. Dickson to Political Resident, May 1, 1932, POWE 33/241/114869 (“wonderful victory”); Memo, February 20, 1933, p. 2, POWE 33/241/114869, PRO. David E. Koskoff, The Mellons: The Chronicle of America’s Richest Family (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1978), pp. 271–98 (“precisely the same”); Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, p. 160.

24. P. T. Cox, “A Report on the Oil Prospects of Kuwait Territory,” May 12, 1932, pp. 26–27, 638–107–393, Gulf Archives; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 26 (“two bidders”), 160 (“personal benefit”), 141 (“go easy”), 67, 27–30 (“dead body”). Rendel memo, Dec. 23, 1932, with Oil Concession in Kuwait, E 6801/121/91, FO 371/16003/115659 (“so keen a personal interest”); Oliphant to Cadman, December 30, 1932, E 6830/121/191, POWE 331/241/114869, PRO.

25. Fowle to Colonial Office, re: Kuwait Oil, June 27, 1933, POWE 33/241/114869, PRO; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 27–28, 175–79 (“keep his hands” and Cadman and Sheikh Ahmad); Ward, Negotiations, p. 227.

26. Rendel to Laithwaite, December 14, 1933, E 7701/12/91, POWE 33/241/114869 (“blessing” and “British hands”); Koweit Oil: Political Agreement of March 4, 1934, E 2014/19/91, FO 905/17/115218; Oil Concessions in Kuwait, March 8, 1935, pp. 8–11, POWE 33/246/114964, PRO. 1934 Concession Agreement, December 23, 1934, 78–135–043, Gulf archives; Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, p. 45 (“heavenly twins”); Ward, Negotiations, p. 229 (“pure in heart”).

27. Nomland to Knabenshue, June 7, 1935, with Knabenshue to Murray, June 20, 1935, 890F.6363/Standard Oil Co./82 (“sure shot”), RG 59, NA. Sun and Flare (Aramco magazine), February 6, 1957; “Persian Gulf Pioneer,” [1956] (“camel days”); “Exploration Comes of Age in Saudi Arabia,” Standard Oil Bulletin, December 1938, pp. 2–10; “A New Oil Field in Saudi Arabia,” Standard Oil Bulletin, September 1936, pp. 3–16, Chevron files. Wilkins, Multinational Enterprise, pp. 215–17 (“total loss”).

28. Seidel to Teagle, November 20, 1935, February 10, 1936, 5–5–36 file, Case 6; Walden memo, 7/26/34, various nos. file, case 2; Halman to Sadler, November 15, 1938, various nos. file, case 2, Oil Companies papers. Rendel Memo, Oil in Arabia, July 7, 1937, P.Z. 612/37, POWE 33/ 533/115294 (“irksome” and “buy them out”); Starling to Clauson, July 3, 1936, P.Z. 674/36, FO 371/19965/115659 (“all to the good”), PRO. William Lenahan to Abdulla Suleiman, February 10, 1934, with Loomis to Hull, May 2, 1938, 890 F.6363/Standard Oil Co./97, RG 59, NA; Anderson, Aramco, pp. 26–28; FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, pp. 73–74, 115; Wilkins, Multinational Enterprise, pp. 214–17.

29. P. T. Cox and R. O. Rhoades, “Report on the Geology and Oil Prospects of Kuwait Territory,” June 1, 1935, 638–107–393; Memo to Bleecker, Summary Review of Burgan No. 1, 537–149–501; L. W. Gardner, Case History of the Burgan Field, 621–74–107, Gulf archives. Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 81, 250.

30. Murray, “The Struggle for Concessions in Saudi Arabia,” August 2, 1939, 890F.6363/Standard Oil Co./118 (“astronomical proportions”), RG 59, NA. Standard Oil of California, “Report on Bahrein and Saudi Concessions,” pp. 75–77, December 5, 1940, pp. 75–77, 3465, DeGolyer papers; Hull to Roosevelt, June 30, 1939, OF 3500, Roosevelt papers; New York Times, August 8, 1939; Wilkins, Multinational Enterprise, p. 217; Uriel Dann, ed., The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988), chap. 19.

31. Standard Oil of California, “Report on Bahrein and Saudi Concessions,” December 5, 1940, p. 80, 3465, DeGolyer papers; Holden and Johns, House of Saud, pp. 121–22; Monroe, Philby, pp. 295–96 (“so bored” and “Greatest”); Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, pp. 93–95 (“my geologist”).

Chapter 16

1. Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 14 (“life line” and “living space”); Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” trans. Marius B. Jansen, in Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932, ed. James William Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 139, 225–30; Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–32(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 59–61, 1–16; G. R. Storry, “The Mukden Incident of September 18–19, 1931,” in St. Antony’s Papers: Far Eastern Affairs 2 (1957), pp. 1–12.

2. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Shall We Trust Japan?” Asia 23 (July 1923), pp. 475–78, 526–28.

3. James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1936–1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 244–45 (“government by assassination”); Mira Wilkins, “The Role of U.S. Business,” in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941, eds. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 341–45; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 15; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, chap. 6; FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, p. 76.

4. FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, pp. 224–25 (“mission” and “special responsibilities”); Crowley, Japan’s Quest, pp. 86–90 (“national defense state”), 284–86 (hokushu), 289–97 (“spirit”); Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 23, 55–70; Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 207–8; Jerome B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), pp. 133–37; Irvine H. Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933–1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 221–31. Anderson is a key source on the oil side. Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 28–29.

5. Laura E. Hein, Fueling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 46–52; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, pp. 81–90 (“frightening” and “resistance”); Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 1, p. 192.

6. Crowley, Japan’s Quest, p. 335 (“unpardonable crime”); Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of War Between the United States and Japan (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 9–10 (“thoroughgoing blow”), 12. Feis remains the classic diplomatic history, to be supplemented by Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). James William Morley, ed., The China Quagmire: Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933–1941(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 233–86; Michael A. Barnhart, “Japan’s Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 4 (June 1981), p. 113; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 147–55 (“quarantine” and “without declaring war”).

7. Utley, Going to War, pp. 36–37 (“moral embargo”); Feis, Pearl Harbor, p. 19 (“not yet”).

8. Joseph Grew Diary, 1939, pp. 4083–84, Joseph Grew Papers (“intercept her fleet”); Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 280–83 (“aerial terror”); Utley, Going to War, p. 54 (“Japan furnishes”).

9. Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, pp. 118–21 (Walden and Elliott).

10. New York Times, January 11, 1940; Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 3, pp. 96, 132, 274; Edwin P. Hoyt, Japan’s War: The Great Pacific Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), p. 215 (“ABCD”); Butow, Tojo, p. 7 (“Razor”); James William Morley, ed., The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 122, 241–86.

11. Henry Stimson Diary, July 18, 19 (“only way out”), 24, 26, 1940, Henry Stimson Papers; Morgenthau Diary, vol. 319, p. 39, October 4, 1940; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 349–59; Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 7, 11; Ickes, Diaries, vol. 3, pp. 273, 297–99 (“needling”); Morley, Fateful Choice, pp. 142–45, chap. 3; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, p. 25. See H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), p. 68: “It was concern about the security of her oil supplies that primarily molded Japanese strategy at the beginning of the war.”

12. Roosevelt to Grew, January 21, 1941, Grew Diary, p. 4793 (“single world conflict”); Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971), p. 137; Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 3, p. 339; Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, p. 39; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, p. 143 (“Europe first”).

13. United States Congress, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), part 17, p. 2463; Feis, Pearl Harbor, pp. 38–39 (“smallest particles”); Kichisaburo Nomura, “Stepping Stones to War,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 77 (September 1951); FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 387 (“friend”); FRUS, 1941, vol. 4, p. 836 (lips and heart); Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 6 (“one pillar”), 119; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol. 2, p. 987; David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 22–27; Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 178.

14. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 10–11 (“schoolboy” and “armchair arguments”); Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1982) pp. 2–13, 32, 70–91, 141, 148–58 (“scientist”), 173–89.

15. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 28–29 (“lesson” and “regrettable”), 15–16 (“fatal blow” and “first day”); Morley, Fateful Choice, p. 274 (“whole world”); Grew to Secretary of State, January 27, 1941, 711.94/1935, PSF 30, Roosevelt papers (Grew’s warning).

16. Feis, Pearl Harbor, p. 204 (“emergency”); Roosevelt to Ickes, June 18, June 30, Ickes to Roosevelt, June 23, July 1, 1941, Ickes files, PSF 75, Roosevelt papers (Ickes-FDR exchange).

17. Morley, Fateful Choice, p. 255, chap. 4; Ike, Japan’s Decision, pp. 56–90 (“life or death”); United States Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Pearl Harbor: Intercepted Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945), pp. 1–2 (“next on our schedule”); Morgenthau Presidential Diaries, vol. 4, 09146–47, July 18, 1941 (“question” and “mean war”); “Exports of Petroleum Products, Scrap Iron and Scrap Steel,” Office of Secretary of the Treasury, Weekly Reports, PSF 918, Treasury, Roosevelt papers; United States Congress, Pearl Harbor Hearings, part 32, p. 560; Feis, Pearl Harbor, pp. 228–29 (“always short”); FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 527–30 (“bitter criticism” and “new move”). For the criticism, see Eliot Janeway, “Japan’s Partner,” Harper’s Magazine, June 1938, pp. 1–8; Henry Douglas, “America Finances Japan’s New Order,” Amerasia, July 1940, pp. 221–24; Douglas, “A Bit of History—Successful Embargo Against Japan in 1918,” Amerasia, August 1940, pp. 258–60. Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 138; Blum, Morgenthau:Years of Uncertainty, p. 378 (“day to day”); Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and America’s Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 134, 153, 178, 246–47; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: New American Library, 1970), pp. 50–52 (“state of affairs”); FRUS, 1941, vol. 4, pp. 886–87.

18. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937–1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 239–40 (“as drastically”); Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 2, pp. 138–39; United States Congress,Intercepted Messages, pp. 8 (“hard looks”), 11; Iriye, Across the Pacific, p. 218; FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, p. 751 (“Japanese move”).

19. Grew Diary, July 1941, p. 5332 (“vicious circle”); Feis, Pearl Harbor, p. 249 (“cunning dragon”); Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 273, n. 32; Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 166–67 (“scarecrows”); United States Congress, Intercepted Messages, p. 9; Blum, Morgenthau: Years of Urgency, p. 380 (“except force”);FRUS, 1941, vol. 4, pp. 342, 359.

20. Butow, Tojo, pp. 236–37 (“whole problem”); Fumimaro Konoye, “Memoirs of Prince Konoye,” in United States Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 20, pp. 3999–4003 (“receipt of intelligence”); Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 1025; Gordon W. Prange, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), p. 186.

21. Ike, Japan’s Decision, pp. 154 (“weak point”), 139 (“day by day”), 133–57, 188, 201–16; Konoye, “Memoirs,” pp. 4003–12 (Emperor); United States Congress, Intercepted Messages, pp. 81–82 (“dead horse”), 141; Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 1069–70 (“no last words”); FRUS, 1941, vol. 4, pp. 590–91; Grew Diary, October 1941, p. 5834; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, p. 135.

22. Grew to Secretary of State, November 3, 1941, 711.94/2406, PSF 30, Roosevelt papers; Stimson Diary, November 25, 1941; United States Congress, Intercepted Messages, pp. 92, 101, 165 (“beyond your ability” and “automatically”); Ike, Japan’s Decision, pp. 238–39 (Tojo’s summation); Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1063–83; FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, pp. 755–56.

23. Stimson Diary, November 26 (“fairly blew up”), 27 (“washed my hands”), 1941; Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p. 406 (“war warning”); Konoye, “Memoir,” pp. 4012–13; United States Congress, Intercepted Messages, p. 128.

24. Kahn, Codebreakers, p. 41; Agawa, Yamamoto, p. 245 (“here nor there”); United States Congress, Intercepted Messages, p. 215; Dallek, Roosevelt, p. 309 (“clouds” and “son of man”); FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 784–87; Feis, Pearl Harbor, pp. 340–42 (“foul play” and “nasty”); Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1095–97 (“Japanese have attacked”); Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 2, p. 177 (“infamous falsehoods” and “dogs”).

25. Stimson Diary, November 28, 30, December 6, 7 (“caught by surprise”); Prange, At Dawn We Slept, p. 527, 558; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942 (New York: Viking, 1966), p. 173 (“fortress”); Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, pp. 3, 386–95; Prange, Verdict of History, p. 624.

26. Hoyt, Japan’s War, pp. 236, 246; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, p. 192; Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 504, 539; Agawa, Yamamoto, pp. 261–65; Prange, Verdict of History, p. 566 (Nimitz).

Chapter 17

1. Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 54 (“financial lords” and “money-mighty”); Nuremberg Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1953), pp. 536–41 (“economy without oil”), 544–54; Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: I. G. Farben in the Nazi Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 64–68. Hayes is the main academic source on I. G. Farben. Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 246–49 (“this man”).

2. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy (Washington, D.C.: USSBS, 1945), p. 90; Raymond G. Stokes, “The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936–45,” Business History Review 59 (Summer 1985), p. 254; Terry Hunt Tooley, “The German Plan for Synthetic Fuel Self Sufficiency, 1933–1942” (Master’s thesis, Texas A & M University, 1978), pp. 25–26 (“turning point”); United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division Final Report(Washington, D.C.: USSBS, 1947), p. 14.

3. Arnold Krammer, “Fueling the Third Reich,” Technology and Culture 19 (June 1978), pp. 397–399; Neal P. Cochran,, “Oil and Gas from Coal,” Scientific American May 1976, pp. 24–29; U.K. Ministry of Fuel and Power, Report on the Petroleum and Synthetic Oil Industry of Germany (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 82; Thomas Parke Hughes, “Technological Momentum in History: Hydrogenation in Germany, 1898–1933,” Past and Present 44 (August 1969), pp. 114–23.

4. Teagle to Bosch, February 27, 1930, various nos. file, Case 2, Oil Companies papers; Borkin, I. G. Farben, pp. 47–51 (Howard’s telegram, “We were babies” and “the I. G.”); Frank A. Howard, Buna: The Birth of an Industry (New York: Van Nostrand, 1947), pp. 15–20 (Howard on hydrogenation); New York Times, May 23, 1945, p. 21; W. J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries: A History, vol. 1, The Forerunners, 1870–1926 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 456–66.

5. Tooley, “Synthetic Fuel,” pp. 14, 28 (“fixed in principle”), 72; Edward L. Homze, Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919–1939 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1976) p. 140; Nuremberg Tribunals,Trials, vol. 7, pp. 571–73; Stokes, “Oil Industry in Nazi Germany,” p. 261; Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 123–30.

6. Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), pp. 296–306 (“mad-dog” and Laval); Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg, Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WW II Meant Victory or Defeat (New York: William Morrow, 1987), pp. 23–24 (“incalculable disaster”). Goralski and Freeburg are an important source for this and the following war chapters. John R. Gillingham, Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr Coal, Hitler, and Europe (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 69, 75 (“wasp’s nest”); New York Times, February 16, 1936, p. 1 (“motor mileage” and “political significance”); Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1964), rev. ed., p. 345 (“nerve-wracking”).

7. Nuremberg Tribunals, Trials, vol. 7, pp. 793–803 (Hitler’s Four Year Plan); Borkin, I. G. Farben, p. 72; Hayes, I. G. Farben, pp. 196–202, 183. USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, pp. 15–27, figures 22, 23; Krammer, “Fueling the Third Reich,” pp. 398–403; USSBS, German War Economy, p. 75; Anne Skogstad, Petroleum Industry of Germany During the War (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1950), p. 34; Homze, Luftwaffe, p. 148; War Cabinet, Committee on Enemy Oil Position, December 1, 1941, Appendix 10, POG (L) (41) 11, CAB 77/18, PRO.

8. Norman Stone, Hitler (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 107–8 (“life’s mission”); Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 25 (“little worms”); Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–1945, trans. R. H. Barry (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), pp. 113–14; Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East, 1941–1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 536–37 (“Hitler’s obsession”); USSBS, German War Economy, p. 17; Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975), p. 84; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 1939–1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 146–48; USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, pp. 36–39 (“need for oil”).

9. Pearton, Oil and the Romanian State, pp. 232–33, 249; USSBS, German War Economy, pp. 74–75; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London: Panther, 1985), pp. 80–87 (“substantial prop”), chap. 3; W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1952), pp. 658, 667; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Putnam, 1970), pp. 143–50 (“those oilfields”); Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973); Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–1941 (London: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 165.

10. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1968), p. 7; USSBS, German War Economy, p. 18; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (London: Michael Joseph, 1952), p. 151; Stone, Hitler, p. 109; Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 1000; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London: Cassell, 1973), p. 126.

11. Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 169; H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, 1939–1945 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), p. 95 (“seize the Crimea”); Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 200 (“aircraft carrier” and “My generals”); Ronald Lewin,Hitler’s Mistakes (New York: William Morrow, 1984), pp. 122–23 (“our Mississippi”); Leach, German Strategy, p. 224 (“end of our resources”). On destroying the oil fields, Lord Hankey’s Committee on Preventing Oil from Reaching Enemy Powers, August 19, September 19, October 30, December 4, 1941, POG (41) 16, CAB 77/12, PRO.

12. Warlimont, Hitler’s Headquarters, pp. 226, 240; F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ranson, and L. C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1981), pp. 80–100. An oil analyst, Walter J. Levy, working in the OSS, conducted a study of German railway tariffs. He discovered a new entry covering shipments from Baku. This gave the clue that the prime German effort would be toward the Caucasus. Walter J. Levy, Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941–1981, ed. Melvin Conant (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), p. 36. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, p. 131; Liddell Hart, Other Side of the Hill, pp. 301–5; USSBS, German War Economy, p. 18; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941–1945 (London: Arthur Barker, 1971), pp. 258, 266; Halder, Halder Diaries, p. 1513. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 238–39.

13. USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, fig. 23; Ziemke, Stalingrad, pp. 19, 355; Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 251 (“icy cold”); Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans. Anthony G. Powell (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 339; Felix Gilbert, ed., Hitler Directs His War (New York: Octagon, 1982), pp. 17–18; USSBS, German War Economy, pp. 19, 24, Alexander Stahlberg, Bounden Duty: The Memoirs of a German Officer, 1932–1945, trans. Patricia Crampton (London: Brassey’s, 1990), pp. 226–27 (Manstein phone call).

14. B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul Findlay (1953; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1985), pp. 198 (“complete mobility”), 58 (“never imagined”), 85 (“lightning tour”), 96 (“quarter master staffs”), 141 (“petrol gauge”), 191; James Lucas, War in the Desert: The Eighth Army at El Alamein (New York: Beaufort Books, 1982), pp. 49–51.

15. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, pp. 514–15 (“conditions” and “colossus”), 235–37 (“Get passports”), 269; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 203–7 (“Destiny”); Carell, Hitler Moves East, p. 519; Halder, Halder Diaries, p. 885; van Creveld, Supplying War, chap. 6.

16. Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (1958; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1982), pp. 72 (“Everything I possessed”), 126 (“nip back”); Nigel Hamilton, Monty, vol. 1, The Making of a General, 1887–1942 (London: Sceptre, 1984), p. 589 (“slightly mad”); Liddell Hart, Other Side of the Hill, p. 247 (“all his battles”); Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, pp. 278–80 (“badly depleted”).

17. Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, pp. 359 (“petrol transport”), 380 (“proper homage”), 394 (“two years”); Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, pp. 454–55 (“catastrophic”); Denis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force, 1939–1945, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 239–41; Hamilton, Monty, vol. 1, pp. 795–98. For Rommel’s constant refrain about fuel, see Rommel Papers, pp. 342–89.

18. Alan Bullock, Hitler, p. 751 (“heart”); Liddell Hart, Rommel Papers, pp. 328 (“bravest men”), 453 (“weep”).

19. Leach, German Strategy, p. 151. Speer’s own memoir, Inside the Third Reich, should be supplemented with Matthias Schmidt, Albert Speer: The End of a Myth (New York: Collier Books, 1982); J. K. Galbraith, Economics, Peace and Laughter (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 288–302; and the report on Galbraith’s original interrogation of Speer as part of the 1945 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, reprinted in the Atlantic Monthly, July 1979, pp. 50–57. USSBS, German War Economy, pp. 23–25, 7, 76; Liddell Hart, Second World War, p. 599 (“weakest point”); Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell: Air University Press, 1983), pp. 272–74; Tooley, “Synthetic Fuel,” p. 110; USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, pp. 19–20.

20. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945 (New York: Bantam, 1978), pp. 199–200; Nuremberg Tribunals, Trials, vol. 8, pp. 335 (“favorably located”), 386, 375, 393 (“unpleasant scenes”), 405 (“brute force”), 436–37, 455, 491–92 (shooting party); Borkin, I. G. Farben, pp. 117–27; Tooley, “Synthetic Fuel,” p. 106; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 282–83; Krammer, “Fueling the Third Reich,” p. 416 (“not run away”); Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz and the Reawakening: Two Memoirs, trans. Stuart Woolf (New York: Summit Books, 1985), pp. 72, 85, 171. For the Wannsee Conference, see J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism 1919–1945: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, vol. 2 (New York: Schocken Books, 1990), pp. 1127–36.

21. Speer, Third Reich, pp. 553, n. 3, 346–48 (“technological war” and “scatter-brained”); Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 172–79, 287 (“nightmare”); David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943–1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 154–57, 184–86; USSBS, German War Economy, p. 80; Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 272–76. In The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–1945: Allied Air Power and the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), Alfred C. Mierzejewski argues that, in terms of attacking the German war economy, the railway marshaling yards were the number-one target. But he acknowledges that the destruction of the synthetic fuel plant would have immobilized the military, ibid., p. 185.

22. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, vol. 3, p. 179; USSBS, German War Economy, pp. 4–5 (“primary strategic aim”); Borkin, I. G. Farben, pp. 129–30; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 247–48 (“fatal blow”); Speer, Third Reich, pp. 350–52 (“committing absurdities”); USSBS, Oil Division Final Report, pp. 19–29, 87; United Kingdom Ministry of Fuel and Power, Synthetic Oil Industry, p. 116; Milward, War, Economy, and Society, p. 316; Krammer, “Fueling the Third Reich,” p. 418; Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 35–36.

23. Bullock, Hitler, pp. 759–61; Liddell Hart, Other Side of the Hill, pp. 450–51 (“stand still”), 463; Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1965), pp. 259–69; John S. D. Eisenhower, The Bitter Woods (New York: Putnam, 1969), pp. 235–42.

24. USSBS, German War Economy, p. 80; Speer, Third Reich, pp. 472 (“nonexistent divisions”), 406; Liddell Hart, Second World War, p. 679; Bullock, Hitler, pp. 772–73, 781; Warlimont, Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 497 (“last crazy orders”); Stone, Hitler, p. 179.

Synthetic fuels, in the German war economy, reached as high as 60 percent of total supply. The fall-off in output toward the end of the war reflects the Allied bombing campaign. Most of the synthetic fuels were produced by hydrogenation and Fischer-Tropsch, but also included alcohol, benzol, and the product of coal tar distillation.

German Oil Supply, 1938–1945
(barrels per day)

Year

Synthetic

Other

Total

Synthetic Share

1939

47,574

121,973

169,547

28.1%

1941

89,007

119,614

208,621

42.7%

1943

124,299

112,865

237,164

52.4%

1944

       

Q1

131,666

100,782

232,448

56.6%

Q2

107,120

66,862

173,981

61.6%

Q3

48,473

40,245

88,719

54.6%

Q4

43,240

36,455

79,695

54.3%

1945

       

Q1

5,437

17,726

23,163

23.5%

Source: USSBS, German War Economy, tables 37, 38 and 41, pp. 75–76, 79.

Chapter 18

1. Johan Fabricus, East Indies Episode (London: Shell Petroleum Company, 1949), pp. 1, 41–67, 57 (“no longer possible”).

2. S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan, vol. 1, The Loss of Singapore (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 449; Butow, Tojo, p. 416; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, pp. 52–53 (“victory fever”). Cohen provides a most useful analysis of the Japanese economy. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (Toyoda), OPNAU-P-03-100, p. 320 (“victory drunk”); Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Vintage, 1985), pp. 418 (FDR), 146 (Nimitz). Spector is an excellent source on the Pacific War. E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 48 (“primary objectives”).

3. Agawa, Yamamoto, p. 299 (“adults’ hour”).

4. Jiro Horikoshi, Eagles of Mitsubishi: The Story of the Zero Fighter (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), p. 130; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), pp. 18, 135; Pipeline to Progress: The Story of PT Caltex Pacific Indonesia (Jakarta: 1983), pp. 27–34; Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931–1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 176.

5. USSBS, Japan’s War Economy, p. 46 (“fatal weakness”); Japan, Allied Occupation, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, vol. 2, part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1966), pp. 48 (“Achilles heel”), 45 (originally printed but not published by General MacArthur’s headquarters in 1950); Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 191–93; Kirby, War Against Japan, vol. 3, The Decisive Battles (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 98; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil and Chemical Division, Oil in Japan’s War (Washington, D.C.: USSBS, 1946), p. 55 (“only American planes”).

6. Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1982), pp. 223–24 (“noon positions”), 227–28; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, pp. 104, 58 (“death blow”), 137–46 (Japanese captain and “synthetic fuel”); Clay Blair, Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975), pp. 361–362, 435–39, 553–54.

7. USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Toyoda), p. 316 (“much fuel”); Cohen, Japan’s Economy, pp. 142–45 (“very keenly” and “too much fuel”); Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 370 (“Turkey Shoot”); Kirby, War Against Japan, vol. 4, The Reconquest of Burma (London: HMSO, 1965), p. 87; Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations, vol. 2, part 1, p. 305; United States Army, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, “Interrogation of Soemu Toyoda,” September 1, 1949, DOC 61346, pp. 2–3; USSBS, Japan’s War Economy, p. 46.

8. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, pp. 294 (MacArthur), 440 (“divine wind”); USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Toyoda), p. 317; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, pp. 144–45 (“shortage”); Rikihei Inoguchi, Tadashi Nakajima, and Roger Pineau, The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force in World War II (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 74–75; Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations, vol. 2, part 2, p. 398. Toshikaze Kase, Journey to the Missouri, ed. David N. Rowe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 247–48. Liddell Hart in his History of the Second World War offers other reasons for Kurita’s swerve, pp. 626–27.

9. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 7, pp. 107–9; vol. 8, pp. 343–45; James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, 1966), p. 546 (“long legs”); Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 316, 310 (“potatoes”); USSBS, Japan’s War Economy, p. 32; Thomas R. H. Havens, Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War II (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 122, 130.

10. USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Toyoda), p. 316 (“large-scale operation”); Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 538 (“the end”).

11. Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 617–19, 673–74; Cohen, Japan’s Economy, pp. 146–47; USSBS, Oil in Japan’s War, p. 88 (“end of the road”).

12. Robert J. C. Butow, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 30, 64, 77, 90–92, 121–22; United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan’s Struggle to End the War (Washington: GPO, 1946), pp. 16–18; Kase, Journey to the Missouri, pp. 171–76 (“utter hopelessness” and “ready to die”).

13. Lewin, American Magic, p. 288; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Touchstone, 1988), pp. 617–99; and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Penguin, 1990), pp. 120–22.

14. United States Army, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, “Statements by Koichi Kido,” May 17, 1949, DOC 61476, pp. 13–15, DOC 61541, pp. 7–8; Butow, Japan’s Decision, pp. 161, 205–19; Kase, Journey to the Missouri, p. 247; Cohen,Japan’s Economy, pp. 144, 147.

15. D. Clayton Jones, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 785–86; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with Destiny (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 214–16; Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo(New York: Viking, 1950), pp. 262–63; John Costello, The Pacific War, 1941–1945 (New York: Quill, 1982), p. 599; Butow, Tojo, pp. 449–54.

Chapter 19

1. D. T. Payton-Smith, Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration (London: HMSO, 1971), pp. 21–23, 44 (“paraphernalia of competition”), 62 (“strategic oil reserve”). “Spanish Petroleum Monopoly,” November 18, 1927, W 10770, FO 371/12719 (“Sir Henri’s word”); J. V. Perowne, Minute, September 30, 1935, C6788, FO 371/18868 (“hatred of the Soviets”); Faulkner to Vansittart, September 30, 1935, C6788, FO 371/18868 (“suitable actions” and “getting an old man”); Thornton to Montgomery, January 1, 1937, H2/1937, FO 371/2075 with C137/105/2/37 (Dutch prime minister); Draft, Personalities Series, 1938, FO 371/21795, PRO. On the effort to gain control of Shell, see Bland to Halifax, April 27, 1939, no. 228, 233, C6277, C6278, Watkins memo, April 12, 1939, C5474, FO 371/23087, PRO and Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped, rev. ed. (London: Coronet, 1988), pp. 96–97; In the autumn of 1939, the British and French allocated $60 million to pay the Rumanians to destroy their oil wells, in order to deny Rumanian oil to the Germans. The Rumanians, however, wanted more, and the Rumanian oil went to the Germans. War Cabinet, Meeting Notes, November 22, 1939, POG (S), CAB 77/16, PRO.

2. Payton-Smith, Oil, p. 85 (“basic ration”); George P. Kerr, Time’s Forelock: A Record of Shell’s Contribution to Aviation in the Second World War (London: Shell Petroleum Company, 1948), p. 40; Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), p. 203.

3. Payton-Smith, Oil, pp. 195–99 (“arsenal”), 210–11; Huston, Sinews of War, p. 442 (“dollar sign”); Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 443 (“Dr. Win-the-War”). Roosevelt to Ickes, May 28, 1941, OF 4435; FDR to Smith, May 6, 1941, OF 56, Roosevelt papers. Surplus capacity number derived from John W. Frey and H. Chandler Ide, A History of the Petroleum Administration for War, 1941–1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), p. 444, which is an important source on Allied oil supplies. For the suit, called the “Mother Hubbard” case because the defendants seemed to include almost all of the American oil industry, see United States Tariff Commission, Petroleum, Report No. 17, in War Changes in Industry Series (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), p. 94.

4. Everett DeGolyer, “Government and Industry in Oil,” 813; PAW, “Transportation of Petroleum to Eastern United States,” May 15, 1942, 4435, DeGolyer papers. Ickes to Roosevelt, July 18, 1939, OF 56, Roosevelt papers; Nash, United States Oil Policy, pp. 152–63; Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 3, p. 530; Oil Weekly, June 2, 1941; Harold Ickes, Fightin’Oil (New York: Knopf, 1943), p. 71.

5. Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, p. 109 (Raeder); Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 6, Finest Hour, 1939–1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 1020–21 (“measureless peril”), 1036 (“blackest cloud”); Davies to Ickes, July 8, 1941, Ickes to Roosevelt, July 9, 1941, PSF 12, Roosevelt papers (“shocking”); Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 3, pp. 561, 543 (“parking conditions”); Williamson et al., The Age of Energy, p. 758 (gasless Sundays); Frey and Ide, Petroleum Administration, pp. 118–19 (“one-third less”).

6. Beaton, Shell, p. 604 (“phony shortage”); Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 2, pp. 169–74 (“narrowest of margins”); Frey and Ide, Petroleum Administration, p. 119 (“shortage of surplus”); Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. 3, p. 617 (“fill it up”), 630–33 (Ickes’s complaints). Wirtz to Ickes, May 15, 1941, Ickes to Roosevelt, May 19, 1941, OF 4435; Uoyd to Ickes, November 24, 1941, OF 4226; Ickes to Roosevelt, January 17, 1942, PSF 75 (Ickes’s new strategy), Roosevelt papers.

7. Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 108 (“ample targets”), 114–15. Davies to Ickes, March 21, 1942, Ickes to Roosevelt, March 23, 1942, PSF 75; Ickes to Roosevelt, April 21, 1942, PSF 12 (“desperate”), Roosevelt papers. Morison, Naval Operations, vol. 1, pp. 254, 200–1, 130; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, pp. 295–96.

8. Ickes to Nelson, June 17, 1942, box 209, Hopkins papers; Nash, U.S. Oil Policy, pp. 164–65.

9. NA 800.6363: Minutes of Federal Petroleum Council, March 20, 1942, 411; Thorburg to Collado et al., June 25, 1942, 786 RG 59. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking, 1989), p. 229 (“Rescue no one”); Morison, Naval Operatons, vol. 1, pp. 157, 198 (“enemy tonnage”); Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, August 1942–September 1943 (London: HMSO, 1972), p. 54; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 387; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 113 (“milk cows”), 116; Stanton Hope, Tanker Fleet: The War Story of the Shell Tankers and the Men Who Manned Them (London: Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, 1948), chap. 9.

10. Wilkinson to Ickes, December 5, 1942, Ickes to Roosevelt, December 10, 1942, PSF 75, Roosevelt papers; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 7, Road to Victory, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), pp. 265, 289; S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939–1945, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 355, 217 (“not look at all good”); Howard, Grand Strategy, vol. 4, pp. 244–245 (“stranglehold”), 621; Liddell Hart, Second World War, pp. 387–90 (“never came so near” and “heavy losses”); Larson,Standard Oil, vol. 3, p. 529.

11. Ickes to Roosevelt, August 4, 1942, August 7, 1942, September 3, 1942, Smith to Roosevelt, October 1, 1942, OF 4435; Roosevelt to Land, November 6, 1941, OF 56; Nelson file memo, May 1, 1942, OF 12, Roosevelt papers. Ickes to Nelson, November 26, 1942, Box 209, Hopkins papers; Board of Petroleum Reserves Corporation, Record, April 25, 1944, pp. 88–91, RG 234, NA (“any oil matter”); Petroleum Administration for War, Petroleum in War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: PAW, 1945), pp. 39–44.

12. Pratt to Farish, May 16, 1941, Pratt to DeGolyer, March 17, 1942, 1513; DeGolyer to Hebert, January 16, 1943, 3470, DeGolyer papers. Cole to Roosevelt, October 22, 1942, pp. 20, 22, OF 4435, Roosevelt papers; Ickes to Brown, April 7, June 10, 1943, Davies to Hopkins, July 26, 1943, box 209, Hopkins papers; Frey and Ide, Petroleum Administration, p. 5 and statistical tables; John G. Clark, Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900–1946 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 327 (“commie outfit”); E. DeGolyer, “Petroleum Exploration and Development in Wartime,” Mining and Metallurgy, April 1943, pp. 188–90.

13. Roosevelt to Ickes, August 12, 1942, OF 4435, Roosevelt papers (“natural gas”); Clark, Energy and Federal Government, p. 316 (Bea Kyle to Ickes); Frey to Kyle, August 1941, Davies papers; Minutes of Federal Petroleum Council, March 20, 1942, 811.6363/411, RG 59, NA (“knew for sure”).

14. Hertz to the Undersecretary of War, August 13, 1942, Hertz to Hopkins, August 13, 1942, box 209, Hopkins papers; John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), p. 130 (“private skepticism”); James Conant,My Several Lives: Memoirs of a Social Inventor (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 314 (Baruch’s dinner).

On the “rubber famine,” see United States Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, part 11, Rubber, 77th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1942) (hereafter,Truman Hearings); Howard, Buna; Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, pp. 405–18, chap. 15.

In a case brought by Thurman Arnold, the trust-busting assistant Attorney General, and in a series of Congressional hearings, Jersey was charged with collusion and cartel making in its relationship with I. G. Farben involving synthetic rubber. The arrangements between the two companies, the critics said, had deprived the United States of synthetic rubber know-how and production. Natural rubber had, before Pearl Harbor, constituted the single largest import of the United States. The abrupt cessation of supply resulting from Japan’s capture of the primary sources in Southeast Asia created a “rubber famine” in the United States, threatening the entire Allied war effort.

Arnold insisted that the source of the rubber famine was what he called the “full marriage” between Jersey and I. G. Farben (Truman Hearings, p. 4811). As to the substance of the charges themselves, Arnold pursued his case in a singular way, though sometimes taking events out of context (Truman Hearings, pp. 4313, 4427, 4598). Jersey had made its arrangements with I. G. Farben before the Nazis came to power. As a result of the deal, considerable benefits in chemistry and research organization flowed to the American side, including synthetic rubber know-how. After all, Germany and I. G. Farben, not America and Jersey, held the leadership in world chemistry. The Jersey management did show considerable obtuseness and political naiveté from 1937 on in not recognizing the degree to which I. G. Farben had become a captive and tool of the Nazi state. See Hayes, Industry and Ideology. But the charge that Jersey prevented the diffusion of synthetic rubber technology before World War II disregarded the economic realities. In a Depression world of low commodity prices and large surpluses, there was no economic incentive or rationale to develop synthetic technologies, unless a country was preparing for war. If the United States had so prepared, then innovation and implementation would have required substantial government subsidies or tariff protection. Though the import price of natural rubber fluctuated substantially in the years before America’s entry into World War II, the production costs for synthetic rubber were estimated at five times those of natural rubber. No company could have been expected to make a commitment to a large level of production in the face of those economics. Indeed, from 1939 on, Jersey, along with other companies, had tried to get Washington to support the development of synthetic rubber technology and production, but the effort fizzled in the face of administrative disarray and rivalry in Washington, lack of consensus on the need, and a strong aversion to the commitment of large amounts of government money. The general view was that the supply of natural rubber from Southeast Asia could not be interrupted, and there was also skepticism about the viability of the synthetic substitutes (see Truman Hearings, pp. 4285–89, 4407–79, 4805, 4937). The “rubber famine” resulted not from the patent exchanges between Jersey and I. G. Farben, which on the contrary increased American knowledge about synthetic rubber, but from a failure of the government’s program of preparedness in the three years before Pearl Harbor. The “rubber famine” arose primarily from the same psychology that excluded the possibility that there could be a Pearl Harbor.

15. Clark, Energy and the Federal Government, pp. 337–44 (“nonessential driving”).

16. Payton-Smith, Oil, pp. 249–53; Standard Oil (New Jersey), Ships of the Esso Fleet in World War II (New York: Standard Oil, 1946), pp. 151–54.

17. Ickes, Fightin’ Oil, p. 6 (Stalin’s toast); Erna Risch, Fuels for Global Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Office of Quartermaster General, 1945), pp. 1–2, ix–x, 59–60 (gas cans).

18. United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, A Documentary History of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974) (Patterson to Ickes); Agnew to Lloyd, June 15, 1942, POWE 33/768 121286, PRO; “100 Octane Aviation Gasoline: Report to the War Production Board,” March 16, 1942, May 29, 1942, pp. 9–10 (“eke out”), October 15, 1942; Ickes to Roosevelt, October 19, 1942, Nelson to Roosevelt, October 28, 1942, Roosevelt to Ickes, November 7, 1942, PSF 12, Roosevelt papers. Beaton, Shell, pp. 560–76, 579–87 (“out of a hat”); Charles Sterling Popple, Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) in World War II (New York: Standard Oil, 1952), pp. 29–30; War Production Board, Industrial Mobilization for War: History of the War Production Board and Its Predecessor Agencies, 1940–1945, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), pp. 39–41; James Doolittle Oral History (Shell and 100 octane); Giebelhaus,Sun, chaps. 7 and 9.

19. Petroleum Administration for War, Petroleum in War and Peace (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1945), p. 204 (“Not a single operation”); van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 213; Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 499–516; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, p. 254 (“men and horses”); Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 492 (poem); Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 275; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and Stephen E. Ambrose, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 4, The War Years (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 2060, n. 4 (“great leader”); Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1985), p. 216; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, vol. 3, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945 (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 385 (“thoroughly weary” and “into the breach”), 371–72 (“Patton’s good qualities”).

20. Van Creveld, Supplying War, p. 221; Nigel Hamilton, Monty, vol. 2, Master of the Battlefield, 1942–1944 (London: Sceptre, 1987), p. 754 (“spectacularly successful”); Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, p. 438 (“planning days”); Blumenson, Patton Papers, vol. 2, pp. 841, 571, 533, 529–30 (“chief difficulty”).

21. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), p. 515; Blumenson, Patton Papers, vol. 2, p. 523 (“blind moles”); Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), pp. 402–5 (“angry bull”); Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, vol. 1, table 10, p. 503; Hamilton, Monty, vol. 2, p. 777.

22. Blumenson, Patton Papers, vol. 2, p. 531 (“unforgiving minute”); Liddell Hart, Second World War, pp. 562–63 (“eat their belts”); Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981), p. 127 (“get Patton moving”).

23. Cole, Battle of the Bulge, pp. 13–14; Liddell Hart, Second World War, p. 563; Goralski and Freeburg, Oil & War, pp. 264–65; Blumenson, Patton, chap. 10, p. 216; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 292–93 (“late summer… inescapable defeat”); Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, esp. pp. 515–16; General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, shared Eisenhower’s point of view. A decade after the war ended, he said: “Of course he [Patton] wanted more gasoline; of course Montgomery wanted more gasoline and a larger freedom of action. That is just natural to commanders under these circumstances. What was going on was the First Army was making very rapid moves in a very positive manner and getting very little public credit for it in this country. The Third Army was getting far more credit because of Patton’s dash and showmanship…. Patton wanted to get free—with the great temptation of running right up to the Rhine—and there was almost no gasoline…. I think Eisenhower’s control of the operations at that time was correct. And that all the others were yelling as they naturally would yell. There is nothing remarkable about that except one was the supreme commander of the British forces, which at that time was very small, and the other was a very high-powered dashing commander who had the press at his beck and call—General Patton…. In trying to judge what was the correct disposition of the available gasoline, one has to remember a great many subsidiary facts and prospects. For example, take the German operation in the Bulge later on. If it was successful, it was a grand thing. But it wasn’t successful…. You can sometimes win a great victory by a very dashing action. But often or most frequently the very dashing action exposes you to a very fatal result if it is not successful.” Pogue, Marshall, vol. 3, pp. 429–30.

24. Hamilton, Monty, vol. 2, pp. 776–821; Nigel Hamilton, Monty, vol. 3, The Field-Marshal (London: Sceptre, 1987), pp. 3–8; Liddell Hart, Second World War, pp. 565–67 (“best chance”).

This table of world oil supply shows how the United States continued to dominate world oil production throughout the first 85 years of the industry. The table also demonstrates the importance that Russian and Mexican production gained and then lost, the significance of Venezuela by World War II, and the beginning of the impact of the Middle East on world supply.

World Crude Oil Production, 1860–1945
(thousands of barrels per day)

Year

United
States

Mexico

Venezuela

Russia/
USSR

Rumania

East
Indies

Persia/
Iran

All
Others

Total

1865

6.8

   

0.2

0.1

   

0.3

7

1875

32.8

   

1.9

0.3

   

1.1

36

1885

59.9

   

38.2

0.5

   

2.2

101

1895

144.9

   

126.4

1.6

3.3

 

7.9

284

1905

369.1

0.7

 

150.6

12.1

21.5

 

35.3

589

1915

770.1

90.2

 

187.8

33.0

33.7

9.9

58.9

1,184

1925

2,092.4

316.5

53.9

143.7

45.6

70.4

93.3

112.8

2,929

1935

2,730.4

110.2

406.2

499.7

169.2

144.4

156.9

317.0

4,534

1945

4,694.9

119.3

885.4

408.1

95.3

26.6

357.6

521.6

7,109

East Indies includes Indonesia, Sarawak, and Brunei. Source: American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures: Centennial Edition, 1959 (New York: API, 1959), pp. 432–37.

Chapter 20

1. Pratt to Farish, August 3, 1934, 1513, obituaries, DeGolyer papers; Anderson, Aramco, p. 111; Philip O. McConnell, The Hundred Men (Peterborough: Currier Press, 1985); Lon Tinkle, Mr. De: A Biography of Everette Lee DeGolyer (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 212, 227, 255; Herbert K. Robertson, “Everette Lee DeGolyer,” Leading Edge, November 1986, pp. 14–21.

2. E. DeGolyer, “Oil in the Near East,” Speech, May 10, 1940, 2288 (“No such galaxy”); notes, 3466; itinerary, 3459; and letters to wife, November 7, 10 (“no Lindbergh”), 14, December 1 (“pretty barren land”), 1943, DeGolyer papers.

3. Leavell to Alling, February 3, 1943 (“single prize”), Summary of Report on Near Eastern Oil, 800.6363/1511–1512, RG 59, NA; E. DeGolyer, “Preliminary Report of the Technical Oil Mission to the Middle East,” Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists 28 (July 1944), pp. 919–23 (“center of gravity”).

4. Moffett to Roosevelt, April 16, 1941, PSF 93; Hull to Roosevelt, June 30, 1939, OF 3500, Roosevelt papers. Duce to DeGolyer, April 29, 1941, 360, DeGolyer papers (“closer look”); Conversation with Ibn Saud, May 10, 1942, with Alling memo, June 18, 1942, 890F.7962/45, RG 59, NA (“have the money”); Aaron David Miller, Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1949 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 29–35.

5. Knox to Roosevelt, May 20, 1941, Hull with memo to Roosevelt, April 25, 1941, Hopkins to Jones, June 14, 1941, PSF 68, Roosevelt papers; Miller, Search for Security, pp. 38–39; Michael B. Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–47 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 52–54. Stoff, along with Anderson in note 1, Miller in note 4, and Painter in note 9, are the major monographs on postwar oil policy.

6. Pratt to Farish, May 16, 1941, 1513; William B. Heroy, “The Supply of Crude Petroleum Within the United States,” July 29, 1943, pp. 4–9, 3417 (“diminishing returns” and “bonanza days”), DeGolyer papers; E. DeGolyer, “Petroleum Exploration and Development in Wartime,” Mining and Metallurgy, April 1943, pp. 189–90; Foreign Office Research Dept., “A Foreign Policy for Oil,” United States Memoranda, May 16, 1944, AN 1926, FO 371/38543/125169, PRO; United States Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources, Investigation of Petroleum Resources (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), pp. 276–77; “Wartime Evolution of Postwar Foreign Oil Policy,” May 29, 1947, 811.6363/5–2947, RG 59, NA.

7. Harold Ickes, “We’re Running Out of Oil!,” American Magazine, December 1943 (“America’s crown”); Campbell to Eden, September 28, 1943, A9193, FO 371/34210/120769, PRO (“private interest”); Herbert Feis, Seen from E. A.: Three International Episodes (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. 102 (“one point and place”). Later, in mid-1944, Roosevelt called a halt to efforts by the American ambassador in Mexico City to negotiate the reentry of private American capital and instead suggested that the United States finance oil exploration for the Mexican government. “When a new and adequate dome is found,” said Roosevelt, “it could be set aside in toto by the Mexican Government for the purpose of aiding the defense of the Continent” and the United States government would pay an annual holding fee to Mexico. Roosevelt to Ickes, February 28, 1942, Roosevelt to Hull, July 19, 1944, OF 56, Roosevelt papers.

8. Moose to Hull, April 12, 1944, 890F.6363/124; Stimson to Hull, May 1, 1944, 890F.6363/123, RG 59, NA. Kline to Ickes, Summary of Dillon Anderson report, March 4, 1944, 3459, DeGolyer papers; Multinational Subcommittee, History of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, p. 4 (“diddle”); Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 4, pp. 402–5, 410; Feis, Seen from E. A., pp. 110–111. Standard Oil of California, “Plans for Foreign Joint Venture,” December 7, 1942, 25391–25617 file, case 1, Oil Companies papers.

9. Kline to Ickes, Summary of Dillon Anderson report, March 4, 1944, 3549, DeGolyer papers; Vice Chief of Naval Operations to Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 31, 1943, U69139 (SC) JJT/E6, RG 218, NA; The Position of the Department on the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, p. 1, 800.6363/ 2–644, RG 59, NA. Feis, Seen from E. A., p. 105; United States Congress, Senate, Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Investigation of the National Defense Program, Hearings, part 42, pp. 25435, 25386–87; Anderson, Aramco, pp. 46–48 (“purely American enterprise”), 51; David Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941–1954 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 37 (“richest oil field”); Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, p. 54 (“far afield”).

10. Thornburg to Hull, March 27, 1943, 800.6363/1141–1/2; Feis to Hull, June 10, 1943, 890F.6363/80, RG 59, NA. Hull to Roosevelt, March 30, 1943, OF 3500, Roosevelt papers; Painter, Oil and the American Century, pp. 41 (“intense new disputes” and “smell of oil”), 43 (“breath away”). Notes, June 12, 1943, 3468 (“rapidly dwindling”); Petroleum Reserves Corporation, Record of Negotiations, August 2–3, 1943, 3463 (“tremendous shock”), DeGolyer papers. Feis, Seen from E. A., pp. 122 (“boyish note”), 129–30 (“caught a whale”).

11. NA 890F.6363 Feis to Hull, September 16, 1943, 65; September 23, 1943, 70; Merriam, memo of conversation with Paul Bohannon, October 4, 1943, 84, RG 59; Minutes of Special Meeting of Directors of Petroleum Reserves Corporation, November 3, 1943, 3463, DeGolyer papers.

12. Herbert Feis, Petroleum and American Foreign Policy, (Stanford: Food Research Institute, 1944), p. 45 (“favored competition”); Ralph Zook, The Proposed Arabian Pipeline: A Threat to Our National Security (Tulsa: IPAA, 1944) (“move towards fascism”); Anderson, Aramco, p. 101 (“monopolies” and “military necessity”); RGH Jr. to Berle, April 20, 1944, 890F.6363/122–1/2, RG 59, NA; Ickes to Roosevelt, May 29, 1944, Roosevelt to Ickes, May 31, 1944, PSF 68, Roosevelt papers; Kline to DeGolyer, May 22, 1944, 946, DeGolyer papers (“understatement”).

13. Chiefs of Staff to War Cabinet, April 5, 1944, WP (44) 187, FO 371/42693/120769 (“American assistance” and “continental resources”); Cabinet Paper, “Oil Policy,” MOC (44) 5, CAB 77/ 15/184, PRO. Minutes, Special Committee on Petroleum, September 21, 1943, 3468, DeGolyer papers.

14. Ickes to Roosevelt, August 18, 1943 (“available oil”), with Duce memo on conversation with Jackson, August 13, 1943 (Jackson), PSF 68, Roosevelt papers. Eden to the Prime Minister, February 11, 1944, POWE 33/1495; Beaverbrook to the Prime Minister, February 8, 1944, POWE 33/1495 (“pigeon hole”); Halifax to Foreign Office, February 19, 1944, No. 846, FO 371/42688 (Roosevelt’s map), PRO. NA 800.6363: Feis to Ickes, with memo, October 1, 1943, /1330A; Ailing memo, December 3, 1943, /1402; Sappington to Murray, December 13, 1943, /1466, RG 59; Feis, Seen from E. A., p. 126; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, vol. 4, pp. 393–94 (“shockingly”). For DeGolyer’s comment, memo with DeGolyer to Snodgrass, n.d., 3468, DeGolyer papers.

15. FRUS, 1944, vol. 3, pp. 101–05; Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1975), pp. 440–41 (“wrangle”), 459 (“assurances”); Painter,Oil and the American Century, p. 55 (“horn in”); Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, p. 156 (“rationing of scarcity”).

16. Duce to DeGolyer, August 1, 1944, 360, DeGolyer papers (“lamb chops”); Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, p. 167 (“monster cartel”); Minutes of Anglo-American Conversations on Petroleum: Plenary Sessions, August 1, 1944, 800.6363/7–2544, RG 59, NA (“‘As-Is’ character” and “Petroleum Agreement”); Anderson, Aramco, pp. 218–23 (“reserves” and “give effect”).

17. Duce to DeGolyer, September 11, 1944, 360, DeGolyer papers. NA 800.6363: Pew to Connally, August 17, 1944, with Pew to Hull, August 23, 1944, 8–2344, Rayner memo, Meeting with Senate Committee, August 17, 1944, 8–1744, RG 59. Zook to Roosevelt, November 28, 1944, PSF 56, Roosevelt papers.

18. DeGolyer to Duce, November 13, 1944, 360, DeGolyer papers; Ickes to Roosevelt, November 29, 1944, 800.6363/12–344 RG 59, NA (“seeing ghosts”).

19. Roosevelt to Ibn Saud, February 13, 1942, OF 3500, Roosevelt papers; William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), pp. 19–35 (FDR and Ibn Saud); FRUS, 1945, vol. 8, pp. 1–3, 7–9; Miller, Search for Security, pp. xi–xii, 130–31; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 871–72; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929–1969 (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 203.

20. Miller, Search for Security, p. 131 (“immense oil deposits”); William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 325–27; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 7, Road to Victory, 1941–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), pp. 1225–26 (“allow smoking” and “finest motor car”); Laurence Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant (London: John Murray, 1970), pp. 253, 271 (Rolls-Royce). Churchill’s irritation is vividly described in the draft of Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud, p. 5, with Kidd to DeGolyer, October 22, 1953, 3461, DeGolyer papers.

21. Roosevelt to Stettinius, March 27, 1945, PSF 115 (“remind me”), Roosevelt papers; Shinwell to Chancellor of Exchequer, September 24, 1945, PREM 8/857/122019, PRO; Anderson, Aramco, pp. 224–28 (text of Revised Agreement); United States Congress, Senate, Investigation of Petroleum Resources, pp. 278–79, 34, 37 (“optimist”); Robert E. Wilson, “Oil for America’s Future,” Stanolind Record, October-November 1945, pp. 1–4; Ickes to Truman, February 12, 1946, Davies papers; Harry S. Truman,Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 554 (“kind of letter”); Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 73 (“lack of adherence”); Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow, 1973), p. 291 (“monarch”).

22. Forrestal to Secretary of State, December 11, 1944, 890F.6363/12–1144 (“cannot err”); Forrestal to Byrnes, April 5, 1946, 811.6363/4–546 (“cheering section”); Collado to Clayton, March 27, 1945, 890F.6363/3–2745, RG 59, NA. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951) p. 81 (“first importance”).

23. Wilcox to Clayton, February 19, 1946, 800.6363/2–1946 (“dangerous or useless” and “orphan”), RG 59, NA; Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, p. 97 (“salvation”).

Chapter 21

1. NA 811.6363: Sandifer to McCarthy, July 2, 1948, 6–1847; Department of State, Current and Prospective Worldwide Petroleum Situation, February 17, 1948, 2–1748, RG 59. Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, pp. 667–72; Beaton, Shell, pp. 637–42; Shell Transport and Trading, Annual Report, 1947, p. 8 (“astonishingly”); Giddens, Standard Oil of Indiana, pp. 682–84 (“jackrabbit”); Arthur M. Johnson, The Challenge of Change: The Sun Oil Company, 1945–1977 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983), p. 40 (“Helpful Hints”).

2. R. Gwin Follis to author, September 18, 1989 (“hardly touch” and “surprising enthusiasm”); Anderson, Aramco, p. 120 (“sufficient markets”), 140–45 (Forrestal); Hart to Secretary of State, July 2, 1949, 890F.6363/7–249, RG 59, NA (“our oil market” and “greatest”); Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 213; “The Great Oil Deals,” Fortune, May 1947, p. 176 (Collier).

3. Sellers to Foster, June 12, 1946, “IPC memos, 1946” file, case 5 (“bombshell”); “IPC Memorandum on Present Legal Position,” July 10, 1946, 127274–127448 file, case 2, Oil Companies papers. Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 111–15 (“inadvisable and illegal”), 124 (“supervening illegality”); Anderson, Aramco, pp. 148–51 (“aliens” and “frustrated”). NA 890F.6363: Meloy to Secretary of State, December 12, 1948, 12–1248; Hart to Secretary of State, July 2, 1949, 7–249, August 6, 1949, 8–649; Sappington to Secretary of State, December 5, 1945, 800.6363/12–545, RG 59.

4. Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 115–19 (“mutual interest,” Sheets, “restraints,” “political question” and “family circle”); Interview with Pierre Guillaumat (“angry with God”); CFP, “Events Arising from the War,” February 27, 1945; Gulbenkian to Near East Development Corporation, January 6, 1947, 4–5–35 file, case 6, Oil Companies papers (“not acquiesce”).

5. FTC, International Petroleum Cartel, p. 104; Nitze to Clayton, February 21, 1947, 800.6363/2–2147, RG 59, NA (“arrest” and “retard”); Letter from Paul Nitze to author, October 3, 1989. Sellers and Shepard to Harden and Sheets, February 7, 1947, “IPC memos, 1946” file; Earl Neal, “Alternatives to IPC,” February 19, 1947, 126898–127063 file, case 2, Oil Companies papers. Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 160–61 (“practicable plan”).

6. Childs to Secretary of State, January 3, 1947, 890F.6363/1–347, RG 59, NA (Aramco and Ibn Saud); R. Gwin Follis to author, September 18, 1989 (“off our shoulders”); Anderson, Aramco, pp. 158, 152 (Socony president); Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 156–66 (“good thing” and “problems”); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War (New York: Penguin, 1990), pp. 282–83 (“all-out”).

7. “Notes on Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian,” June 6, 1947, with Berthoud to Butler, June 9, 1947, PE 650, POWE 33/1965, PRO (British official); Gulbenkian, Portrait in Oil, pp. 210–15 (“musts”), 251 (“father’s practice”); Interview with John Loudon; Anderson,Aramco, pp. 155–59 (“drove as good”). Turner to Johnson, September 15, 1948, 127274–127448 file; Dunaway to Grubb, April 4, 1946, “various nos.” file, case 2, Oil Companies papers. Gulbenkian and Raphael in John Walker, Self-Portrait with Donors: Confessions of an Art Collector (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1974), pp. 234–37.

8. Harden to Holman, November 3, 1948, Harding to Vacuum, November 3, 1948, 128167–128229 file, case 7, Oil Companies papers; Gulbenkian, Portrait in Oil, pp. 225–27 (complexity of agreements and “caravan”); Belgrave memo, “Gulbenkian Foundation,” January 13, 1956, POWE 33/2132, PRO; “The Great Oil Deals,” Fortune, May 1947, p. 176 (“moon”).

9. Memo, Meeting, including Clayton and Drake, February 3, 1947, 811.6363/2–347 (“long on crude oil” and “wholly American owned”); Loftus to Vernon, September 5, 1947, FW 811.6363/8–2047, RG 59, NA. Chisholm, Kuwait Oil Concession, p. 187. Jennings to Sheets, September 27, 1946, 17–3–4 file, case 5; “Kuwait—Supply,” “Kuwait” file, case 1; “Shell Negotiation,” “various nos., incl. Gulf & Jersey” file, case 2, Oil Companies papers. “Shell in Kuwait,” Middle East Oil Committee, CME (55), May 16, 1955, CAB 134/1086, PRO (“partner”).

10. Yergin, Shattered Peace, chap. 7, pp. 163 (“What does…how far”), 180; Interview with Nikolai Baibakov; FRUS, 1946, vol. 6, pp. 732–36 (Stalin’s oil fears); Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 138 (“south of Batum”); William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 55–62; Arthur Meyerhoff, “Soviet Petroleum,” in Robert G. Jensen, Theodore Shabad, and Arthur W. Wright, eds., Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 310–42; Owen,Trek of the Oil Finders, pp. 1371–73.

11. European Economic Cooperation, London Committee, Drafts for chaps. 1–3, August 2, 1947, UE 7237, FO 371/62564, PRO; Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy, 1945–51 (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 367–70; Alan Bullock,Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London: Heinemann, 1984), pp. 361–62.

12. “Anglo-American Responsibility for Petroleum Prices,” January 4, 1951, FOA 0453–4351 file, case 1, Oil Companies papers; Painter, Oil and the American Century, pp. 155–56; European Recovery Program, Petroleum and Petroleum Equipment Commodity Study (Washington, D.C.: Economic Cooperation Administration, 1949), p. 1 (“Without petroleum”); Walter J. Levy, “Oil and the Marshall Plan,” paper presented at the American Economic Association, December 28, 1988.

13. Holman to Hoffman, February 23, 1949; Harden to Foster, April 19, 1950; Foster to Harden, August 22, 1950; Suman to Foster, September 1, 1950; Harden to Daniels, December 27, 1950; Foster to Holman, January 18, 1951, FOA 0453–4351–2 file, case 1, Oil Companies papers. David Painter, “Oil and the Marshall Plan,” Business History Review 58 (Autumn 1984), pp. 382, 376. Cabinet Programme Committee, January 9, 1949, P49, POWE 33/1772; McAlpine to Trend, September 8, 1948, POWE 33/1557 (Bevin); “Oil Prices,” to R. W. B. Clarke, February 3, 1947, T2361/2161, PRO. Levy, Oil Strategy and Politics, p. 75; W. G. Jensen, Energy in Europe, 1945–1980 (London: G. T. Foulis, 1967), p. 21.

14. European Economic Co-Operation, London Conversations, August 2, 1947, Drafts for chaps. 1–3, pp. 56–57, 65–66, UE 7237, FO 371/62564, PRO; Miller, Search for Security, pp. 177–78; Ethan Kapstein, The Insecure Alliance: Energy Crisis and Western Politics Since 1949 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 61 (Dalton); Interview with T. C. Bailey, GHS/2B/75, Shell archives (“no value”).

15. Miller, Search for Security, p. 196 (“handicapped”); “Visit of Abdul Aziz to Aramco,” January 1947, pp. 36, 45, Aramco papers; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, vol. 4, Statesman, 1945–1954 (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 350 (“famine”). Henderson to Marshall, May 26, 1948, 890 F.6363/5–2648 (Duce); Eakens to Martin and “Impact of Loss of Arab Oil Production on World Petroleum Situation,” July 8, 1948, 800.6363/7–848 (“hardship”), RG 59, NA.

16. “Remarks made to Colonel Eddy by King Ibn Saud,” November 17, 1947, with Merriam memo, November 17, 1947, 890F.6363/11–1347, RG 59, NA; Trott to McNeil, “Annual Review for 1949,” February 28, 1950, ES 1011, FO 371/82638, PRO (“formal hostility”); FRUS, 1949, vol. 6, pp. 170, 1618, 1621; Louis, British Empire, p. 204 (“Jewish pretensions”); James Terry Duce Statement, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, January 30, 1948, pp. 10–11, 3461, DeGolyer papers.

17. James Terry Duce Statement, House Armed Services Committee, February 2, 1948, 3461, DeGolyer papers; Bullock, Bevin, p. 113 (“no hope”); James Forrestal, “Naval Policy,” Speech, June 18, 1947, National War College; David A. Rosenberg, “The U.S. Navy and the Problem of Oil in a Future War: The Outline of a Strategic Dilemma, 1945–1950,” Naval War College Review 29 (Summer 1976), pp. 53–61; Miller, Search for Security, p. 203 (“economic prize”); FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, pp. 1190–91 (Truman letter to Ibn Saud); “Saudi Arabia: Economic Report,” September 24, 1950, POWE 33/323, PRO.

18. “Problem of Procurement of Oil for a Major War,” Joint Chiefs of Staff paper 1741, January 29, 1947, pp. 3, 6 (“very susceptible”), RG 218, NA; McGinnis to Daniels, November 26, 1948, CS/A, 800.6363/11–2648, RG 59, NA; Eugene V. Rostow, A National Policy for the Oil Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 147–48. National Security Resources Board, “A National Liquid Fuels Policy,” August 1948, p. 1, 3526 (“storage place”); API National Oil Policy Committee, Synthetics Subcommittee of Long Range Availability Subcommittee, July 14, 1948, 3508, DeGolyer papers. On synthetic fuels, see Bernard Brodie, “American Security and Foreign Oil,” Foreign Policy Reports, March 1, 1948, pp. 297–312. Richard H. K. Vietor,Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 44 (New York Times), 54–59; Crauford D. Goodwin, ed., Energy Policy in Perspective: Today’s Problems, Yesterday’s Solutions(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 148–56.

19. Owen, Trek of the Oil Finders, p. 801; John S. Ezell, Innovations in Energy: The Story of Kerr-McGee (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), pp. 152–69 (“real class-one”); William Rintoul, Spudding In: Recollections of Pioneer Days in the California Oil Fields (Fresno: California Historical Society, 1978), pp. 207–9.

20. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), “Natural Gas,” August 1945, 3680, DeGolyer papers. Standard Oil of New Jersey, “Cost Considerations in Mid-East Crudes,” July 28, 1950, “various nos. 1937–47” file, case 2; Holman to Hoffman, February 23, 1949, case 1, Oil Companies papers (“crudes available”). Deale to Forrestal, May 8, 1948, Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 218, NA (“pipelines”); Douglass R. Littlefield and Tanis C. Thorne, The Spirit of Enterprise: The History of Pacific Enterprises from 1886 to 1989 (Los Angeles: Pacific Enterprises, 1990).

Chapter 22

1. Meeting at the Treasury, September 1950, ES 1532/18, FO 371/82691, PRO (“startling demands”); Richard Eden, Michael Posner, Richard Bending, Edmund Crouch, and Joseph Stanislaw, Energy Economics: Growth, Resources, and Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 264 (“uneasy”); John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money [1936], volume 7 of The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, St. Martin’s Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1973), p. 383; David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation [1817], volume 1 of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, ed. Piero Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1951), pp. 11–83; M. A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 42.

2. Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela: Oil and Politics, trans. Everett Bauman (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), pp. 29, 43, 67; Franklin Tugwell, The Politics of Oil in Venezuela (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 182; Rabe, The Road to OPEC, pp. 64–73.

3. Rabe, The Road to OPEC, pp. 102 (“suicidal leap”), 103 (“tax structure”); Larson, Standard Oil, vol. 3, pp. 479–85; Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela’s Oil, trans. Donald Peck (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 162 (“ritual cleansing”); Godber to Starling, April 10, 1943, A786/94/ 47, FO 371/34259, PRO (Godber); Christopher T. Landau, “The Rise and Fall of Petro-Liberalism: United States Relations with Socialist Venezuela, 1945–1948” (Senior Thesis, Harvard University, 1985), pp. 5 (“octopi”), 10 (“vast dollar resources”), 75–76 (“disheartening”); Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 128–36 (“taboo”). Holman to Hoffman, November 1, 1948, “FOA 0453–4357” file; McCulloch to Orton, December 1948, “CT 3028–3293” file; Miller to McCollum, September 3, 1947, “Gulf 6, 9, 18, etc.” file (“reap the profits”), case 1, Oil Companies papers. “Creole Petroleum: Business Embassy,” Fortune, February 1949, pp. 178–79.

4. Loftus and Eakens to McGhee and Nitze, March 4, 1947, 800.6363/3–447; “Saudi Arabia’s Offshore Oil,” August 6, 1948, 890F.6363/8–1148, RG 59, NA; Interview with Jack Sunderland; FRUS: Current Economic Developments, 1945–1954, July 19, 1948, p. 10 (“new companies”); John Loftus, “Oil in United States Foreign Policy,” Speech, July 30, 1946; Monsell Davis memo, “Kuwait Neutral Zone Concession,” August 16, 1947, POWE 33/478, PRO; Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 165 (“Aminoil”); Duce to DeGolyer, December 16, 1944, 360, DeGolyer papers; Tompkins, Little Giant of Signal Hill, pp. 156–63 (Davies).

5. Somerset de Chair, Getty on Getty (London: Cassell, 1989), pp. 15–20 (“best hotel” and “a casino”), 143 (“always let down”), 145, 76 and 158 (Madame Tallasou), 70 (“family life”), 156; Interview with Jack Sunderland (“thousand fights” and “value”); Robert Lenzner, Getty: The Richest Man in the World (London: Grafton, 1985), pp. 59–60 (Dempsey), 101, 118–34 (“espionage”); Russell Miller, The House of Getty (London: Michael Joseph, 1985), p. 207 (“thinking about girls”); “The Fifty-Million Dollar Man,”Fortune, November 1957, pp. 176–78; Ralph Hewins, The Richest American:J. Paul Getty (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960), pp. 289 (“Middle East”); Interview with Paul Walton.

6. Miller, House of Getty, pp. 191–93 (“expenses”), 200–4 (“Teach” and “seminar”); Lenzner, Getty, pp. 156–57 (“insane”), 159–60 (“pathological fear”), 182 (“garbage oil”); Hewins, Richest American, pp. 309 (“favorably impressed”), 313 (“My bankers”); Munro to Rowe-Dutton, February 22, 1949, T 236/2161; to Furlonge, Foreign Office, November 1, 1950, ES 1532/24, FO 371/82692 (“notorious”), PRO. Proctor to Drake, June 28, 1949, 12–2–4 file, case 4, 644a; Dunaway to Grubb, 44a, April 4, 1946, “various nos.” file, case 2 (Gulbenkian), Oil Companies papers. Interviews with Paul Walton and Jack Sunderland; Bernard Berenson, Sunset and Twilight: From the Diaries of 1947–1958 of Bernard Berenson, ed. Micky Mariano (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963), p. 309 (richest man); Multinational Hearings, part 8 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), pp. 282–84.

7. Trott to Bevin, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1950,” March 19, 1951, ES 1011/1, FO 371/ 91757; Trott to McNeil, “Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1949, February 28, 1950, ES 1011/1, FO 371/82638, “Saudi Arabia: Economic Report,” to Foreign Office, September 24, 1950, POWE 33/323, “Saudi Arabia: Economic Report,” January 28, 1951, POWE 33/324, PRO. Cable with Duce to Wilkins, May 25, 1950, 886A.2553/5–2550 (“large company profits”); “Arabian-American Oil Company’s Tax Problems,” July 20, 1949, 890F.6363/7–2049, RG 59, NA. Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 342–50 (“rolling” and “horsetrading”), 357 (IRS); part 7, pp. 168 (“spread the benefits”), 130–35 (“retreat”); Anderson, Aramco, pp. 188–96 (“welfare” and “Each time”); Betancourt, Venezuela, p. 89 (“grave threat”); Painter, Oil and American Century, p. 166 (“darn bit”); Interview with George McGhee (“Saudis knew”); John Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 196–99 (criticism of tax credit).

8. Gulf to Anglo-Iranian, June 20, 1951, “various nos. inc. Gulf and Jersey” file, case 2; LWE to Larsen, March 11, 1952, Butte to EPL, Jan. 25, 1952 (Jersey working paper), nos. 128253–128255 file, case 3 (“We now know”), Oil Companies papers. “Aramco December 30 Agreement” Memo, January 10, 1951, 886A.2553/1–1051; “Gulf Oil Talks with Anglo-Iranian,” March 29, 1951, 886A.2553/3–2951; “Gulf Oil Company Difficulties,” June 4, 1951,886D.2553/6–451, NA. Louis, British Empire, pp. 595, 647 (historian); Multinational Hearings, part 4, pp. 86, 89 (McGhee and senator).

Chapter 23

1. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, The Shah’s Story, trans. Teresa Waugh (London: Michael Joseph, 1980), pp. 31–47 (“grief”); Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (New York: Penguin, 1984), p. 383, n. 9 (“mouse”); FRUS, 1950, vol. 5, pp. 463 (“Westernized”), 512; Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: Granada, 1985), p. 205 (“bribed”).

2. Pahlavi, Shah’s Story, p. 39 (“miraculous failure”); Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 249–50 (“the Great”); Interview with George McGhee; Louis, British Empire, pp. 636, 596 (“infant prodigy” and “nineteenth-century”); George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World: Adventures in Diplomacy (New York: Harper & Row, 1983), pp. 320 (“kindly feeling”); Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 646 (“stupidity”).

3. Berthoud memo, April 18, 1951, EP 1531/204, FO 371/91527; Bevin to Frank, April 12, 1950, EP 1531/37, FO 371/82395, PRO. “The Iranian Oil Crisis,” 3460, DeGolyer papers; Raymond Vernon, “Planning for a Commodity Oil Market,” in Daniel Yergin and Barbara Kates-Garnick, eds., The Reshaping of the Oil Industry: Just Another Commodity? (Cambridge: Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 1985), pp. 25–33 (“Minister and Manager”); Louis, British Empire, p. 56 (“no power or influence”); Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Postwars of Earl Attlee (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 178–79; Robert Stobaugh, “The Evolution of Iranian Oil Policy, 1925–1975,” in Iran Under the Pahlavis, ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 206; James A. Bill and William Roger Louis, eds., Mossadiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 1988), p. 8 (“West End gentlemen”).

4. NA 886D.2553 “Gulf Oil Company Difficulties,” June 4, 1951, 6–451; “Gulf Oil Talks with Anglo-Iranian,” March 29, 1951, 3–2951 (“did not dare”), RG 59, NA. Bill and Louis, Mossadiq, p. 247 (“fingertips” and “tough bargaining”); Time, August 1, 1949, p. 58 (“came with the shale”); Minutes of Meeting, August 2, 1950, EP 1531/40, FO 371/82375, PRO; Sampson, Seven Sisters, p. 134 (“Glasgow accountant”); Interviews with Robert Belgrave (“skinflint”) and George McGhee.

5. Louis, British Empire, p. 645 (Fraser); Interview with Peter Ramsbotham (“Bombshell”); Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy, 1941–1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 192–96 (“misfortunes”); Abrahamian, Iran, p. 266 (“sacred mission” and “stooge”); Norman Kemp, Abadan: A First-Hand Account of the Persian Oil Crisis (London: Allan Wingate, 1953), pp. 27–28. Meeting at Foreign Office, January 16, 1951, EP 1531/112, FO 371/91524; Shepherd to Morrison, “Political Situation in Persia,” July 9, 1951, EP 1015/269, FO 248/1514 (1951), part IV (“Former Company,” “abolished” and “no further”), PRO. On the governor and the sheep, see Lapping, End of Empire, pp. 208–9;Times (London), June 9, 11, 1951; New York Times, June 9, 10, 11, 1951.

6. Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (London: Penguin, 1987), pp. 122–25 (“pure”). “Biographic Outline, Mohammed Mossadeq,” Memorandum for the President, October 22, 1951; CIA, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953,” NIE-75/1, January 9, 1953, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman papers. H. W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), chap. 18 (fainting spells); Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 219 (“Old Mossy”); Painter, Oil and the American Century, p. 173 (“colonial exploiter”); Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 651 (“great actor”); Interviews with George McGhee and Peter Ramsbotham (“Moslem”); Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), p. 262; C. M. Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982), pp. 113–14; Louis, British Empire, pp. 651–53 (“lunatic” and “cunning”); Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 130–37.

7. Interviews; Louis, British Empire, pp. 667–74 (“Suez Canal”); Notes, June 27, 1951, EP 1531/870, FO 371/ 91555, PRO (Churchill); Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan, vol. 1, 1894–1956, (New York: Viking, 1988), p. 310; H. W. Brands, “The Cairo-Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East, 1951–1953,” International History Review, 11 (1989), pp. 438–40 (“scuttle and surrender”).

8. Interview with Richard Funkhouser, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews (“oracle”); Interview with Walter Levy. On Levy’s proposals, see Logan memo, July 31, 1951, with Minute, July 29, 1951, EP 1531/1290, FO 371/91575 (“camouflage”); Shepherd to Foreign Office, October 10, 1951, EP 1531/1837, FO 371/91599 (John Kennedy); Cabinet Minutes, July 30, 1951, CM (51), CAB 128/20, PRO. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 655; Louis, British Empire, p. 677, n. 5 (“mongrelization” and “dilute”); Walters, Silent Missions, pp. 247–56 (“crafty,” “Where else?,” “certain principles” and Kashani); FRUS: Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 145 (“dream world”).

9. Louis, British Empire, p. 678 (“jolly good”); Fergusson to Stokes, October 3, 1951, with Fergusson to Makins, October 4, 1951, EP 1531/1839, FO 371/91599; Ramsbotham to Logan, August 20, 1951, EP 1531/1391, FO 371/91580, PRO. Interview with Peter Ramsbotham (“last act of Figaro”); Peter Ramsbotham to author, July 4, 1990; Painter, Oil and American Century, p. 177. John F. Thynne, “British Policy on Oil Resources 1936–1951 with Particular Reference to the Defense of British Controlled Oil in Mexico, Venezuela and Persia” (Ph.D., London School of Economics, 1987), pp. 211–12, 273 (“stock-in-trade”); Walters, Silent Missions, p. 259 (“failure”).

10. Cabinet, Persia Committee, “Measures to Discourage or Prevent the Disposal of Persian Oil,” December 13, 1951, PO (0)(51)26, CAB 134/1145 (“stolen oil”); Cabinet Minutes, September 27, 1951, CM (51), CAB 128/20 (“humiliating”), PRO. Interview with Eric Drake (“sabotage” and “pistol”); Kemp, Abadan, pp. 235 (“day of hatred”), 241 (“Stand Firm”); Longhurst, Adventure in Oil, pp. 143–44 (“records”).

11. “Steps Taken to Make Up the Loss of Persian Production,” Appendix D to “Measures to Discourage or Prevent the Disposal of Persian Oil,” December 13, 1951, PO (0) (51), CAB 134/1145; “Persian Oil: Future Policy,” April 15, 1953, CAB 134/1149; “Persian Ability to Produce and Sell Oil,” November 22, 1951, PO (0) (51) 17, CAB 134/1145, PRO. “Plan of Action No. 1 Under Voluntary Agreement,” July 1951; Lilley to Longon, April 26, 1951, “Texas Co. 1951” file, Case 9, Oil Companies papers. Shell Transport and Trading, “Survey of Current Activities, 1951,” Shell archives (“unnecessary”). C. Stribling Snodgrass and Arthur Kuhl, “U.S. Petroleum’s Response to the Iranian Shutdown,” Middle East Journal 5 (Autumn 1951) pp. 501–4; Lenczowski, Iran, p. 212.

12. Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), pp. 355 (“‘old brain’”), 346 (“splutter of musketry”), 60, 347 (Anglo-Iranian stock); Eden, Full Circle pp. 212–25 (“shaken”). Eden Minute on Bullard to Foreign Office, May 7, 1941, No. 202, FO 371/27149; P. Dixon, “Informal Conversation about Persia,” November 14, 1951, CAB 134/1145; Fergusson to the Minister, “Persian Oil,” January 30, 1952 and February 7, 1952 (“tell the U.S.A.”), PO (M) (52), POWE 33/1929; Butler to the Secretary, May 22, 1952, POWE 33/1934, PRO. Bill and Louis, Mossadiq, pp. 244, 246 (“cloud cuckoo”).

13. Interview with George McGhee (“end of the world”); George McGhee to author, July 5, 1990; Peter Ramsbotham to author, July 4, 1990; McGhee, Envoy, pp. 401–3; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 650 (“like Texas”); Walters, Silent Missions, p. 262 (“my fanatics”); Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 267–68 (“rabble rouser”); Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982), p. 46; Brands, Loy Henderson, chap. 20 (“secret contempt”); FRUS: Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 179 (future generations), 186 (“helpless”).

14. “Record of Meeting,” June 28, 1952, EP 15314/163, CAB 134/1147 (“some stage”); Makins to Foreign Office, May 21, 1953, EP 1943/1, FO 371/104659; Churchill to Makins, June 5, 1953, EP 1943/3G, FO 371/104659; Makins to Foreign Office, June 4, 1953, No. 473, FO 371/104659, PRO. Churchill to Truman, August 16, August 20 (“very edge”), August 22, September 29, 1952 (with Acheson to Truman, October 1, 1952), Truman to Churchill, August 18, 1952 (“communist drain”), Henderson and Middleton to Bruce and Byroade, August 27, 1952 (“trap”), PSF, Truman papers. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 650; Eden, Full Circle, p. 221 (“autograph”); Woodhouse, Something Ventured, pp. 110–27; Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 114–20; Pahlavi, Shah’s Story, p. 55; FRUS: Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 742 (“mobocracy”), 693 (“Communist control” and “feasible course”), 737–38 (“active”), 878.

15. Makins to Foreign Office, June 4, 1953, FO 371/104659 (Shah’s suspicions); Shuckburgh to Strang, August 29, 1953, FO 371/104659; Roe to Foreign Office, August 25, 1953, EP 1914/1, FO 371/104658; Bromley to Salisburg, August 26, 1953, EP 1941/12, FO 371/104658 (Shah in Rome and Baghdad), PRO. FRUS: Iran, 1951–54, pp. 748 (“snuggle up”), 780–88 (description of events); William Shawcross, The Shah’s Last Ride (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 68–70 (“bulletin” and “I knew they loved me”); Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 156–72, and passim; Mark T. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19 (1987), pp. 261–86; Woodhouse, Something Ventured, pp. 115–16. Woodhouse was, at the time, Kim Roosevelt’s opposite number, in charge of the 1953 coup enterprise from the British side.

16. Robert Belgrave to author, March 16, 1989; Interview with Wanda Jablonski; “Persia: Quarterly Political Report,” July-September 1953, November 19, 1953, EP 1015/263, POWE 33/2089, PRO; Donald N. Wilber, Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1986), p. 189; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 129 (“dime novel”); Richard and Gladys Harkness, “The Mysterious Doings of CIA,”Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1954, pp. 66–68; Brands, Loy Henderson, chap. 20.

17. Butler to Secretary, August 24, August 26, 1953, POWE 33/2088 (“stumped”); “Skeleton Memo on Middle East Oil,” August 17, 1953, PO (0) (53) 72, CAB 134/1149; “Draft Proposal/Walter Levy,” October 20, 1952, POWE 33/1936, PRO. Interview with Wanda Jablonski; Bennett Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment: The History of Standard Oil (New Jersey), 1950–1972, and the Exxon Company, 1972–1975 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), pp. 487–88; Wilber, Adventures in the Middle East, p. 184; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 133–37; United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), p. 60; Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 301 (“touch and go”); Interviews with George Parkhurst (“ouchy”) and Howard Page (“beat us on the head”), Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Burton I. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 162–70 (Funkhouser); Wilkins, Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, p. 322; Interview with George McGhee (“fiddler”); United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Security (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), pp. 57–58 (“strictly commercial viewpoint”).

18. Wall, Exxon, pp. 453–55, 947, n. 33; Kaufman, Oil Cartel Case, pp. 27 (“rubber stamping”), 163 (“highly slanted”), 30 (“Soviet propaganda”); FTC, International Petroleum Cartel. For Justice Department version, see Multinational Subcommittee, Iranian Consortium, pp. 5–16 (“spot market”). For the British view, see Eden in “Notes for Secretary of State on U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s Report,” September 4, 1952, POWE 33/1920 and “International Oil Industry,” Memo by the Foreign Secretary, September 30, 1952, C (52) 315, PREM 11/500; Churchill to Foreign Secretary, August 30, 1952, M 463/ 52, PREM 11/500, PRO. Lloyd to Anglo-Iranian, October 2, 1952, brown wrapper, Case 9, Oil Companies papers (“stale bread,” “witch-hunters” and “prejudicial”). On antitrust policy, see Raymond Vernon and Debra L. Spar, Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 113–17 and Kingman Brewster, Jr., Antitrust and American Business Abroad(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 8, 72–74, 330–31.

19. FRUS: Current Economic Developments, 1945–1954, January 6, 1947 (“national interest”); Multinational Subcommittee, Iranian Consortium, pp. 30–36 (“unlawful combination”), 52 (“enforcement”), 77 (“would not violate”); Burton I. Kaufman, “Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War,” Business History Review 51 (Spring 1977), p. 38 (“start trouble”); Truman, Memoirs, pp. 126–27 (Truman’s oil experience); Wall, Exxon, pp. 481–86 (“considered judgment”); John Foster Dulles, “Iranian Oil” memorandum, January 8, 1954, DDRS, 1983, doc. 257C.

20. Multinational Hearings, part 7, pp. 304 (“political matter” and “no case”), 297 (“yacking”), 248–49; Wall, Exxon, pp. 492–96 (“hostages”); Interview with Robert Belgrave (“apple cart”). “Iran—Basis for Settlement with Anglo-Iranian,” March 16, 1954, CAB 134/1085; Cabinet, Middle East Oil Committee, “Middle East Oil Policy,” April 2, 1954, O.M.E. (54) 21, CAB 134/1085 (“reliable independents”), PRO. New York Times, November 1, 1954, p. 1; Henderson to Jernegan, November 12, 1953, 880.2553/11–1253 (“almost inevitable”), RG 59, NA; Interview with Howard Page, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Interviews with Pierre Guillaumat, John Loudon (“wonderful deal”) and Wanda Jablonski.

Chapter 24

1. Chester L. Cooper, The Lion’s Last Roar (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 12 (“Great Engineer”), 16, 18 (“highway”), 20; Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin’s, 1967), pp. 584–85 (Disraeli).

2. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, “Traffic and Capacity of the Suez Canal,” p. 10, August 10, 1956, National Security Council records; Harold Lubell, “World Petroleum Production and Shipping: A Post-Mortem on Suez,” P-1274 (Rand Corporation, 1958), pp. 17–18.

3. Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (New York: Mayflower Books, 1978), pp. 45, 69, 24, 2–19; Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes the United States into the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), p. 83 (CIA profile); Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972), p. 75 (“Voice of the Arabs”); Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crises: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), chap. 3; Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes, and Marshall, 1959), p. 61; Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, trans. Misha Louvish (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), p. 61 (“crime”); Jacques Georges-Picot, The Real Suez Crisis: The End of a Great Nineteenth-Century Work, trans. W. G. Rogers (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 34, 61–62; W. S. C. to Minister of State, August 19, 1952, Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, Egypt (main file), part 3, PREM 11/392, PRO. C. Mott-Radclyffe to Ambassador, May 4, 1954, D7 107–83, Middle East Centre archives. Mohammed H. Heikal, Cutting Through the Lion’s Tale: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre Deutsch, 1986), pp. 6, 13, 61–62 (Eden’s Arabic).

4. Interview with Robert Bowie; Jacques Georges-Picot, Real Suez Crisis, p. 68 (“musty… odor”); Wall, Exxon, pp. 547–51; Mohammed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 84–85 (“oil complex”); Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London: Constable, 1967), p. 40; Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez: Ten Years After (New York: Pantheon, 1966), pp. 40–41 (cotton).

5. Cooper, Lion’s Last Roar, p. 103 (“De Lesseps”); Alistair Home, Harold Macmillan, vol. 1, 1894–1956 (New York: Vintage, 1989), p. 397 (Macmillan); Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 110; Interview with John C. Norton (pilots).

6. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries, 1951–1956 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), p. 23 (“Master”); Neff, Warriors at Suez, p. 39 (Ike on Dulles); Interview with Winthrop Aldrich, p. 27, Tape 27, Box 244, Aldrich papers; Eden, Full Circle, p. 487 (“disgorge”); Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, pp. 198–99 (“out of date” and “white men”), 210 (“mantle”); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 670 (“drama”); Interview with Robert Bowie; Heikal, Cairo Documents, p. 103 (“Which side”); Deborah Polster, “The Need for Oil Shapes the American Diplomatic Response to the Invasion of Suez” (Ph.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1985), pp. 65–66.

7. Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 397; Eisenhower to Hoover, October 8, 1956, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda Series, Eisenhower Library; Polster, “The Need for Oil,” chap. 4.

8. April 6, 1956, Personal Telegram Serial, T 221/56, PREM 11/1177 (“Bear’s claws”); Cabinet, Egypt Committee, August 24, 1956, E.C. (56), CAB 134/1216, PRO. Eden, Full Circle, p. 401 (“absolutely blunt”).

9. Eden, Full Circle, pp. 520 (Eden to Eisenhower), 475; Lloyd, Suez, p. 42 (“very worried”); Home, Macmillan, vol. 1, p. 411 (Macmillan’s reading and diary).

10. Eden, Full Circle, pp. 576–78 (“stamp of our generation”); Interview with Robert Belgrave; Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, pp. 72–73 (“vital nerve”); Lloyd, Suez, p. 120 (Spaak).

11. Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 367, 403; Wall, Exxon, pp. 549–61; Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, p. 123 (Kirkpatrick); Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America’s Failure in the Middle East (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 209–13 (Anderson); Eisenhower to King Saud, August 20, 1956, DDRS, 1985, doc. 655. Views about nuclear power similar to Anderson’s were expressed in the Joint Intelligence Staff meetings in London. Chester Cooper to author, May 30, 1989.

12. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow, 1976), p. 218. Lloyd’s attitude reminded Dayan “of a customer bargaining with extortionate merchants.” Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), pp. 95–109, 224. On attitude towards Jews, see Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, passim; for Eden on Jews, see Neff, Warriors at Suez, p. 206 and John Harvey, ed., The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London: Collins, 1978), pp. 191–94, 247. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–59 (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 149; Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, p. 160; Stuart A. Cohen, “A Still Stranger Aspect of Suez: British Operational Plans to Attack Israel, 1955–56,” International History Review 10 (May 1988), pp. 261–81.

13. James, Eden, p. 597 (“artificial inside”); Cooper, Lion’s Last Roar, p. 128 (“Chums”). On Eden’s medication and collapse, see James, Eden, pp. 523, 597; Thomas, Suez Affair, pp. 43–44; Neff, Warriors at Suez, p. 182.

14. Ambrose, Eisenhower, p. 357; “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” October 30, 1956, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda Series (Eisenhower); Cooper, Lion’s Last Roar, p. 167 (“unshirted hell”); Lloyd, Suez, p. 78 (Hoover); Heikal,Cairo Documents, pp. 112–13 (Nasser’s instructions); Cabinet, Egypt Committee, “Political Directive to the Allied Commander-in-Chief,” November 3, 1956, E.O.C. (56) 12, CAB 134/1225, PRO.

15. Cabinet, Egypt Committee Minutes, September 7, 1956, EC (56), CAB 134/1216; Chiefs of Staff, “Review of the Middle Eastern Situation Arising Out of the Anglo-French Occupation of Port Said,” November 8, 1956, E.C. (56) 67, CAB 134/1217, PRO. Ambrose, Eisenhower, pp. 359 (“boil in”), 371 (“Attorney General”); Interview with Peter Ramsbotham (“paraboys”); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 62–65 (“night follows day”); Polster, “Need for Oil,” p. 114 (“get the Arabs sore”); Wall, Exxon, p. 557 (“simply refused”); Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 164 (IMF); Lloyd, Suez, pp. 211, 206 (Macmillan on oil sanctions); Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, p. 228 (“naughty boys”); United States Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Emergency Oil Lift Program and Related Oil Problems: Joint Hearings, 85th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), p. 2401 (“purgatory”). Statistics from Emergency Oil Lift Program, pp. 1046–64; Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, “Economic Consequences of the Closure of the Suez Canal (and IPC Pipelines),” January 7, 1957; Lubell, “World Petroleum Production and Shipping,” p. 21; Harold Lubell, Middle East Oil Crisis and Western Europe’s Energy Supplies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); Peter Hennessy and Mark Laity, “Suez—What the Papers Say,” Contemporary Record 1 (Spring 1957), p. 8.

16. Eisenhower to Ismay, November 27, 1956, DDRS, 1989, doc. 2941 (“sadness” and “delicate”); Dillon to Director (re: Ismay), DDRS, 1989, doc. 859 (Ismay); Lloyd, Suez, p. 219 (hospital meeting with Dulles). Robert Rhodes James, while accepting Lloyd’s recollection, quotes his somewhat more ambiguous report to Eden at the time, in which Dulles criticized “our methods,” but “deplored that we had not managed to bring down Nasser.” James, Eden, p. 577.

17. Cabinet minutes, November 26, 1956, CAB 134/1216; Macmillan to Eden, January 7, 1957, PREM 11/2014, PRO. Emergency Oil Lift Program, pp. 2406 (“sugar bowl”), 2353–57 (“whose interests”), 2404 (Drake and Jersey representative), 810; Love,Twice-Fought War, p. 655 (“Suez sixpence”); Wall, Exxon, pp. 559 (“have already shipped”), 579 (“push a button”); Financial Times and Daily Express, January 19, 1957 (“No Extra Oil”); Johnson, Sun, pp. 84–86 (antitrust case).

18. United States Congress, Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Petroleum, the Antitrust Laws and Government Policy, 85th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), pp. 97–98; Office of Intelligence Research, Dept. of State, “Economic Consequences of the Closure of the Suez Canal,” January 7, 1957; Wall, Exxon, p. 582 (“British shipping”); “Middle East Oil,” January 23, 1957, UE S 1171/39, FO 371/127281, PRO.

19. Cooper, Lion’s Last Roar, p. 281 (“curious time”); Moncrieff, Suez: Ten Years After, p. 45 (“Sir Eden”); James, Eden, p. 593 (“so unrepentant”); Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 181 (“see him now”); Neff, Warriors at Suez, p. 437 (Times); Home,Macmillan, p. 460.

20. Interview with John Loudon (“tanker people”); Wall, Exxon, p. 582. On pipelines, see “Transport of Middle East Oil,” n.d., UE S 1171/228, FO 371/127213; Bridgeman to Ayres, March 11, 1957, POWE 33/1967; Memorandum from Shell, March 11, 1957, POWE 33/1967, PRO. On tankers, see JWH to Secretary of State, October 11, 1956, and Draft Memorandum for the President, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda series; “Bermuda Conference: Long-Term Tanker Prospects,” Note by Ministry of Power and Ministry of Transport, March 15, 1957, UE S 1172/5, FO 371/127210; “Middle East Oil,” January 18, 1957, to Mr. Beely, FO 371/127200 (“political risk”); “Long-Term Requirements for the Transport of Oil from the Middle East,” January 28, 1957, UE S 1141/29, FO 371/127201, PRO.

21. Caccia to Foreign Office, February 12, 1957, AU 1051/A2, FO 371/126684, PRO (“boy scout”); “Memorandum of Conferences with the President,” November 21, 1956, 4:00 P.M., 5:30 P.M., Dulles papers, White House Memoranda series (Ike’s Middle East policy).

22. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 198 (“agonies”), 133 (“rulers”), 258 (weekly letters); “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” November 21, 1956, Dulles papers, White House Memoranda series (“straight, fine man”). Macmillan to “Dear Friend” (letter to Eisenhower), January 16, 1957, PREM 11/2199 (“no illusions”); COIR to Jarrett, March 5, 1957, PREM 11/2010 (“family tree”); Macmillan to C.E., March 6, 1957, PREM 11/2014; “Middle East: General Questions,” Bermuda Conference Notes, PREM 11/1838 (Macmillan in Bermuda), PRO. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 123 (“plain talk”); James, Eden, p. 617 (“lake of oil”).

Chapter 25

1. Wellings to DeGolyer, December 10, 1953; DeGolyer to Wellings, December 24, 1953, 1982, DeGolyer papers.

2. American Petroleum Institute, Basic Petroleum Data Book, vol. 6, September 1986, IV-1, II-1.

3. Cabinet, Middle East Oil Committee, October 7, 1954, O.M.E. (54) 36, CAB 134/1086 (“reasonable basis”); Russell to Lloyd, October 11, 1957, EP 1013/4, FO 371/127073, PRO.

4. Hohler to Foreign Office, August 20, 1957, UE S 1171/228, FO 371/127211, p. 6; Foreign Office, “Signor Enrico Mattei,” FO 371/127210, PRO. “Enrico Mattei and the ENI,” with Tasca and Phelan to Department of State, December 16, 1954, 865.2553/12–1654, RG 59, NA (“economic history”); Paul Frankel, Mattei: Oil and Power Politics (New York and Washington, D.C.: Praeger, 1966), pp. 122, 41–51 (“sucking needles”); Interviews with Marcello Colitti (“into the fire”) and John Loudon (“difficult” and “dessert”).

5. Interview with Robert Belgrave; Frankel, Mattei, p. 83 (Mattei on the Seven Sisters). Beckett to Jardine, May 22, 1957, FO 371/127208; Falle to Gore-Booth, May 6, 1957, UE S 1171/105/4, FO 371/127205; Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, March 26, 1957, O.M.E. (57), CAB 134/2338; Record of Conversation between Mr. Hannaford and Signor Mattei, with Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, OME (57) 35, Eevise, May 24, 1957, CAB 134/2339; Hohler to Lloyd, August 20, 1957, UE S 1171/228, FO 371/127211, PRO.

6. Frankel, Mattei, p. 141 (Italian princess). Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, May 1, 1957, O.M.E. (57) 29, PREM 11/2032; Stevens to Foreign Office, April 12, 1957, no. 47, PREM 11/2032 (“blackmail”); Foreign Office to Rome, March 27, 1957, no. 469, FO 371/127203; Ashley Clarke, “Signor Mattei and Oil,” September 25, 1957, FO 371/127212, PRO.

7. Wright to Coulson, with Cabinet, Middle East Committee, March 25, 1957, O.M.E. (57) 24, CAB 134/2339 (“lesser evil”); Foreign Office, “European Interest in Mid East Oil,” Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, OME 57 (35), May 24, 1957, CAB 134/2339; Pridham minute, August 27, 1957, UE S 1171/228, FO 371/127211; Anglo-American Talks, April 15, 1957, FO 371/127206 (“unreliable person”); Joseph Addison to Wright, April 11, 1957, UE S 1171/120 (C), FO 371/127206; Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, “Italian-Iranian Oil Agreement,” March 25, 1957, O.M.E. 57 (24), CAB 134/2339 and Foreign Office to Rome, March 27, 1957, no. 469, FO 371/127203 (“prejudice”); Hohler to Wright, August 20, 1957, UE S 1171/228, FO 371/127211 (“sign of weakness”); Hohler to Foreign Office, August 20, 1957, no. 141 E, FO 371/127211, PRO.

8. Wright to Coulson, with Cabinet, Committee on the Middle East, “Italian-Iranian Oil Agreement,” March 25, 1957, OME 57 (24), CAB 134/2339; Lattimer notes on Mattei visit, June 1957, E.G. 9956, FO 371/127210; Russell to Wright, August 10, 1957, UE S 1171/223, FO 371/127211 (meeting with Mattei in Tehran and “four minute mile”); M. to Macmillan, May 6, 1957, PREM 11/2032; Wright to Russell, August 16, 1957, UE S 1171/223, FO 371/127211, PRO. Interview with Marcello Colitti (“tiny places”).

9. “Japanese Interest in the Oil Concession for the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone Sea-Bed,” September 27, 1957, FO 371/127170; British Embassy, Tokyo, to Eastern Department, Foreign Office, November 12, 1957, 1532/107/57, FO 371/127171; S. Falle, “Japanese and Middle East Oil Concessions,” October 4, 1957, POWE 33/2110 (“real breach”), PRO. Martha Caldwell, “Petroleum Politics in Japan: State and Industry in a Changing Policy Context” (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1981), pp. 84–86; CIA, “Taro Yamashita,” Biographic Register, August 1964, DDRS, doc. 31A.

10. Halford to Foreign Office, December 19, 1957, No. 22, POWE 33/2110; Cabinet, Official Committee on the Middle East, Minutes, November 7, 1957, p. 5, OME (57), CAB 134/2338; Kuwait to Foreign Office, October 21, 1957, S 1534/29, FO 371/127171; P. J. Gore-Booth to J. A. Beckett, November 4, 1957, PD 1146/17, POWE 33/2110 (“feeling”); Kuwait to Foreign Office, October 8, 1957, nos. 363, 364, FO 371/127171 (royal telegrams); J. C. Moberly, “Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone Seabed Concession,” November 6, 1957, ES 1534/37, FO 371/127171; British Embassy, Tokyo, to Eastern Department, Foreign Office, November 12, 1957, S 1534/41; Shell to BPM, December 11, 1957, FO 371/127171; Halford to Foreign Office, December 22, 1957, No. 477, POWE 33/2110, PRO. Caldwell, “Petroleum Politics,” pp. 86–87 (“national project”); Tadahiko Ohashi to author, August 16, 1989 (information from Mr. Sakakibara).

11. Emmett Dedmon, Challenge and Response: A Modern History of Standard Oil Company (Indiana) (Chicago: Mobium Press, 1984), pp. 203–5 (“opportunities” and “Aryans”); “Conversation with His Imperial Majesty,” FO 371/1330A, PRO (Shah’s home life).

12. Wright to Foreign Office, February 11, 1958, VQ 1015/11, FO 371/134197, PRO (“stranglehold”). On the coup in Iraq, see Wright to Foreign Office, July 17, 1958, VQ 1015/100, FO 371/134199; Embassy, Ankara to Rose, July 17, 1958, VQ 1015/71 (c), FO 37/134199; Stout to Middle East Secretariat, August 7, 1958, VQ 1015/195, FO 371/134202; Johnston to Rose, July 28, 1958, VQ 1015/171, FO 371/134/201; Wright to Lloyd, “The Iraqi Revolution of July 19, 1958,” EQ 1015/208, PREM 11/2368; Wright memo on Howard Page, September 1, 1958, EQ 1531/15, FO 371/133119, PRO.

13. Report of the Commission of Arab Oil Experts, April 15–25, 1957, to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League, pp. 2, 5, FO 371/127224; Nuttali to Falk, October 4, 1957, with minutes of Second Session of Fifth Meeting of Arab Oil Experts, pp. 2, 9, UE 511717/2, FO 371/127224, PRO. Interview with Fadhil al-Chalabi.

14. Bridgett to Department of State, March 4, 1959, 831.2553/3–459, RG 59, NA; Philip, Oil and Politics, p. 83; Betancourt, Venezuela, pp. 323–24, 342 (“factory”); Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 213–27; Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 157 (“romantics”); Tugwell, Politics of Oil, chap. 3; Interviews with Alirio Parra, Alicia Castillo de Pérez Alfonzo, Juan Pablo Pérez Castillo, Oscar Pérez Castillo.

15. NA 831.2553: Leddy to Department of State, January 10, 1951, 1–1051; Davis memo, September 8, 1953, 9–853; Swihart to Department of State, May 9, 1956, 5–956; Chaplin to Department of State, May 25, 1956, 5–2556; Sparks to Secretary of State, December 20, 1958, 12–2058; Anderson-Rubottom memo, June 5, 1959, 6–559; Boonstra memo, June 5, 1959, 6–559; Eisenhower to Betancourt, April 28, 1959, 4–2859, RG 59; Cox to Department of State, September 10, 1959, 631.86B/9–1059, RG 59. Interview with Alirio Parra (“bones”).

16. Pierre Terzian, OPEC: The Inside Story, trans. Michael Pallis (London: Zed Books, 1985), pp. 85–97; New York Times, June 4, 1958, p. 8; Diary of J. B. Slade-Baker, January 20, 1958, Middle East Center; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 88–103; Fortune, August 1959, pp. 97, 146 (“service station”); Petroleum Week, June 20, 1958, p. 41; CIA, “Abdullah Ibn Hamud al-Tariqi, February 26, 1970, DDRS, 1984, doc. 788.

17. CIA, “Middle East Oil,” NIE 30–60, November 22, 1960, 83–542–9, paper 12–17 (“force”); Cabinet Minutes, July 25, 1958, Whitman Files, 1953–1961, Cabinet Series, Box 11 (“dangerous situation”); Eisenhower Library. NA 861.2553: Sundt to Department of State, January 28, 1954, 1–2854; February 3, 1954, 2–354, RG 59, NA. Wall, Exxon, p. 332; J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies & Governments: An Account of the International Oil Industry in Its Political Environment (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), pp. 211, 215.

18. Terzian, OPEC, pp. 23, 26; Bridgett to Department of State, June 4, 1959, 831.2553/6–459, RG 59, NA; Hubbard to BP, April 29, 1959 (“considered successful” and “Miss Wanda Jablonski”); Chisholm to Chairman of BP, April 30, 1959, Deighton File, “Cairo ‘Arab Petroleum Congress’” (“‘plus’”); Weir to Walmsley, June 17, 1959, B51532/8, FO 371/140378, PRO (“my boy”).

19. Interviews with Wanda Jablonski and Alirio Parra; “Wanda Jablonski Reports on the Middle East,” Supplement, Petroleum Week, 1957; “Eugene Jablonski Returns to Botany,” Garden Journal, May-June 1963, pp. 102–3; Terzian, OPEC, pp. 26–29, 7 (“Gentlemen’s Agreement”).

Chapter 26

1. Wall, Exxon, pp. 332–33; Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of Soviet–West German Relations, 1955–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 99 (Keating); Hartshorn, Oil Companies & Governments, pp. 252–53, 218.

2. “Rathbone of Jersey Standard,” Fortune, May 1954, pp. 118–19; “How Rathbone Runs Jersey Standard,” Fortune, January 1963, pp. 84–89, 171–79.

3. Wright memo on Howard Page, September 1, 1958, EQ 1531/15, FO 371/133119 (“tough man”); Williams to Stock, June 23, 1958, 58/6/112, POWE 33/2200 (Jablonski at Jersey), PRO. Interviews with Wanda Jablonski and John Loudon; Ian Skeet, OPEC—Twenty-five Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 22 (“regret”).

4. Terzian, OPEC, pp. 33–34 (“Just wait”), 42–46 (“regulation,” “sanctions,” “disapprove” and Page); Interviews with Alirio Parra (“We’ve done it”) and Fadhil al-Chalabi; Skeet, OPEC, p. 23; Fadhil al-Chalabi, OPEC and the International Oil Industry: A Changing Structure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 67; New York Times, September 25, 1960; CIA, “Middle East Oil,” NIE 30–60, November 22, 1960, 83–542–9, Eisenhower Library; Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds., Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School 3d. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1983), p. 24 (Rouhani).

5. Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait’s Foreign Policy: City-States in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), pp. 19–26 (Iraq and Kuwait); Skeet, OPEC, p. 29 (“nice in theory”).

6. Interviews with Alicia Castillo de Pérez Alfonzo, Juan Pablo Pérez Castillo, Oscar Pérez Castillo (“sowing” and “devil”), Alfred DeCrane, Jr., and Fadhil al-Chalabi; Terzian, OPEC, pp. 80–85 (“ecologist”); Skeet, OPEC, p. 32 (“reality of the oil world”).

7. Interview with Gilbert Rutman; Melby, France, pp. 253 (Economic Council), 302 (Giraud); Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962 (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 242 (De Gaulle); Gilbert Burck, “Royal Dutch Shell and Its New Competition,” Fortune, October 1957, pp. 176–78 (“all our eggs”).

8. Ruth First, Libya: The Elusive Revolution (London: Penguin, 1974), p. 141; Multinational Subcommittee, Multinational Oil Corporations, p. 98 (“one oil company” and “quickly”).

9. Commercial Secretariat to African Department, Foreign Office, June 11, 1957, JT 1534/3, FO 371/126063; Washington to Foreign Office, May 21, 1959, PREM 11/2743/1239 (“jack-pot”), PRO. Wall, Exxon, pp. 668–72 (Wright); Interviews with Robert Eeds, Ed Guinn and Mohammed Finaish, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews. The gap in government takes between Libya, which based its taxes on market prices, and other producers, which used posted prices, became so great that, in 1965, Libya revised its system to increase its revenues by reverting to a posted price base.

10. Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews (corruption in Libya); Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 287 (Page).

11. Interview with Marcello Colitti; Reinhardt to McGhee, April 25, 1962, DDRS, 1981, doc. 206B (“damaged ego”); New York Times, October 28, 1962, p. 16; October 29, 1962, p. 16; November 5, 1962, p. 30 (“most important individual”); Times (London), October 29, 1962, p. 12; Time, November 2, 1962, p. 98; January 18, 1963, p. 26.

12. Neil H. Jacoby, Multinational Oil: A Study in Industrial Dynamics (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 138–39 (“new internationals”); Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 352.

13. Multinational Subcommittee, Multinational Oil Corporations, p. 95 (“surge pot”); Wall, Exxon, pp. 616 (Jamieson), 610 (“always fighting”); Multinational Hearings, part 7, pp. 287 (“most important concession”), 314, 288 (“balloon”); Interviews with George Parkhurst, Kirchner, Merrill, Shaffer, Howard Page, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews.

14. Department of State to Tehran Embassy, June 8, 1964, CM/Oil, Conference Files (“Arab imperialism”); Carroll to Vice President, July 27, 1966, EX FO 5, 6/30/66-8/31/66, Box 42 (Shah to Kim Roosevelt), Johnson Library. Multinational Subcommittee,Multinational Oil Corporations, p. 108 (“do their best”); Interview with Parkhurst, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 309 (Oman).

15. Vietor, Energy Policy, p. 96 (“Tex” Willis); “Effect of Petroleum Imports Upon Oil Industry in Texas,” July 15, 1949, 811.6363/7–1549, RG 59, NA (“re-election”); Goodwin, Energy Policy, pp. 227–28 (“old suggestion”).

16. President’s Appointment with Senators, June 3, 1957 (“nice balance”); Cabinet Minutes, July 24, 1957, p. 3; Eisenhower to Anderson, July 30, 1957, Box 25; Eisenhower to Moncrief, May 12, 1958, Box 33; Dulles-Brownell telephone call, July 2, 1957, box 7, Eisenhower diary, Whitman files (“window dressing”); Memorandum of Conversation with the President, November 10, 1958, Box 7, Dulles White House memos (“some action”), Eisenhower Library. Interview with Robert Dunlop; Lenzner,Getty, pp. 217–19; Goodwin, Energy Policy, pp. 247–51 (Randall and economic advisers); D. B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), p. 349; Robert Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Knopf, 1982); Robert Engler, The Politics of Oil: Private Power and Democratic Directions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 230–47.

17. Vietor, Energy Policy, pp. 119 (“nightmare”), 134 (Russell Long); Fortune, June 1969, pp. 106–7.

Chapter 27

1. Jacoby, Multinational Oil, pp. 49–55.

2. P. H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A Key to Oil Economics, new ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1969), p. 1. Frankel’s book, though written in 1946, remains essential to understanding the oil industry. David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 98; Carlo M. Cipolla, The Economic History of World Population, 7th ed. (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 56 (Jevons); Senate,Emergency Oil Lift Program, pp. 2739, 2749, 2731–42. Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years, 1945–50 (New York: Atheneum, 1976), pp. 123–24 (Lewis); Interview (statue).

3. Senate, Emergency Oil Lift Program, pp. 2371–78; G. L. Reid, Kevin Allen, and D. J. Harris, The Nationalized Fuel Industries (London: Heinemann, 1973), p. 23 (“Killer Fogs,” “smokeless zones” and “Living Fire”); U.K. Department of Energy archives; William Ashworth, The History of the British Coal Industry, vol. 5, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 672–73; Melby, France, pp. 227, 236, 303–4; W. O. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834–1914 (London: Temple Smith, 1975), p. 235 (Keynes); Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis in Perspective (New York: Norton, 1976), pp. 94, 92.

4. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 237 (“no longer living”); Hein, Fueling Growth, chaps. 7, 10, 11; Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 191–92, 196; Michael A. Cusamano, The Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 392–94; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Industrial Revolution and Institutional Arrangements,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 33 (May 1980), pp. 47–48.

5. Interviews with William King and James Lee; Conoco, The First One Hundred Years (New York: Dell, 1975), pp. 169, 193; Fortune, April 1964, p. 115 (“big bite”); Interviews with Kirchen (“beat the bushes”), Shaffer and Merrill, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews.

6. Fortune, September 1961, pp. 98, 204–6 (Texaco); September 1953, pp. 134–37, 150–62; September 1954, pp. 34–37, 157–62; Robert O. Anderson, Fundamentals of the American Petroleum Industry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), pp. 280–81; Johnson, Sun, pp. 82–83; Wall, Exxon, pp. 300–1, 308, 132–33 (tiger). For specific oil company ads, see Life, July 5, July 12, July 26, 1954; July 17, July 24, 1964.

7. Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 231–38 (Levitt), 248–49 (Eisenhower on atomic attack), 254 (“drive-in church”); Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 182; Warren James Belasco, Americans on the Road: From Autocamp to Motel, 1910–1945 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979), pp. 141, 168; James J. Flink, The Automobile Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 166, 162; Ristow, “Road Maps,” Surveying and Mapping 34 (December 1964), pp. 617, 623; John B. Rae, The American Automobile: A Brief History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 109 (tail fins). Angus Kress Gillespie and Michael Aaron Rockland, Looking for America on the New Jersey Turnpike (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), pp. 23–37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Years, vol. 1, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 501–2, 547–49 (“six sidewalks to the moon”).

8. Rusk to American Diplomatic Posts, “Middle Sitrep as of June 7,” June 8, 1967, Mideast Crisis Cable, vol. 4, June 1967, NSF Country File, Johnson Library; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 240–56. When President Havai Boumedienne of Algeria complained in Moscow in 1967 of inadequate Soviet support for the Arab cause during the war, Leonid Brezhnev replied, “What is your opinion of nuclear war?” Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, p. 128.

9. Moore to Bryant, June 27, 1967, with Moore to Califano, June 28, 1967, Pricing Files, January-June 1967, Ross-Robson papers, Aides Files, White House Central Files, Johnson Library (“compliance” and “crisis”); Harkabi, Arab Attitudes, pp. 2–9 (“liquidation”).

10. Interview with Harold Saunders (“floating crap game”); Oil and Gas Journal, July 17, 1967, p. 43 (“bad dream”); September 11, 1967, p. 41; “Wright/Summary,” June 26, 1967, Pricing Files, January-June 1967, Ross-Robson papers, Aides Files, White House Central Files, Johnson Library; Letter from James Akins to author, July 27, 1989; Kapstein, Insecure Alliance, pp. 130 (“Suez system”), 147 (“threat of an emergency”), 136 (“principal safety factor”).

11. “World Export Picture,” July 27, 1967, October 15, 1967, Pricing Files, Oil, July and August, 1967, Ross-Robson papers, Aides Files, White House Central Files, Johnson Library; Wall, Exxon, pp. 624–26 (“tanker fleet”); Multinational Hearings, part 8, p. 589 (salt mines); Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1967, p. 1; Oil and Gas Journal, August 7, pp. 96–98; September 11, p. 45; August 14, 1967, p. 8.

12. Multinational Hearings, part 8, p. 764 (“surplus crude”); Geoffrey Kirk, ed., Schumacher on Energy (London: Sphere Books, 1983), pp. 1–5, 82, 14; Barbara Wood, E. F. Schumacher: His Life and Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 344 (“chickens”).

The following table shows the explosive growth in automobile usage in the U.S. and the rest of the world since World War II.

Passenger Car Registration
(millions of cars)

 

U.S.

Rest of World

Total

1950

40.3

12.7

53.0

1960

61.7

36.6

98.3

1970

89.2

104.2

193.4

1980

121.6

198.8

320.4

1990*

147.9

292.8

440.7

*Estimate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the U.S., World Motor Vehicle Data, 1990, p. 35.

Chapter 28

1. Interview with Peter Ramsbotham; Time, October 25, 1971, pp. 32–33 (Pompidou); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 183–85 (Shah on Maxim’s).

2. Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), pp. 284 (band), 299 (“unwise”); J. B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf & the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 47–53 (“mercenaries”), 80 (Dubai), 92 (Bahrain); Pahlavi, Shah’s Story, p. 135 (“safety of the Persian Gulf”); FRUS: Iran, 1951–1954, pp. 854–57 (Nixon on the Shah); Interview with James Schlesinger.

3. Interview with Ulf Lantzke; Steven A. Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution, p. 110 (“old warrior”); Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy Future, p. 1 (1968 State Department notice); Wall, Exxon, p. 828 (1972 OECD meeting); Vernon, Oil Crisis, pp. 31, 18, 23, 28.

4. On New York utilities, interviews with Pierce, Swartz and Doyle, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews and New York Times, November 25, 1966, p. 1; November 26, 1966, p. 1; December 18, 1966, p. 24. Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jorgen Randers and William Behrens III, The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, 2d ed. (New York: Signet Books, 1974), pp. 29, 85–86, 75; Johnson, Sun, p. 217 (“new game”). On Santa Barbara spill, see Cole to Nixon, “Santa Barbara Channel Oil Leases,” November 9, 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Nixon papers; New York Times, February 27, 1969, p. 1; William Rintoul, Drilling Ahead: Tapping California’s Richest Oil Fields (Santa Cruz: Valley Publishers, 1981), chap. 12.

5. Macmillan to Menzies, “Prime Minister: Personal Telegram,” T267/58, PREM 11/2441/PRO (“well aware”); Interviews with Robert Belgrave, James Lee (“never get to $5”), Robert O. Anderson and Frank McFadzean; Peter Kann, “Oilmen Battle Elements to Tap Pools Beneath Alaskan Water, Land,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1967, p. 1; Charles S. Jones, From the Rio Grande to the Arctic: The Story of the Richfield Oil Corporation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), chap. 45; Kenneth Harris,The Wildcatter: A Portrait of Robert O. Anderson (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 77–93; Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import Question: A Report on the U.S. Relationship of Oil Imports to the National Security(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970). For the environmental battle, see David R. Brower, “Who Needs the Alaska Pipeline?” New York Times, February 5, 1971, p. 31; Charles J. Cicchetti, “The Wrong Route,” Environment 15 (June 1973), p. 6 (“probable major discharges”); United States Department of the Interior, An Analysis of the Economic and Security Aspects of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971).

6. Interviews with Armand Hammer, Victor Hammer, James Placke and others.

7. Interviews with Deutsch (gold chess set) and William Bellano (“orderly transfer”), Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Armand Hammer with Neil Lyndon, Hammer (New York: Putnam, 1987), passim, esp. pp. 337 (“Hammer’s Folly”), 340; Steve Weinberg, Armand Hammer: The Untold Story (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), chap. 15.

8. Interview with James Placke; First, Libya, chap. 7, pp. 103, 265; Mohammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), pp. 185 (“ideas of Islam”), 70; Wall, Exxon, pp. 704–11 (“5000 years,” “Good God!” and Jersey director); Interviews with William Bollano, Charles Lee, Northcutt Ely, Jack Miklos, Thomas Wachtell, Henry Schuler, James Akins, Mohammed Finaish (“eggs”), George Williamson (“perfectly understandable” and “Everybody who drives”), George Parkhurst and Dennis Bonney, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Hammer, Hammer, p. 383 (“disciple”); Fortune, August 1971, p. 116; John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 239; Multinational Hearings, vol. 7, pp. 377–78.

9. Multinational Hearings, part 8, pp. 771–73 (“picked off”); part 6, pp. 64 (“tricks”), 84–87 (“year 1951”), 70–71 (“must go along”). Interviews with Fadhil al-Chalabi and James Placke; Interviews with George Williamson and John Tigrett (Libyan Safety Net), James Placke (“truce”), Dudley Chapman and John McCloy, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews. Fortune, August 1971, pp. 113, 197 (“Groucho”), 190 (“not my father”); Wall, Exxon, pp. 774–76 (“silly as hell”); Thomas L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 12.

10. Interview with Fadhil al-Chalabi (“OPEC got muscles”); Kelly, Arabia, p. 357 (“no leapfrogging”); Wright, Libya, p. 244 (“buyer’s market…is over”); Interviews with Henry Schuler, pp. 10–12, Joseph Palmer II, Henry Moses, George Parkhurst and Dennis Bonney, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews; Multinational Subcommittee, Multinational Hearings, part 6, p. 221 (Jalloud).

11. Zuhayr M. Mikdashi, Sherrill Cleland and Ian Seymour, Continuity and Change in the World Oil Industry (Beirut: Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1970), pp. 215–16 (Yamani on participation); Sampson, Seven Sisters, p. 245 (“Catholic marriage”); Multinational Hearings, part 6, pp. 44–45 (“concerted action”), 50 (“trend toward nationalization”); Schneider, Oil Price Revolution, pp. 176 (“updated book value” and “participation agreement”), 179, 182 (Exxon chairman); Interview with Ed Guinn, Multinational Subcommittee Staff Interviews (skeletons); Wall, Exxon, pp. 840–42 (“hard blow” and “I won”).

12. Sampson, Seven Sisters, pp. 240–42; Multinational Hearings, vol. 7, pp. 332–37 (surplus capacity). Embassy in Tripoli to Washington, December 5, 1970, 02823; Embassy in Tripoli to Washington, November 23, 1970, A-220, State Department papers.

Chapter 29

1. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 248–52; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 854 (“altered irrevocably”). On quotas, see Kissinger to Nixon, November 21, 1969; Jamiesen and Warner to Nixon, November 26, 1969, White House Central Files [EX] CO 1–7; Flanigan to Staff Secretary, November 20, 1969, [CF] TA 4/Oil, White House Special Files, Confidential Files. Flanigan to Kissinger, January 23, 1970, [EX] CO 128 (“power vacuum”); Nixon to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, April 16, 1970, [EX] CO 68 (“disappointment”), White House Central Files, Nixon archives.

2. Flanigan to Nixon, March 11, 1972, [EX] UT; Charles DiBona to John Ehrlichman and George Shultz, March 19, 1973, Darrell Trent to the President, April 4, 1973, [EX] CM 29, White House Central Files, Nixon archives. Akins’s study is Department of State, “The International Oil Industry Through 1980,” December 1971, in Muslim Students Following the Line of the Iman, Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den, vol. 57 (Tehran: Center for the Publication of the U.S. Espionage Den’s Documents, [1986]), pp. 42, i, ii; James Akins interview (Ehrlichman); James Akins, “The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf Is Here,” Foreign Affairs, April 1973, pp. 462–90; M. A. Adelman, “Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as OPEC Tax Collectors,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1972–1973, pp. 73, 102–3.

3. Interview with Herbert Goodman (“In spite”); Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution, pp. 195 (“near-panic buying”), 202 (Nixon), 205–6 (“either dead or dying”); Vernon, Oil Crisis, p. 47 (market prices); Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 538 (“out of whack”).

4. Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 210 (“legacy”), 237, 239 (Sadat and Faisal); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 460 (“Sadat aimed”), 297–99; New York Times, December 21, 1977, p. A14.

5. For Faisal on Israelis, see Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 1012 and Heikal, Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975), p. 79. Terzian, OPEC, pp. 164–65 (Faisal on oil weapon), 167 (Faisal to American press); MEES, September 14, 1973, pp. 3–5; June 23, 1973, p. ii (Kuwaiti oil minister); April 20, 1973; September 21, 1973, p. 11; Multinational Hearings, part 7, pp. 504–9 (Faisal’s meetings with Aramco, Aramco’s with Washington); Interview with Alfred DeCrane, Jr.

6. Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 364–66; Heikal, Road to Ramadan, p. 268 (“give us time”); Multinational Hearings, part 7, p. 542 (“new phenomenon”); MEES, August 3, 1973, p. 8 (Sisco); September 7, 1973, pp. iii–iv (Nixon press conference); September 21, 1973, p. 1; Interviews with William Quandt, Harold Saunders and Ulf Lantzke; Caldwell, “Petroleum Politics in Japan,” pp. 182–88 (White Paper, Nakasone and Tanaka), 264 (Akins article).

7. MEES, September 21, 1973, p. 2 (“windfall profits”); “Mr. McCloy Comes to Washington: Highlights of John J. McCloy’s Recent Oil Diplomacy,” Multinational Subcommittee Staff interviews (“picked off” and “indispensable”); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 465 (CIA analysis), 466 (Israeli estimate); Interview with William Colby (Watch Committee); Multinational Subcommittee, Multinational Oil Corporations, p. 149. A dramatic account of the crucial October 12 meeting is in chaps. 1 and 12 of Anthony Sampson’s classic history of the international oil industry, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped, rev. ed. (London: Coronet, 1988), esp. pp. 262–64 and 32–33.

8. Interviews with William Quandt and Harold Saunders (“fall maneuvers”); Sadat, In Search of Identity, pp. 241–42; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 482, 459–67; Safran, Israel, pp. 285–86, 484; Avi Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” World Politics 28 (1975), pp. 352–59 (“conception”); Moshe Ma’oz, Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1988), pp. 91–92.

9. Safran, Israel, pp. 482–90 (“Third Temple” and Meir’s letters); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 493–96 (“conscious”), 536 (“stakes”); Multinational Hearings, part 7, pp. 546–47 (Aramco letter), 217; Interviews with William Quandt, James Schlesinger, and Fadhil al-Chalabi; Schneider, Oil Price Revolution, pp. 225–26 (Kuwaiti oil minister); MEES, October 19, 1973, p. 6. For analysis of the Soviet resupply, see William Quandt, “Soviet Policy in the October Middle East War,” part II, International Affairs, October 1977, pp. 587–603. Owing to the surprise, said General Haim Barlev, there was on the Israeli side “not a single field in which things were handled according to plan.” The massive and confused improvisation further strained the supplies and matériel. Louis Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Publishing Project, 1975), pp. 264–68.

10. Interviews with William Quandt and Fadhil al-Chalabi; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 526 (“lukewarm”), 534–36 (Saqqaf meeting), 854 (“political blackmail”), 552 (“All hell”); Terzian, OPEC, pp. 170–75 (secret resolution); Heikal, Road to Ramadan, pp. 267–70; Sampson, Seven Sisters, pp. 300–1; William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 190; New York Times, October 18, 1973, p. 1;MEES, October 19, 1973, p. 1 (“Suffice it”); Cabinet Meeting, October 18, 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office File, President’s Meetings, Nixon archives (“had to act”); Nixon, Memoirs, p. 933.

11. Interviews with William Colby and James Schlesinger; Nixon, Memoirs, p. 923 (Agnew); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 501, 511 (“eerie ceremony”), 576 (“idiot”), 583 (“say it straight”), 585 (“too distraught”); Quandt, Decade of Decisions, pp. 194–200; Multinational Hearings, part 7, pp. 515–17 (Jungers); Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 374–85.

Chapter 30

1. Interviews with Steven Bosworth (“Coca Cola”) and James Schlesinger; MEES, November 2, 1973, pp. 3, 14–16 (Saddam Hussein); Vernon, Oil Crisis, pp. 180–81.

2. Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy Future, p. 27 (“bidding for our life”); Wood, Schumacher, pp. 352–55 (“party is over”); Interview with Ulf Lantzke. On Japan, Letter from Takahiko Ohashi, August 19, 1989; Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, eds., Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal, (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 134, 174–75; Caldwell, “Petroleum Politics in Japan,”: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 224–91. Laird to Haig, November 5, 1973, CM 29; Sawhill to Rush, June 26, 1974, UT (“measures”), White House Central Files, Nixon archives.

3. Cabinet Meeting Notes, November 6, 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, President’s meetings; Ash to Nixon, “Federal Role in Energy Problem,” White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, President’s Handwriting (“I urge”); Yankelovich to Haig, December 6, 1973, with memorandum; Parker to Haig, November 23, 1973 (“heavy newsday”); Ash to Nixon, February 28, 1974 (“nothing could win”), UT, White House Central Files, Nixon archives. D. Goodwin, Energy Policy, pp. 447–48 (“national goal”); William E. Simon, A Time for Truth (New York: Berkley Books, 1978), pp. 55–66; Wall, Exxon, p. 883; Interviews with Steven Bosworth and Charles DiBona; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 805 (“hydra-headed”), 567, 632 (“spectacular”).

4. Pierre Wack, “Scenarios: Uncharted Waters Ahead,” Harvard Business Review, 63 (September-October 1985), pp. 72–89; “Apportionment of Oil Supplies in an Emergency Among the OECD Countries,” with Knubel memo, National Security Council, November 8, 1973, [EX] MC, White House Central Files, Nixon archives (“working group”); Multinational Hearings, part 5, p. 187; part 7, p. 418 (Keller); part 9, pp. 190 (“only defensible course”), 33–34 (“equitable share”); Interviews with Eric Drake, Herbert Goodman (“torment”) and Yoshio Karita; Federal Energy Administration and Senate Multinational Subcommittee, U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil Embargo: The International Allocation of Constricted Supply (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), p. 4; Skeet, OPEC, p. 106 (“impossible to know”); Vernon, Oil Crisis, pp. 179–88 (“Holland”); Geoffrey Chandler, “Some Current Thoughts on the Oil Industry,” Petroleum Review, January 1973, pp. 6–12; Geoffrey Chandler in “The Changing Shape of the Oil Industry,” Petroleum Review, June 1974.

5. Vernon, Oil Crisis, pp. 189–90 (“assurances”), 197; Interviews with Eric Drake and Frank McFadzean; Letters to the author from Drake, July 2, 1990, and McFadzean, August 23, 1990; Sampson, Seven Sisters, pp. 275–77; FEA, International Allocation, pp. 9–10 (“difficult to imagine”).

6. Interview with James Akins; Sampson, Seven Sisters, p. 270 (“If you went down”); Schneider, Oil Price Revolution, p. 237; Interview with Shah by Robert Stobaugh (“new concept”); Skeet, OPEC, p. 103 (“alternative source”); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 888 (Nixon to Shah); Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to Richard M. Nixon, January 10, 1974, with Department of State to NSC Secretariat, CM 29, White House Central Files, Nixon archives; MEES, December 28, 1973, Supplement, pp. 2–5 (“noble product”).

7. Sadat, In Search of Identity, p. 293 (“99 percent”); Interviews with Steven Bosworth and William Quandt (“60 percent of the cards”); Schneider, Oil Price Revolution, p. 233 (“extremely sorry” and “If you are hostile”); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 897 (Pompidou), 720 (Heath), 638–44, 883 (“putting pressure”); MEES, November 30, 1973, p. 13; November 11, 1973 (“kiss blown from afar”); Robert J. Lieber, Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1976), p. 15; Michael M. Yoshitsu, Caught in the Middle East: Japan’s Diplomacy in Transition (Washington, D.C.: Heath, 1984), pp. 1–3 (“always buy” and “oil on the brain”); Caldwell, “Petroleum Politics in Japan,” pp. 206–7 (“direct request”), 211 (“neutrality”), 217.

8. MEES, January 18, 1974; Frank McFadzean, The Practice of Moral Sentiment, (London: Shell, n.d.), p. 30 (“spectacle”); Interviews with Ulf Lantzke and Yoshio Karita; Helmut Schmidt, Men and Power: A Political Perspective (New York: Random House, 1989), pp. 161–64; Robert J. Lieber, The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 19 (Jobert).

9. Interviews with William Quandt and Harold Saunders; MEES, January 4, 1974, p. 11 (“increasingly less appropriate”); MEES, March 22, 1974, pp. 4–5 (“constructive effort”); MEES, November 30, 1973, p. 11 (“Wailing Wall”); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 663–64 (Kissinger and Faisal), 659; Quandt, Decade of Decision, pp. 231, 245.

Chapter 31

1. Ali M. Jaidah, “Oil Pricing: A Role in Search of an Actor,” PIW, Special Supplement, September 12, 1988, p. 2 (“Golden Age”); Business Week, May 26, 1975, p. 49 (Datsun); Interview with Chief M. O. Feyide.

2. Howard Page, “OPEC Is Not in Control,” 1975, Wanda Jablonski papers. Raymond Vernon describes the period 1973 through 1978 as one of “a somewhat unruly oligopoly, composed of a dominant member (Saudi Arabia), a dozen followers barely prepared to acknowledge its leadership, and a large outer circle of producers pricing under the shelter of the oligopoly. It was clear at this stage that the majors had lost control of prices, but not at all clear what organizing force had taken its place.” Raymond Vernon,Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 29. Tax shares calculated from OPEC, Petroleum Product Prices and Their Components in Selected Countries: Statistical Time Series, 1960–1983 (Vienna: OPEC, [1984]). Shawcross, Shah’s Last Ride, pp. 166–82 (“speed,” “serious” and Yamani on Shah); Helms to Secretary of State, September 10, 1974, Tehran 07611 (“day has passed”); Yamani-Ingersoll Meeting Transcript, October 1974, State Department Papers. MEES, September 5, 1975, p. 49 (“toy”).

3. Jeffrey Robinson, Yamani: The Inside Story (London: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 41 (Yamani on his father), 153, 204 (“long term”); New York Times, October 8, 1972, section 3, p. 7 (“sweet reasonableness”); Oriana Fallaci, “A Sheikh Who Hates to Gamble,” New York Times Magazine, September 14, 1975, p. 40 (“can’t bear gambling”); Interviews (“consummate strategist” and “ostentatiously calm”); Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 876–77 (“technician”); Time, January 6, 1975, pp. 9, 27; Pierre Terzian,OPEC, chap. 11; MEES, April 25, 1977 (“economic disaster”); May 1, 1978; January 10, 1977, p. 10 (“devil”); December 27, 1976, p. iii (“stooge” and “in the service”). On Prince Fahd’s meeting with Carter, see William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 68; “Secretary’s Lunch for Prince Fahd,” May 24, 1977, Vance to Crown Prince Fahd, June 18, 1977, State Department Papers. On division of responsibility in Saudi oil policymaking, see Cyrus Vance to the President, Memorandum, “Saudi Arabian Oil Policy,” October 1977, Dhahran to Secretary of State, February 3, 1977, Dhahran 00149, State Department Papers.

4. Business Week, January 13, 1975, p. 67 (“only chance”); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 316–20. A review of 1,021 State Department cables and papers obtained under the Freedom of Information Act shows a consistent opposition of the United States government to higher oil prices from 1974 onward and right across the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. For instance, the outgoing (Ford Administration) Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William D. Rodgers, wrote a long, private letter to his successor (Carter Administration), Richard N. Cooper, outlining the main international economic issues and policies for the United States. “Our oil diplomacy,” Rodgers noted, “concentrate[s] on what we can do to head off an oil price rise.” Rodgers to Cooper, January 11, 1977, State Department papers. Indeed, in the last days of the Ford Administration, Kissinger met with the Saudi Arabian ambassador to explain that he was “conscience-bound” to argue against price increases on behalf of the incoming Carter Administration! Secretary Kissinger’s meeting with Saudi Ambassador Alireza on OPEC Price Decision, November 9, 1977, State Department papers. Also see Kissinger to Ford, August 27, 1974; Kissinger Meeting with Senators and Congressmen, June 10, 1975; President Ford to King Khalid, December 31, 1976, State 314138, State Department papers. On Soviet deal, interviews with Herbert Goodman and in Moscow; Hormats to Scowcroft, November 14, 1975, TA 4/29, 10/1/75–12/11/75 file, White House Central Files; Russell to Greenspan, October 29, 1975, “Russell (6)” file; Russell to Greenspan, November 4, 1975, “Russell (7)” file, Box 141, CEA papers, Ford Library.

5. United States Department of State, Briefing Paper on Iran, January 3, 1977, in Muslim Students Following the Line of the Iman, U.S. Interventions in Iran (1), vol. 8 of Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den (Tehran: Center for the Publication of the U.S. Espionage Den’s Documents, [1986]), p. 129; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Penguin, 1984), pp. 140 (“wave a finger”), 172; Interviews with Harold Saunders (“Big Pillar”), James Schlesinger, Steven Bosworth (“pussy cats”) and James Akins. On nut: New York Times, July 16, 1974, p. 4, July 18, 1974, p. 57, and letter from Jack C. Miklos to author, Sept. 4, 1990. Minister of Court Asadollah Alam’s retort was, “Simon may be a good bond salesman, but he does not know a whole lot about oil.” Anthony Parsons, The Pride and the Fall: Iran, 1974–1979 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 47 (“calculating opportunism”); Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Penguin, 1987), pp. 16, 26 (“no visible”), 32–33; Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin’s, 1979), p. 20 (“acquired money”). Richard Cooper to the Secretary, August 12, 1978 (“price freeze offensive”); Blumenthal to the President, October 28, 1977, Dhahran 01261; Cyrus Vance to the President, November 4, 1977 (“price hawk”), State Department papers. Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter Presidency (New York: Putnam, 1982), pp. 88–89; Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 321–22 (“punishing impact” and “break”). Real prices derived from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1988, p. 187.

6. PIW, April 14, 1975, p. 10 (“good bye”); MEES, March 7, p. 2; July 18, (“Oil is everything”). On oil companies’ meetings in Kuwait, “Kuwait: Summary of Situation as of March 15, 1975,” March 17, 1975; “Meetings at Ministry of Oil, March 12 and March 15, 1975,” March 17, 1975, pp. 1, 3, 4, 8; “Meeting with the Prime Minister, March 29, 1975,” April 2, 1975, Goodman papers; Interview with Herbert Goodman.

7. Interviews with Frank Alcock, Alberto Quiros, and Robert Dolph; Gustavo Coronel, The Nationalization of the Venezuelan Oil Industry: From Technocratic Success to Political Failure (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 66–71 (“feverish debate”); Rabe, Road to OPEC, p. 190 (“act of faith”).

8. On Saudi Arabia’s purchase of Aramco, Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution, pp. 407–8; Aramco Annual Reports; Interviews. On direct sales, Vernon, Two Hungry Giants, p. 32 and PIW, February 25, 1980, p. 3.

Chapter 32

1. Business Week, January 13, 1975, p. 67 (“conditions”). On Japan, interviews with Naohiro Amaya and Yoshio Karita; Letter from Tadahiko Ohashi, August 14, 1989; Samuels, Business of the Japanese State, chaps. 5–6. On French policy and advertising, interviews with Jean Blancard, Jean Syrota and Charles Mateudi.

2. Interview with Henry Jackson (“screwed on”); Carol J. Loomis, “How to Think About Oil Company Profits,” Fortune, April 1974, p. 99; Karalogues to Nixon, December 19, 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Nixon archives (“Scoops the hell”). On Jackson Committee Hearings, see United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 93d Congress, 1st Session, Current Energy Shortages, Oversight Series: Conflicting Information on Fuel Shortages (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), pp. 113–14, 154, 399, 400, 472–73 and New York Times, January 22–25, 1974. Yergin and Hillenbrand, Global Insecurity, pp. 119–20; “The Eighties: An Update,” Company Document, January 1976, p. 22 (“less certain”); Geoffrey Chandler, “The Innocence of Oil Companies,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1977, p. 67 (“threat”); Chase Manhattan Bank, Annual Financial Analysis of a Group of Petroleum Companies, 1970–1979. On inflation, see Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989).

3. Pietro S. Nivola, The Politics of Energy Conservation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986); Vietor, Energy Policy, pp. 253 (“every problem”), 256 (“refining junk”), 238 (Federal Register), 258; Cole to the President, Decision on Signing of Alaska Pipeline Legislation, November 13, 1973, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Nixon archives; Interview with Robert O. Anderson.

4. Goodwin, Energy Policy, pp. 554–55 (“zeal”); Interviews with Stuart Eizenstat and James Schlesinger; Stuart E. Eizenstat, “The 1977 Energy Plan: M.E.O.W,” Case note for the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Collins, 1982), pp. 92–106 (“deeply resented” and “most difficult question”); James Schlesinger, “The Energy Dilemma,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review, Summer 1972, p. 13; Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy Future, p. 70 (“Hell”); MEES, December 11, 1978, p. i (“water torture”).

5. Business Week, February 3, 1975, p. 38 (“just wild”); Interview with Robert Dolph (“rabbits”); E. C. G. Werner, “Presentation to the Frankfurt Financial Community,” Nov. 25, 1976, p. 3.

6. George W. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), pp. 58, 77 (“digestion”); “Why the Bankers Love Mexico,” Fortune, July 16, 1979, pp. 138, 142.

7. Anthony Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries, 1972–1976 (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 403 (“cross-section”); Interviews with Harold Wilson and Thomas Balogh; Stig S. Kvendseth, Giant Discovery: A History of Ekofisk Through the First 20 Years (Tanager, Norway: Phillips Petroleum Norway, 1988), pp. 9–31; Daniel Yergin, “Britain Drills and Prays,” New York Times Magazine, November 2, 1975, pp. 13, 59.

8. On oil price forecasting, see Arthur Andersen & Co. and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, The Future of Oil Prices: The Perils of Prophecy (Houston: 1984). On the extent of the consensus in 1978, see “Threatening Scramble for Oil,” Petroleum Economist, May 1978, pp. 178–79; Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy Future, pp. 351–52, n. 34; Francisco Parra, “World Energy Supplies and the Search for Oil,” MEES, Supplement, April 12, 1978, pp. 1–6. “By general consensus,” Parra commented, “the next energy crisis is programmed for the 1980s, when a shortage of oil will occur that threatens further economic growth because alternative supplies of energy will not be available in the required quantities.” MEES, June 26, 1978, p. iv (“our own studies”); Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977, book 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), pp. 2220–21 (“island of stability”); Interview (“big trouble”).

Chapter 33

1. Parsons, Pride and Fall, pp. 10, 8, 50, 54–55; Graham, Iran, p. 19; New York Times, June 5, 1989, p. A11; Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions, p. 176 (“A-list”).

2. Bill, Eagle and Lion, pp. 235, 51; Sick, All Fall Down, p. 40 (“40–40”). Sick is a significant source for the Iranian revolution and American policy. Parsons, Pride and Fall, pp. 62–64 (“no compromise”), 71 (“I was worried”); United States Congress, House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Evaluation, Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1979), pp. 2, 6–7 (intelligence); Shawcross,Shah’s Last Ride, chap. 14 (Shah’s ill health); Interview with Robert Bowie.

3. IEA archives; Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 57 (“public opinion”), 123–25 (Soviet plot), 132; Parsons, Pride and Fall, pp. 85 (“snow”); Interviews with Jeremy Gilbert (“The Fields”), James Schlesinger and Harold Saunders (“first systematic meeting”); Richard Falk, “Trusting Khomeini,” New York Times, February 16, 1979, p. A27 (“entourage”); New York Times, February 8, 1979, p. A13; February 9, 1979, p. A17 (“saint”); William H. Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 200–3 (“Thinking the Unthinkable”), 225 (“no policy”).

4. Mohamed Heikal, Iran, The Untold Story: An Insider’s Account of America’s Iranian Adventure and Its Consequences for the Future (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 145–46; Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 123 (“torrents of blood”), 108 (prank), 182–83 (“Khomeini wins”); Parsons, Pride and Fall, pp. 114 (“dictator”), 124–26 (“I would leave”); Interview with Jeremy Gilbert and Jeremy Gilbert to author, Nov. 15, 1989. On the American tanker, Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 96–247. Shawcross, Shah’s Last Ride, p. 35 (“feeling tired”); Paul Lewis, “On Khomeini’s Flight,” New York Times, Feb. 2, 1979, p. A7.

5. Interview with Jeremy Gilbert.

6. IEA archives; Daniel Badger and Robert Belgrave, Oil Supply and Price: What Went Right in 1980? (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1982), pp. 106–7 (motorists); M. S. Robinson, “The Crude Oil Price Spiral of 1978–80,” February 1982, pp. 1–2. Katz to Cooper, “U.S. Oil Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia,” January 12, 1979; Richard Cooper to John West, January 15, 1979, State 011064; Vance to Embassy, Saudi Arabia, January 26, 1979; Cooper to the Secretary, February 8, 1979, 7902573; West to Vance, “Oil Matters: Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd,” February 15, 1979, State Department papers. PIW, March 19, 1979, pp. 1–2 (“not to count on Exxon”); Interview with Clifton Garvin.

7. Interviews with Ulf Lantzke, J. Wallace Hopkins and others; Muslim Students Following the Line of the Iman, Documents from U.S. Espionage Den, vol. 40, U.S. Interventions in the Islamic Countries: Kuwait (2) (Tehran: Center for the Publication of the U.S. Espionage Den’s Documents, [1986]), p. 58 (“fool”); CIA, outgoing message, April 4, 1979, DDRS, 1988, doc. 1300.

8. OPEC, “Communique: 53rd Extraordinary Meeting,” March 27, 1977; Stobaugh and Yergin, Energy Future, 2d ed., pp. 342 (“free-for-all”), 346 (“short-run politics”); Interview with M. S. Robinson (“Nobody controlled”). On the Saudis and “the whole question of production,” see Riyadh to Secretary of State, March 25, 1979, Riyadh 00484; Jidda to Secretary of State, April 17, 1979, Jidda 03094; Yamani edict in Daniels to Secretary of State, May 23, 1979, Jidda 03960, State Department papers. IEA archives; PIW, May 14, 1979, pp. 1, 9; United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Report of the Justice Department to the President Concerning the Gasoline Shortage of 1979 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), pp. 153–65; Interviews with Richard Cooper and Clifton Garvin.

9. Interviews with Stuart Eizenstat, James Schlesinger and Eugene Zuckert; Eliot Cutler to Jim McIntyre and Stuart Eizenstat, “Synthetics and Energy Supply,” June 12, 1979; Benjamin Brown and Daniel Yergin, “Synfuels 1979,” draft case, Kennedy School, 1981, pp. 15 (“darts and arrows”), 46 (Eizenstat memo); Richard Cooper to John West, June 8, 1979, State 147000, State Department papers; Carter, Keeping Faith, pp. 111–13 (“one of the worst days”); New York Times, June 27, 1979, p. Al (Harvard Business School); July 12, 1979, p. Al; July 19, 1979, p. A14; July 20, 1979, p. Al, July 21, 1979, p. Al. The Washington Post’s national editor was Lawrence Stern.

10. M. S. Robinson, “Crude Oil Price Spiral,” pp. 10, 12 (“cat-and-mouse”); Skeet, OPEC, p. 159 (“If BNOC”); Interviews with Ulf Lantzke, James Schlesinger, and industry executive; Shell Briefing Service, “Trading Oil,” 1984; PIW, August 27, 1979, p. 1, Special Supplement (Schlesinger).

Chapter 34

1. Tim Wells, 444 Days: The Hostages Remember (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 67–69; Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 35–41, 57 (Elizabeth Ann Swift), 58–60, 112 (Carter Doctrine); Terence Smith, “Why Carter Admitted the Shah,” New York Times Magazine, May 17, 1981, pp. 36, 37ff.; On the Algiers meeting, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985), pp. 475–76. John Kifner, “How a Sit-in Turned into a Siege,” New York Times Magazine, May 17, 1981, pp. 58, 63 (“Nest of spies”); Sick, All Fall Down, pp. 239 (“rotten brains”), 248 (“by the balls”); Steven R. Weisman, “For America, A Painful Reawakening,” New York Times Magazine, May 17, 1981, pp. 114ff.; Shawcross, Shah’s Last Ride, pp. 242–52.

2. IEA archives. Mansfield to Secretary of State, December 14, 1979, Tokyo 21956; Mansfield to Secretary of State, January 4, 1980, Tokyo 00125; Vance to Tokyo Embassy, February 5, 1980, State 031032, State Department papers. MEES, October 22, p. 6 (“losing control”); December 31, 1979; New York Times, December 21, 1979, p. D3 (“catastrophe”); December 20, 1979, p. D5 (“glut”); Terzian, OPEC, p. 275 (“almighty God”).

3. PIW, Supplement, pp. 1, 4 (“cardinal issue”); Walter Levy, “Oil and the Decline of the West,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 999–1015; Interviews with Rene Ortiz and others.

4. Joan Oates, Babylon (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), pp. 51–52 (poem); Georges Roux, Ancient Iraq (London: Penguin, 1985), p. 168; Ilya Gershevitch, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 2, The Medean and Achaemenian Periods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 1–25.

5. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 217–20 (shaqawah), 228; Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 147–60 (“infidel Ba’th Party”), 165 (“every street corner”); Anthony H. Cordesman, “Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round,” Armed Forces Journal International, 119 (April 1982), p. 34 (“dwarf Pharaoh”); R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 60 (“Khomeini the rotten”); Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, p. 126; Interview with Rene Ortiz; R. M. Grye, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4, The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 9–25 (“Victory of Victories”); David Lamb, The Arabs: Journeys Beyond the Mirage (New York: Vintage, 1988), pp. 287–91 (coffins, “purest joy” and minefields); Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).

6. IEA archives; M. S. Robinson, “The Great Bear Market in Oil 1980–1983” (Nyborg: Shell, 1983). Ryan to Secretary of State, October 6, 1980, Paris 31399; Sherman to Secretary of State, October 7, 1980, Tokyo 17911; Salzman to Secretary of State, October 22, 1980, Paris 33213; Muskie to Embassies, October 24, 1980, State 283948, State Department papers.

7. PIW, November 17, 1980 (“still someone else”); November 24, 1980, p. 2 (“deep trouble”); April 17, 1981, Supplement, p. 1 (“stabilize the price”). Mansfield to Secretary of State, December 23, 1980, Tokyo 22437 (MITI official on “undesirable purchases”); Vance to Tokyo Embassy, October 11, 1980, State 277058, State Department papers. Interviews with Ulf Lantzke, J. Wallace Hopkins, William Martin (D’Avignon) and Alfred DeCrane, Jr.; Schneider, Oil Price Revolution, p. 453.

Chapter 35

1. Interview with Clifton Garvin; New York Times, May 3, 1982, p. Al; October 10, 1982, p. A33; Andrew Gulliford, Boomtown Blues: Colorado Oil Shale, 1885–1985 (Niwot, Colo.: University Press of Colorado, 1989), chaps. 4–6. On autos, see Marc Ross, “U.S. Private Vehicles and Petroleum Use,” Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report, October 1988.

2. PIW: Alirio Parra, “OPEC Move May Lead to ‘Structured’ Market,” Special Supplement, April 12, 1982; “Spot Products Nosedive Spreads Everywhere,” Special Supplement, February 22, 1982; Herbert Lewinsky, “Oil Seen Becoming Even More International,” Special Supplement, July 12, 1982, p. 3 (Mobil Executive); Robert Mabro, “OPEC’s Future Pricing Role May Be at Stake,” Special Supplement, April 19, 1982; December 3, 1982, p. 1; June 4, 1982, pp. 1–3 (“punishment”). Skeet, OPEC, p. 178 (rejection of embargo proposal).

3. Interviews with Yahaya Dikko and Alberto Quiros; PIW, February 14, 1983 (Yamani on pregnancy); March 21, 1983 (“swing producer”); Terzian, OPEC, pp. 313–19.

4. PIW, April 11, 1983, pp. 8–9 (“strategic commodity”); John G. Buchanan, “How Trading Is Reshaping the Industry,” in Yergin and Kates-Garnick, Reshaping of the Oil Industry, pp. 41–44 (“light on security,” “nimble” and “opportunistic”); Interviews with P. I. Walters, George Keller and M. S. Robinson; Chevron, Annual Report, 1983, “Presentation on Downstream Oil Supply Policy,” December 1983.

5. See New York Mercantile Exchange, A History of Commerce at the New York Mercantile Exchange: The Evolution of an International Marketplace, 1872–1988 (New York: New York Mercantile Exchange, 1988).

6. A. G. Mojtabai, Blessed Assurance: At Home with the Bomb in Amarillo, Texas (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), pp. 47, 199; T. Boone Pickens, Boone (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987), passim, and pp. 11, 31 (“mouth shut”), 34; Interviews with T. Boone Pickens and Taylor Yoakam (“Saturday morning”); Adam Smith, The Roaring ’80s (New York: Summit Books, 1988), pp. 193–95; T. Boone Pickens, “The Restructuring of the Domestic Oil and Gas Industry,” in Yergin and Kates-Garnick, Reshaping of the Oil Industry, pp. 60–61.

7. Interviews with Jesus Silva Herzog and Patrick Connolly (“eating our lunch”); Fausto Alzati, “Oil and Debt: Mexico’s Double Challenge,” Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report, June 1987; Philip L. Zweig, Belly Up: The Collapse of the Penn Square Bank (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1986), pp. 198–99 (Gucci loafers); William Greider, Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country (New York: Touchstone, 1989), pp. 518–25 (“bank to beat”), 628–31; Mark Singer, Funny Money(New York: Knopf, 1985).

8. Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1983, p. 1; December 5, 1983, p. 60; April 19, 1984, p. 1; Interviews with Richard Bray and P. I. Walters.

9. Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Oil & Honor: The Texaco-Pennzoil Wars (New York: Putnam, 1987); Steve Coll, The Taking of Getty Oil (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Lenzer, Getty, pp. 331–38; Miller, House of Getty, pp. 331–46.

10. Interviews with James Lee, George Keller, Robert O. Anderson, Philippe Michelon and M. S. Robinson; Pickens, Boone, pp. 182–83 (“need a touchdown”), 216; Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1984, p. 1; John J. McCloy, Nathan W. Pearson and Beverley Matthews, The Great Oil Spill: The Inside Report—Gulf Oil’s Bribery and Political Chicanery (New York: Chelsea House, 1976).

11. Time, June 3, 1985, p. 58 (Armand Hammer); Interviews with Robert O. Anderson and Clifton Garvin; Time, March 17, 1985, p. 46 and Business Week, May 6, 1985, p. 82.

12. On the Soviet gas pipeline, Interview with William F. Martin; Angela Stent, Soviet Energy and Western Europe, Washington paper 90 (New York: Praeger, 1982); Bruce Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Trade(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), chap. 6; Anthony Blinken, Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis (New York: Praeger, 1987).

Chapter 36

1. Richard Reid, “Standing the Test of Time,” Speech at University of Surrey, March 23, 1984 (“chief variable”); PIW, March 18, 1985, p. 8 (“very painful”); Arthur Andersen & Company and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Future of Oil Prices, p. iii; Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, “OPEC’s Deepening Dilemma: The World Oil Market Through 1987,” Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report, October 1984; I. C. Bupp, Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, “How Low Can It Go? The Dynamics of Oil Prices,” Cambridge Energy Research Associates Report, May 1985; MEES, June 2, 1985, p. A6 (“draw a line”).

2. “OPEC Ministers, Taif, June 2–3, 1985” (King’s letter); Skeet, OPEC, p. 195; Interviews with Alfred DeCrane, Jr. and George Keller; PIW, December 16, 1985, p. 8 (communiqué).

3. PIW, September 29, 1986; August 11, 1986 (Iraqi official); Interview with Alfred DeCrane, Jr.; Arie de Geus, “Planning as Learning,” Harvard Business Review 66 (March-April, 1988), pp. 70–74; Washington Post, April 4, 1986, p. 3 (Billy Jack Mason).

4. New York Times, January 13, 1989, p. D16 (“They got a President”); February 21, 1980, p. B10 (Reagan on Alaska); George Bush, with Victor Gold, Looking Forward: An Autobiography (New York: Bantam, 1988), pp. 46, 55 (partner), 64–66, 72 (“rubbed both ways”), 78; Seymour Freedgood, “Life in Midland,” Fortune, April 1962; Bush to Kennedy, November 12, 1969, White House Special Files, Confidential Files, Nixon archives; Fadhil J. al-Chalabi, “The World Oil Price Collapse of 1986: Causes and Implications for the Future of OPEC,” Energy Paper no. 15, International Energy Program, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, p. 6 (“Absolute competition”).

5. New York Times, April 2, 1986, pp. Al, D5 (“selling very hard” and “Our answer”); April 3, 1986, p. D6 (“way to address”); April 7, 1986, pp. Al, D12 (“stability” and “bum rap”); Washington Post, April 10, 1986, p. A 26 (“I’m correct”); April 9, 1986 (“Poor George” and “couldn’t care less”); April 8, 1986 (editorial); Wall Street Journal, April 7, 1986, p. 3 (“national security interest”); Interviews with Richard Murphy, Walter Cutler and Frederick Khedouri.

6. Interviews with Alirio Parra and Robert Mabro; Ise, United States Oil Policy, pp. 123, 109, 113; “Meeting of Group of Five Oil Ministers,” May 24–25, 1986 (Taif meeting); PIW, September 22, 1986, p. 3 (“reasonable prices”); July 28, 1986, p. 4; Briefing to Press Editors, Brioni, July 1, 1986 (“Not on your life”); “The Impact of the U.S. $17–19/Barrel Price Range on OPEC Oil,” July 24, 1986 (OPEC paper); Discussions in Moscow, May 1986 (“bananas”).

7. Ahmed Zaki Yamani, “Oil Markets: Past, Present, and Future,” Energy and Environmental Policy Castes, Kennedy School, Harvard University, September 1986, pp. 3, 5, 11, 20; MEES, May 25, 1987, p. A2: Interviews.

8. Interview with Richard Murphy; Thomas McNaugher, “Walking Tightropes in the Gulf,” in Efraim Karsh, ed., The Iran-Iraq war: Impact and Implications (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 171–99; Anthony M. Cordesman, The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988), chaps. 10–11; New York Times, July 21, 1988, p. Al (“poison”); MEES, May 23, 1988, p. A3; MEES, May 30, 1988 p. C1; MEES, July 25, 1988, p. C1 (“God willing”): MEES August 22, 1988, p. Al; MEES, August 29, 1988. pp. A3, C1.

Chapter 37

1. Interview of Saddam Hussein by Diane Sawyer, Foreign Broadcast Information Services, July 2, 1990, p. 8.

2. Karea Elliott House, “President Sees New Mideast War Unless America Acts,” Wall Street Journal, June 28, 1990, p. A10 (“Weakness”); Marr. Modern History of Iraq, chap. 8; Samir al-Khall, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989).

3. H. R. P. Diction, Kuwait and Her Neighbors (Kuwait borders); Thomes B. Allon, F. Clinton Berry, and Norman Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Publishing Co., 1991 (Bush on aggression): New York Times, August 16, 1990, p. A14 (Bush on freedom).

4. Michael L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (Times Books, New York: 1991), p. 229 (“millitary option”), p. 125 (“10,000 deaths”), p. 173 (“tragic miscalculation”).

5. Schwarzkopf quoted in Allen, Berry, and Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf, p. 211.

Epilogue

1. World Bank, The East Asian Economic Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

2. Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam.” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.

3. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon, 2006, Chapters 8–9, epilogue (“lightning victory,” p. 506).

4. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy. New York: Touchstone, 2002.

5. New York Times, October 30, 2005.

6. CERA Special Report, Capital Costs Analysis Forum—Upstream: Market Review, 2008.

7. On the dollar, see Stephen P. A. Brown, Raghav Virmani, and Richard Alm, Economic Letter—Insights from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, May 2008, p. 6.

8. J. S. Herold, Financial and Operational Data Base.

9. www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/video.transcript/index.html.

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