Additional Information About, and Abbreviations in, the Notes and Bibliography

The spellings of some names may vary between the text and the notes. For example, the usual English-language versions of the names Kochemasov and Maximychev change to German-language renditions, which are sometimes inconsistent, in the notes if the source cited is in German (i.e., usually to Kotchemassow or Maximytschew). Similarly, the German double s, or ß, does not appear in the text, but does appear in notes citing older sources where it was still used.

Locations of primary sources (archives, collections of published documents, collections of documents distributed at scholarly conferences) are abbreviated as indicated below, and their full citations appear in the bibliography (to aid in the finding of the correct reference in the bibliography, the lead editor’s last name is given below where relevant). The bibliography contains primary sources, memoirs, and autobiographical accounts; these are cited where appropriate in the notes as well. Because of space constraints, however, secondary sources appear in full citation only on first reference in the notes, and in short reference for all subsequent citations.

Any emphasis is present in the original unless otherwise indicated in the note. Citations from Stasi documents use the post-1990 Stasi Archive’s page numbering if inserted, otherwise the original page numbers are given. Finally, the archival abbreviations below are for overall collections and major subcollections. Some minor abbreviations, used internally in archives, are not included, since they are available on the archival website and/or at the archive itself.

BArch Bundesarchiv (West German, then German, Federal Archive)

BArchK Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (site of former West German archive)

BDE Bestand Deutscher Einheit (German Unity Collection), part of German Foreign Ministry Political Archive collection

BEL Bezirkseinsatzleitung (District Deployment Leadership, East German term)

BP James A. Baker III Papers, Princeton University

BPB Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Center for Political Education, Germany)

BRD Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany)

BStU Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic, German name for the Stasi Archive)

CWIHPPC Cold War International History Project Paris Conference

DA Demokratischer Aufbruch (German name for Democratic Awakening, new East German political party in 1989)

DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas, published collection of British documents, Salmon, ed.

DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)

DESE Deutsche Einheit Sonderedition (German Unity Special Edition), published collection of West German documents, Küsters, ed.

DFUA La diplomatie française face à l’unification allemande (French Diplomacy and German Unification), published collection of French documents, Vaïsse, ed.

FRL Die friedliche Revolution in Leipzig (The Peaceful Revolution in Leipzig), published collection of East German documents, Hollitzer, ed.

FUF Freunde und Feinde (Friends and Enemies), published collection of East German documents, Dietrich, ed.

GC Georgia Conference proceedings, National Security Archive

GHWBPL George H. W. Bush Presidential Library

GÜST Grenzübergangsstelle (East German term for a border crossing)

KCLMA King’s College Liddell Hart Military Archive

memcon Memorandum of conversation

MG Михаил Горбачев и германский вопрос (Mikhail Gorbachev and the German Question), published collection of Russian documents, Gorbachev, ed.

NSA National Security Archive

PA-AA Politisches Archiv, Auswärtiges Amt (Political Archive, Foreign Ministry, Germany)

PC Prague Conference proceedings, National Security Archive

RRPL Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

SAPMO Stiftung/Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (Foundation /Archive of GDR Parties and Mass Organizations, now part of BArch)

SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social-Democratic Party of Germany)

SS Schlußbericht des Sonderausschusses (Final Report of the Special Committee), report on the investigation of the state of Saxony into regime crimes in the GDR

ZRT-WD Der Zentrale Runde Tisch der DDR (Central Round Table of the GDR), published collection of East German documents, Thaysen, ed.

Notes

Note to Epigraph

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, L’ancien régime et la révolution (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1856), 269–270; Jon Elster, ed., The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 157. The original quotation in French is as follows: “Ce n’est pas toujours en allant de mal en pis que l’on tombe en révolution. Il arrive le plus souvent qu’un peuple qui avait supporté sans se plaindre, et comme s’il ne les sentait pas, les lois les plus accablantes, les rejette violemment dès que le poids s’en allège. . . . Le mal qu’on souffrait patiemment comme inévitable semble insupportable dès qu’on conçoit l’idée de s’y soustraire.” To provide clarity for this excerpt, minor changes to the translation as originally published were undertaken in consultation with the translator.

Introduction: Discovering the Causes of the Collapse

1. These sentences are the concluding lines to Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l’histoire (Paris: Armand Colin, 1974), 160. The original quotation in French is as follows: “Pour tout dire d’un mot, les causes, en histoire pas plus qu’ailleurs, ne se postulent pas. Elles se cherchent. . . .” The translation of this quotation is from Arthur Goldhammer and I am grateful to him for it. For a full English translation of this book, see Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft: Reflections on the Nature and Uses of History and the Techniques and Methods of the Men Who Write It, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Vintage, 1964); Putnam’s translation of this quotation is at 197.

2. It seems that the unusual shape of the Wall at this location was the result of an earlier face-off between US and Soviet tanks over Checkpoint Charlie. The regime appears to have feared that the West might move tanks to the Brandenburg Gate as well, and so constructed the Wall at this site to serve as a particularly effective barrier to tanks. Hence its squat, thick nature. For more on this point, see Johannes Cramer et al., Die Baugeschichte der Berliner Mauer (Petersberg: Imhof Verlag, 2011), 236–238, 305, particularly the photos at 236 and 305.

3. A video clip of this broadcast is available at www.nbcnews.com/id/33590933/#.UnEBuFGRP0c.

4. Hans-Hermann Hertle, Die Berliner Mauer: Biografie eines Bauwerks (Berlin: Links, 2011), 178–181; and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Endspiel: Die Revolution von 1989 in der DDR (Munich: Beck, 2009), 303–305.

5. Historian and theorist William Sewell has written convincingly of the need to investigate both how and why when looking at historical events. He laments that, too often, historians have “generally disdained the study of mere events and sought to instead discover general causal patterns underlying historical change.” Rather, he sees a need to look both at events and structures and at their interaction: “I argue that events should be conceived of as sequences of occurrences that result in transformations of structures.” Sewell provides a useful definition of a historical event as “(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures.” He also argues that “changes tend to be clustered into relatively intense bursts. . . . Lumpiness, rather than smoothness, is the normal texture of historical temporality.” See William H. Sewell Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25 (1996): 841–881, quotations at 841–844; I am grateful to Mary Lewis for drawing my attention to this article.

6. Christopher Clark expressed a similar thought in his own study of a brief but critical time period, namely the summer of 1914, in a way that applies to this book as well: “Questions of why and how are logically inseparable, but they lead us in different directions. The question of how invites us to look closely at the sequences of interactions that produced certain outcomes. By contrast, the question of why invites us to go in search of remote and categorical causes. . . . The why approach brings a certain analytical clarity, but it also has a distorting effect, because it creates the illusion of a steadily building causal pressure; the factors pile up on top of each other pushing down on the events; political actors become mere executors of forces long established and beyond their control. The story this book tells is, by contrast, saturated with agency.” See Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (New York: Harper, 2013), xxix.

7. One such inaccurate claim—that the East German regime purposely authored the opening of the Wall—has found its way, despite a lack of evidence, into not only popular accounts but also otherwise carefully researched peer-reviewed academic histories in the intervening decades. To cite just two recent examples, see George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 905, and Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 390–391; both of these sources are discussed further in the epilogue. Many eyewitnesses later claimed that they saw it all coming; see, for example, John Kornblum, “November 9, 1989,” Berlin Journal 18 (Fall 2009): 10, where he remarks that “Most surprising to me about the events of November 9, 1989 was that so many people were surprised by them [sic]” since he was not. In contrast, the former US ambassador to East Germany in 1989, Richard Barkley, remarked in an interview with the author that neither he nor “anyone else in the US government” foresaw the opening of the Wall, but “it is amazing how wise some of them have become in the intervening twenty-five years.”

8. On such dramatic moments of rupture, see Sewell, “Historical Events,” and Charles Maier, “Civil Resistance and Civil Society,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)272–276, especially 276: “The historian should not abandon the search for the long-term or structural vulnerability, but neither should he or she forget that the journée, at least the repeated journée, and the place are the decisive theatres for radical upheaval. In physics and in the social sciences, sudden changes of state, discontinuities, bursts of self-organization are fundamental challenges to explanation. Every smooth curve or continuous function potentially decomposes into jagged fragments at potentially any point.”

9. Revolutions are rapid transformations of a state, its structures, and its dominant political principles through the mobilization of large numbers of its residents. This definition draws on the work of Mark Beissinger, who has combined aspects of two commonly used versions, that of Charles Tilly and that of Theda Skocpol. Beissinger sees Tilly’s definition of revolution (as “a situation of dual sovereignty in which non-ruling contenders mobilise large numbers of citizens for the purpose of gaining control over the state”) as narrower than Skocpol’s, which emphasizes “the rapid transformation of a country’s state and class structures and its dominant ideology.” See Mark R. Beissinger, “Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism,” Contemporary European History 18, no. 3 (2009): 343; Charles Tilly, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). As for “civil resistance” and “peaceful revolution,” which I am using interchangeably in this book, I rely on the definition provided by Adam Roberts: “Civil resistance is a type of political action that relies on the use of non-violent methods. It is largely synonymous with certain other terms, including ‘non-violent action,’ ‘non-violent resistance,’ and ‘people power.’ It involves a range of widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy, or regime—hence the term ‘resistance.’” Adam Roberts, “Introduction,” in Roberts and Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance, 2. For more on the nuances in various terms used to describe civil resistance in the East German context, see Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, “Artikulationsformen und Zielsetzungen von widerständigem Verhalten in verschiedenen Bereichen der Gesellschaft,” in Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, Enquete-Kommission, ed., Materialien der Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland” (Bonn: Bundestag Drucksache 1994), vol. 7, pt. 2:1203–1284.

10. Broadly speaking, writers have generally focused on one or the other, namely, on the character and collapse of the ruling regime and other political elites, or on the experience of the broader population and of the protest movement. Authors focusing on elites tend to emphasize the East German ruling regime’s “dissolution” or even “self-dissolution” when explaining the story of the fall of the Wall. See, for example, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, “Zu Nutzung und Auswertung der Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdiensts,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 41, no. 4 (1993): 575–587; Hans-Hermann Hertle, Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996) (the title in English is “The Fall of the Wall: The Unintentional Self-Dissolution of the SED State”); Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf Raten (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1993). Other scholars, in contrast, focus on the wider population, the question of how GDR citizens could conduct “perfectly ordinary” lives in spite of various institutions of control, and the ways that popular movements eventually rejected dictatorial leaders. See, for example, Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 11–23, which proposes the concept of a “participatory dictatorship” as a way of reconciling these two approaches, and Kowalczuk, Endspiel. For a comparison of these two approaches, see Gary Bruce, The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1–19.

11. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 401–403.

12. For more on the conflicts within the Soviet Union and the rise of Solidarity, see Gregory Domber, Empowering Revolution: America, Poland, and the End of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (New York: Basic Books, 2014); and Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

13. Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: Vintage Books, 2010), 527. For more on the argument that Gorbachev intended to wage the Cold War in a different way, not to end it, see Sergey Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

14. For more on Stalin’s death and its consequences in 1953, see Christian Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Central European University Press, 2001), and Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War After Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).

15. It is possible to research this speech in the original sources at the Reagan Library: see in particular RRPL, White House Staff Member and Office Files, Files of Peter M. Robinson, Files 1983–1988, Series I, Drafts, Box 9, Subject File, Notes from Berlin Pre-Advance. Also useful are the speechwriter’s own comments; see Peter Robinson, It’s My Party: A Republican’s Messy Love Affair with the GOP (New York: Warner Books, 2000), and Peter M. Robinson, “Four Words That Moved the World: ‘Tear Down This Wall,’” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2012. See also Romesh Ratnesar, Tear Down This Wall: A City, a President, and the Speech That Ended the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), which includes the text of the speech; the quotation from Reagan’s speech is at 210.

16. On Gorbachev-Reagan summits and Soviet-US relations, see Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Jack F. Matlock Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004); and James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). For differing views on the significance of US foreign policy in the 1980s, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War (New York: Penguin, 2006); Tony Judt, “A Story Still to Be Told,” New York Review of Books, Mar. 23, 2006; and James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking, 2009). On the superpower arms race in particular, see David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Anchor, 2010).

17. For analysis of one or both of the superpowers over the course of the entire Cold War, see, to name just a few, Brown, Rise and Fall; Gaddis, Cold War; John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005); Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind;Westad, Global Cold War; and Zubok, Failed Empire.

18. Bloch, Apologie, 160. On Bloch’s life and tragic death, see Carole Fink, Marc Bloch: A Life in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 86, 318–322.

19. On hindsight bias and on Tocqueville, see Timothy Garton Ash, “1989!” New York Review of Books, Nov. 5, 2009; Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, updated ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 142; Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 275–276; and Maier, Dissolution, epigraph. On the significance of agency, see Clark, Sleepwalkers,xxix.

20. In these notes, I have listed when possible multiple pieces of evidence to support any given citation, in order of significance for that particular citation: audio, video, or written materials from the original time period; later interviews and other autobiographical narratives; and the relevant secondary literature and/or journalism. In cases where there was a single source, I have indicated that in the note, and, if that source was an interview, often signaled that in the text as well, by saying, “as person X later remembered,” or “later recalled,” or similar formulations.

21. Stasi Archive staff members are, for example, required to black out certain private details about the people discussed in the sources but, given the sheer mass of material involved, there is still more than enough information on display. More information about the rules governing use of the Stasi Archive is available on its website, in English as well as in German, at www.bstu.bund.de/EN/Home/home_node.html.

22. It is worth noting that the party was in all cases superior to the state in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. For more on the pact, see Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact (New York: CEU Press, 2005).

23. A full list of the primary sources consulted and interviews conducted appears in the bibliography. The analysis here also builds upon some of my related works, such as 1989: The Struggle to Create Post–Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to ‘Bribe the Soviets Out’ and Move NATO In,” International Security 35 (July 2010): 110–137; and “China’s Fear of Contagion,” International Security 37 (Fall 2012): 156–182.

24. A catalyst is defined here as an agent that provokes or speeds a significant change or action. As Richard Ned Lebow has rightly argued, in our quest to discover deeper patterns in history we all too often underestimate the significance of short-term catalysts. We do so at our peril; “underlying causes, no matter how numerous or deep-seated, do not make an event inevitable.” Rather, moments of dramatic change result not just from deeper trends but also from triggering agents and events. Moreover, catalysts are not like buses; they are not insignificant or interchangeable, and do not appear with regularity. Rather, they are worthy of study in their own right. See Richard Ned Lebow, “Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 4 (Winter 2000–2001): 591–616, quotation at 591. The author is grateful to Jacques Hymans for pointing out this article. As the political scientist Robert Jervis has suggested, there is also need to question at what level we look for causation. In other words, as summarized by Lebow, Jervis argues that “structural change may be the product, not the cause, of behavior—the opposite of what most realist theories contend.” Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), summarized by Lebow in “Contingency, Catalysts,” 616.

25. These individuals shared little and mostly did not even know each other. The dissidents and the loyalists in particular were diametrically opposed to each other in their actions toward the ruling regime. They had crucial characteristics in common, however: they were neither members of the top political elite nor simply part of a broader mass of spectators to events; they were not in charge in 1989, but they were in the middle of the action. The contingencies of that autumn unexpectedly elevated their importance suddenly and dramatically. As a result, to understand how and why the Wall opened, it is essential to understand what can be called their “history from the middle” as well as the larger context. On this concept of history from the middle, see Paul Kennedy, “History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War,” Journal of Military History 74 (Jan. 2010): 35–51; and Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Random House, 2013), xvii. On the need to ask where the main actors are to be found and who they were, see Michael Richter, Die friedliche Revolution: Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen, 1989/90 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2009), 21.

26. For more on the history of Berlin, Prussia, and Germany, not only in the bloody twentieth century but also in preceding centuries, see David Blackbourn, History of Germany 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003); Christopher M. Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Gordon Craig, Germany 1866–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Harold James, A German Identity (London: Phoenix, 1994); and Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, from 1453 to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

27. Again, for similar (and, for this book, very apt) thinking, see Clark, Sleepwalkers, xxix: “a single, symbolic event—however deeply it may be enmeshed in larger historical processes—can change politics irrevocably, rendering old options obsolete and endowing new ones with an unforeseen urgency.”

28. For more on the challenges facing nonviolent protest, see Roberts and Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance; see also Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Non-Violent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation (New York: New Press, 2012); Sidney Tarrow, The Language of Contention: Revolutions in Words, 1688–2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Sidney Tarrow, Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

29. For more on this phenomenon, see Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post–Cold War World (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2008); Barbara J. Falk, “From Berlin to Baghdad: Learning the ‘Wrong’ Lessons from the Collapse of Communism,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 243–270; and Ellen Schrecker, ed., Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism (New York: New Press, 2004). On US hubris more generally, see Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris (New York: Harper, 2010), and Fredrik Logevall and Campbell Craig, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MAHarvard University Press, 2009), 350. On the larger historical significance of the phrase “Berlin to Baghdad,” see, among other sources, Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

30. My comments here—on the general applicability of specific cases of historical extremity—draw on the pathbreaking analysis by John Dower of the Japanese experience after World War II: “. . . it is such moments of extremity that often best reveal the essence of things. I myself find the concrete details and textures of this extraordinary experience of a whole country [Japan] starting over absorbing, but they do not strike me as alien, exotic, or even mainly instructive as an episode in the history of Japan or of US-Japanese relations. On the contrary, what is most compelling from my own perspective is that defeat and occupation forced Japanese in every walk of life to struggle, in exceptionally naked ways, with the most fundamental of life’s issues—and that they responded in recognizably human, fallible, and often contradictory ways that can tell us a great deal about ourselves and our world in general.” John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: Norton, 1999), 29. I am grateful as well to Axel Klausmeier, the director of the Stiftung Berliner Mauer, for a discussion on this point in June 2013. See also Rainer Eckert, SED-Diktatur und Erinnerungsarbeit im vereinten Deutschland (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2011), 12, and Henke, “Zu Nutzung und Auswertung,” 575–587.

31. In his own article on the French Revolution, Sewell also emphasizes the key role of violence in a revolution. In Sewell’s view, the central importance of the French Revolution was that it created a modern definition of revolution, namely, an event where popular violence combines with popular sovereignty to enhance the power of the people. See Sewell, “Historical Events,” 860–861.

32. To assemble this story, and the abundant evidence on which it is based, into some kind of comprehensible format, this book presents its history as a series of ever smaller circles. The largest outer circle is the broader context of global history in the twentieth century. Set within that, the next concentric circle is the Cold War contest in Europe, and, within that, competition for control of the Saxon region of the GDR. The story then narrows to the streets of East Berlin and, finally, to the gates of the Berlin Wall itself.

Chapter 1: A Brutal Status Quo

1. Author’s interview with Gueffroy.

2. For an insightful analysis of the varying responses to life under dictatorial control and the range of behaviors used to signal refusal of that control, see Fulbrook, People’s State, 11–23, and Kowalczuk, “Artikulationsformen und Zielsetzungen.” See also Ulrike Poppe, Rainer Eckert, and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, eds., Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung: Formen des Widerstandes und der Opposition in der DDR (Berlin: Links, 1995).

3. Author’s interview with Gueffroy.

4. For an overview of the Cold War division of Europe, see Harper, Cold War; for more on the division of Germany specifically, see Edith Sheffer, Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

5. On the Soviet empire, see Plokhy, The Last Empire, and Zubok, A Failed Empire. On the division of Europe, see James Cronin, The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History (New York: Routledge, 1996), which rightly points out on p. 2 that “internal and external relations reinforced each other”; Judt, Postwar; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 2000); and Westad, Global Cold War, 397. See also John Mueller, “What Was the Cold War About?” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 4 (2004–2005): 609–631.

6. For more on conditions in defeated Europe after World War II, see William I. Hitchcock, The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe (New York: Free Press, 2008).

7. For a first-person account of the experience of such rapes, see Anonymous, A Woman in Berlin, trans. Philip Boehm (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). On the Soviet occupation of Germany generally, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

8. For more on the creation and history of the FRG, see Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany: 1944–1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995); and Andreas Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium 1982–1990: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: DVA, 2006).

9. Harold James, A German Identity (London: Phoenix, 1994), 240. On the broader theme of provisionality, see Wirsching, Abschied vom Provisorium.

10. For a brief history of the division of Germany, see Henry Ashby Turner, Germany from Partition to Unification, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). For more on transatlantic relations during the Cold War, see Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Benedikt Schoenborn, and Barbara Zanchetta, Transatlantic Relations Since 1945: An Introduction(New York: Routledge, 2012), and Mary Nolan, The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890–2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

11. For more on the 1940s and the division of Europe, see William Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent 1945 to the Present (New York: Doubleday, 2003), and, by the same author, Bitter Road; see also Mazower, Dark Continent. By way of comparison, on the later process of overcoming the division of Europe, see Jan Svejnar, “Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 3–28, and Jan Svejnar et al., “The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies,” Journal of Economic Literature 47, no. 3 (Sept. 2009): 699–728.

12. On the FRG becoming a NATO member in 1955, see Helga Haftendorn, “[West] Germany’s Accession to NATO: 50 Years On,” NATO Review, June 1, 2005.

13. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident Bush in ertweitertem Kreise, Bonn,” May 30, 1989, doc. 1, DESE 272–273. Also, a note in BDE, PA-AA, ZA 140.711E, indicates that in June 1989, the Soviet forces in divided Germany changed their name from “Gruppe der sowjetischen Streitkräfte in Deutschland” to “Westgruppe der sowjetischen Streitkräfte.” On nuclear weapons and transatlantic politics during the Cold War, see Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), and Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); see also James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Mariner Books, 2008).

14. On the history of the Berlin Wall, see Pertti Ahonen, Death at the Berlin Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Gerhard Sälter and Manfred Wilke, Ultima Ratio (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011).

15. Speech by Honecker, Jan. 19, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/2333, 16, 21–22.

16. Walter Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende: Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang, 1989 eine Revolution zu verhindern (Berlin: Links, 1999)93 n. 97.

17. For more on these issues, see Fulbrook, People’s State, 4; Hans-Hermann Hertle and Stefan Wolle, Damals in der DDR: Der Alltag im Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat (Munich: Bertelsmann, 2004), 239–240; Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 266–267; Bernd Schäfer, Staat und katholische Kirche in der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999); and Clemens Vollnhals, ed., Die Kirchenpolitik von SED und Staatssicherheit (Berlin: Links, 1996).

18. Author’s interviews with Hattenhauer, Schwabe, and Wonneberger.

19. Interview with Bärbel Bohley in Alexander Kluge and Cassian von Salomon, prod., Der letzte Sommer der DDR, Spiegel-TV documentary, 2009. See also Bärbel Bohley, Gerald Praschl, and Rüdiger Rosenthal, eds., Mut: Frauen in der DDR (Munich: Herbig, 2005); Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 268; and Jens Reich, Abschied von Lebenslügen: Die Intelligenz und die Macht (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992).

20. Bruce, The Firm, 2, 10, 183–184; see also Kristie Macrakis, Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi’s Spy-Tech World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). For photos of some of the disguises used by Stasi agents, see Simon Menner, Top Secret: Images from the Stasi Archives (Berlin: Hatje Cantz, 2013).

21. Bruce, The Firm, 10, says there were “precisely 91,015 full-time Stasi employees and 173,000 informants,” the latter usually known as “IMs”(from the German inoffizieller Mitarbeiter). For years, experts generally accepted that there had been, as Bruce stated, close to 200,000 IMs. That number became an issue of controversy in 2013 with the publication of Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Stasi Konkret: Überwachung und Repression in der DDR (Munich: Beck, 2013). On 217–232, Kowalczuk claimed that the number was lower than previously thought and was actually closer to 100,000.

22. A series of guides on the Stasi Archive website describes the functions of the various branches of the Stasi; see www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/Publikationen/Reihen /Handbuch/handbuch_node.html. See also Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 116; Kowalczuk, Stasi Konkret, 16; and, on the Stasi reporting to the SED, Daniela Münkel and Jens Gieseke, eds., Die DDR im Blick der Stasi(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 2010).

23. On the Soviets in the GDR, see Wjatscheslaw Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission (Berlin: Dietz, 1994); specifically on the KGB in the GDR, see Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 512–514; on the KGB’s Karlshorst outpost in particular, see the thread “KGB Residentur Karlshorst” in the Forum section of the Geschichtsspuren.de website, www.geschichtsspuren.de/forum /kgb-residentur-karlshorst-t7614.html.

24. See, for example, BStU Zentralarchiv, MfS-HA KuSch Nr. 186, 195–197; and “Dresden, 22. Dezember 1988,” BStU, BV Dresden Abt. II, 10448.

25. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 22–23, 106–116. For an overview of the history of the Wall, see Frederick Taylor, The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961–1989 (New York: Harper, 2008); specifically on its construction, see Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: Putnam, 2011).

26. Walter Momper, Grenzfall: Berlin im Brennpunkt deutscher (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1991), 135.

27. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 23.

28. Ibid., 136–137; and Hans-Hermann Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls: Die dramatischen Ereignisse um den 9. November 1989, 12th ed. (Berlin: Links, 2009), 29–35.

29. Dietmar Schultke, “Keiner Kommt Durch”: Die Geschichte der innerdeutschen Grenze und der Berliner Mauer (Berlin: Links, 2011), 192–198.

30. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 23.

31. Ahonen, Death, 40–42, 219–220; and Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 23, 106–121.

32. Interview with Schabowski in Hans-Hermann Hertle, Theo Pirker, and Rainer Weinert, “Der Honecker muß weg!” Berliner Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Freie Universität, Berlin, 1990.

33. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 136–137; and Hertle, Chronik, 29–35.

34. Stiftung Friedliche Revolution, ed., Vor 25 Jahren: Die friedliche Revolution 1989, ein Wochenrückblick (Berlin: Medialis Offsetdruck, 2013), 4. Kalenderwoche.

35. Heinz Keßler, Marlies Menge, and Theo Sommer, “‘Karten auf den Tisch und anfangen!’” Die Zeit, Sept. 30, 1988; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 149–150.

36. Author’s interview with Regel.

37. Author’s interview with Gueffroy; and Ahonen, Death, 242–246.

38. Author’s interview with Gueffroy; and Ahonen, Death, 244; Sven Goldman, “Er wollte zur Golden Gate Bridge,” Tagesspiegel, Feb. 5, 2014. See also information about Chris Gueffroy on the Stiftung Berliner Mauer website, www.berliner-mauer-gedenkstaette.de/de/1989-0-332,454,2.html.

39. Ahonen, Death, 246.

40. Author’s interview with Gueffroy. See also the documentary film produced by the Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur, Das kurze Leben des Chris Gueffroy.

41. Through this and other means, Karin Gueffroy, along with her other son and friends of Chris, such as Dirk Regel, succeeded in producing widespread international condemnation of her son’s death. Author’s interviews with Gueffroy and Regel; and Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung, Das kurze Leben; Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 149–150.

42. She was particularly amazed that all of this could be happening despite Gorbachev’s reforms. For more on those reforms, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. and ed. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

43. Author’s interview with Gueffroy.

44. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 181; and Hans-Hermann Hertle and Maria Nooke, eds., Die Todesopfer an der Berliner Mauer 1961–1989 (Links: Berlin, 2009), 429–437.

45. Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 304.

46. Internal report cited in Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 151 nn. 397, 398; see also 148–154 for more on the order to shoot at the border and the impact of the April incident.

47. “Niederschrift über die Rücksprache beim Minister für Nationale Verteidigung, i.V. Generaloberst Streletz,” Apr. 3, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, HA I 5753, 2–5, available online.

48. “HA I beim Kommando Grenztruppen, Niederschrift,” Pätz, Apr. 12, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, HA VI 1308, 27, available online; and Hans-Hermann Hertle, “Prämien für Todesschützen,” Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Mar. 28, 1999.

49. “Ausführungen des Gen. Ministers,” Apr. 28, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, ZAIG 8677, 171–172, available online; see also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 153.

50. Carl Duisberg to Chef BK, “Regelung in humanitären Fragen,” in BArchK, B 136, Grüner Ordner 11, doc. 563, B136/21859; and Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 142. On the larger history of the practice, see Claus J. Duisberg, Das deutsche Jahr: Einblicke in die Wiedervereinigung (Berlin: Siedler, 2005), and Ludwig A. Rehlinger, Freikauf: Die Geschäfte der DDR mit politisch Verfolgten 1963–1989 (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1991).

51. Manfred Görtemaker, Der Weg zur Einheit (Bonn: BZPB, 2009), 12, has a useful overview of such accords; see also Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 136–137, and, for more on the 1970s, M. E. Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

52. On the history of the CSCE generally, see Daniel Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). See also BStU, MfS, HA I 15215, 3–9, and Walter Süss, “Der 9. November 1989,” in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., Die Mauer (Munich: dtv, 2011), 228.

53. “ZK Hausmitteilung,” Krenz to Honecker, Mar. 13, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/307, 88–90, available at www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDR Geschichte/Revolutionskalender/Maerz-1989/Dokumentenseiten/13-Maerz/13_mar _text.html?nn=1932236.

54. See the discussion of this issue in FRL 76.

55. For the original 1975 Final Act, see “Helsinki Final Act Signed by 35 Participating States,” OSCE website, www.osce.org/mc/58376; for the 1989 Vienna CSCE Concluding Document, see “Concluding Document of the Third Follow-up Meeting, Vienna,” OSCE website, www.osce.org/mc/40881. On the significance of Vienna in particular, see William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 257–259. On the CSCE, the GDR, and the USSR, see Anja Hanisch, Die DDR im KSZE-Prozess 1972–1985: Zwischen Ostabhängigkeit, Westabgrenzung, und Ausreisebewegung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), and Yuliya von Saal, KSZE-Prozess und Perestroika in der Sowjetunion: Demokratisierung, Werteumbruch und Auflösung 1985–1991 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013). On CSCE and international relations, see Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York: Berghahn, 2008); Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); and Thomas, The Helsinki Effect.

56. On the challenge of acting as the equivalent to the United States, see Westad, Global Cold War, 401–403.

57. Brown, Rise and Fall, 482–521; Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 501–527; and Marie-Pierre Rey, “‘Europe Is Our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept,” Cold War History 2 (Jan. 2004): 33–65. See also Michail Gorbatschow, Alles zu seiner Zeit (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2013).

58. The new rules were, in many cases, more restrictive than the ones they replaced (only appearing on the surface to be an improvement) and sparked widespread negative reactions. See “Hinweise zur Reaktion der Bevölkerung,” Jan. 27, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, ZAIG 4246, 1–11; and “Information,” n.d. but from context after Jan. 27, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/307, 20–25, both available online; see also BStU, MfS, Rechtstelle 101, 100, and Hans-Hermann Lochen and Christian Meyer-Seitz, eds., Die geheimen Anweisungen zur Diskriminierung Ausreisewilliger (Cologne: Bundesanzeiger Verlag, 1992), 7–17, 251–254.

59. “Der Minister, Diensteinheiten, Leiter,” Jan. 23, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, HA IX 687, 134–136, available online; see also the BStU online history at www.BStU.bund .de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/August-1989/august89_node .html.

60. “Information für die Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politbüros,” Apr. 14, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/332, 2–4. See also “Schreiben Mielkes an die Leiter der Diensteinheiten zur Veröffentlichung des KSZE-Dokuments,” BStU, MfS, ZA, HA IX 687, 134–136, and “Ausführungen des Gen. Ministers,” Feb. 1, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5342, 1–70, both available online.

61. “Referat für die Arbeitsberatung der SED-Kreisleitung im MfS in Üdersee,” Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 1989, BStU, MfS, SED-KL 4575, 496–552, available online.

62. See the discussion to this effect in “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost),” Sept. 22, 1989, doc. 45, DESE 415–416; on the impact of the CSCE on transnational human rights issues generally, see Snyder, Human Rights Activism.

63. In the end, her other adult son received permission to emigrate as well but chose to stay in the GDR because he did not want to leave his girlfriend; author’s interview with Gueffroy.

64. Author’s interview with Gueffroy.

Chapter 2: Marginal to Massive

1. A copy of this 1969 agreement is in BStU, MfS, Rechtsstelle 101, starting at 70.

2. “Memorandum of the International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Alexander Yakovlev,” Feb. 1989, in GC.

3. “Ergebnisse der Bearbeitung von Schreiben, die von Angehörigen des MfS im Zusammenhang mit der Nichtauslieferung der Zeitschrift ‘Sputnik’ 10/89 an das ZK der SED gerichtet wurden,” Jan. 19, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA SED-KL 4581, available online.

4. “Notiz über die Besprechung des Genossen Ministers mit dem Stellv. des Vors. des KfS der UdSSR . . . Genossen Generalmajor Schebarschin,” Apr. 7, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5198, 128–129, available online.

5. “Notiz zur Absprache,” May 5, 1989, BStU, MfS, HA VI 4748, 141–143, discusses the “Konzeption zur militärischen Besetzung von Berlin-West, bestätigt durch den NVR,” and explains how, after the “Einmarsch in Berlin-WEst [sic]” of “Kontingente der NVA,” next “[es] folgen ihnen Kräfte des MfS zur Lösung spezifischer Aufgaben.” This document then details which specific buildings in West Berlin will be occupied, including the Reichstag.

6. “From the Conversation Between Gorbachev and Kohl, One-on-One,” June 12, 1989, MG, 161.

7. For a summary of Soviet worries about this process, despite Gorbachev’s overall trend toward reform, see “Memorandum to Alexander Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 12–13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 52–61. On Solidarity and its legacy more generally, see Domber, Empowering Revolution,and Grzegorz Ekiert, The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

8. Chris Gueffroy died during the night of Feb. 5–6, 1989. For more on the Polish roundtable, see Marjorie Castle, Triggering Communism’s Collapse: Perceptions and Power in Poland’s Transition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), and Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); for more on Gueffroy, see Stiftung Friedliche Revolution, ed., Vor 25 Jahren.

9. On the Polish roundtable talks and the election in summer 1989, see “Minutes No. 64 from an Expanded Meeting of the PZPR CC Secretariat,” June 5, 1989, NSA, www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991105/Doc-57.htm; Castle, Triggering Communism’s Collapse, 146–195; Gregory Domber, “Reevaluating US Policy,” Journal of Cold War Studies13, no. 3 (2011): 52–82; Domber, Empowering Revolution; and Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution, 363.

10. On the roundtable, see “Opening Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations,” June 13, 1989, Cold War International History Project, http://legacy .wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index-54563.html; András Bozóki, ed., The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002); John Prados, How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 228–231; and Németh-Gorbachev memcon in Csaba Békés and Melinda Kalmár, “The Political Transition in Hungary, 1989–90,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 12–13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 76–77. On differences between the Hungarian and Polish roundtables, see Garton Ash, Magic Lantern, 55–57.

11. See the documents on these negotiations in Békés and Kalmár, “Political Transition in Hungary,” 83–84; see also PA-AA, BDE, ZA139.937E, Aug. 18, 1989.

12. On the reburial specifically, see Garton Ash, Magic Lantern, 47–51, and Rudolf L. Tökés, Hungary’s Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 306–308; see also Michael Meyer, The Year That Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall (New York: Scribner, 2009). In East Germany, the Stasi paid close attention to the reburial; see “Monatsübersicht Nr. 6/89,” BStU, MfS, ZA 5337, 97–98, available online. On the process of reform in Hungary in the late 1980s generally, see M-KS-288-5/1050, reprinted in CWIHPPC; “Memorandum of the International Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU to Alexander Yakovlev”; Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 3–6; and István Horváth, Die Sonne ging in Ungarn auf (Munich: Universitas, 2000), 298–358.

13. Excerpt from Gorbachev-Németh conversation, Mar. 3, 1989, in GC; on the Stasi, see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 154–157; see also Constantine Pleshakov, There Is No Freedom Without Bread! 1989 and the Civil War That Brought Down Communism (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 181.

14. Similarly, West German diplomats also wondered what the potential classification as refugees could mean for the East Germans in Hungary. See Staatssekretär Dr. Sudhoff, Bonn, “Mein Gespräch mit dem ungarischen AM Horn [Aug. 14, 1989],” Aug. 18, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, ZA178.925E; see also Horváth, Die Sonne, 290–294.

15. “Hinweise auf wesentliche motivbildende Faktoren,” Sept. 9, 1989, BStU, MfS, Sekr. Mittig 27, 122–129. On the question of motivations for emigration, see also Robert Darnton, Berlin Journal (New York: Norton, 1991), 15–16.

16. “Hinweis zum verstärkten Mißbrauch des Territoriums des UVRs durch Bürger der DDR,” July 14, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, ZAIG 5352, 124–134, available online; see also the online annotation, www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDR Geschichte/Revolutionskalender/August-1989/Dokumentenseiten/14-Juli/14_jul _text.html?nn=1930872.

17. Mielke complained about these developments in a speech on June 29, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, ZAIG 4021, 79–89, available online, and by August they had grown worse, according to “Monatsübersicht 8/89,” BStU, MfS, ZA ZAIG 5338, 1–34, available online, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 154–158. On the broader significant of emigration for the GDR, see Gareth Dale, The East German Revolution of 1989 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 223–230.

18. See the records related to the embassy refugees in PA-AA, BDE, such as B85-2340, B85-2346, ZA139.918E; for more on Hungary generally, see Andreas Oplatka, Der erste Riß in der Mauer (Vienna: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2009).

19. The “two-track” nature of the West German policy response to the refugee crisis, run partly by Kohl and partly by Genscher, required some explanation to Washington; the US ambassador to Bonn, Vernon Walters, sent the National Security Council staffer Robert Hutchings a detailed memo explaining the division. Walters, memo to Hutchings, Aug. 12, 1989, CF 01413-012, in Hutchings Files, FRG Cables, GHWBPL.

20. “Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an den Generalsekretär und Staatsratsvorsitzenden Honecker,” Aug. 14, 1989, doc. 22, DESE 355–356; see also docs. 24–25, DESE, 358–372, and the various documents in BArchK, B136-37241 from Aug. 1989.

21. See “Vermerk, Betr.: Konsultationsgespräche mit Ungarn am 27.07.1989, Dg21/HA Leiter Alföldy (A1),” July 28, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, B85-2.339; “Betr.: UNHCR, Hier: Einrichtung eines Büros in Budapest,” August 9, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, ZA140.734E; and also letter from Genscher to Horn, n.d. but from context written Aug. 9–14, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, ZA140.734E.

22. See the correspondence on the closure in BArchK, B136-37241, Aug. 1989, and BArchK, B136, Grüner Ordner 11, Aug. 10, 1989; in PA-AA, BDE, ZA140.733E, Aug. 10, 1989; and “Vorlage des Ministerialdirigenten Stern an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes Seiters, Bonn,” Aug. 8, 1989, doc. 20, DESE 351–353. See also doc. 37 in Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Countdown zur Deutschen Einheit: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen 1987–1990 (Berlin: Dietz, 1996), 197.

23. “Asshole” comment in entry for Oct. 11, 1989, diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, available on the National Security Archive website, which translates the insult as “scumbag,” www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB275/1989%20for%20posting.pdf; for the translation given above, see doc. 57, GC.

24. Honecker would only find out about the illness that would eventually kill him accidentally, from a television news report months later. After his downfall, he faced the prospect of legal proceedings due to misuse of state funds for personal purposes. Honecker’s sympathizers, in response, combed through his medical records to find a reason that he might be unfit to stand trial and, in so doing, found the evidence of cancer. The diagnosis leaked out to the media before the patient himself heard the news privately. As a result, a televised news broadcast would stun him with the revelation. See “Außerhalb der Tagesordnung,” Aug. 22, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/76; Michael Funken, Das Jahr der Deutschen (Munich: Piper, 2008), 72; and Norbert Pötzl, Erich Honecker (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2003), 336–337.

25. On the laming of the Politburo, and Krenz in particular, in summer 1989 and its far-reaching consequences, see “Interview mit Generalsekretär Egon Krenz 19.11.1989,” BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 181–182; Ekkehard Kuhn, Der Tag der Entscheidung: Leipzig, 9. Oktober 1989 (Berlin: Ullstein, 1992), 78; Helmut Müller-Enbergs et al., eds., Wer war wer in der DDR?(Berlin: Links, 2010), 890–891; Colin Munro, “Britain, Berlin, German Unification, and the Fall of the Soviet Empire,” German Historical Institute Bulletin 31, no. 2 (Nov. 2009): 61–62; and Walter Süß, “Selbstblockierung der Macht,” in Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, eds., Weg in den Untergang: Der innere Zerfall der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1999), 243–248. For more on Mittag, see his autobiography, Günter Mittag, Um jeden Preis (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1991).

26. Staatssekretär Dr. Sudhoff, Bonn, “Mein Gespräch mit dem ungarischen AM Horn [Aug. 14, 1989],” Aug. 18, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, ZA178.925E, 7.

27. Ibid. For more on Gyula Horn’s worldview, see his memoir, Freiheit die ich meine: Erinnerungen des ungarischen Außenministers, der den Eisernen Vorhang öffnete, trans. Angelika and Péter Máté (Hamburg: Hoffmann, 1991).

28. On the appeal to Hungary of US most-favored-nation trading status and emigration, see Hutchings Files, Oct. 18, 1989, CF 01410 Hungary, GHWBPL; on the transition in Eastern Europe generally, see György Dalos, Der Vorhang geht auf: Das Ende der Diktaturen in Osteuropa (Munich: Beck, 2009).

29. See “Vermerk des Bundesministers Genscher über das Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Németh und Außenminister Horn, Schloß Gymnich,” Aug. 25, 1989, doc. 28, DESE 377–380, and “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl und des Bundesministers Genscher mit Ministerpräsident Németh und Außenminister Horn während des Mittagessens, Schloß Gymnich,” Aug. 25, 1989, doc. 29, DESE 380–382; see also, in the Foreign Ministry archive, “Vermerk über das Gespräch am 25. August 1989,” PA-AA, BDE, ZA178.925E, 1–5. Kohl provided more information on the Schloß Gymnich meeting in his memoir: Helmut Kohl, Kai Diekmann, and Ralf Georg Reuth, Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit (Berlin: Ullstein, 1996), 71–74.

30. Notes from the East Berlin Politburo discussion of advance word of this decision, Aug. 29, 1989, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/76, 45–55, and “Vermerk,” Mittag-Horn conversation, Aug. 31, 1989, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/342, both in BArch, SAPMO; see also “Vermerk,” Fischer-Horn conversation, Aug. 31, 1989, PA-AA, BDE, ZR467-09. The French ambassador to Moscow reported that Moscow had not been consulted, only informed; see doc. 3, Sept. 21, 1989, DFUA, 67, and Horváth, Die Sonne, 324. Oplatka, Der erste Riß, 216, suggests that Moscow had previously indicated to Budapest that it had a free hand in this matter.

31. Günter Buchstab and Hans-Otto Kleinmann, eds., Helmut Kohl Berichte zur Lage, 1989–1998 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2012), xvii; Oplatka, Der erste Riß, 212; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Helmut Kohl: Eine politische Biografie (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2012), 491–517.

32. Letter from Eduard Shevardnadze to Oskar Fischer, Sept. 1, 1989; “Vermerk über das Gespräch des Ministers für auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, Genossen Oskar Fischer, mit dem außerordentlichen und bevollmächtigten Botschafter der UdSSR in der DDR, Genossen W.I. Kotschemassow,” Sept. 7, 1989; and “Übersetzung aus dem Russischen,” Sept. 7, 1989, all in PA-AA, BDE, ZR469-09.

33. “Telegramm des Bundeskanzlers Kohl an Ministerpräsident Németh,” Sept. 12, 1989, doc. 40, DESE 404.

34. Horváth, Die Sonne, 333.

35. Author’s interview with Schwabe; and Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Information Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91,” World Politics, 47, no. 1 (Oct. 1994): 64.

36. “Vermerk,” Seiters-Horváth memcon, Sept. 19, 1989, BArchK, B136-37241; and author’s interview with Horváth.

37. See DDR Journal zur November Revolution (a compilation of news reports from 1989, collected and reprinted by the West Berlin newspaper taz in 1990), 15.

38. Fischer conveyed Shevardnadze’s words to Honecker in telegram, Oct. 2, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 49–51; this topic was also discussed in the author’s interview with Kastrup.

39. “Protokoll der Sitzung des Politbüros,” Sept. 29, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV/2/2A/3243. On the confiscation of property, see various documents in BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3245.

40. “Vermerk, Betr.: Gespräch BM mit AM Schewardnadse am 27.09. in New York (Kleiner Kreis),” Sept. 27, 1989, ZA178.931E, and note from Genscher to Shevardnadze, Sept. 29, 1989, ZA178.924E, both in PA-AA, BDE.

41. See the extensive West German chancellery paperwork on making these arrangements in docs. 51–57, DESE 429–442; for memoir accounts, see Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 15–25, and Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), 33–38.

42. Author’s interviews with Elbe, Genscher, Kastrup, Kiessler, and Seiters; see also Sarotte, 1989, 31–33, 234 nn. 86–89.

43. “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost),” Oct. 2, 1989, doc. 52, DESE 430–432; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 252.

44. “Vermerk, Betr.: Gespräch von BM Seiters mit dem Leiter der ständigen Vertretung der DDR, Neubauer, am 02. Oktober 1989, 14.00 Uhr,” BArchK, B136-37241; “Fernschreiben,” Oct. 2, 1989, DESE 430–432; and author’s interviews with Elbe and Kastrup, who were on the trains.

45. The number of East Germans transported comes from a speech by Rudolf Seiters; the author is grateful to him for a copy of it.

46. Telegram from Dickel, Oct. 3, 1989, 3:40 p.m., in SS, Anlage VIII, 1632–1633; see also “Hinweise zu den unterbreiteten Varianten,” BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7438, 12–17; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 252.

47. BStU, MfS, Rechtsstelle 100, HA Konsularische Angelegenheiten, “Reiseverkehr DDR-CSSR,” n.d. but from context on or about Oct. 3, 1989, 9–15.

48. Paula Butturini, “East Germany Closes Its Border After 10,000 More Flee to West,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1989; see also Florian Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum: Das Drama des 9. November (Berlin: Rowholt, 2009), 17.

49. Tobias Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf des 9. Oktober 1989 in Leipzig,” in Günther Heydemann, Gunther Mai, and Werner Müller, eds., Revolution und Transformation in der DDR (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1999), 251; and Uwe Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung’: Die Friedensgebete in Leipzig,” Horch und Guck 23 (1998). The author is grateful to Schwabe for a digital version of this article, which indicates that from Aug. 1989 to Apr. 1990 there were a total of 3,115 demonstrations in East Germany, of which 963 were in Saxony, the highest single total. For more on Saxony, see Alexander Fischer and Günther Heydemann, eds., Die politische “Wende” 1989/90 in Sachsen: Rückblick und Zwischenbilanz (Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 1995), and Eckhard Jesse, ed., Friedliche Revolution und deutsche Einheit: Sächsische Bürgerrechtler ziehen Bilanz (Berlin: Links, 2006).

50. Albert O. Hirschmann, “Exit, Voice and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic,” World Politics 45 (Jan. 1993): 173–202.

51. On organizing the next round of trains, see East German documents from on or about Oct. 4, 1989, in BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342; BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV/2/2A/3245; BStU, MfS, SdM 664, 59–60; and SS, Anlage VIII, 1634. See West German documents on the same subject in BArchK, B136-37241, Oct. 4–6, 1989, and docs. 55–56 from Oct. 3–5, 1989, DESE 437–441. There were originally supposed to be fifteen trains, but in the end only eight actually made the trip; see Funken, Das Jahr, 237 n. 105, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 259 n. 114.

52. On the situation in Dresden and the violent proclivities of the local Stasi leader, Horst Böhm, see information provided by the Stasi Archive at www.BStU.bund.de /DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/Oktober-1989/oktober89_node .html.

53. “Auszug aus Lagefilm v. 04.10.1989,” SS, Anlage I, 82–86; “Telegram, BV Dresden,” Oct. 4, 1989, in SS, Anlage I, 101–105; “Telegramm,” Oct. 5, 1989, SS, Anlage I, 125–129. No evidence of Putin’s personal participation in these specific events has yet surfaced, but Putin has described the angry crowds of 1989 in Dresden in general terms in Vladimir Putin with Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President Putin, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 69–80. See also Funken, Das Jahr, 82–94, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 252–259, 259 n. 114.

54. “Telegramm,” Oct. 5, 1989, SS, Anlage I, 128; and interview with Rolf Sickert, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

55. Entry for Oct. 5, 1989, diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, available on the National Security Archive website, www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB275/1989%20for%20posting.pdf.

56. “Auszug aus Lagefilm vom 5.10.89,” SS, Anlage I, 115–117; “Aktenvermerk,” Oct. 5, 1989, SS, Anlage I, 130; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 257.

57. See the interviews with Dresden detainees in the KCLMA Fall of the Wall collection, most notably the interview with Andreas Gönsch. See also Funken, Das Jahr, 84, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 262.

58. On the impact of the exodus on the GDR population, see Lohmann, “Dynamics,” 64; the documentary Der letzte Sommer der DDR; and author’s interview with Schwabe.

59. Author’s interviews with Schwabe and Wonneberger. On the work of the Rev. Matthias Berger for the Stasi under the code name “Carl,” see “Institutionen, Organisationsstrukturen und Ereignisse,” FUF 465; for an example of regime pressure on the churches of Leipzig, see “Auszug aus einer Information,” doc. 63, FUF 176–178; see also the evidence of regime pressure on Leipzig church leaders in FRL 250. On the church-state relationship in East Germany generally, see Vollnhals, ed., Die Kirchenpolitik.

60. “Fernschreiben des Staatssekr. Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost),” Sept. 20, 1989, doc. 43, DESE 410; on the plans of the Stasi to keep control in Sept. 1989, as Bertele expected it would, see “Hinweis auf ein weiteres ‘Montagsgebet’ in der Nikolaikirche in Leipzig,” Sept. 19, 1989, FRL 353.

61. “Fernschreiben des Staatssekr. Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost),” Sept. 22, 1989, doc. 45 in DESE 415–416. Skepticism toward these groups came not just from contemporaries; Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 269, retroactively (in 2009) classified them as unimportant as well, seeing instead a healthy ruling regime: “The bottom line was that, as of the summer of 1989, these circles of dissenters, and other small groups officially unregistered, could hardly trouble the regime, which in any case had infiltrated most of them with Stasi collaborators. Pre-existing oppositional groups had hardly achieved a troubling profile. The German Democratic Republic remained a state and society with a highly organized group life. Teams, factory associations, musical and hobby groups thrived.” The regime still had “remaining inner sources of stability,” and “the Stasi’s role of subverting social protest remained significant.”

62. For more on those activists, see Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 10–11; Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Tom Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land mit freien Menschen: Opposition und Widerstand in Biographien und Fotos (Berlin: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, 2006), 208–211; and Müller-Enbergs et al., eds., Wer war wer, 494–495, 1206. See also Torsten Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition in Ost-Berlin gestern und heute (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 2000).

63. On the history of the theological department, or faculty, see Andreas Gößner and Alexander Wieckowski, eds., Die theologische Fakultät der Universität Leipzig: Personen, Profile und Perspektiven aus sechs Jahrhunderten Fakultätsgeschichte (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2005). I am grateful to Hans-Jürgen and Wilma Sievers for a copy of part of this book.

64. See the report on environmental damage in the region of Leipzig by the regional news agency MDR, “Die misshandelte Umwelt der DDR,” n.d., www.ndr.de /geschichte/grenzenlos/glossar/ddrumwelt100.html.

65. See, for example, interview with Helmut Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

66. Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

67. For more on the musical significance of Leipzig and some of the musicians who lived and worked there, see John Eliot Gardiner, Bach: Music in the Castle of Heaven (New York: Knopf, 2013), and www.kurtmasur.com/bio.html. On Leipzig more generally, see Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1993), 111, and Hans-Jürgen Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch einer deutschen Revolution: Die leipziger Kirche im Oktober 1989 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1990), 25–26.

68. For materials from the illicit June 10, 1989, music festival and crackdown, see FRL 208–215.

69. Jesse, ed., Friedliche Revolution, 286–287; Kuhn, Der Tag, 22–23; and Lohmann, “Dynamics,” 67. The significance of Leipzig as a place for protest was also discussed in author’s interview with Birthler.

70. “Information 150/89,” n.d. but from accompanying cover note May 23, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZA, BdL/Dok. 008932, 2.

71. Christian Führer, Anne Ascher, and Patricia Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei gewesen: Die Revolution, die aus der Kirche kam (Berlin: Ullstein, 2008), 113–118; and “Führer contra Weißgerber,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, June 8, 2009. The author thanks Schwabe for a copy of the latter.

72. On the interaction between the missiles and the peace prayers, see Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 266–267, and Uwe Schwabe, “Die Entwicklung der Leipziger Opposition in den achtziger Jahren am Beispiel der Friedensgebete,” in Heydemann, Mai, and Müller, eds., Revolution und Transformation, 171. On the politics of superpower missiles in Europe more generally, or “Euromissiles,” see Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991); Leopoldo Nuti, ed., The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 (New York: Routledge, 2009); Kiran Klaus Patel and Kenneth Weisbrode, eds., European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and the Wilson Center’s online document collection about Euromissiles at www.wilsoncenter.org/publication /the-euromissiles-crisis-reader.

73. I am grateful to Kathy Conley for her remarks on this point.

74. On antinuclear protests and peace activism, see Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Disarmament Movement: 1971 to the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 3:144–147, and Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Europe 1969–1987: The Problem of the SS-20 (London: Macmillan, 1989).

75. Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 267, talks about ministers in the tradition of “Karl Barth or Bishop Dibelius who sought to preserve the apolitical autonomy of an independent Church amidst totalitarian pressures.” For more on what took place at the peace prayers themselves, see the documentary collection FUF, and Hermann Geyer, Nikolaikirche, Montags um fünf: Die politischen Gottesdienste der Wendezeit in Leipzig (Darmstadt: WBG, 2007).

76. On Christoph Wonneberger’s early years and brief stint with the Stasi, see Thomas Mayer, Der nicht aufgibt: Christoph Wonneberger, eine Biographie (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2014), 9–58, esp. 28 (a reprinted document from the Stasi) and 49–50 (on alternatives to military service); see also Andreas Peter Pausch, Widerstehen: Pfarrer Christoph Wonneberger (Berlin: Metropol, 2014). For more on contacts between East German and Polish dissidents, see Basil Kerski, Die Dynamik der Annäherung in deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen (Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press, 2011).

77. Author’s interview with Wonneberger.

78. Author’s interviews with Hattenhauer and Schwabe; Funken, Das Jahr, 122–125; Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 208–211; and Uwe Schwabe, “Die Entwicklung der Leipziger Opposition,” 171.

79. The Stasi Archive contains, unsurprisingly, extensive files on Hattenhauer, her arrests, and her interrogations. The author is grateful for Katrin Hattenhauer for providing the legal permission (Einwilligung) necessary to view the transcripts of her interrogations, as well as the rest of the files, and also for Hattenhauer’s own description of her arrests and incarceration. For the “provocative questions” quotation, see “Einleitungsbericht zur OPK ‘Meise,’” Aug. 10, 1989, BStU Lpz. AOPK 3993/92, 10.

80. Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 10–11; Katrin Hattenhauer biography on her website, www.katrin-hattenhauer.de/biografie_en.html; Müller-Enbergs et al., eds., Wer war wer, 494–495; and Doug Saunders, “Half a Life Ago, Katrin Blew the Wall Down,” Globe and Mail, Nov. 6, 2009.

81. For biographical information on Schwabe, see www.runde-ecke-leipzig.de /sammlung/Zusatz.php?w=w00195.

82. For a copy of the list with Schwabe at position one, see BV für Staatssicherheit Leipzig, “Im Rahmen des Vorbeugungskomplexes zuzuführende Personen,” Oct. 9, 1989, FRL 413; see also Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

83. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

84. See ZAIG-Information 25/89, Jan. 16, 1989, in BStU, ZA, ZAIG 3734, 1–7, also available online. For more details on activists in Leipzig, see Wayne C. Bartee, A Time to Speak Out: The Leipzig Citizen Protests and the Fall of East Germany (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), and Thomas Mayer, Helden der Friedlichen: 18 Porträts von Wegbereitern aus Leipzig Revolution (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2009). See also Kerry Kathleen Riley, Everyday Subversion: From Joking to Revolting in the German Democratic Republic (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2008).

85. Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthaleds., Mut, 201–207; and Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

86. “Absprache zwischen Referatsleiter der Abt. XX und Eppisch,” Mar. 23, 1989, FUF 277 n. 406. A video interview with Wonneberger can be seen at www.youtube .com/watch?v=_6lwz-bSe5I.

87. Foreword by Fischer in Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch, 15.

88. Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 203; Tobias Hollitzer and Reinhard Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren: Leipzig auf dem Weg zur friedlichen Revolution (Fribourg: InnoVation Verlag, 2000), 364; and FRL 76; see also Lochen and Meyer-Seitz, eds., Die geheimen Anweisungen.

89. Transcript of remarks by Führer on Sept. 4, 1999, in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 356.

90. There would be countless books, events, and memorials bearing these words after the revolution succeeded. A book by Gerhard Ritter would even use both phrases:Wir sind das Volk! Wir sind ein Volk! (Munich: Beck, 2009). At the time, however, there were those in the West who, in response to hearing Wir sind ein Volk, “We are one people,” from their much poorer Eastern neighbors, would respond with Wir auch, “We are too.”

91. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 190.

92. Ibid., 119; and Schwabe, “Die Entwicklung der Leipziger Opposition,” 160–164.

93. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 188–189.

94. Schwabe, “Die Entwicklung der Leipziger Opposition,” 164–166; and Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 68.

95. “Brief des Vorsitzenden des KV St. Nikolai, Pf. Führer, an Pf. Berger, Pf. Wonneberger und Sup. Magirius,” June 9, 1988, doc. 61, FUF 175; see also doc. 64, FUF 178–179.

96. Letter from Magirius to Wonneberger, Aug. 25, 1988, FRL 24, see also 25–27; Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 204; Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 192–193; Günter Hanisch et al., eds., Dona nobis pacem: Fürbitten und Friedensgebete Herbst ’89 in Leipzig (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1990), 11–12; and Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 311. See also Martin Jankowski, Der Tag, der Deutschland veränderte: 9. Oktober 1989 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), and Reiner Tetzner, Leipziger Ring: Aufzeichnungen eines Montagsdemonstranten (Frankfurt: Luchterhand, 1990).

97. “Mitschrift der Erklärung von Sup. Magirius,” Aug. 29, 1988, Doc. 69, FUF, 183.

98. Summarized in FUF, 184 n. 234; see also Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 68–72, and Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

99. “Treffbericht eines Führungsoffiziers des MfS,” Sept. 13, 1988, Doc. 87, FUF, 209.

100. “Mitschrift einer Intervention von Pf. Führer,” Aug. 29, 1988, Doc. 70, FUF, 184–185.

101. The protest letter is summarized in FUF, 184, n. 234.

102. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 193–195; Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 70; and Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

103. “Leipziger Friedensgebet abgewürgt,” article from underground newspaper Umweltblätter, Oct. 1988, reprinted as Doc. 89, FUF, 214–215.

104. Remarks by Ernst Demele, in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 366.

105. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

108. Both Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 64, and Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung,’” point out that there had previously been events outside of the Nikolai Church in the past, such as after a peace prayer in Nov. 1983, when participants took lighted candles out of the church, but they were sporadic. After the 1988 expulsion, however, the regularity of the outdoor events, combined with the other developments of the late 1980s, helped to turn the outdoor events into massive marches.

109. Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 205. On the importance and theatricality of protest in public, see Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 264.

110. See the analysis of these events in FRL 27 and in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 72.

111. Mike Leary, “100,000 Protest in E. Germany,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 10, 1989; and author’s interview with Leary.

112. “Chiffriertes Fernschreiben,” Sept. 12, 1989, Helmut Hackenberg to Horst Dohlus, in SS, Anlage II, 556–558, refers to Stasi attempts to achieve “eine zeitliche und örtliche Verlegung der Montagsgebete.”

113. Transcript of remarks by Führer on Sept. 4, 1999, in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 359.

114. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 194–198; Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 359; and Schwabe, “‘Symbol der Befreiung.’”

115. See the analysis of these events in FRL 102; Hanisch et al., eds., Dona nobis pacem, 12; Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 311; and Schwabe, “Die Entwicklung der Leipziger Opposition,” 167. Hard feelings still remained over a decade later; at a 1999 event, an activist speaking on a panel with Führer called the latter’s description of 1988–1989 a lie. See the transcript of this event in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 360–364. See also an essay by Hans-Friedrich Fischer, the Catholic priest who served as moderator between Führer and the activists, in Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch, 15–20.

116. Rat des Bezirkes Leipzig, Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden des Rates für Inneres, “Information,” Mar. 16, 1989, FRL 98.

117. See the analysis of the May Day march, FRL 102.

118. “Kopie des Briefes des OBM der Stadt Leipzig, Seidel,” Aug. 25, 1989, Doc. 191, FUF 376–377.

119. “Auszug aus dem handschriftlichen Protokoll der 50. Sitzung des KV St. Nikolai,” May 8, 1989, Doc. 156, FUF 318–319.

120. “Xerokopie [sic] des Briefs von Landesbischof Hempel,” May 31, 1989, Doc. 173, FUF 352–353.

121. “Dienstbesprechung,” Aug. 31, 1989, MfS, ZAIG B/215, reprinted in Arnim Mitter and Stefan Wolle, eds., Ich liebe euch doch alle! Befehle und Lageberichte des MfS Januar-November 1989 (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1990), 125.

122. “Auszug aus Mitschrift des Oberstleutnant [sic] Seidel zur Dienstversammlung,” Sept. 2, 1989, Doc. 195, FUF 379; see also Doc. 196, FUF 380–382, and Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 329.

123. Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 10, 216; see also photos, 222–223.

124. The Stasi’s records from Hattenhauer’s September incarceration survive in BStU, Lpz AU 1793–89, Strafakte I, Hattenhauer (see especially 7–9); BStU, BV Lpz AGL 2793, Sept. 12, 1989, 20–22; BStU, Lpz AU 1793–89 Handakte Hattenhauer; and BStU, Lpz AOPK 3993-92. The author is also grateful to Hattenhauer for discussing the experience with her in detail. For more on the nature of Stasi detention practices generally, see Katrin Passens, MfS-Untersuchungshaft: Funktionen und Entwicklung von 1971 bis 1989 (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2012).

125. A transcript of this particular interrogation survives in “Abschrift,” June 10, 1989, Leipzig, Hattenhauer, BStU, Leipzig AOPK 3993/92, 43–46. See also Müller-Enbergs et al., Wer war wer, 494–495, 1206–1207; Saunders, “Half a Life Ago”; and Hattenhauer’s biography on her website at www.katrin-hattenhauer.de /biografie_en.html.

126. “Aktennotiz von Pf. Führer,” Sept. 18, 1989, doc. 208, FUF 399–400; and “Brief der Superintendentur Leipzig-Ost (Briefkopf) und des KV St. Nikolai (Führer),” Sept. 20, 1989, doc. 212, FUF 404.

127. “Chiffriertes Fernschreiben,” Sept. 26, 1989, Helmut Hackenberg to Erich Honecker, in SS, Anlage II, 568–569.

128. “Brief vom Vorsitzenden des KV St. Nikolai (Pf. Führer) an den KV St. Thomas (Pf. Ebeling),” Oct. 3, 1989, Doc. 234, FUF, 444–445 (the Thomas Church’s leaders changed their minds on Oct. 6); “Immer loyal,” Spiegel 11 (1990): 22–23; and Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch, 68–70.

129. “Erklärung der Volkskammer zu den aktuellen Ereignissen in der VR China,” June 8, 1989, doc. 190, in Werner Meißner and Anja Feege, eds., Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 397–398. For more on the events in Tiananmen Square and their impact, see Jean-Philippe Béja, ed., The Impact of China’s 1989 Tiananmen Massacre (New York: Routledge, 2010); Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, and Zhang Liang [pseud.], eds., The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force Against Their Own People—In Their Own Words (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001); David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). See also Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie J. Bunce, “Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Motivations Against Authoritarian Rulers,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (Sept. 2013): 753–768.

130. On the support of the SED Politburo for the Chinese leadership, see “Protokoll Nr. 22,” June 6, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY30/J IV 2/2/2331; see also the letters collected by the Stasi in BStU, MfS, HA II 26624. On the protestors, see “Personenfeststellungen zum Sicherungsbereich ‘Botschaft der VR China,’” June 7, 1989, www.BStU.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/Juni-1989 /juni89_node.html.

131. Records from Krenz’s visit to China (from Sept. 25 to Oct. 2, 1989) are available in PA-AA, BDE, ZR 2496-90; excerpts also available in Meißner and Feege, eds., DDR und China, 412–414. See also Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 415–416 n. 583, and Sarotte, “China’s Fear of Contagion.”

132. Telegram from Honecker to first secretaries in all party districts, Sept. 22, 1989, BStU, SdM664, 61.

133. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 207; Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 253; and Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 371.

134. Mario Niemann, Die Sekretäre der SED-Bezirksleitungen 1952–1989 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 121–122, 355, 361; and Pötzl, Erich Honecker, 17.

135. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 168. On the phenomenon of the opposition, not the regime, shaping events in Leipzig, see Eckert, SED-Diktatur, 12.

136. Interview with Günter Schabowski, CNN Cold War Collection, KCLMA.

137. “Information,” 428/89, Sept. 26, 1989, in BStU, ZAIG 3748; “ZK Hausmitteilung,” Oct. 3, 1989, BStU SdM 664, 62–63; “ZK Hausmitteilung,” Oct. 3, 1989, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/317, BArch; and “Information,” Oct. 3, 1989, MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 435/89, reprinted in Mitter and Wolle, eds., Ich liebe euch doch alle, 190–191. See also Mielke, Sept. 13, 1989, BStU, ZA, Neiber 364, 242–246, available online; Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 256–261; Kuhn, Tag der Entscheidung, 52; and Neues Forum, ed., Jetzt oder nie—Demokratie! Leipziger Herbst ’89 (Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 1989), 305.

138. Statement of unit member Gerald Pilz, Oct. 2, 1989, reprinted in Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch, 55–56; and Walter Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang des 9. Oktober in Leipzig,” in Martin Sabrow, ed., 1989 und die Rolle der Gewalt (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2012), 178–180.

139. Kommandeur Günter Lutz, im Auftrag der Kampfgruppenhundertschaft “Hans Geiffert,” “Staatsfeindlichkeit nicht länger dulden,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, Oct. 6, 1989, reprinted in Hollitzer, “‘Heute entscheidet es sich,’” Horch und Guck 23 (Feb. 1998): 25.

140. “Plan der Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung der Sicherheit während des 40. Jahrestages der Gründung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik — 6. bis 8. Oktober 1989,” Sept. 27, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7314, 1–30, quotation at 4, also available online; this document was issued by Mielke and confirmed by Honecker personally. See also “Hinweise für Kollegiumssitzung,” Oct. 3, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 8680, 1, 15–21, also available online.

141DDR Journal zur November Revolution, 41–42.

142. Volkspolizei-Kreisamt Leipzig, Der Leiter, “Zusätzliche Maßnahmen,” Sept. 27, 1989, FRL 404; see also Mielke to the leaders of duty units, Oct. 5, 1989, reprinted in Mitter and Wolle, eds., Ich liebe euch doch alle, 195–198.

143. Portion of police document reprinted in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 413.

144. See the file on the visit, Oct. 2–9, 1989, ZR 2495–90, BDE, MfAA, PA-AA; and “Einige Fragen und Probleme,” Oct. 25, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/317. See also Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 255; Sarotte, “China’s Fear of Contagion”; and Bernd Schäfer, “Die DDR und die ‘chinesische Lösung,’” in Sabrow, ed., 1989, 153–172.

145. Neues Forum, ed., Jetzt oder nie, 83–84; the name of the housewife was Susanne Rummel.

146. Neues Forum, ed., Jetzt oder nie, 84; the name of the woman was Gudrun Fischer. See also Pond, Beyond the Wall, 93. For a description of, and photos from, the violence on the anniversary day, Oct. 7, see FRL 390–391.

147. Author’s interviews with Greenwald and Lipping.

Chapter 3: The Fight for the Ring

1. On the disappearance of relevant documents, see Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf des 9. Oktober 1989 in Leipzig,” 250, 268–269; see also Süß, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 188 n. 54.

2. “Information,” 452/89, n.d. but from context Oct. 9, 1989, BStU, ZAIG 3748, 16; Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 217; and Sievers, ed., Stundenbuch, 73.

3. Neues Forum Leipzig, Jetzt oder nie, 305.

4. “Mitschrift des Leiters der Abt. XXII der BVfS Leipzig von der Dienstversammlung beim Leiter der BVfS Leipzig, Manfred Hummitzsch, am 30.9.1989, BStU Leipzig, Abt. XXII, Arbeitsbuch 4255,” 7–8, quoted in Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 255.

5. Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 260; and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 183–184.

6. ARD, Tagesschau, Oct. 8, 1989; and author’s interview with Leary.

7. The estimate of 50,000 appears in “Entschluß des Chefs der BDVP Leipzig zum Ordnungseinsatz am 9. Oktober 1989,” SS Anlage II, 663. A note typed on this document indicates that it was confirmed personally by Interior Minister Dickel. See also Süß, “Selbstblockierung der Macht,” 239; and Jens Gieseke, “Der entkräftete Tschekismus,” in Sabrow, ed., 1989, 57–66.

8. Erich Honecker regarded his country’s newspapers in particular almost as his own personal hobby and put a lot of effort into the details of coverage. The results were obvious: reporting on the Leipzig trade fair, one newspaper published over forty pictures of Honecker in a single issue; see Hannes Bahrmann and Christoph Links, Chronik der Wende: Die DDR zwischen 7. Oktober und 18. Dezember 1989 (Berlin: Links, 1994), 18–19, and interview with Schabowski in Hertle, Pirker, and Weinert, “Der Honecker muß weg!,” 8–11.

9. Author’s interviews with Baum and Leary. The former was intimidated into not going to Leipzig; the latter went but was escorted out to the city limits. In an interview, Hackenberg confirmed that there had been a “Drehverbot”; see interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA. See also Hartmut Zwahr, “Die Revolution in der DDR 1989/90,” in Fischer and Heydemann, eds., Die politische “Wende,” 205–215.

10. For discussion of the actions of the army, or NVA, in Dresden, see Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 259.

11. Albrecht Hinze, “Eine Legende zerbröckelt,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nov. 21, 1989; see also Victor Sebestyen, Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire (New York: Vintage, 2009), 337–338.

12. Interview with Gerhard Straßenburg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA; and interviews with Straßenburg and Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 52–53.

13. See the analysis of the Oct. 8 meeting in FRL 410.

14. Erich Mielke to “Diensteinheiten, Leiter,” Oct. 8, 1989, BStU, MfS, BdL, Doc. 006920, also available online; a copy of this telegram, with a different title and the addition of a handwritten transmission time of 5:58 p.m. and receipt time of 6:20 p.m., is in FRL 411. For more on the structure of the Stasi and its official and unofficial staff, see David Childs and Richard Popplewell, The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service (London: Macmillan, 1996); Jens Gieseke, Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt, 1950–1989/90 (Berlin: Links, 2000); Jens Gieseke, Die Stasi 1945–1990 (Munich: Pantheon, 2011); and Helmut Müller-Enbergs, ed., Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit: Richtlinien und Durchführungsbestimmungen (Berlin: Links, 1996).

15. BV für Staatssicherheit Leipzig, Kreisdienststelle Leipzig-Stadt, “Im Rahmen des Vorbeugungskomplexes zuzuführende Personen,” Oct. 9, 1989, FRL 413.

16. Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 271; Mielke, “Diensteinheiten, Leiter,” Oct. 8, 1989; ARD Tagesthemen broadcast, Oct. 9, 1989. For more on the preparations for Oct. 9, 1989, in Leipzig, see the various documents in FRL 410–413. For an earlier instance of monitoring of journalists in Leipzig, see “Information,” 435/89, BStU, ZAIG 3748, 12–14. For an earlier instance of preventing undesirable persons from travel, see Mielke’s instructions of Oct. 5, 1989, when he instructed the Stasi to prevent undesirables from traveling to Berlin during the fortieth-anniversary celebration period surrounding Oct. 7; the goal, as he put it, was “keine Überraschungen zulassen!” Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, der Minister, Diensteinheiten, Leiter, Oct. 5, 1989, FRL 406.

17. Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 466–467; FRL 425, has a picture of one of the cameras set up in Leipzig for the feed to Berlin and a copy of some of the technical orders for safeguarding its operation.

18. On the control of the party over nearly all organizations in East Germany, see Kowalczuk, Stasi Konkret, 16.

19. For assessments of the paramilitaries from later in October, see “Einschätzung der Kampfkraft und Einsatzbereitschaft der Kampfgruppen,” Oct. 23, 1989, BStU, MfS, HA VII 68, 248–260, also available online; and “Information,” Oct. 15, 1989, ZAIG Nr. 457/89, reprinted in Mitter and Wolle, eds., Ich liebe, 221–222. See also “Kampfgruppen,” FUF 470, and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 190.

20. On the coup against Gorbachev, see Plokhy, The Last Empire.

21. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 169; and Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)90–91. In a separate account, Valentin Falin, a Soviet official and Germany expert, said in an interview that, starting in Aug. 1989, Soviet troops had an order not to intervene in events such as those in Leipzig, but did not say who issued it; Krenz challenged the idea that there was such an order, saying that if there had been one, he would have known about it. See Kuhn, Der Tag, 29–31.

22. Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 417. On the Soviet Union in divided Germany generally, see Brown, Rise and Fall; Jacques Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Naimark, The Russians in Germany; and Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe 1945–89 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). For a theoretical assessment of the GDR-USSR relationship, see Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, “Hierarchy Under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State,” International Organization 49 (Autumn 1995): 689–722.

23. “Fernschreiben an alle 1. Sekretäre der Bezirksleitungen der SED,” Oct. 8, 1989, 11:00 a.m., in BArch DY 30/IV 2/2.039/314.

24. Records from this meeting are lacking, unfortunately, but its content can be surmised from paperwork and instructions issued later; see Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 261.

25. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 168–169.

26. Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 261.

27. Ibid., 248–249; Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 187–195. See also telegram, Hackenberg to Krenz, Oct. 5, 1989, doc. 235, FUF 445–447. The original German for “district deployment command” is “Bezirkseinsatzleitung,” often abbreviated in the documents as BEL.

28. Telegram, Hackenberg to Krenz, Oct. 5, 1989, doc. 235, FUF 445–447; and Kuhn, Der Tag, 47–50.

29. For more on Tiananmen Square, see Sarotte, “China’s Fear of Contagion.”

30. Martin Jankowski, “Sieg ohne Helden,” Deutschland Archiv 41 (2008): 821; Martin Jankowski, Der Tag, der Deutschland veränderte: 9. Oktober 1989 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007); Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 270; and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 183–184.

31. See the photos of armored vehicles, dogs, water cannons, and other equipment in Leipzig in Oct. 1989 in Wolfgang Schneider, Leipziger Demontagebuch (Leipzig: Kiepenhauer, 1990); the police and Stasi documents with details of preparations for Oct. 9 in Leipzig, such as Volkspolizei-Kreisamt Leipzig, “Entschluß des Leiters des VPKA Leipzig, Fritzsche, Oberst der VP, Bestätigt: Chef der BDVP Straßenburg Generalmajor,” Oct. 8, 1989, FRL 407; the various handwritten notes on preparations, in FRL 408; and “Vorschlag zu Aufgabenstellung,” n.d. but from context, part of Oct. 9 preparations, and handwritten documents, FRL 412. See also the overview of security preparations provided in Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 262–279, and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 183–184.

32. Hinze, “Eine Legende zerbröckelt”; and Kuhn, Der Tag, 74–75.

33. See the photo of one of the horse stalls used for this purpose, FRL 412; see also Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 265; and Kuhn, Der Tag, 63–64.

34. In the video documentary by Andreas Voigt and Gerd Kroske, Leipzig im Herbst: Aufbruch ’89, ein DEFA-Dokument, 1989, filmed between Oct. 16 and Nov. 7, 1989, demonstrators from Oct. 7 describe being locked inside horse stalls with multiple other prisoners for extended periods with no provision for water, food, or toilets.

35. Interview with Straßenburg in Kuhn, Der Tag, 46.

36. According to Volkspolizei-Kreisamt Leipzig, “Entschluß des Leiters des VPKA Leipzig,” Oct. 8, 1989, FRL 407, the security forces were assembled near the Ostknoten, or “Eastern Knot,” on the ring, a tactically advantageous spot just shy of the main train station, and were to prevent “eine weitere Bewegung in Richtung Hauptbahnhof” (see “Sicherungsbereich 2—Georgiring/Ostknoten” section of Entschluß, reproduced as sections 4 and 5 in FRL 407).

37. Telegram from Straßenburg, Oct. 9, 1989, to Ltr. VPKÄ, Ltr. StVE, Kdr., FRL 406; see also the related documents, FRL 407–412.

38. “Entschluß des Chefs der BDVP Leipzig zum Ordnungseinsatz am 9. Oktober 1989,” SS Anlage II, 665–667; as mentioned in n. 7, a written note on this document indicates that Dickel confirmed it.

39. Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 273.

40. Interview with Silvio Rösler, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

41. Interview with Uwe Chemnitz, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

42. Interview with Gisela and Wolfgang Rähder, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

43. Interview with Jens Illing, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

44. Remarks by Toralf Dörre, formerly of the Volkspolizei-Bereitschaft Essenerstr. Leipzig, on Oct. 7, 1999, reprinted in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 486–487.

45. Interview with Illing, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

46. Page from diary of Superintendent Dr. Johannes Richter, Oct. 9, 1989, reprinted in FRL 409.

47. Führer quoted in Kuhn, Der Tag, 74.

48. Photographs of the pages of Friedrich’s letter are reprinted in Kuhn, Der Tag, 91–111; the suggestion that it was time for Honecker to go is at 109. Krenz confirms that Friedrich came to see him on that day and for that purpose; see Egon Krenz, Herbst ’89 (Berlin: Neues Leben, 1999), 89–92. The Stasi got wind of this event somehow: see BStU, BV Lpz Abt. XX 1722, Oct. 10, 1989, “Meinungen zur aktuellen Lage im Rat des Bezirks,” 2–3.

49. Kuhn, Der Tag, 84–90.

50. Interview with Krenz and letter from Friedrich to Krenz, both in Kuhn, Der Tag, 87–111.

51. “Lagefilm zum Einsatz/der Absicherung des ‘Friedensgebetes’ am 09.10.1989,” SS, Anlage II, 628. The original wording in German on the cloth was “Leute keine sinnlose Gewalt, reißt euch zusammen, laßt die Steine liegen.”

52. On Zimmermann’s outing of himself as a Stasi agent, see “Startrampe für Spione,” Spiegel 5 (1991): 50–52. See also FUF 566, which discloses his Stasi cover name as “Karl Erb.” Zimmermann is often misidentified as a pastor but was an employee of the theological faculty of the University of Leipzig. See Gößner and Wieckowski, eds., Die theologische Fakultät, for a history of the faculty.

53. “Aufruf der Sechs,” reprinted in Kuhn, Der Tag, 122–123. See also Hackenberg’s version of how the appeal came to be, saying that local party leaders had in fact come up with a similar idea for such cooperative measures themselves earlier that morning, in interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

54. Author’s interviews with Schwabe and Wonneberger.

55. Author’s interview with Wonneberger; the leaflet itself, or “Appell,” is reprinted in FRL 418. On the experience of distributing the leaflet and nearly being arrested for it, see interview with Gisela Kallenbach, CNN Cold War Collection, KCLMA.

56. Jahn worked with a number of other “information smugglers” in East Germany as well, but by 1989 Radomski and Schefke were his main sources of visual images. Author’s interviews with Jahn, Radomski, and Schefke.

57. Author’s interview with Jahn; Gerald Praschl, Roland Jahn: Ein Rebell als Behördenchef (Berlin: Links, 2011), 118–141; and, on the CSCE’s effects, Korey, Promises, chapter 3.

58. Siegbert “Siggi” Schefke, Leipzig—Städteverfall in der DDR, initial broadcast Sept. 12, 1989, Kontraste, SFB/ARD; see also remarks by Schefke reprinted in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 477–478.

59. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

60. Author’s interviews with Jahn, Radomski, and Schefke; see also Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 478.

61. “Beabsichtigtes Treffen feindlicher Kräfte in Prag,” BStU, MfS, HA XX/9 1772, 9.

62. Photographs of both the video camera and the concealing carrier bag used by Radomski and Schefke are in FRL 432–433.

63. Jahn quoted in Praschl, Roland Jahn, 220.

64. Author’s interview with Jahn; and Funken, Das Jahr, 20.

65. For biographical information about Radomski, see Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 380–383; see also the online biographical information at www .chronik-der-wende.de.

66. Author’s interview with Radomski; and Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 380–381.

67. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke. On the East German band Feeling B, some of whose members then formed Rammstein, and the importance of rock music to the GDR opposition, see Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 158–162.

68. See the internal Stasi documentation summarizing the reasons for taking Schefke under surveillance in BStU, BV Berlin, AOP 5761-91, Schefke, especially 12. For a summary of Schefke’s biography, see Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 474–475.

69. No less than a Stasi crown prince, Sven Schwanitz, was in charge of the operation of watching over “Satan.” Sven was the son of Wolfgang Schwanitz, the senior Stasi officer in line to take over the entire ministry once its eighty-one-year-old leader, Mielke, finally relinquished the reins that he had held for over three decades. As a result, Sven’s last name entitled him both to authority beyond his age and to the highest-profile operations, such as those against Schefke. On Schwanitz and Schefke, see Frank Junghänel, “In der Zeitschleife,” Berliner Zeitung, Oct. 9, 2009; for more information on Mielke and Schwanitz, see the relevant entries in Enbergs et al., eds., Wer war wer, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 81–82.

70. For instructions from the Stasi to have his employer make leaving work for his dissident activities difficult, see “Eröffnungsbericht,” Berlin, Mar. 1, 1988, Abteilung XX/2, BStU, 29. For Schefke’s response to the subsequent actions by his employer, see “Sachstandbericht zum OV ‘Satan,’” Sept. 18, 1988, Berlin, Bezirksverwaltung für Staatssicherheit Berlin, Abteilung XX, BStU, AOP 5761-91, 95. The author is grateful to Schefke for providing the legal permission (Einwilligung) necessary to view his complete Stasi files.

71. “Sachstandbericht zum OV ‘Satan,’” 92–96; see also Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 216, and Vollnhals, ed., Die Kirchenpolitik.

72. See the collection of Stasi documents about the East Berlin Protestant church that sheltered the library, the Zionskirche, on the Stasi Archive website, www.bstu .bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Vorabend-der-Revolution/1987_Buerger echtler-Umweltbibliothek/_node.html.

73. Author’s interview with Jahn; Lina’s quotation in Praschl, Roland Jahn, 77. Further autobiographical information in Roland Jahn, “‘Du bist wie Gift,’” Spiegel 25 (1983): 78–84; see also Ralf Huisinga, Roland Jahn und die Friedensgemeinschaft in Jena (Munich: Grin Verlag, 2006); and Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 321–324.

74. “9. Juni 1983, Bericht,” Bezirksverwaltung für Staatssicherheit, Stellvertreter Operativ, Gera, 67–70, in BStU, “Aktion ‘Gegenschlag,’” BStU-Außenstelle Gera; quotation at 69.

75. Author’s interview with Jahn.

76. “9. Juni 1983, Bericht,” 69. For good measure, the Stasi noted the name, birthdate, and home address of the sleeping-car conductor, in case later follow-up with the conductor might be needed, were he tempted to talk.

77. Author’s interview with Jahn.

78. Author’s interviews with Jahn and Poppe; Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 235–253; Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 306–311; and Praschl, Roland Jahn, 80–178. On East German dissent generally, see John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

79. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ed., Freiheit und Öffentlichkeit: Politischer Samisdat in der DDR 1985–1989 (Berlin: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, 2002), 216 n. 1. For more on Jahn’s network, see Praschl, Roland Jahn, 118–141.

80. Author’s interview with Jahn; and Funken, Das Jahr, 25–31.

81. “Eröffnungsbericht,” Mar. 1, 1988, BStU, MfS Archiv der Zentralstelle, BVfS Berlin, AOP 5761/91, 21–32.

82. “Vermerk über den Rapport zum OV ‘Satan,’” Aug. 21, 1989, BStU, AOP 5761-91, Abteilung XX/9, 56; and author’s interview with Schefke.

83. Extensive Stasi files are available on one of Schefke’s “friends,” a man named Falk Zimmermann, who was in fact an undercover Stasi operative, reporting on Schefke for years in exchange for payment. Zimmermann’s Stasi code name was “Reinhard Schumann.” See the multiple volumes of his Stasi files in BStU, Reg.-Nr. BV Berlin/ XV/1619/79, “Reinhard Schumann.” Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts After Communism (New York: Random House, 1995), 358–372, also describes Zimmermann’s work, although on the basis of interviews rather than the actual Stasi files.

84. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

85. Author’s interview with Radomski.

86. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke; and remarks by Schefke in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 478–482.

87. Author’s interview with Schefke; and remarks by Bickhardt in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 442–443.

88. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

89. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke; and Funken, Das Jahr, 31.

90. Author’s interview with Sievers; interview with Sievers in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 432–434; and Hans-Jürgen Sievers, ed., In der Mitte der Stadt: Die Evangelisch-Reformierte Kirche zu Leipzig von der Einwanderung der Hugenotten bis zur friedlichen Revolution (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2000), 141.

91. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Sievers.

92. Author’s interviews with Radomski, Schefke, and Sievers; and Praschl, Roland Jahn, 171–172.

93. Author’s interview with Sievers; see also interview with Sievers in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 432–434.

94. Author’s interviews with Radomski, Schefke, and Schwarz.

95. In the wake of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the GDR let the West German newsweekly Spiegel, along with others, open bureaus in East Berlin. On Helsinki and its legacy, see Korey, Promises, and Snyder, Human Rights Activism.

96. Schwarz’s predecessor, Jörg Mettke, was also thrown out, for an article about forced adoptions; author’s interview with Schwarz. See also Jochen Bölsche, “Das Geheimnis der Tarantel,” Spiegel 33 (2000): 56–70.

97. One of the many Stasi files on Schwarz is available at BStU, MfS HA II/13, Nr. 1228, OV “Tarantel.”

98. The group was called “Arche.” On Cooper’s role, see Carlo Jordan and Hans Michael Kloth, eds., Arche Nova (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1995), 99–111.

99. Author’s interviews, with Cooper, Schefke, and Schwarz; see also Funken, Das Jahr, 31.

100. Author’s interviews with Schefke and Sievers.

101. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 214.

102. Ibid., 213–216.

103. Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 464.

104. Hackenberg quoted in Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 272.

105. For speculation on how many of the party members due to pack the church actually showed up, see Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 190–192.

106. Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 216–218; and interview with Führer in Kuhn, Der Tag, 120.

107. “Bericht des Sekretärs der SED-Stadtleitung Leipzig,” Oct. 10, 1989, doc. 244, FUF 458–460.

108. Interview with Führer in Kuhn, Der Tag, 120–122; and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 191–192.

109. Author’s interview with Sievers; and “Auszug aus dem Fernschreiben des Chefs der BDVP Leipzig [Straßenburg] an den Minister des Inneren,” Oct. 10, 1989, 1:45 a.m., FRL 430.

110. Author’s interview with Sievers.

111. Author’s interview with Sievers; and “Manuskript der Predigt von Pfarrer Hans-Jürgen Sievers in der Reformierten Kirche,” Oct. 9, 1989, FRL 422. For the text of the 1963 “I Have a Dream” speech, see, among other places, www .archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf; on King in divided Berlin, see the German Historical Institute website, www.aacvr-germany.org/index.php/images-7 /dr-martin-luther-kings-visit-to-cold-war-berlin.

112. In a later interview, Hackenberg claimed that he had allowed delivery and reading of the appeal because he agreed with it in principle, but had not signed it himself because the fact that only some, not all, of the party secretaries in Leipzig had signed it revealed a split in the party. See interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA. See also “Chronik der Wende: Oktober 9, 1989,” video series, RBB Media, 1994, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 310–312.

113. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

114. Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern, Die volkseigene Revolution (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993), 47. Opp and his co-authors analyzed the Oct. 9 protest and estimated that the number of participants may have been as high as 166,000; they concluded that the commonly used estimate of 70,000 is almost certainly too low.

115. “Lagefilm zum Einsatz/der Absicherung des ‘Friedensgebetes’ am 09.10.1989,” SS, Anlage II, 634.

116. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer; see also Bohley, Praschl, and Rosenthal, eds., Mut, 10–11; Hattenhauer’s biography on her website, www.katrin-hattenhauer .de/biografie_en.html; and Saunders, “Half a Life Ago.”

117. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

118. Interview with police Oberstleutnant Wolfgang Schröder in Kuhn, Der Tag, 80; and Martin Jankowski, “Sieg ohne Helden,” 821–823.

119. On Hackenberg’s operational authority as district deployment leader, see Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 248.

120. Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 188–190.

121. Interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA; and interview with Krenz in Kuhn, Der Tag, 133.

122. Interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 130–133.

123. Krenz would also say that there had never been any order to shoot in Leipzig, which may have been accurate since Hackenberg did not issue it, but that does not explain why large numbers of the deployed forces stated that they had received an order to shoot (as described in this chapter). See Hinze, “Eine Legende zerbröckelt,” and interview with Egon Krenz, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

124. Interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 130, 134.

125. Interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

126. Hinze, “Eine Legende zerbröckelt”; Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 278; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 307.

127. Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 195.

128. Nieman, Sekretäre, 337.

129. Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 310–312.

130. As mentioned above in note 7 to this chapter, the estimate of 50,000 appears in “Entschluß des Chefs der BDVP Leipzig zum Ordnungseinsatz am 9. Oktober 1989,” SS Anlage II, 663.

131. Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 195–202.

132. “Aktennotiz zur Einweisung am 14.10.1989, 08.00 Uhr, beim Chef des Hauptstabes des NVR,” SS Anlage II, 698; this document also appears in FRL 442.

133. “Protokoll, 22. Sitzung der Bezirksleitung,” Nov. 21, 1989, FRL 432.

134. Interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 135. Straßenburg has provided a different history of this evening. He claimed that his orders on Oct. 9 were to avoid the use of violence, and that in pursuit of that goal he was the one who instructed the forces to take up a self-defensive post; see interview with Straßenburg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA. A minor point of interest in this interview is that the questioner had to request that Straßenburg stop ogling a female member of the crew recording it. In contrast with Straßenburg’s account, the surviving written documentation cited here, plus the fact that Hackenberg was the highest de facto authority on-site, suggests that Hackenberg’s account is more credible. Hackenberg does indicate that he consulted with Straßenburg a number of times in the course of the evening, and the written record makes clear that he did, so it is possible that the idea of reverting to self-defense arose in a mutual conversation. Ultimately Hackenberg had to implement it, however.

135. The full original in German is as follows: “09.10.89, 18.35 Uhr, Vorsitzender BEL und Chef [Hackenberg]: Nach Bestätigung wird befohlen, keine aktiven Handlungen gegenüber den Demonstranten zu unternehmen. Befehl Chef: An alle Einsatzkräfte ist der Befehl zu erteilen, daß der Übergang zur Eigensicherung einzuleiten ist! Einsatz Kräfte nur bei Angriffen auf Sicherungskräfte, Objekte und Einrichtungen. Bei Angriff-Abwehr mit allen Mitteln. Verkehrsorganisatorische Maßnahmen einleiten.” In SS Anlage II, 679. See also interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 130–133, and Niemann, Die Sekretäre, 345.

136. On-camera testimony of Oberstleutnant Schröder, Kommandeur der 5. VP-Bereitschaft, in Andreas Voigt and Gerd Kroske, producers, Leipzig im Herbst: Aufbruch ’89, ein DEFA-Dokument, video documentary filmed Oct. 16–Nov. 7, 1989; see also interviews with Wötzel and Straßenburg in Kuhn, Der Tag, 131–133, and Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 196–197.

137. Volkspolizeihauptmann Dieter Zarges, quoted in Jankowski, “Sieg ohne Helden,” 823.

138. Remarks by Dörre in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 485–487.

139. Quotation from interview with Dörre in Funken, Das Jahr, 134–135; see also Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 485–487.

140. “Information zum Stimmungs- und Meinungsbild nach dem Einsatz am 09.10.1989 in Leipzig,” BStU, BV Lpz Abt. VII 907, 184.

141. Interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 134.

142. Hollitzer, “Der friedliche Verlauf,” 278 n. 139; Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 466–467; and Doris Mundus, Leipzig 1989: A Chronicle (Leipzig: Lehmstedt Verlag, 2009), 24–25.

143. Interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA; and interview with Wötzel in Kuhn, Der Tag, 135. See also the analysis of these events in FRL 424. On the number of participants at the Oct. 9 march, still in dispute, note that, like Hackenberg, the GDR Ministry of the Interior also estimated that the crowd had been “ca. 100.000 Mann” in “Auszug aus dem Lagefilm der Führungsgruppe des MdI,” Oct. 9, 1989, FRL 429. See also Opp, Voss, and Gern, Die volkseigene Revolution, 47; “Information über eine nicht-genehmigte Demonstration im Stadtzentrum von Leipzig am 9.10.1989,” BStU, MfS, Neiber 617, 100–106, and BStU, “Oktober 1989: Offene Krise und Machtwechsel,” available online at www.BStU.bund.de /DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/Oktober-1989/oktober89_node .html.

144. Author’s interview with Radomski.

145. Ibid. On the massive size of the march, see FRL 429.

146. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

147. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

148. “Notizen des Referatsleiters des Referats XX/7 zur Referatsleitersitzung der Abteilung XX der BV Leipzig des MfS am 09.10.1989, 19.00 Uhr,” doc. 243, FUF 458.

149. Interview with Hackenberg, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

150. Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 262, discusses what might have happened if violence had broken out.

151. Interview with Theo Kühirt, “Angehöriger der Kampfgruppen,” in Neues Forum, ed., Jetzt oder nie, 90–92.

152. Interview with Schröder, in Kuhn, Der Tag, 137–138.

153. Tetzner, Leipziger Ring, 18–19; and Reiner Tetzner, Kerzen-Montage verändern die Welt: Warum die Waffen wirklich schwiegen (Leipzig: Haus des Buches, 2009). See also the pictures of the demonstrators in Schneider, Leipziger Demontagebuch, 44–45, which show marchers filling the breadth of the wide ring road.

154. For more on the phenomenon of the revolution gaining power in the GDR, see Eckert, SED-Diktatur, 12, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 313–314.

155. Author’s interview with Schwabe.

156. The Ministry of the Interior estimated that 5,500 people used the train station to depart afterward; see “Auszug aus dem Lagefilm der Führungsgruppe des MdI,” Oct. 9, 1989, FRL 429.

157Tagesthemen broadcast, night of Oct. 9, 1989, ARD archive.

158. Report of BDVP Leipzig, Chef, Straßenburg, Oct. 10, 1989, 1:45 a.m.; see also Kuhn, Der Tag, 11.

159. For Stasi photos of the round corner, see BStU, BV Leipzig, Abt. RD 762, 114–117. I am grateful to Hans-Jürgen and Wilma Sievers for visiting it with me.

160. Interview with Straßenburg in Kuhn, Der Tag, 132–133.

161. Manfred Hummitzsch, “Montagseinsätze, handschriftliche Aufzeichnungen,” BStU Außenstelle Leipzig, BVfS Leipzig, Leitung 00591, 48.

162. “Information über eine nicht-genehmigte Demonstration im Stadtzentrum von Leipzig am 9.10.1989,” BStU, MfS, Neiber 617, 100–106, also available online.

163. Hummitzsch, “Montagseinsätze,” 41; also reprinted in FRL 431.

164. “Geprägt von Besonnenheit,” Leipziger Volkszeitung, Oct. 10, 1989, reprinted in FRL 431.

165. Honecker quoted in Krenz, Herbst ’89, 96.

166. “Aktennotiz zur Einweisung am 14.10.1989, 08.00 Uhr, beim Chef des Hauptstabes des NVR,” SS Anlage II, 698; and FRL 442; see also Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 130; Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 469; and Kuhn, Der Tag, 11.

167. “Über Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung der Sicherheit und Ordnung in LEIPZIG,” Befehl Nr. 9/89, Oct. 13, 1989, SS, Anlage VIII, 1655–1657.

168. “Auszug aus einer Rede von Innenminister Friedrich Dickel,” Oct. 21, 1989, FRL 454. Dickel appears to have agreed with Hackenberg that the marchers numbered 100,000 (see section 4 of speech). For more information on 1953, see Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953.

169. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke; Führer, Ascher, and Holland-Moritz, Und wir sind dabei, 221; and remarks by Schefke in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 478.

170. Author’s interview with Radomski.

171. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke; and remarks by Schefke in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 478.

172. Author’s interviews with Radomski, Schefke, and Sievers.

173. Author’s interview with Sievers.

174. Author’s interviews with Radomski, Schefke, and Sievers; interview with both Sievers and his son Ulf Sievers in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 432–434, 444. Note that there are differing versions of the story of the filming on Oct. 9 in circulation. For example, the Hollitzer and Bohse edited volume includes remarks to the effect that other people had filmed from the tower that night as well. Since the accounts of Cooper, Jahn, Radomski, Schefke, Schwarz, and Sievers in separate interviews were all consistent with each other, were consistent with the surviving video footage, and yielded a common recollection of the involvement of only those three men plus a church custodian, their version is included in the text above. The only minor disagreement in these six accounts is over how long the church custodial worker, who had the key necessary to open the locked door to the tower, spent with Radomski and Schefke. For the alternative version, see the remarks of Thomas Rudolph, and Sievers’s refutation of them, in Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 445–446. Sievers recollects that other people did come to his church to make photographs and film, but not on Oct. 9; author’s interview with Sievers. Similarly, Mayer, Der nicht aufgibt, 107, suggests that a Leizpig activist named Katrin Walther made a prior agreement with Sievers to allow Radomski and Schefke to use the tower on Oct. 9, but none of the six participants in events interviewed by the author recalled such an agreement.

175. Author’s interview with Schwarz.

176. Author’s interviews with Cooper and Schefke; and Praschl, Roland Jahn, 171–173.

177. Author’s interviews with Cooper and Schwarz.

178. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

179. Author’s interviews with Jahn and Schwarz.

180. For more on Jahn’s work with SFB, see Praschl, Roland Jahn, 162.

181. Author’s interview with Jahn and Neubert; and Funken, Das Jahr, 31.

182Tagesschau and Tagesthemen, Oct. 10, 1989, in ARD-NDR archive; and Funken, Das Jahr, 31.

183. Author’s interviews with Jahn and Schefke.

184. Author’s interview with Wonneberger; Funken, Das Jahr, 126; Kowalczuk and Sello, eds., Für ein freies Land, 211; and Mayer, Der nicht aufgibt, 122–144.

185. Hollitzer and Bohse, eds., Heute vor 10 Jahren, 467; and Kuhn, Der Tag, 10.

Chapter 4: The Revolution Advances, the Regime Plays for Time

1. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Entscheidung für die deutsche Einheit,” DESE 61; see also the graphic in Richter, Die friedliche Revolution, book endpapers.

2. Author’s interview with Cooper.

3. Schwabe, “Symbol der Befreiung,” n. 11. On the Berlin-Dresden relationship, see Jesse, ed., Friedliche Revolution; on opposition movements generally, see Erhard Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949–1989 (Bonn: BPB, 1997).

4. Author’s interview with Birthler.

5. Author’s interview with Sello; original German, “nicht nachlassen.”

6. On Gorbachev’s visit to East Berlin, see telegram, “Amembassy Moscow to Secstate Washdc,” Oct. 6, 1989, CWIHPPC; records from Gorbachev’s visit in BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3239; “Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens der Genossen des Politbüros des ZK der SED mit . . . Gorbatschow, am Sonnabend, den 7. Oktober 1989 in Berlin-Niederschönhausen,” doc. 21, in Daniel Küchenmeister and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Honecker Gorbatschow Vieraugengespräche (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1993), 252–266; analysis of Gorbachev’s visit in BDE, ZA 140.711E, PA-AA; and entry for Oct. 8, 1989, diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, available on the National Security Archive website, www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB /NSAEBB275/1989%20for%20posting.pdf. On violence near the Gethsemane Church, see Momper, Grenzfall, 106. For the story of Klaus Laabs, the protestor who was run over and nearly killed by a police vehicle, see taz DDR-Journal, 41–42.

7. On the violent reaction of the security forces to the anniversary overall, see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 239–293.

8. Author’s interview with Birthler.

9. Author’s interview with Birthler. See one of the Stasi reports on Birthler in BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4599, 155–158, also available online.

10. Author’s interview with Birthler; see the reports on her in BStU, MfS, HA IX 2638; and, on the BStU website, see “Gedächtnisprotokolle, Tage und Nächte nach dem 7. Oktober 1989, Berlin,” www.BStU.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte /Revolutionskalender/Oktober-1989/Bilder/Gedaechtnisprotokolle_pdf.pdf.

11. See photos of such events in the Gethsemane Church in Oct. 1989 in FRL 347; coverage of the Gethsemane Church on Tagesthemen, ARD, Oct. 7, 1989; and a Politburo assessment of events at the church in “Information über die aktuelle Lage in der DDR,” Oct. 17, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 88–98.

12. Author’s interviews with Birthler and Schwabe; and Marianne Birthler, “Oppositionelle Gruppen in der DDR der 80er Jahre und ihre Rolle in der friedlichen Revolution,” in Horst Möller and Aleksandr Tschubarjan, eds., Mitteilungen der Gemeinsamen Kommission für die Erforschung der jüngeren Geschichte der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 281.

13. Author’s interview with Birthler.

14. For more on older Communists and their experiences, see Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 262–263.

15. Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 339.

16. “Weitere Hinweise auf Reaktionen der Bevölkerung,” and cover note from Mielke to Krenz, Oct. 16, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4259, 10–14, also available online.

17. On the potential for violence, see Detlef Pollack, “Die Friedlichkeit der Herbstakteure 1989,” in Sabrow, ed., 1989, 124.

18. See incident reports in BStU, MfS, ZAIG 14169.

19. Hans-Hermann Hertle and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED: Die letzten Tage des Zentralkomitees (Berlin: Links, 1997), 52.

20. Interview with Günter Schabowski, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

21. Vote recorded in “Protokoll Nr. 43,” from Politburo meeting of Oct. 17, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV/2/2A/3247, 9. See also Schabowski interview, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA; Mielke comments in “Gerhard Schürer, Persönliche Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung des Politbüros,” Oct. 17, 1989, reprinted in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 434; Funken, Das Jahr, 58–80, and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 339–341.

22. “Protokoll der Aktivtagung der Parteiorganisation im MfS am 18.10.1989,” Oct. 20, 1989, BStU, MfS, SED-Kreisleitung 19, 2, also available online, reports on these events. Honecker’s wife, the education minister, Margot Honecker, resigned as well; see “Protokoll Nr. 46,” BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV/2/2A/3251, 7. See also remarks in the interview with Schabowski, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA. Schabowski suggests that there was supposed to be a real vote at the central committee meeting on Honecker’s successor, but Krenz maneuvered it so that he was the only person considered and then appointed.

23. “Information über Meinungen von Bürgern,” Oct. 19, 1989, BStU, MfS, Berlin XV Nr. 49, reprinted in Jens Schöne, Die friedliche Revolution (Berlin: Berlin Story Verlag, 2008), 80.

24. “Einige Fragen und Probleme,” Oct. 25, 1989. See also the letters received by Krenz’s office in BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/323; Munro, “Britain, Berlin,” 62; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 348.

25. Mielke Referat, Oct. 21, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 4885, also available online.

26. “Einige Fragen und Probleme,” Oct. 25, 1989; see also “Hinweise über Reaktionen progressive Kräfte,” Oct. 8, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5351, 55–62, also available online.

27. “Chiffriertes Fernschreiben der Bezirksleitung Leipzig an . . . Egon Krenz,” n.d., from context Oct. 30, 1989, BStU, MfS, SdM 664, 1–3.

28. Telegram from BL Leipzig, Oct. 31, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/317. See also the information delivered to Helmut Kohl about the Oct. 30 march in “Vorlage des Ministerialdirigenten Jung an Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bonn,” Nov. 3, 1989, doc. 72, DESE 478–479.

29. See photos of the interior of the Leipzig Stasi headquarters in Bürgerkomitee Leipzig, ed., Stasi intern (Leipzig: Forum Verlag, 1991).

30. “Aufgabenstellungen,” Oct. 31, 1989, BStU, MfS, BdL/Dok 005033, also available online.

31. “Reduzierung des Bestandes an dienstlichen Bestimmungen und Weisungen in den Kreisdienststellen/Objektdienststellen,” Nov. 6, 1989, BStU, MfS, BdL/Dok. 005592, 1–6, also available online; see also BStU, MfS, HA I 16938, 129, n.d., but from context on or about Nov. 11, 1989.

32. “Thesen für Dienstkonferenz des Leiters der Abt. M des MfS Berlin,” Nov. 9, 1989, BStU, ZA, Abt. M 1025, 59–63, also available online.

33. Letter from Mielke, Nov. 2, 1989, BStU, MfS, BdL/Dok. 004400, also available online.

34. “Vorlage für das Politbüro des ZK der SED,” Oct. 30, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3252, available online on BStU website. See also Martin Sabrow, “‘1989’ und die Rolle der Gewalt in Ostdeutschland,” in Sabrow, ed., 1989, 22–30.

35. See the online commentary to “Entwurf des Gesetzes,” Nov. 6, 1989, www .bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/November-1989 /Dokumentenseiten/06-November_b/06_nov__b_text.html?nn=1930806.

36. “Erklärung von Egon Krenz vor der Volkskammer der DDR,” Oct. 24, 1989, draft in BArch, SAPMO, J IV 2/2A/3249, 9–41.

37. For an analysis of the precarious economic state of the GDR in fall 1989, see Hertle, Chronik, 92–95; Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany 1945–1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); and Günter Kusch et al., Schlußbilanz—DDR: Fazit einer verfehlten Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1991). For a more optimistic view of the GDR’s economic health, see Matthias Judt, Der Bereich kommerzielle Koordinierung: Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski—Mythos und Realität (Berlin: Links, 2013), 236–237.

38. See the “ungeschminktes Bild” of the dire economic situation in the GDR in “Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit Schlußfolgerungen,” Oct. 27, 1989, BStU, MfS, HA XVIII 3314, quotation at 5; see also BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/5195, available online on BStU website. The BStU annotator notes that the Politbüro considered, but then deleted, phrasing about working with Bonn to make the Wall “überflüssig”(unnecessary) by the end of the century. See also the interview with Schürer, and “Schreiben von Gerhard Schürer an Egon Krenz,” Oct. 27, 1989, both in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 313–321, 460–462.

39. “Schreiben von Alexander Schalck an Egon Krenz, 13.10.1989,” reprinted in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 429–430. On Schalck’s role and his office more generally, see Frank Schumann and Heinz Wuschech, Schalck-Golodkowski: Der Mann, der die DDR retten wollte (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2012); Judt, Der Bereich; and Peter Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992).

40. Interview with Schabowski in Berliner Arbeitshefte.

41. “Konzeption: Zum Vorgehen gegenüber der BRD im Zusammenhang mit den vorgesehenen Regelungen im Reiseverkehr,” Oct. 23, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 113–114; see also BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3250, 62–63, which reads as follows: “Die BRD-Seite ist darauf hinzuweisen, daß aus der zu erwartenden weiteren Zunahme des Reiseverkehrs für die DDR erheblich Devisenaufwendungen entstehen werden. Gleichermaßen ergeben sich für die DDR aus ständigen Ausreisen enorme Nachteile und Verluste. Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang erforderlich, einen angemessenen Interessenausgleich herbeizuführen (z.B. in Form von Pauschalen für die Erstattung von Ausbildungskosten im Zusammenhang mit ständigen Ausreisen, für die Ausstattung mit Reisezahlungsmitteln sowie von Ausgleichszahlungen hinsichtlich der Beförderungskosten der Eisenbahn).”

42. “Schreiben von Alexander Schalck an Egon Krenz, 24.10.1989” in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 438–443; the original quotation, at 440, is “faktisch unbegrenzten Reiseverkehrs zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten.” See also Hertle, Chronik, 99–106, and Karl-Rudolf Korte, Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), 458–464.

43. “Telefongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit dem Staatsratsvorsitzenden Krenz,” Oct. 26, 1989, doc. 68, DESE 468–469. In the West German original, Krenz used the word “Wende” to describe what he did not want to happen: “Er [Krenz] wolle keine Wende herbeiführen” (468). The East German transcript of the same conversation is in “Gespräch zwischen . . . Egon Krenz und . . . Helmut Kohl,” Oct. 26, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/328, and a note attached to the record of this conversation suggests that Mielke and others should start thinking about the practical implications of a new travel law; see “Maßnahmen,” Oct. 26, 1989, in same file. Later, at a meeting on Nov. 1, Krenz would hint to Gorbachev about allowing some travel abroad, although only with a passport, a visa, and sufficient personal funds. See the record of their conversation, Nov. 1, 1989, MG, 240–241; an abbreviated English-language translation of the Russian version of this conversation is available in GC, but it is shorter than the version published by Gorbachev himself; the East German version of this conversation is also available in BArch, SAPMO, J IV 2/2A/3255, and has been published in various locations. See also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 423.

44. Krenz seems to have already thought of some kind of new regulations at that point, but as he was not yet in charge, the idea made little progress at the time. See notes that, according to BArch archivist Sylvia Gräfe, were handwritten by Krenz, Sept. 17, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/77, 54. See also Süss, “Der 9. November 1989,” 228–229, 507 n. 7.

45. “2. Oktoberwoche,” handwritten, BStU, MfS, Rechtsstelle 101, describes the meeting of the working group under the leadership of Wolfgang Herger. See also note from Krenz to Honecker, Oct. 12, 1989, in BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 77–80; “Zu beachtende Probleme bei der Realisierung der Grundsätze für ein Gesetz zu Reisen von Bürgern der DDR in das Ausland,” Oct. 16, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7438, 41–43; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 419.

46. “Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit dem am 26.10.1989 geführten Telefongespräch,” that is, considerations resulting from the telephone conversation between Krenz and Kohl, Oct. 26, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3252, 62.

47. “Niederschrift über das Gespräch . . . Egon Krenz mit . . . Wolfgang Mischnick,” Oct. 25, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/328; Momper, Grenzfall, 98–105; and BStU, MfS, SdM 664, 34.

48. Stasi documents from both of these meetings are available in “Information über eine Zusammenkunft der SPD-Politiker Walter Momper und Horst Ehmke mit oppositionellen Kräften der DDR am 29.10.1989 im Atelier von Bohley, Bärbel,” Nov. 2, 1989, BStU, MfS HA XX/9, 1698, 87–90, and “Information A/043286/31/10/89/01,” BStU, MfS Arbeitsbereich Neiber, 194, 72–73.

49. “Information über eine Zusammenkunft,” 89; author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 98–109. Quotations at 105 and from author’s interview with Momper, respectively. See also Vier Tage im November (Hamburg: Gruner + Jahr, 1989), 10.

50. See the correspondence between Dickel and Krenz, Oct. 31, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/89.

51. Günter Schabowski, Frank Sieren, and Ludwig Koehne, Das Politbüro Ende eines Mythos: Eine Befragung (Hamburg: Reinbek, 1990), 113, discuss how, although East Germany had a state apparatus in name—a minister-president and full set of ministries—they were subordinate to the party organizations, with the Politburo at the top.

52. Author’s interview with Lauter.

53. Gerhard Lauter, Chefermittler: Der Oberste Fahnder der K in der DDR berichtet (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2012), 48–87.

54. See the evidence about Lauter’s service to the Stasi in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 217.

55. Lauter, Chefermittler, 11–14.

56. Ibid., 25. On the purging of longtime Communists in the GDR, see Epstein, Last Revolutionaries, 2–3.

57. Author’s interview with Lauter; and Lauter, Chefermittler, 148–152.

58. “Information über die Sitzung des Ministerrates,” Nov. 2, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/214.

59. “Gespräch mit Gerhard Lauter,” in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 326; Lauter, Chefermittler, 152; and Florian Huber and Marc Brasse, producers, Schabowskis Zettel, video, Spiegel-TV, first broadcast Nov. 9, 2009.

60. “Vorlage für das Politbüro,” Oct. 27, 1989, BStU, MfS, SdM 664, 43. See also BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2/3250, 128; Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 189; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 425.

61. See the television coverage of the refilling of the grounds of the West German embassy in Prague on, among other places, the television news shows Tagesschau and Tagesthemen, ARD-NDR archive, Nov. 3, 1989.

62. Küsters, “Entscheidung,” 42.

63. “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes Berlin (Ost),” Nov. 3, 1989, doc. 71, DESE 476–478.

64. Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 420; see also “Hinweise auf im Zusammenhang mit der aktuellen Lage in der DDR stehende Aktivitäten in den Bereichen Kunst/Kultur,” Oct. 9, 1989, in BStU, MfS, ZAIG 5376, 2–9, also available online.

65. See telegram from Krenz to all leading party officials saying that contacts with the opposition were only to be carried out “so that no official recognition” would be implied: Fernschreiben, BArch, SAPMO, Oct. 31, 1989, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/314. See also “Information 451/89,” BStU, ZA, ZAIG 3756, 127–135, and “Hinweise zur möglichen Zulassung des ‘Neuen Forum,’” BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7388, 20–22, both available online. On the significance of the New Forum, see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 316.

66. Author’s interview with Meckel; FRL 318; see also Markus Meckel, Selbstbewußt in die deutsche Einheit (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001).

67. See the concerns expressed about the Nov. 4 demonstration in letter from Kurt Hager to Egon Krenz, Oct. 20, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/26269; on the Nov. 4 event itself, see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 385–413.

68. Krenz’s comments were also published word for word in all major East German newspapers the next day. See, for example, “Fernseh- und Rundfunkansprache von Egon Krenz an die Bürger der DDR,” Neues Deutschland, Nov. 4–5, 1989; also printed in Der Morgen, Nov. 4–5, 1989, 1, and Junge Welt, Nov. 4–5, 1989. On the short notice, see “Amembassy Berlin to Secstate Washdc,” Nov. 6, 1989, in CWIHPPC, and Bahrmann and Links, Chronik, 76.

69. Egon Krenz, “Befehl 11/89,” Nov. 3, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 14392, 19; and author’s interview with Krenz. The original German phrasing says that the “Anwendung körperlicher Gewalt” is to be used to prevent demonstrators from going “in das Grenzgebiet.” However: “Die Anwendung der Schußwaffe im Zusammenhang mit möglichen Demonstrationen ist grundsätzlich verboten.”

70. Author’s interview with Birthler; see also, at RHG, in Bestand Marianne Birthler (MBi), the various documents related to the Nov. 4 demonstration.

71. “Entwurf: Gesetz über Reisen von Bürgern der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in das Ausland-Reisegesetz vom . . . ,” and “Entwurf: Durchführungsverordnung,” Neues Deutschland, Nov. 6, 1989, 1–3. Similarly, see “Entwurf: Gesetz über Reisen von Bürgern der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in das Ausland—Reisegesetz vom . . . ,” and “Entwurf: Durchführungsverordnung,” Berliner Zeitung, Nov. 6, 1989, 2. The symbol “. . .” was to be replaced later with a date for the law to go into effect, but none was given at the time. The notes below refer to the former document as the “Entwurf” and the latter as the “Entwurf, Durchführungsverordnung.”

72. For an example of the press coverage, see “Ausreise-Anträge werden schnell entschieden,” Neues Deutschland, Nov. 6, 1989, 2; see also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 420–421.

73. The draft would, in theory, once it became law, replace both of the legal documents governing travel at the time: (1) “Verordnung vom 30.11.88,” Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Teil I, Nr. 25 (Berlin: Dec. 13, 1988), 271–274 (hereafter “Verordnung”); and (2) “Erste Durchführungsbestimmung vom 14.03.89,” Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Teil I, Nr. 8 (Berlin: Mar. 28, 1989), 119–120.

74. These provisions are given in the “Entwurf, Durchführungsverordnung,” Paragraph 2, Absatz 1, and in Paragraph 5, Absatz 1.

75. “Entwurf,” Paragraph 6, Absatz 1.

76. “Entwurf,” Paragraph 5.

77. “Reisemittel, Subvention, Besteuerung der Handwerker,” Neues Deutschland, Nov. 8, 1989, 3.

78. “Information über den Verlauf und die Ergebnisse der öffentlichen Diskussion zum Entwurf des am 06. November 1989 veröffentlichten Gesetzes über Reisen,” BStU, MfS, Rechtsstelle 101, 158–160; see also “Reisegesetzentwurf steht zur Diskussion,” Berliner Zeitung, Nov. 6, 1989.

79. Author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 122–124.

80. Discussion summarized in Hertle, Chronik, 106–107. Original: “objektgebunden.”

81. Süß, “Der 9. November,” 230.

82. “Chronik,” Deutschland Archiv 22 (Dec. 1989): 1475; Funken, Das Jahr, 136–137; Klaus Hartung, “Die Wut in Leipzig nimmt zu,” tageszeitung, Nov. 8, 1989, reprinted in DDR-Journal, 88–89; and Sieren and Koehne, Politbüro, 113. See also Egon Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen (Wien: Neff, 1990), 227.

83. “Draft,” Nov. 6, 1989, released by my request, 2008-0655MR, from the GHWBPL. Blackwill continued: “Short of that extreme contingency, we should aim to avert a brutal internal crackdown in the GDR and minimize the risks of spillover into Poland and Hungary.”

84. See “Besprechung der beamteten Staatssekretäre, Bonn,” Nov. 6, 1989, docs. 74 and 74A, DESE 482–489, esp. 482.

85. “Schreiben, Alexander Schalck an Egon Krenz,” Nov. 7, 1989, doc. 12, in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 486–487.

86. “Zwischen Bundeskanzler Kohl, Bundesminister Schäuble, und Bundesminister Seiters am Abend des 6. November 1989 im Kanzlerbungalow abgestimmte Textpassage für den Bericht des Bundeskanzlers zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland am 8. November 1989 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag,” reproduced as a photograph, including handwritten notes, in DESE 491; and “Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lage der Nation, Erklärung von Bundeskanzler Kohl am 8. November 1989 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag,” in Auswärtiges Amt, ed., Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1995), 609.

87. There were some minor differences between the two older rules and the new draft. For the first time, the new version defined travel to foreign countries as a “right,” although precisely what that meant remained unclear. There was also a new “right” added: the “right” to travel back into the GDR at any time. Earlier travelers had not been able to take this for granted; for example, the SED withdrew the citizenship of the prominent singer and dissident Wolf Biermann when he was on a trip in the Federal Republic in 1976 and denied him reentry. Another novelty was the declaration that refusals would be “exceptions” (in “Entwurf,” Paragraph 6, Absatz 2, “Die Versagung der Genehmigungen für Reisen in das Ausland trägt Ausnahmecharakter”). Furthermore, if an application was refused, the draft would require the appropriate office not only to inform the applicant but also to explain why. The continuities outweighed the changes, however.

88. The East German ambassador in Prague gave Jakeš’s message to the GDR’s foreign minister, Oskar Fischer, who in turn passed it to Krenz; see letter from Fischer to Krenz, Nov. 3, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/342, 155–156. See also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 425–426.

89. On the phone call to Krenz, see remarks by Lauter, cited in Daniel Küchenmeister, Detlef Nakath, and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich”: Der Fall der Mauer am 9. November 1989 (Potsdam: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2000) 33–34.

90. “Protokoll Nr. 48 der Sitzung des Politbüros,” Nov. 3, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/3254, 6; Ilse Spittmann, “Eine Übergangsgesellschaft,” Deutschland Archiv 22 (Nov. 1989): 1204; www.chronik-der-mauer.de/index.php/de/Chronical /Detail/day/5/month/November/year/1989; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 425–427. See also “Ein wahrer Treppenwitz der Weltgeschichte,” Die Presse, Nov. 2, 2013; the author is grateful to Roberto Welzel for a copy of this article.

91. See the file from the Nov. 7 Politburo meeting in BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/J IV/2/2A/3255, 13–18; and Hertle, Chronik, 111–114.

92. A report from Mielke to Krenz indicated that the draft had intensified, not solved, the discontent in the GDR; see “3. Lagebericht,” Nov. 7, 1989, BStU, MfS, ZAIG 8266, 9–11, available online. See also Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, 164, 176–182, and Hans-Hermann Hertle, “‘Das reale Bild war eben katastrophal!’” Deutschland Archiv 10 (Oct. 1992): 1037.

93. “Document No. 4, Minutes No. 49 of the Meeting of the SED Politburo, 7 November 1989,” in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 12–13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 153–154.

94. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 187. As Vladimir Grinin, at the time a junior staffer in the Soviet embassy, recalled in an interview with the author, SED leaders were indeed frequent visitors.

95. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 17–27.

96. I am grateful to Tim Colton and Serhii Plokhy for information about Kochemasov. See also “Aleksandr Shelepin, 76, Dies,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1994; Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski, Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 331–333; Igor F. Maksimytchew, “Der Zusammenbruch der DDR,” in Horst Möller and Aleksandr Tschubarjan, eds., Mitteilungen der Gemeinsamen Kommission für die Erforschung der jüngeren Geschichte der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008)51; and Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 126.

97. Author’s interviews with Burton and Munro. For more on Kochemasov, see Pond, Beyond the Wall, 125–127.

98. Author’s interviews with Burton, Greenwald, Maximychev, and Munro.

99. “Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen Genossen Oskar Fischer und dem sowjetischen Botschafter Genossen W.I. Kotschemassow am 7.11.1989, 11.45 Uhr,” 10–11, former DDR Staatsarchiv, Ministerrat, Stoph, DC20-4933; see also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 427–428.

100. “Vermerk über ein Gespräch zwischen Genossen Oskar Fischer und dem sowjetischen Botschafter Genossen W.I. Kotschemassow am 7.11.1989, 11.45 Uhr,” Staatsarchiv, Ministerrat, Stoph, DC20-4933; author’s interview with Maximychev; and interview with Maximychev in Hans-Hermann Hertle and Kathrin Elsner, eds., Der Tag, an dem die Mauer fiel: Die wichtigsten Zeitzeugen berichten vom 9. November 1989 (Berlin: Nicolaische, 2009), 20–21; the word “opinion” is at 20; see also Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 35–36; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 427–428.

101. Author’s interview with Maximychev; and remarks by Maximychev in Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 35.

102. Interview with Maximychev in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 20–21, 24–25; Maximychev summary of Shevardnadze quotation at 20.

103. The East German official in Bonn was apparently a “Comrade Glienke.” See “Brief vom Oskar Fischer an Egon Krenz,” Nov. 8, 1989, Staatsarchiv, Ministerrat, Stoph, DC20–4933; see also “Eine friedliche Revolution,” Spiegel 46 (Nov. 13, 1989): 18–28.

104. Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 66.

105. “Referat von Egon Krenz,” Neues Deutschland, Nov. 9, 1989, 3; Gesamtdeutsches Institut, ed., Analysen, Dokumentationen und Chronik (Bonn: 1990), 85; Hertle, Chronik, 114–116; and Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 66–70.

Chapter 5: Failure to Communicate on November 9, 1989

1. Interview with Herger in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 22; on Herger’s significance to Krenz, see Süß, “Der friedliche Ausgang,” 193.

2. Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 424–426, cites the relevant documentary evidence, but this is one of the few points on which I disagree with his interpretation. He argues that emigration out of Czechoslovakia in early November represented the actual, unlimited “opening of the Wall,” so to speak, since it was, in his view, a form of unlimited travel freedom. It was clear, however, that the Czechs would be putting a stop to this process if the East Germans did not do so themselves, so it was not going to remain unlimited.

3. According to Lauter, as quoted in Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 46; and author’s interview with Lauter; see also Stent, Russia and Germany, 93–97.

4. Author’s interview with Lauter; Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum, 27, 50–55; Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 46; and Hertle, Chronik, 119.

5. Author’s interview with Lauter. See also Roger Engelmann and Clemens Vollnhals, eds., Justiz im Dienste der Parteiherrschaft: Rechtspraxis und Staatssicherheit in der DDR (Berlin: Links, 1999), 334–339.

6. According to Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 217 n. 244; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 435–437, it appears that Hubrich had been an IM from 1953 to 1984 under the cover name “Roter Matrose”; Lauter, still active in 1989, had been an IM since 1975 in part under the cover name “Richard.”

7. Author’s interview with Lauter; and Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum, 50–51.

8. Author’s interview with Lauter.

9. Hertle, Chronik, 119–120.

10. BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553; interview with Lauter in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 328; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 436–437 nn. 86–93.

11. Author’s interview with Lauter.

12. BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 17; and the reprint of the final document in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 34–35.

13. BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 27–29; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 436 nn. 86–90.

14. BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 17–18; author’s interview with Lauter; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 436–438, emphasis added by the author.

15. BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 17–18, emphasis added by the author.

16. Perhaps they added West Berlin as part of the general trend of exceeding orders, or perhaps the fact that the group of four had provided an out for themselves—by indicating that their text was temporary—made them feel better able to add divided Berlin. It is also at least possible that the internal Politburo note calling for more border-crossing options to West Berlin had somehow been communicated to them as part of their tasking, but this is purely speculative; see “Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang,” 62. See also Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 34–35. See also Walter Süß, “Weltgeschichte in voller Absicht oder aus Versehen?” Das Parlament, Nov. 9–16, 1990, 9.

17. Author’s interviews with Lauter and Maximychev; and Lauter, Chefermittler, 155–156; and interview with Lauter in Hertle, Der Fall, 328, where he says that he asked an unspecified superior whether his task included West Berlin and was told “yes, yes, also West Berlin.”

18. Interview with Lauter, published in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 31; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 440–441.

19. Author’s interview with Lauter; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 437–439.

20. Hertle, Chronik, 122–123.

21. Interview with Gerhard Niebling in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 30–31.

22. Lauter, Chefermittler, 157–158.

23. Author’s interview with Lauter; and Lauter, Chefermittler, 158–159.

24. Interview with Maximychev, published in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 24–25.

25. Author’s interview with Maximychev.

26. Notes from the Nov. 9 Politburo meeting, Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow; see also Svetlana Savranskaya, Thomas Blanton, and Vladislav Zubok, eds., Masterpieces of History: The Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 577–579, and Zubok, A Failed Empire, 326–327. Zubok points out that the lack of systematic consideration of German issues continued even after the opening of the Wall.

27. Author’s interview with Maximychev; and interview with Maximychev, published in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 25.

28. Author’s interview with Maximychev; interview with Maximychev in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 24–25; and comments by Maximychev in Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 40.

29. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 187.

30. On the composition of the central committee, or ZK as it was known in its German initials, see Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 22–26.

31. Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 439.

32. Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 455.

33. Hertle, Chronik, 123–127, estimates that about half of the 17 Politburo members were present, and also points out that Krenz and the Politburo members were not the only ones to receive the group of four’s text that afternoon. For the sake of appearances, the East German council of ministers—a state entity, as opposed to a party entity—was charged with issuing the text as their “own” resolution. The ministers’ offices received the group of four’s text via courier under what was known as the “circulation procedure,” according to which ministers would have until 6:00 p.m. that same day to register objections, otherwise the text would go into force. The entire procedure would normally have been just a formality, as it was de facto the Politburo and ultimately Krenz who really held power, but in the chaotic days of Nov. 1989, this represented a chance for someone to raise questions on the afternoon of Nov. 9. Since twenty-nine of the forty-four ministers included in the “circulation procedure” were attending the central committee meeting, however, they would only get back to their offices and see the text before the deadline if the meeting ended on time, which it showed no signs of doing. They did not know that a text to which they had to reply by 6:00 p.m. had just landed on their desks back in their offices while they were sitting unawares in a meeting, and that by failing to respond, they were allowing a radical change to happen. It would seem incumbent upon their staff members to alert them to this problem, but such alerts do not appear to have gone out. See also BStU, MfS, Rechtstelle 101, Nov. 9, 1989; BStU, MfS, ZA, Mittig 30, available online; www.bstu .bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/November-1989/Doku mentenseiten/09-November_a/09_nov_a_text.html?gtp=1939026_list%253D2.

34. A transcript of the central committee meeting on Nov. 9 is reprinted in Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 242–379; see also the excerpt “Die Behandlung der Reiseregelung auf der 10. Tagung des ZK, 9.11.1989, 15.47–15.55 Uhr [3:47–3:55 p.m.] (Tonbandabschrift),” doc. 16, in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 492. For Krenz’s own summary of this event, see Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, 179–181.

35. Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, 181. See also the description of the central committee meeting in Cordt Schnibben, “‘Genosse, schlagen die uns tot?’” Spiegel 18 (1990).

36. In fact, Meyer would end up looking on in a state of shock as Schabowski announced it instead; see interview with Meyer in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 51–52.

37. Since central committee sessions were routinely recorded, it is possible to hear an audio version of this discussion; audio clip for Nov. 9, 1989, 3:47 to 3:55 p.m., in Hans-Hermann Hertle, ed., Der Sound des Untergangs: Tonmitschnitte aus den letzten Sitzungen des SED-Zentralkomitees Oktober bis Dezember 1989 (Berlin: Links, 2013).

38. For more on this sequence of events, see M. E. Sarotte, “Elite Intransigence and the End of the Berlin Wall,” German Politics 2 (Aug. 1993): 270–287.

39. For a description of the effects of the emigration on the economy, see Christoph Links and Hannes Bahrmann, Wir sind das Volk (Berlin: Links, 1990), 89; and “A Society Deep in Crisis,” Newsweek, Nov. 20, 1989.

40. For more discussion of how the central committee could have missed the full import of what they were doing, see Süß, Staatssicherheit, 438–439.

41. In theory, members of the council of ministers had until 6:00 p.m. to approve or disapprove the text, see n. 33 above, but the party and Stasi offices involved did not bother to wait for that unimportant deadline. Notice went out to the district office of the Stasi in Karl-Marx-Stadt, for example, by 5:23 p.m. that afternoon, in the form of a telegram from Egon Krenz; see CFS-Nr. 190, Nov. 9, 1989, 17.23 Uhr, in BStU, MfS, BV KMS BdL 503883. Similar notice went out in a telegram over Neiber’s name at 8:25 p.m.; see CFS-Nr. 247, Nov. 9, 1989, 20:25 Uhr, in the same file. The time stamp on the latter document answers a question posed by Süß about the timing of its sending; see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 443 n. 120. For relevant party communications, see BArch, SAPMO, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/314.

42. Hertle, Chronik, 135–137.

43. Interview with Meyer in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 51.

44. Peter Brinkmann has attempted to research Schabowski’s whereabouts during his absence from the meeting. As a journalist himself, Brinkmann has tried to find the reporters with whom Schabowski notionally spent the day, but without success. Author’s interview with Brinkmann.

45. Among other jobs, he had once served as the editor of the leading party newspaper, Neues Deutschland. Information about Schabowski’s background from Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum, 19–21.

46. Hertle, Chronik, 134; interview with Schabowski in Hertle, Pirker, and Weinert, “Der Honecker muß weg!,” 39; and Krenz, Wenn Mauern fallen, 182.

47. Cordt Schnibben, “‘Diesmal sterbe ich, Schwester,’” Spiegel 41 (1990); and Schabowski, Sieren, and Koehne, Das Politbüro, 136.

48. Interview with Schabowski in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 38–39.

49. In his own research into this topic, Peter Brinkmann interviewed Gerhard Beil, who rode over with Schabowski, and Beil said he had no recollection of Schabowski looking at the text while in the car. Author’s interview with Brinkmann.

50. Author’s interview with Brinkmann; and Peter Brinkmann, Schlagzeilenjagd (Bergisch Gladbach: Bastei Lübbe, 1993).

51. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Kusnetz, Lamprecht, and Wheatley.

52. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Gelefsky, Gould, Kusnetz, Neubert, and Walling. For context on the history of US news broadcasters, see Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004).

53. Author’s interviews with Brokaw and Neubert; and Tom Brokaw, “Freedom Danced Before My Eyes,” New York Times, Nov. 19, 1989.

54. The author is grateful to Peter Brinkmann for sharing, from his personal archive, a complete video recording of the entire press conference (hereafter “Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive”). A typed German-language transcript of approximately the final eight minutes of the press conference, “Internationale Pressekonferenz von Günter Schabowski (in Begleitung der SED-ZK-Mitglieder Helga Labs, Gerhard Beil und Manfred Banaschak), 9. November 1989 (Ton-Abschrift),” is available under the heading “18.00,” meaning 6:00 p.m., at www.chronik-der-mauer.de/index.php/de/Start/Index/id/618085. At the same location as this transcript, see also “Hans-Hermann Hertle, 9. November 1989, 18.00 Uhr: Schabowskis Auftritt.” Other transcripts and summaries of the press conference are available as well: see, for example, Albrecht Hinze, “Versehentliche Zündung,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nov. 9, 1990, and Schnibben, “‘Diesmal sterbe ich, Schwester.’” See also Schabowski, Sieren, and Koehne, Das Politbüro, 136.

55. Author’s interviews with Brokaw and Walling; and Brokaw, “Freedom.”

56. Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive.

57. Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive; author’s interview with Brinkmann; Brinkmann, Schlagzeilenjagd; Ewald König, Menschen Mauer Mythen: Deutsch-deutsche Notizen eines wiener Korrespondenten (Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2014), 184; and Marcus Walker, “Did Brinkmannship Fell Berlin’s Wall?” Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 2009. See also Hertle, Chronik, 140–147.

58. The wait could range from hardly anything at all to hours, depending on the whim of the overseer and the Stasi; author’s interview with Brinkmann.

59. Author’s interviews with Brinkmann, Brokaw, and Neubert.

60. Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive; author’s interview with Johnson; and Daniel Johnson, “Seven Minutes That Shook the World,” Standpoint, Nov. 2009.

61. Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive; see also the summary of these events in Sarotte, 1989.

62. Author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 129–139.

63. Author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 135–136.

64. Author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 135–140.

65. Author’s interview with Maximychev; and comments by Maximychev in Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 40.

66. Remarks by Maximychev in Huber and Brasse, Schabowskis Zettel, video.

67. Interview with Sir Robert Corbett, published in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 81.

68. Jaruzelski conveyed Thatcher’s words to Krenz; see page 8 of the summary of a conversation between Jaruzelski and Krenz in “An alle Mitglieder und Kandidaten des Politburos des ZK der SED,” Nov. 5, 1989, J IV 2/2A/3255, SAPMO.

69. Note from J. Stapleton Roy to James A. Baker, Nov. 9, 1989, Folder 11, Box 108, 8c monthly files, series 8, BP.

70. Bush’s schedule for Nov. 9, 1989, is available in Marlin Fitzwater’s Press Guidance Files, GHWBPL, organized by date.

71. “Statement to the Press 11/9/89,” in Presidential Daily Files, organized by date, GHWBPL.

72. See the press reports in Folder 11, Box 108, 8c monthly files, Series 8, BP; and Tim Russert, NBC News, to the White House, Nov. 9, 1989, stamped “The President has seen,” in Presidential Daily Files, organized by date, GHWBPL.

73. Author’s interviews with Teltschik and Wheatley.

74. The full visit schedule is available in BArchK, B 136-Anhang, Grüner Ordner 12.

75. This help was scheduled to include 3 billion DM in credit, forgiveness on previous loans, promotion of Polish exports, and advice from experts on various projects, among other things. See letter from Kohl to Mitterrand, Nov. 6, 1989, BArchK, B136-37240.

76. BArchK, B 136-Anhang, Grüner Ordner 12.

77. “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit dem Vorsitzenden der Gewerkschaft ‘Solidarität,’ Walesa, Warschau,” Nov. 9, 1989, doc. 76, DESE 492–496; and author’s interview with Teltschik.

78. Author’s interview with Bitterlich.

79. Interview with Eduard Ackermann in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 90; see also Andreas Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland (Munich: Beck, 2009), 133–134.

80. B136–37240, BArchK, contains part of the text of the speeches given at the state dinner in Warsaw on Nov. 9, 1989.

81. Author’s interviews with Bitterlich and Teltschik; Eduard Ackermann, Mit feinem Gehör: Vierzig Jahre in der bonner Politik (Bergisch Gladbach: Lübbe Verlag, 1994), 310; and Küsters, “Entscheidung,” 53–55.

82. Author’s interview with Teltschik; and Küsters, “Entscheidung,” 53–55.

83. Author’s interviews with Bitterlich and Teltschik; Ackermann, Mit feinem Gehör, 310; Kohl, Diekmann, and Reuth, Ich wollte, 126–127; and Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 14–16.

84. Interviews with Albrecht Rau and other participants in this event published in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 77–79.

Chapter 6: The Revolution, Televised

1. Author’s interviews with Brinkmann, Brokaw, Kusnetz, and Neubert; interview with Brokaw in documentary film produced by Hans-Hermann Hertle and Gunther Scholz, When the Wall Came Tumbling Down—50 Hours That Changed the World, 1999; and Ahonen, Death, 240.

2. Wire reports, press releases, and broadcast transcripts are reprinted in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 54–57, and quoted in Hertle, Chronik, 148–151. The two Hertle books have different times for the first Reuters wire report (7:02 p.m. vs. 7:03 p.m.), but an image in the documentary of Hertle and Scholz, When the Wall, shows a copy of that report with the time stamp of 7:02 p.m.

3Tagesschau, Nov. 9, 1989, 20:00 Uhr, ARD-NDR video archive.

4. BStU, MfS, HA III 9201. German laws do not allow the release of the names of individuals spied upon without their permission.

5. Audio and video feed from minutes after press conference, Nov. 9 video, Brinkmann Archive.

6. Author’s interview with Kusnetz and Neubert.

7. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Kusnetz, and Neubert; video clip from the Brokaw-Schabowski interview on Nov. 9, 1989, available at www.nbcnews.com /id/33590933/#.UmR15lGRP0c; and Hertle, Chronik, 146–147.

8. Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum, 40, 126–127; and Günter Schabowski, “Wie ich die Mauer öffnete,” Die Zeit, Mar. 19, 2009.

9. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Kusnetz, and Neubert. Brown, Rise and Fall, 537, singles out Schabowski’s answers to Brokaw as the ones that succeeded in giving the public impression that East Germans were “entirely free.”

10. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Gelefsky, Gould, and Kusnetz. Funken, Das Jahr, 199, mistakenly says that Brokaw started broadcasting from the Brandenburg Gate at 7:00 p.m. German time.

11. Author’s interviews with Gelefsky and Lamprecht.

12. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Gelefsky, and Gould.

13. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Kusnetz, and Neubert.

14. “Vorkommnisse am 9./10. Nov. 1989 im Grenzabschnitt Brandenburger Tor,” Nov. 10, 1989, BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 45.

15. Author’s interviews with Kusnetz and Wheatley.

16. A Stasi overview with practical details and statistics from Bornholmer is available in “Auskunftsdokument GÜST Bornholmer Straße, Stand: 01.10.1988,” BStU, HA I 3510, 1–22; sketches and photos are in BStU, HA I 2699, 29–34. For numerous photos of Bornholmer on the night of Nov. 9, see Kai Diekmann and Ralf Georg Reuth, eds., Die längste Nacht, der grösste Tag: Deutschland am 9. November 1989 (Munich: Piper, 2009); for information about border fortifications more generally, see Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

17. Gerhard Haase-Hindenberg, Der Mann, der die Mauer öffnete: Warum Oberstleutnant Harald Jäger den Befehl verweigerte und damit Weltgeschichte schrieb (Munich: Heyne, 2007), 16.

18. Author’s interviews with Radomski, Schefke, and Schwarz; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 388.

19. Author’s interview with Radomski.

20. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

21. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke; and Funken, Das Jahr, 185–186.

22. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer.

23. Interview with Hattenhauer, www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/beitrag/video/1795 806/; and Pond, Beyond the Wall, 118.

24. “Verfügung,” Oct. 13, 1989, BStU, Lpz AU 1793-89 Handakte Hattenhauer, 22, says, “die Beschuldigte ist sofort aus der Haft zu entlassen”; and author’s interview with Hattenhauer.

25. The Stasi files confirm the birth date; see also Tony Paterson, “The Joy of Freedom,” Independent, Nov. 10, 2009; and Saunders, “Half a Life Ago.”

26. Author’s interviews with Hattenhauer, Radomski, and Schefke.

27. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke. Funken, Das Jahr, 187, reports that the person who spoke to Radomski was Harald Jäger. In an interview, Radomski seconded that statement. However, when I asked Jäger about the accuracy of that claim, he replied that on the night of Nov. 9–10, 1989, he did not speak personally with any of the people on the eastern side attempting to exit to the West; only his subordinates did so. Author’s interview with Jäger.

28. Author’s interview with Jäger; Haase-Hindenburg, Der Mann, 18–21; and Jäger Kaderakte (a kind of Stasi personnel file), BStU.

29. Jäger Kaderakte, BStU.

30. Author’s interview with Jäger; interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 381; and Haase-Hindenburg, Der Mann, 15–16, 188.

31. Other staff surveyed the entire border crossing on several television monitors. Various telephones enabled officers to reach their superiors quickly if there were problems. Author’s interview with Jäger; Haase-Hindenburg, Der Mann, 15–16; and Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 381.

32. Jäger’s Stasi files, which would include information to show if he had been involved in a killing, are available and show no such evidence; the author is grateful to the BStU staff for confirming this point.

33. As mentioned in the introductory section, the regiments all stood under the leadership of a command in Karlshorst, a location that was also the site of the KGB outpost. Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls, 157; see also Jochen Maurer, Dienst an der Mauer: Der Alltag der Grenztruppen rund um Berlin (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2011), 22–55, 125.

34. Specifically to the Stasi Main Department VI, run by General Heinz Fiedler; see Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 81–82, and Maurer, Dienst, 125.

35. Author’s interview with Jäger; and Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls, 156–159.

36. Author’s interview with Jäger; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 381–386.

37. Interview with Jäger in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 86; and Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 380 n. 1.

38. Hertle, Chronik des Mauerfalls, 160.

39. Interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 380–382; and Cordt Schnibben, “Die Nacht der Wildschweine,” Spiegel 45 (2009).

40. “PKE Erfassungsbogen,” BStU, MfS, HA VI 15689, 252. The author is grateful to BStU staff member Roberto Welzel for researching the fact that these reports came from Sonnenallee.

41. See the records from Nov. 9, 1989, in BStU, MfS, HA XX 2345.

42. Interview with Peter Leonhardt in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 74–75; quotations, 74–75.

43. On the “quick round trip” of the “wild pigs” to the police station and back, see the interview with Jäger in 1990 on the television special produced a year after the opening of the Wall by Georg Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990, Spiegel-TV, Magazin 128, broadcast on Nov. 4, 1990; the author thanks Mascolo for a copy of this video. See also interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 382–383.

44. On Jäger’s concern for the safety of his men, see the interview with Jäger in 1990 in Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990. On the ambiguity of orders, see Ahonen, Death, 219. And on the pressure that West Germany could exert on the East, see Heinrich Potthoff, ed., Die Koalition der Vernunft (Munich: dtv, 1995).

45. Author’s interview with Jäger; for details of the weapons present at the checkpoint that night, see the interview with Jäger in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 99; Chronik, 161–162; and Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 386.

46. Author’s interview with Jäger; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 384.

47. Author’s interview with Jäger; and Huber, Schabowskis Irrtum, 60–61.

48. Author’s interview with Jäger.

49. Ibid. Jäger’s description of the “let-off-steam” plan, or in its German name “Ventillösung,” matches written evidence from his colleagues at other checkpoints. For example, BStU, MfS, HA VI 15689, 252-253, “HA VI/ PKE, Erfassungsbogen zum Lagebericht,” Nov. 9, 1989, according to BStU from the checkpoint at Sonnenallee, notes that at 8:30 p.m. there was a message to this effect from Operational Command, or OLZ, where Ziegenhorn was on duty: “Mitteilung durch OLZ/Anweisung Stv. Ltr. HA, Registrierung der DDR-Bürger die ausreisen” and that the process began about an hour later: “Beginn der Ausreise 21.35.” Later that night, checkpoint staff noted that they stopped controls at midnight exactly, “00.00 keine Karten mehr notwendig,” “00.17 alles aufmachen,” and that they informed Ziegenhorn of this, “Gen. Ziegenhorn + OLZ verst. keine Handlung.”

50. Telegram, Nov. 9, 1989, 11:05 p.m., BStU, MfS, HA VI 1735. Video images of East Germans holding IDs thereby rendered invalid, although they did not know it, are in Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990. See also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 443 n. 121.

51. Interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 384.

52. Author’s interview with Radomski and Schefke; and Funken, Das Jahr, 187.

53. A picture of Schefke’s ID with the stamp on his photo is in FRL 498.

54. Author’s interview with Schefke; and Funken, Das Jahr, 188.

55. Author’s interviews with Jahn, Radomski, and Schefke.

56. Author’s interviews with Jahn and Momper.

57. Author’s interviews with Jahn, Radomski, and Schefke.

58. Author’s interview with Jäger; Hertle, Chronik, 162; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 386. Both Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990, and Barbara Supp, in “‘Die machen uns fertig,’” Spiegel 45 (1996): 91–96, interview one of the Bornholmer officials called up by this alarm, Bruno Nevyhosteny.

59. Author’s interview with Jäger; interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 387.

60. On the construction of the Wall and the West German practice of paying to free individuals from the GDR, see Harrison, Driving the Soviets, and Rehlinger, Freikauf.

61. Author’s interview with Jäger; and interview with Jäger in 1990 in Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990.

62. Video clip from East German television news show AK Zwo, 10:30 p.m., Nov. 9, 1989, shown in documentary by Hertle and Scholz, When the Wall; see also Hertle, Chronik, 168–169.

63. ARD-NDR video archive, Tagesthemen, Nov. 9, 1989.

64. Author’s interview with Mascolo; Funken, Das Jahr, 192; and Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 199; and Hertle, Chronik, 13. Thanks to video footage from Mascolo’s Spiegel-TV camera team, which includes a clock, it is clear that the final sequence of events leading to the opening of the wall must have happened shortly before 11:30 p.m., despite comments by some participants in events that it was earlier.

65. Author’s interview with Jäger; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 387. Jäger says that he made this call at 10:30 p.m., but, as mentioned in n. 64, video footage shows that it must have been closer to 11:30 p.m.

66. Author’s interview with Jäger; interview with Jäger in 1990 in Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990; and interview with Jäger in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 387.

67. Author’s interview with Jäger; and interview with Helmut Stöss, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

68. Video footage from Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990; and author’s interview with Mascolo. The cameraman was Rainer März and his assistant was German Biester; see Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 199, for a still image of the exact moment. Mascolo’s footage did not appear on television immediately since it was intended, and used, for a specific television program, not just part of a network’s general coverage, but it was the most striking footage filmed that night, and still powerful when it appeared on air. Other camera teams captured images from Bornholmer that night as well, however, and those images did appear quickly, including on the NBC Nightly News, as described later in this chapter.

69. Interview with Stöss, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA.

70. Author’s interview with Jäger.

71. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer; and Tony Paterson, “The Joy of Freedom.”

72. Interview with Merkel in Diekmann and Reuth, eds., Die längste Nacht, 151; for more on Merkel, see Stefan Kornelius, Angela Merkel: The Authorized Biography (Richmond, UK: Alma Books, 2013).

73. Materials on the new organizations that emerged in 1989 are available in RHG; for Demokratischer Aufbruch, see Bestand DA; other organizations have their own collections. For a West German analysis of the new organizations, see PA-AA, BDE, “Bürgerinitiativen in der DDR,” Oct. 12, 1989, ZA 140.684E.

74. Schabowski, “Wie ich die Mauer öffnete.”

75. Interview with Egon Krenz, Fall of the Wall Collection, KCLMA; on the end of the central committee meeting, see Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 379.

76. Mascolo, 9. November 1989/1990.

77. “HA VI/PKE Erfassungsbogen zum Lagebericht,” 253; and Hertle, Chronik, 168–174.

78. “Vorkommnisse am 9./10. Nov. 1989 im Grenzabschnitt Brandenburger Tor,” Sekr. Neiber 553, 45; see also BStU, BV Berlin, Abt. VII 1624, “Rapport Grenzsicherung Nr. 314 vom 10./11.11.1989,” 40–41, which says that at 10:35 p.m. wall climbers were still willing to get down.

79. Author’s interview with Kusnetz; the opening of the NBC broadcast, showing the clip from the bridge, is at www.nbcnews.com/id/33590933/#.UnEBuFGRP0c.

80. Interview with Carlston Baum, CNN Cold War Collection, KCLMA. The first name is almost certainly misspelled in the KCLMA collection and is probably Carsten or Karsten. The information that the hoses appeared to be leaky, and so not shooting water at full force, comes from this interview.

81. Author’s interviews with Gould and Wheatley.

82. Author’s interview with Lamprecht.

83. Author’s interviews with Brokaw, Gelefsky, and Kusnetz.

84. Author’s interview with Brokaw.

85. Author’s interviews with Jahn, Radomski, and Schefke; on the disappointment of some dissidents, see Sarotte, 1989, 53–54.

Chapter 7: Damage Control?

1. Author’s interview with Fletcher. For more on the atmosphere in East Berlin in the wake of the Wall’s opening, see Garton Ash, Magic Lantern, 61–77.

2. From video clips available on NBC, Nov. 10, 1989, www.youtube.com /watch?v=fK1MwhEDjHg.

3. “Vorkommnisse am 9./10. Nov. 1989 im Grenzabschnitt Brandenburger Tor,” Sekr. Neiber 553, 45–47.

4. HA VI/PKE Oberbaumbrücke, “Erfassungsbogen zum Lagebericht,” BStU, MfS, HA VI 15689, 259, reports that on the night of Nov. 9–10, “um 02.40 gelang es auf der Güst eine normale Lage wieder herzustellen.”

5. Interview with Invaliden Stasi official who would only give his initials, S.W., in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 151; and “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangstellen,” Nov. 10, 1989, BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 553, 32, which reports that at Invaliden checkpoint, “[u]m 3.30 Uhr war die Normallage wieder hergestellt und die Abfertigung der Ein- und Ausreisenden konnte aufgenommen werden.” See also Momper, Grenzfall, 144–147; and Sarotte, 1989, 42.

6. BStU, MfS, BdL Nr. 004404, 1.

7. “Diskussionsbeitrag des SdM Genossen Generaloberst Rudi Mittig,” Nov. 10, 1989, BStU, MfS, BdL Nr. 005053 Mittig, 3–5.

8. Author’s interview with Lauter.

9. Author’s interview with Lauter; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 446.

10. Author’s interview with Maximychev.

11. Remarks by Iwan Kusmin cited in Hertle and Elsner, eds., Der Tag, 111.

12. Author’s interview with Maximychev; and Igor Maximytschew, “Der Fall der Mauer aus russischer Sicht,” in Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 83–87.

13. Ivan N. Kuz’min, “Kurzer Abriss der innenpolitischen Entwicklung in der DDR von 1955 bis zur deutschen Vereinigung,” in Horst Möller and Aleksandr Tschubarjan, eds., Mitteilungen der Gemeinsamen Kommission für die Erforschung der jüngeren Geschichte der deutsch-russischen Beziehungen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), 98.

14. Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1982–1990 (Munich: Droemer, 2005), 969.

15. Author’s interview with Maximychev.

16. Maximytschew, “Der Fall der Mauer,” 84.

17. Kotschemassow, Meine letzte Mission, 189.

18. Interview with Grätz in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 390–395; Hertle, Chronik, 188–202; and Heinz Keßler, Zur Sache und zur Person: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1996), 307–312.

19. “Nationaler Verteidigungsrat, Befehl Nr. 12/89,” Nov. 10, 1989, reprinted in FRL 503; “Information des Ministeriums für Nationale Verteidigung,” Nov. 10, 1989, in Hertle, Fall der Mauer, 508–510; Hertle, Chronik, 259–260; and Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 55–82.

20. Hertle, Chronik, 205–210, 237; the text of the telegram from Krenz to Gorbachev of Nov. 10, 1989, is reprinted on 237. A similarly inaccurate statement, suggesting that the border was once again secure by 6:00 a.m., appears on a document on the letterhead of the Präsidium der Volkspolizei Berlin on Nov. 10, 1989, so perhaps Krenz took the idea from there, or perhaps he ordered this document to be produced; it is not clear; see “Information vom 10.11.1989,” BStU, BV Berlin AKG 20, 28, which reads as follows: “Ab 6.00 Uhr ist der Einsatz von Kräften des Paß- und Meldewesens unmittelbar in den GÜST gesichert.” See also Hertle and Stephan, eds., Das Ende der SED, 380–437; and James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 178–179.

21. See the Stasi various reports from Nov. 10, 1989, including “Bericht über das Stimmungs- und Meinungsbild der AGT und ZB im Verantwortungsbereich des GK Mitte,” and “Lagebericht,” among others, in BStU, MfS, HA I 16938, 113–128.

22. “Information,” Nov. 10, 1989, BStU, Sekr. Neiber 874, 46–47.

23. Author’s interviews with Kastrup and Teltschik.

24. “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters,” Nov. 9, 1989, Public Papers, GHWBPL, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers .php?id=1174&. For a US view of the events of Nov. 9, see Timothy Naftali, George H. W. Bush (New York: Times Books, 2007); Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

25. Copy in PA-AA, BDE, ZA140.685E, Nov. 10, 1989; see also “Letter from Mr Powell (Nr 10) to Mr Wall,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 37, DBPO 101–103.

26. “Letter from Mr Wall to Mr Powell (No. 10),” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 36, DBPO 100–101; and author’s interview with Burton.

27. “Minute from Sir P. Wright to Mr Wall,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 39, DBPO 104–106, esp. 105, n. 5.

28. “Sir R. Braithwaite (Moscow) to Mr Hurd,” Nov. 11, 1989, doc. 40, DBPO 106–108, quotation at 106 and 108.

29. Telegram from Moscow to Bonn, AA, Nov. 10, 1989, 4:48 p.m., in PA-AA, BDE, ZA140.711E.

30. Chernyaev diary excerpt, Nov. 10, 1989, MG, 246. See also the NSA online version of the diary; my translation differs from the NSA. For a similar assessment of Gorbachev, see Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 448; for a critical view, see Lévesque, Enigma, 3, and Joachim Scholtyseck, Die Aussenpolitik der DDR (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 45. On the larger significance of Gorbachev’s actions at the end of the Cold War, see Norman Davies, Europe: A History (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998).

31. “Delegationsgespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Mazowiecki, Warschau,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 77, DESE 497–500.

32. On the need to coordinate with the three Western allies on all matters relating to West Berlin, see “Gespräch des Bundesministers Seiters mit den Botschaftern der drei Mächte, Bonn,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 78, DESE 501–502.

33. Transcript, Nov. 10, 1989, 5:32 p.m., BStU, MfS, HA III 8640, 239–241; the names are blacked out in accordance with German laws on Stasi documents, but the conversation is nearly identical in timing, length, and content to the published version, “Mündliche Botschaft des Generalsekretärs Gorbatschow an Bundeskanzler Kohl,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 80, DESE 504–505. For more on Kvisinky, see his memoir, Julij Kwizisnkij, Vor dem Sturm (Berlin: Siedler, 1993).

34. Author’s interview with Teltschik; Kohl, Erinnerungen, 964–976; Küsters, “Entscheidung,” 54–56; Sarotte, 1989, 50–53; and Teltschik, 329 Tage, 11–22.

35. See the discussion of Gorbachev’s anxious Nov. 10 message in “Letter from Mr Powell (Nr 10) to Mr Wall,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 38, DBPO 103–104.

36. See, for example, the transcripts of his phone calls with other world leaders such as Bush and Thatcher late on the night of Nov. 10, 1989, in docs. 81–82, DESE, 505–509; see also Sarotte, 1989, 62–65, and Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: German Foreign Policy Since 1945, trans. Deborah S. Kaiser (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 279–281.

37. “Gespräch zwischen dem Generalsekretär des ZK der SED, Genossen Egon Krenz, und dem Bundeskanzler der BRD,” Nov. 11, 1989, BArch, SAPMO, IV 2/2.039/328; “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an den Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, Berlin (Ost),” Nov. 11, 1989, doc. 88, DESE 517–519; and Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 434.

38. Author’s interviews with Burton and Momper.

39. Author’s interview with Momper; and Momper, Grenzfall, 142–146.

40. “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangstellen,” 32; and author’s interviews with Momper and with Sedlmaier, a West Berliner present at the Invaliden checkpoint, for Momper’s remarks.

41. Author’s interviews with Momper and Sedlmaier; and Momper, Grenzfall, 142–146.

42. Telegram, “‘Ouverture’ du Mur de Berlin,” Nov. 10, 1989, doc. 10, DFUA 101–102.

43. Hertle, Chronik, 186–187.

44. Author’s interview with Sello; and Kowalczuk, Endspiel, 407.

45. Author’s interview with Sello.

46. Author’s interview with Kusnetz.

47. By the early hours of Nov. 10 alone, the Stasi estimated that close to seventy thousand people had exited for West Berlin on foot and about another ten thousand in some form of vehicle. These are probably underestimates, given eyewitness accounts. “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangstellen,” 30.

48. Ibid., 30–39.

49. “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangsstellen,” Nov. 11, 1989, BStU, Sekr. Neiber 553, 41–43.

50. “Information über die Entwicklung der Lage an den Grenzübergangstellen,” both from Nov. 10 and Nov. 11. It is hard to say how accurate these estimates are in light of the huge numbers involved, but the volume was clearly large.

51. “Aus- und Einreisestatistik,” Nov. 20, 1989, BStU, MfS, Sekr. Neiber 618, 272.

52. Spittmann, “Übergangsgesellschaft,” 1204.

53. “Opposition: DDR-Behörden von der Reisewelle überrollt,” Tagesspiegel, Nov. 14, 1989; see also “DDR-Reisebüro beklagt Mangel an Devisen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov. 10, 1989.

54. Hertle, Chronik, 259–260; and Küchenmeister, Nakath, and Stephan, eds.,  . . . sofort, unverzüglich,” 55–82.

55. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 222.

Epilogue: Violence and Victory, Trust and Triumphalism

1. Durs Grünbein, “Der Weg nach Bornholm,” Zeit Online, Nov. 9, 2008. Grünbein, born in Dresden in 1962, is one of the most acclaimed writers to emerge from former East Germany. The article from which this quotation was taken appeared as part of a series of essays to mark the nineteenth anniversary of the opening of the Wall. Original in German: “Er war keiner von denen, die sich noch einmal umdrehen, nachdem alles entschieden ist.”

2. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 492; Sarotte, “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence”; and Mary Elise Sarotte, “In Victory, Magnanimity: US Foreign Policy, 1989–1991, and the Legacy of Prefabricated Multilateralism,” International Politics 48 (Aug. 2011): 482–495.

3. Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl,” Feb. 24, 1990, GHWBPL, released due to the author’s request, MR-2008-0651 of May 21, 2008. See also George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 253. For more on Bush’s motivations generally, see Jeffrey Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the Surprisingly Peaceful End of the Cold War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, forthcoming).

4. These issues are one of the central concerns not only of my book 1989 but also of three related articles: Sarotte, “In Victory, Magnanimity”; Mary Elise Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev and the Origin of Russian Resentment Toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 119–140; and Sarotte, “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence.” For more on the extension of the EC eastward, see Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, German Unification, and the End of the Cold War, trans. Susan Emanuel (London: Berghahn, 2009).

5. On the history of the Saarland, see www.saarland.de/geschichte.htm.

6. The texts of both Articles 23 and 146 were, however, changed afterward to reassure Germany’s neighbors that the process of expanding the FRG’s territory would not continue beyond 1990. On the process of unifying the two halves of Germany, see Konrad Jarausch and Volker Gransow, eds., Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993 (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1994); Rödder, Deutschland einig Vaterland; Turner, Germany from Partition to Unification; Sarotte, 1989, 119–194; and Ingo von Münch, ed., Dokumente des geteilten Deutschland (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1976). On East German efforts to use a roundtable to draft a new constitution nonetheless, see ZRT-WD.

7. Sarotte, 1989, 162.

8. On the coup and the end of the USSR, see Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Jack Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995); and Plokhy, The Last Empire.

9. See Sarotte, 1989, 195–214; Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward?”; and Sarotte, “Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence.”

10. On Yugoslavia and the lacking European response, see Josip Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), and Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001). The lack of any kind of European structure capable of stopping the violence as Yugoslavia disintegrated particularly concerned the former East German dissident leader Bärbel Bohley, who spent much of the rest of her life volunteering in the region; see www.praschl.net/menschen /das-neue-leben-der-baerbel-bohley.

11. Sarotte, 1989, 187.

12. On the difficulty of converting revolutionary success into a position of post-revolutionary political authority in Germany, see Maier, “Civil Resistance,” 276.

13. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer.

14. For more on the debate over what to do with the Stasi files saved by activists and how much access to allow to them, see Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., Wann bricht schon mal ein Staat zusammen: Die Debatte über die Stasi-Akten auf dem 39. Historikertag 1992 (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993). See also Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende,740.

15. Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 222.

16. On some of the debate in 2009 over what to do with the former border-crossing area, see Siobhán Dowling, “Where the Berlin Wall First Fell,” Spiegel Online International, Nov. 6, 2009.

17. Author’s interview with Jäger.

18. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer; on one recent film containing a character based on Jäger, see Sven Goldmann, “Brückentage,” Tagesspiegel, Sept. 29, 2013.

19. Author’s interview with Wonneberger; Ralf Geissler, “Der verstummte Revolutionär,” Die Zeit, Oct. 8, 2009; Mayer, Der nicht aufgibt, 144, 148; Peter Wensierski, “Handeln statt Beteln,” Spiegel 43 (2009): 42–46; see also Pausch, Widerstehen.

20. See, for example, the commentary made by state investigators for the new Saxon state government about such stonewalling: “Vorbemerkungen,” SS, 21–22.

21. For a scholarly account of this issue, see James McAdams, Judging the Past in Unified Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); for a popular account, see Rosenberg, Haunted Land.

22. Author’s interview with Gueffroy; and Ahonen, Death, 255–259.

23. Author’s interview with Gueffroy; quotation from Rosenberg, Haunted Land, 267–268.

24. Ahonen, Death, 255–259; and Rosenberg, Haunted Land, 345–348.

25. Author’s interviews with Gueffroy and Regel.

26. Ahonen, Death, 267; Hertle, Berliner Mauer, 218–221; and Günter Schabowski and Frank Sieren, Wir haben fast alles falsch gemacht: Die letzten Tage der DDR, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Ullstein, 2009), 255–272.

27. Wolfgang Saxon, “Erich Honecker, Ruler of East Germany for 18 of Its Last Years, Dies in Exile at 81,” New York Times, May 30, 1994; see also Pötzl, Erich Honecker.

28. Author’s interview with Jahn; and Praschl, Roland Jahn, 176–181, quotation at 181.

29. Author’s interview with Radomski. On a personal level, Radomski later ended his relationship with his girlfriend of Nov. 1989. As he would later put it, many couples split up after the Wall opened, because once the pressure of living in a dictatorship was removed, many of the “emergency partnerships” that people had formed for support were no longer necessary.

30. His reply showed that he, like so many others, had challenged the dictatorial regime in 1989 for a complex mixture of motives. Author’s interviews with Radomski and Schefke.

31. When Hackenberg’s boss, the chronically absent Leipzig first secretary, got his wish to be removed from his duties in Nov. 1989, Hackenberg did not succeed him, even though he had long been the leading candidate for the top job. Instead, that top slot went to Wötzel, one of the district secretaries who had cosigned Masur’s appeal. Wötzel heard that he owed his success to the fact that Hackenberg could no longer be trusted “to hold together because of his nerves.” Hackenberg died in 1999 at the age of seventy-three. See Wötzel, quoted in Niemann, Die Sekretäre, 355, and Müller-Enbergs, et al., eds., Wer war wer, 468.

32. Author’s interviews with Grinin, Lauter, and Maximychev; Lauter, Chefermittler, 206–222; and Putin, First Person, 80.

33. Durs Grünbein, “Der Weg nach Bornholm”; for more on Durs Grünbein, see Michael Eskin, Karen Leeder, and Christopher Young, eds., Durs Grünbein: A Companion (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013). For more on nostalgia for the former GDR, a phenomenon known as “Ostalgie,” see Thomas Goll and Thomas Leuerer, eds., Ostalgie als Erinnerungskultur? Symposium zu Lied und Politik in der DDR (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), and Katja Neller, DDR-Nostalgie: Dimensionen der Orientierungen der Ostdeutschen gegenüber der ehemaligen DDR, ihre Ursachen und politischen Konnotationen (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006).

34. To cite just two of the many examples: (1) Soviet expert Jonathan Haslam could still write that “Krenz . . . instructed that the barriers be raised” (Haslam, Russia’s Cold War [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011], 391); and (2) the volume on US foreign policy in the seemingly definitive Oxford University Press History of the United States series could state that, following the ouster of “the recalcitrant hard-liner Erich Honecker,” on “November 9, his successor opened the Berlin Wall to passage without visas” (Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 905).

35. The gist of this narrative is that when Reagan speaks, “even walls fall down,” as summarized in Ratnesar, Tear Down This Wall, 195. Ratnesar does acknowledge that factors other than Reagan’s speech played a role in the opening of the Wall and acknowledges the contributions of Germans themselves elsewhere in the book, so his book is not the most strident advocate of this view.

36. See, for example, Charles Maier, “What Have We Learned Since 1989?” Contemporary European History 18, no. 3 (2009): 253–269.

37. Bloch’s interpretation of this phenomenon appears to be the opposite of Tocqueville’s. In the opening lines of Part I, Chapter 1, of Ancien Régime, Tocqueville argues that events that are in fact inevitable appear to be unlikely before they happen. Bloch’s work, however, suggests the opposite: events that are not preordained seem afterward to have been so. This appears to be the definition of hindsight bias as identified by Bloch and described in the introduction.

38. Egon Krenz’s email to the author, Oct. 24, 2013. The original two German quotations, given in my translation in the text above, are as follows: (1) “Als am 9. November 1989 Berliner Bürger zu den Grenzübergängen eilten, weil ein Politbüromitglied sie falsch informiert hatte, waren wir einer bürgerkriegsähnlichen Auseinandersetzung näher als das viele heute wahrhaben wollen”; (2) “Am Abend des 9. November und im Verlaufe des 10. November bestand die reale Gefahr einer militärischen Eskalation, in die auch die Großmächte hätten hineingezogen werden können.”

39. On the immense size of the Leipzig protest in particular, see Opp, Voss, and Gern, Die volkseigene Revolution, 47.

40. For more on this story, see Sarotte, “China’s Fear of Contagion,” and Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 602–694.

41. In hindsight, it is surprising that he did not use even more violence. Honecker’s plans for the Oct. 16 march in Leipzig—an aerial assault—suggest that he was moving in that direction. The fact that he had not used such measures already seems to have resulted from a combination of factors: the collapse of cooperation among the member states of the Warsaw Pact appears to have made him uncertain, rightly, about how much support from his allies he would have; and, in addition, there was the awkward need to extract support from Bonn, and to regard its wishes for a lessening of violence in return. For more on this topic, see Süß, Staatssicherheit am Ende, 742–752.

42. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, 145.

43. A weaker Gorbachev might have given them a greater opportunity to do so had the Wall not opened when it did. The time of day of the Wall’s opening was significant as well: that it opened at night during a holiday in the Soviet Union hindered decision making by Moscow until it was too late. On the continued willingness of Soviet military leaders to use force in 1989, despite Gorbachev, see Brown, Rise and Fall, 527.

44. Sarotte, 1989, 188–211.

45. For accounts analyzing the longer-term causes of the end of the Cold War, see, to name just a few, Gaddis, Cold War; Harper, The Cold War; Judt, Postwar; Kotkin, Armageddon Averted; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind; Mazower, Dark Continent; and Zubok, A Failed Empire.

46. Many activist leaders in particular deeply admired Martin Luther King Jr. In their moment of extremity, local leaders such as Wonneberger and Sievers turned specifically to King’s example and writings as practical guides on how to manage the situation in which they found themselves. Author’s interviews with Sievers and Wonneberger; see also “Notizen des Referatsleiters des Referats XX/7 zur Referatsleitersitzung der Abteilung XX der BV Leipzig des MfS,” Oct. 9, 1989, doc. 243, FUF 458.

47. The author is grateful to Jacques Hymans for highlighting this point; see his own work on international relations in Jacques Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The question of trust and its role in political action is a major topic among political theorists; see, for example, Brian Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

48. Author’s interview with Hattenhauer.

49. Author’s interview with Wonneberger.

50. It further suggests that such leaders need to maintain cognizance of the potential impact that a handful of individuals, even those in the middle tier of authority, can have on the future of their country, particularly in times of dramatic change. I am grateful to Chris Miller for this insight. See also Rathbun, Trust, 228, who concludes that “overall it seems best to trust in international cooperation.”

51. For documents from, and a summary of the history of, the CSCE process, see Jeremy P. Schmidt, The Helsinki Final Act (blog), http://cscehistory.wordpress.com/ford.

52. While some writers have started to address this issue, as a phenomenon it remains both important and understudied. Scholars who have started to address it include Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad; Falk, “From Berlin to Baghdad”; James M. Goldgeier and Derek Chollet, America Between the Wars, from 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Thomas H. Henriksen, American Power After the Berlin Wall (New York: Palgrave, 2007); Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Meyer, Year That Changed the World, xii; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Schrecker, ed., Cold War Triumphalism. On the impact on relations with Russia, see Stephen F. Cohen, Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), chap. 7, and Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014)chap. 2.

53. This list of memorials to the opening of the Wall in the United States is not complete; for example, there is also a piece of the Wall in the Reagan Building in Washington, DC. For more information about Wall memorials in the United States and elsewhere, see Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung, ed., Die Berliner Mauer in der Welt (Berlin: Berlin Story Verlag, 2009); I am grateful to Hope Harrison for drawing my attention to this book. Images of the memorials mentioned in the text above are available on the websites of the RRPL and GHWBPL; for an image of the Reagan statue in the US Capitol Rotunda, see the website of the Architect of the Capitol, www.aoc .gov/capitol-hill/national-statuary-hall-collection/ronald-wilson-reagan.

54. The sculptor of the Bush Library statue is Veryl Goodnight; information about the library’s statue and the “sister casting” installed in Berlin is available at her website, www.verylgoodnight.com/TheDaytheWallCameDown.html.

55. I am grateful to Hope Harrison for information about the naming of the Platz des 9. November 1989. For more on larger questions about the politics of memory of the Wall, see Hope Harrison, After the Wall: Memory and the Making of the New Germany, 1989 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

56. On the success of a temporary exhibit organized by RHG and consisting largely of information panels on Alexanderplatz in 2009–2010, see Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft and Kulturprojekte Berlin, eds., Friedliche Revolution 1989/90 (Berlin: RHG, 2010), and Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft and Kulturprojekte Berlin, eds., “Wir sind das Volk!” Magazin zur Ausstellung friedliche Revolution 1989/90 (Berlin: Kulturprojekte, 2009).

57. This foundation’s exhibits do mark the fall of the Wall as well, but in the larger context of the history of the Wall, of East German refugees, and of the peaceful revolution. I am grateful to both Axel Klausmeier and Manfred Wichmann, its director and curator of collections, respectively, for their help with my research. For more information about the Berlin Wall Foundation and the memorials that it maintains, see its website, available in English at www.stiftung-berliner-mauer.de/en.

58. On the competition for a bigger memorial to the opening of the Wall in the city center, see Jan Otakar Fischer, “Berlin: The Art of Reunification,” Nov. 5, 2009, Design Observer Group website, http://places.designobserver.com/feature /berlin-the-art-of-reunification/11707.

59. Stefan Berg and Steffen Winter, “Going Bats,” Spiegel Online International, Mar. 6, 2014.

60. For more on the design for the “Freiheits- und Einheitsdenkmal” chosen in the second round, see www.freiheits-und-einheitsdenkmal.de/; see also Apelt, ed., Der Weg zum Denkmal für Freiheit und Einheit. For more on the difficulties of commemorating the past in contemporary Germany, see Hope M. Harrison, “The Berlin Wall,” in Mark Kramer and Vit Smetana, eds., Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 173–196. I am also grateful to both Jan Otakar Fischer and Hope Harrison for information about this memorial.

61. Author’s interview with Birthler.

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