Introduction: The Blood Never Dried
1 N Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2003); Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London, 2004). Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) was a short-story writer, novelist and poet (his best known work today is The Jungle Book). Kipling’s poem “The White Man’s Burden” (1899) glorified the British Empire.
2 N Ferguson, Empire, pxiv.
3 For Orwell and the British Empire see my Orwell’s Politics (Basingstoke,1999).
4 See M Leven, “‘Butchering the brutes all over the place’: Total war and massacre in Zulu land, 1879”, History, 84 (1999), for an overview, and more particularly A Greaves, Rorke’s Drift (London, 2002), pp140-144.
The Jamaican rebellion and the overthrow of slavery
1 For the Antiguan conspiracy see D B Gaspar, “The Antigua Slave Conspiracy of 1736: A Case Study of the Origins of Collective Resistance”, The William and Mary Quarterly, 35 (1978). See also D B Gaspar, Bondmen and Rebels: A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua (Durham, NC, 1993).
2 R B Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies 1623-1775 (Kingston, 1994), p256.
3 A Bakan, Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica: The Politics of Rebellion (Montreal, 1990), p22.
4 R Dirks, The Black Saturnalia: Conflict and its Ritual Expression on British West Indies Plantations (Gainesville, 1987), p161.
5 H Beckles, “The 200 Years War: Slave resistance in the British West Indies”, Jamaica Historical Review, 13 (1982).
6 See J Rawley with S Behrendt, The Transatlantic Slave Trade (Lincoln, 2005).
7 J Walvin, Black Ivory: A History of British Slavery (London, 1992), p57.
8 H S Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge, 1999), pp158, 159, 182.
9 J Walvin, Questioning Slavery (London, 1996), pp50-51, 57.
10 As above, pp233, 234, 235. See also L Greene, “Mutiny on the Slave Ships”, Phylon, 5 (1944); W McGowan, “The Origins of Slave Rebellions in the Middle Passage”, in A O Thompson (ed), In The Shadow of the Plantation: Caribbean History and Legacy (Kingston, 2002); and R B Sheridan, “Resistance and Rebellion of African Captives in the Transatlantic Slave Trade before Becoming Seasoned Labourers in the British Caribbean 1690-1807”, in V Shepherd (ed), Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom (Kingston, 2002).
11 For a discussion of the Zong episode see I Baucom, Spectres of the Atlantic: Finance, Capital, Slavery and the Philosophy of History (Durham NC, 2005).
12 R B Sheridan, “Resistance and Rebellion of African Captives in the Transatlantic Slave Trade before Becoming Seasoned Labourers in the British Caribbean 1690-1807”, pp24-25.
13 E Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven, 1965), pp130, 133.
14 B Bush, Slave Women in Caribbean Society 1650-1835 (Oxford, 1990), p44.
15 P Wright, Knibb The Notorious: Slaves’ Missionary 1803-1845 (London 1973), p60.
16 D Hall, In Miserable Slavery: Thomas Thistlewood in Jamaica 1750-1786 (London, 1989), p72.
17 B Bush, Slave Women in Caribbean Society 1650-1835, p44.
18 R Coupland, Wilberforce (Oxford, 1923), p460.
19 See J Andrew, The Hanging of Arthur Hodge (New York, 2000). Hodge’s defence was that “a negro being property, it was no greater offence in law for his owner to kill him than it would be to kill his dog” (p18).
20 R Dirks, The Black Saturnalia, pp161-162.
21 R Blackburn, The Overthrow of British Slavery 1776-1848 (London, 1988), p20.
22 H Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade, p158.
23 R B Sheridan, “Resistance and Rebellion of African Captives in the Transatlantic Slave Trade before Becoming Seasoned Labourers in the British Caribbean 1690-1807”, p254. “Seasoning” was the process where the African slaves were prepared for the new life that faced them on the plantations. It could last for two or three years.
24 As above, pp166-169; B Bush, Slave Women in Caribbean Society 1650-1835, p15.
25 E V da Costa, Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823 (Oxford, 1994), pp115, 173.
26 O Patterson, “Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the First Maroon War 1655-1740”, Social and Economic Studies, 19 (1970), p289.
27 For the Jamaican Maroons see in particular M Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796 (Trenton, 1990). See also R Price, Maroon Societies (New York, 1973).
28 M Craton, Testing The Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, 1982), pp127, 136-137; M Mullin, Africa in America: Slave Acculturation and Resistance in the American South and the Black Caribbean (Urbana, 1994), p41. See also R Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery (Kingston, 2002), pp130-156.
29 O N Bolland, Colonialism and Resistance in Belize (Belize, 2003), p29. He quotes Edward Despard, the superintendent of the settlement, to the effect that slaves deported from Jamaica to the Honduras “showed a continuance of their dispositions as to create a rebellion…when it was found necessary to put several of the ringleaders to death by burning, gibbeting and other methods of torture”. This was the same Despard who in 1803 was involved in a revolutionary conspiracy against the British government in alliance with the Irish Republicans. He was himself publicly hanged, drawn and beheaded.
30 R Blackburn, The Overthrow of British Slavery 1776-1848, p30.
31 D P Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793-1798 (Oxford 1982), p89.
32 O Blouet, “Bryan Edwards and the Haitian Revolution”, in D P Geggus (ed), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia, 2001), p46.
33 D Geggus, Slavery, War and Revolution, pp90-92. The French colony of St Domingue made up a third of the island of Hispaniola with the rest under Spanish rule. The French colony became Haiti and the Spanish colony became today’s Dominican Republic.
34 J W Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 4 (London, 1915), p427.
35 For the Grenada revolt, see E L Cox, “Fedon’s Rebellion 1795-96: Causes and Consequences”, in Journal of Negro History, 67 (1982). See also B Steele, Grenada (Oxford, 2003), pp115-148.
36 J W Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 4, pp463-465.
37 For the Second Maroon War, see M Campbell, The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796, pp209-249. For the Trelawny Maroons in exile see J Grant, The Maroons in Nova Scotia (Halifax, 2000).
38 R N Buckley, Slaves in Redcoats: The British West Indies Regiments 1795-1815 (New Haven, 1979), p55. In April 1802 there was a serious mutiny in the Eighth West Indian Regiment after it was rumoured that they were to be sold off as plantation slaves. This effectively secured Britain’s slave soldiers their freedom.
39 R Blackburn, The Overthrow of British Slavery 1776-1848, p231. For the St Lucia campaign see D B Gaspar, “La Guerre de Bois: Revolution, War and Slavery in Saint Lucia 1793-1838”, in D B Gaspar and D P Geggus (eds), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean (Bloomington, 1997). See also L Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill, 2004).
40 The best account of the revolution in St Domingue remains C L R James’s The Black Jacobins (New York, 1963). See also D P Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington, 2002) and L Dubois, Avengers of the New World (Cambridge, Ma, 2004).
41 See D P Geggus, “The Enigma of Jamaica in the 1790s”, The William and Mary Quarterly, 44 (1987).
42 R B Sheridan, “From Jamaican Slavery to Haitian Freedom: The Case of the Black Crew of the Pilot Boat, Deep Nine”, Journal of Negro History, 67 (1982). The Haitians made the interesting point that if the men had landed in England they would have been free and the same went for landing in Haiti.
43 See, for example, K O Lawrence, “The Tobago Slave Conspiracy of 1801”, Caribbean Quarterly, 28 (1982), and M Craton, Testing the Chains, pp224-238.
44 H Beckles, Black Rebellion in Barbados: The Struggle Against Slavery 1627-1838 (Bridgetown, 1984), pp25, 46-47, 92.
45 M Craton, Testing the Chains, p264. H Beckles, A History of Barbados (Cambridge, 1990), p84.
46 M Craton, Testing the Chains, p270.
47 E V da Costa, Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood, p216.
48 S G Checkland, “John Gladstone as Trader and Planter”, Economic History Review, 7 (1954), pp225-226. For John Smith see N Titus, “Reassessing John Smith’s Influence on the Demerara Slave Revolt of 1823”, in A Thompson (ed), In The Shadow of the Plantation, pp223-245.
49 E Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (London, 1964), p206.
50 H G C Matthew, Gladstone 1809-1874 (Oxford, 1986), p31.
51 M Craton, Testing The Chains, p295.
52 R Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, pp252, 253.
53 M Turner, Slaves and Missionaries: The Disintegration of Jamaican Slave Society 1787-1834 (Kingston, 1998), pp148, 154; A Bakan, Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica, p55.
54 M Mullin, Africa in America, p257.
55 Sharpe had sent emissaries to the Maroons in an attempt to secure their neutrality, but they handed them over to the British who shot them. See R Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, pp269-270.
56 A Bakan, Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica, p65.
57 R Hart, Slaves Who Abolished Slavery, pp257, 320.
58 P Sherlock and H Bennett, The Story of the Jamaican People (Kingston, 1998), p220.
59 R Hart, From Occupation to Independence (London, 1998), p39.
60 J Walvin, “The Rise of British Popular Sentiment for Abolition 1787-1832”, in C Bolt and S Drescher (eds), Anti-Slavery, Religion and Reform: Essays in Memory of Roger Anstey (Folkestone, 1980), pp157, 159. For a recent account of the abolitionist movement see A Hochschild, Bury The Chains: The British Struggle To Abolish Slavery (London, 2005).
61 S Drescher, From Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery (Basingstoke, 1999), p74. See also his Capitalism and Anti-Slavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective (New York, 1986).
62 P Wright, Knibb The Notorious, pp120-121.
63 See R Frucht, “Emancipation and Revolt in the West Indies, St Kitts, 1834”, Science and Society, 39 (1975); R Shelton, “A Modified Crime: The Apprenticeship System in St Kitts”, Slavery and Abolition, 16 (1995); and G Heuman, “Riot and Resistance in the Caribbean at the Moment of Freedom”, Slavery and Abolition, 21 (2000).
64 For apprenticeship and resistance to it in Jamaica see T C Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain 1832-1938 (Baltimore, 1992), pp63-66. Flogging continued to be a routine feature of life for “apprentices”.
65 A Tyrell, “The Moral Radical Party and the Anglo-Jamaican Campaign for the Abolition of the Negro Apprenticeship System”, English Historical Review, 99 (1984), pp498.
66 G Heuman, “The Killing Time”: The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica (London, 1994), p98. For the dismal role of the Maroons, see J Lumsden, “‘A brave and loyal people’: the Role of the Maroons in the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865”, in V Shepherd (ed), Working Slavery.
67 C Hutton, “The Defeat of the Morant Bay Rebellion”, Jamaican Historical Review (1996), p35.
68 A Erickson, “Empire or Anarchy: The Jamaican Rebellion of 1865”, Journal of Negro History, 44 (1959), pp115-119.
69 B Semmel, The Governor Eyre Controversy (London, 1962), pp88-95.
The Irish Famine
1 For the 1798 and 1803 Rebellions see in particular K Whelan, The Fellowship of Freedom (Cork, 1998); R O’Donnell, Robert Emmet and the 1798 Rebellion (Dublin, 2003), and Robert Emmet and the Rising of 1803 (Dublin, 2003); and my own United Irishman: The Autobiography of James Hope (London, 2000).
2 W F Monypenny, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, 2 (London, 1912), p86.
3 C O Grada, Black ’47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy and Memory (Princeton, N J, 1999), p24.
4 There is inevitably considerable controversy about the government’s culpability and there has never been any shortage of historians prepared to endorse the official position. Recently, for example, Trevelyan has been the subject of a massive biography (600+ pages) defending his record: R Haines, Charles Trevelyan and the Great Irish Famine (Dublin, 2004). More useful is James S Donnelly Jr’s assessment: “The famished children who Mitchel viewed as he travelled from Dublin across the Midlands to Galway in the winter of 1847 prompted the vitriolic remark: ‘I saw Trevelyan’s claw in the vitals of those children, his red tape would draw them to death; in his government laboratory he had prepared for them the typhus poison’… The harsh words which Mitchel had for Charles Trevelyan, who effectively headed the Treasury in London, do not seem—to me, at any rate—to have been undeserved, even if the professional historian would choose different language”, from J S Donnelly Jr, The Great Irish Potato Famine (Stroud, 2001), pp18-20.
5 C Kinealy, A Death-Dealing Famine (London, 1997), p70.
6 D Kerr, A Nation of Beggars (Oxford, 1994), p37. See also J Prest, Lord John Russell (London, 1972), p246. He describes Russell’s claim that government intervention “would lead to a greater number of deaths from famine” as “a high water mark of laissez-faire”.
7 G O Tuathaigh, Ireland before the Famine (Dublin, 1972), pp219-220.
8 P Gray, Famine, Land and Politics (Dublin, 1999), p294.
9 As above, pp314-315.
10 C O Murchadha, Sable Wings Over The Land: Ennis, County Clare And Its Wider Community During the Great Famine (Ennis, 1998), pp77, 82-83, 93, 95. For another valuable local study see D Marnane, “The Famine in South Tipperary”, Tipperary Historical Journal, 9 (1996) and 10 (1997).
11 P Gray, Famine, Land and Politics, p333.
12 C O Grada, Black ’47 and Beyond, p78. Christine Kinealy has made the point that the money “advanced by the Treasury during the whole of the famine was less than one-half percent of the annual Gross National Product…or as has been aptly pointed out, merely 10 percent of what had been spent in one year alone during the Napoleonic Wars”—from C Kinealy, This Great Calamity(Dublin, 1994), p295.
13 For the evictions see in particular J Donnelly Jr, “Mass Eviction and the Great Famine”, in C Poirteir (ed), The Great Irish Famine (Dublin, 1995); T P O’Neill, “Famine Evictions” in C King (ed), Famine, Land and Culture (Dublin, 2000); and C O Murchadha, “One Vast Abbatoir: County Clare 1848-1849”, The Other Clare, 21 (1997).
14 R F Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1989), p374. For critiques of Foster see T P O’Neill, “Famine Evictions”, and my own “Walking Away from the Abyss: Foster on the Famine”, Socialist History, 10 (1996).
15 See T C Smout, A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830 (London, 1998), and T M Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000 (London, 2000).
16 J Killeen (ed), The Famine Decade: Contemporary Accounts 1841-1851 (Belfast, 1995), pp232-233.
17 I Murphy, The Diocese of Killaloe (Blackrock, 1992), pp216-217.
18 J Donnelly Jr, “Mass Eviction and the Great Famine”, p163.
19 J Donnelly Jr, The Great Irish Potato Famine, p139.
20 J Prest, Lord John Russell, p286.
21 D Kerr, A Nation of Beggars, p333.
22 For the press campaign around the Mahon shooting and the attacks on the Catholic church that were part of it, see D Kerr, as above, pp93-107, and L Williams, Daniel O’Connell, The British Press and the Irish Famine (Aldershot, 2003), pp249-255. As well as attempting to intimidate the clergy, the government gave serious consideration to introducing a scheme of state payment in an attempt to buy their loyalty. As Nassau Senior had succinctly put it, “Troops are more expensive than priests”—from P Gray, Famine, Land and Politics, p12. The Catholic hierarchy rejected Russell’s various proposals, but although many bishops attacked the government, they never presented a united front with regard to the starvation of so many of their flock.
23 E Ashley, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston 1846-1865 (London, 1876), pp44-46.
24 J Ridley, Lord Palmerston (London, 1970), pp322-323.
25 G Moran, Sending Out Ireland’s Poor: Assisted Emigration to North America in the Nineteenth Century (Dublin, 2004), p107.
26 See, for example, J Chambers, Palmerston: The People’s Darling (London, 2004). See also P O Laighin, “Grosse-Ile: The Holocaust Revisited”, in R O’Driscoll and L Reynolds (eds), The Untold Story: The Irish In Canada (Toronto, 1988).
27 J Mitchel, Jail Journal (Dublin, 1913), pxlvii.
28 P Gray, Famine, p292.
29 J Mitchel, Jail Journal, pxxxix; J Mitchel, The History of Ireland, 2 (Glasgow, 1869), pp214-215. Most historians reject Mitchel’s claim that there was enough food in Ireland to sustain the population, although Christine Kinealy has offered a powerful defence of his stance (see C Kinealy, Death-Dealing Famine, pp77-83). Regardless of this, the export of food in front of a starving population is still incredible, and even if it was not enough to keep everyone alive, would still have saved many thousands of people. This is not a judgement after the event, but was argued at the time.
30 J Mitchel, The Last Conquest of Ireland (Glasgow, no date), p94.
31 J Mitchel, The History of Ireland, pp224-227.
32 For the Chartists and the Irish Confederation see J Saville, 1848: The British State and the Chartist Movement (Cambridge, 1990). See also T Koseki, “Patrick O’Higgins and Irish Chartism”, in T Matsuo (ed), Comparative Aspects of Irish and Japanese Economic and Social History(Tokyo, 1993).
33 United Irishman, 12 February 1848.
34 P S O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland Under the Union (London, 1952), p343. In the course of the famine the Irish electorate shrank from some 121,000 voters in 1845 to 45,000 in 1850.
35 United Irishman, 4 March 1840.
36 D Gwynn, Young Ireland and 1848 (Cork, 1949), p159.
37 J R Hill, The Role of Dublin in the Irish National Movement 1840-1848, PhD thesis (Leeds, 1973), p275.
38 D Kerr, A Nation of Beggars, pp132-138. Clarendon had been pleading to be allowed to introduce internment since November 1847. His complaints were continual: in Ireland “every man was in favour of the criminal: law and order have no friends”—from Sir H Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, Fourth Earl of Clarendon, 1 (London, 1913), p285; and that he was governing what was only “a half conquered country”—from C Kinealy, The Great Calamity, p216.
39 A M Sullivan, New Ireland (Glasgow, 1882), p64.
40 J McCarthy, A History Of Our Times, 1 (Glasgow, 1882), p64.
41 G P Gooch, The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 1840-1878, 1 (London, 1925), p230.
42 H Maxwell, The Life and Letters of George William Frederick, p289.
43 R Davis, Revolutionary Imperialist: William Smith O’Brien 1803-1864 (Dublin, 1998), p243. See also R Sloan, William Smith O’Brien and the Young Ireland Rebellion of 1848 (Dublin, 2000), and R Davis and S Petrow (eds), Ireland and Tasmania 1848 (Hobart, 1998).
44 Carthage was a North African sea power and the Roman Empire’s great rival.
45 J Mitchel, Jail Journal, pp83, 377.
46 There is, astonishingly, no modern scholarly biography of John Mitchel, but see my “John Mitchel and Irish Nationalism”, Literature and History, vol 6 (1980).
47 For the Fenians see my Fenianism in Mid-Victorian Britain (London, 1994).
48 For the history of the Irish Republican Brotherhood see L O Broin, Revolutionary Underground (Dublin, 1976).
The Opium Wars
1 D Judd, Empire (London, 1996).
2 A Porter (ed), Oxford History of the British Empire: the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999).
3 F Wakeman, “The Canton Trade and the Opium War”, in J K Fairbanks (ed), The Cambridge History of China, 10, 1 (Cambridge, 1992), p172.
4 J K Fairbanks, “The Creation of the Treaty System”, in J K Fairbanks, as above, p213.
5 According to John Richards, in India, Burma and Sri Lanka, “The British so managed opium with a limited excise system that they circumscribed domestic use of the drug…for the Indian consumer, opium remained relatively scarce and expensive whether legally or illegally acquired”—”The Opium Industry in British India”, Indian Economics and Social History Review, 39 (2002), p154. For more on the East India Company see Chapter 4.
6 M Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-1842 (Cambridge, 1951), p232.
7 J Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions: China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford, 1990), p27.
8 C Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy (London, 1999), pp10, 26, 73-74.
9 R Murphey, The Outsiders (Ann Arbor, 1977), p85.
10 J Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War (Cambridge, 1998), pp411-412.
11 H Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals (Basingstoke, 2004), pp63, 68.
12 R Blake, Jardine Matheson (London, 1999), p106.
13 P J Maythornthwaite, The Colonial Wars Sourcebook (London, 1995), p237.
14 Lord Jocelyn, Six Months With The Chinese Expedition (London, 1841), pp55-57.
15 J Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (London, 1975), p116.
16 J Ouchterlony, The Chinese War (London, 1844), pp238-239, 241.
17 “A Field Officer”, The Last Year in China (London, 1843), pp143, 150-151, 152.
18 Lord Jocelyn, Six Months With The Chinese Expedition, pp39-41, 142-143.
19 S Guan, “Chartism and the First Opium War”, History Workshop, 24 (1987), p22.
20 J Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars, p109.
21 J Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 1 (London, 1904), pp226, 227.
22 P Lowe, Britain in the Far East (London, 1981), p16.
23 K Marx and F Engels, Collected Works, 12 (London, 1979), p98.
24 For the Taiping see F Michael, The Taiping Rebellion, 3 vols (Seattle, 1972), and V Shih, The Taiping Ideology (Seattle, 1967). The most recent discussion of Taiping Christianity is in T Reilly, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (Seattle, 2004). For an excellent biography of Hong Xiuguan see J Spence, God’s Chinese Son (London, 1996).
25 T Meadows, The Chinese and Their Rebellions (London, 1856), pp457-458.
26 J Edkins, Religion in China (London, 1878), p197.
27 A F Lindley, Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Ti-Ping Revolution (London, 1866), pp154-155. See also my “Taiping Revolutionary: Augustus Lindley in China”, Race and Class, 42 (2001).
28 J Wong, Deadly Dreams, pp9-10.
29 For Bowring see G Bartle, An Old Radical and his Brood (London, 1994).
30 J K Fairbanks, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge, Ma, 1954).
31 J Wong, Deadly Dreams, p23.
32 E Steele, Palmerston and Liberalism (Cambridge, 1991), p121.
33 For Elgin see my “Elgin in China”, New Left Review, May-June 2002.
34 Sir F Stephenson, At Home And On The Battlefield (London, 1914), pp219-220, 223. See also K Bruner and others (eds), Entering China’s Service: Robert Hartley’s Journals 1854-1863 (Cambridge, Ma, 1986), pp193-201.
35 Rev R J L M’Ghee, How We Got to Pekin (London, 1862), pp114-115. The manufacturer of the Armstrong guns, William Armstrong, explained the thinking behind the weapon: “We, as a nation, have few men to spare for war and we have need of all the aid that science can give us to secure us against aggression and enable us to hold in subjection the vast and semi-barbarous population which we have to rule in the East”—from D Dougan, The Great Gunmaster (Newcastle, 1970), pp67-68.
36 D Rennie, The British Arms in North China and Japan (London, 1864), p208.
37 G J Wolseley, Narratives of the War with China in 1860 (London, 1862), p227.
38 J T Harris, China Jim (London, 1912), pp81-117.
39 D Boulger, The Life of Gordon (London, 1896), pp45-46.
40 F Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China (New York, 1975), p162.
41 J L Hevia, English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth Century China (Durham, NC, 2003), p89.
42 A Lindley, Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh, pp277-279.
43 As above, p607-609.
44 A Wilson, The Ever Victorious Army (Edinburgh, 1868), p155-156.
45 A Lindley, Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh, p759.
The Great Indian Rebellion, 1857-58
1 M Edwardes, “The Mutiny and its Consequences”, introduction to W H Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary (London, 1957), pxv.
2 T Lowe, Central India During The Rebellion of 1857 and 1858 (London, 1860), pp103, 104, 166. He writes approvingly of his commander, General Hugh Rose, having “strewn the plains of India with corpses” (p304).
3 For the United Irish Rebellion see my United Irishman.
4 D Judd, The Lion and the Tiger (Oxford, 2004), p47.
5 V G Kiernan, European Empires From Conquest to Collapse (London, 1982), p42.
6 J A Hobson, Richard Cobden: The International Man (London, 1919), pp90; S Hobhouse, Joseph Sturge (London, 1919), pp119-120.
7 See O Pollak, “The Origins of the Second Anglo-Burmese War 1852-53”, Modern Asian Studies, 12, 3 (1978). For the Anglo-Burmese Wars see G Bruce, The Burma Wars 1824-1886 (London, 1973).
8 J A Hobson, Richard Cobden, pp87, 91-92.
9 T Blackburn, The British Humiliation of Burma (Bangkok, 2000), p58.
10 S L Menezes, Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army From The Seventeenth to the Twenty-First Century (New Delhi, 1999), p77.
11 R Mukherjee, Awadh in Revolt 1857-1858 (London, 2002), p35. See also S Mohan, Awadh Under the Nawabs (New Delhi, 1997), and F A Taban, “The Coming of the Revolt in Awadh: Evidence of Urdu Newspapers”, Social Scientist, 26 (1998).
12 C A Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1988), pp79, 116.
13 K Marx and F Engels, The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859 (Moscow, 1959) pp24, 26, 27, 30. It is worth quoting Marx on the role of the British capitalist class in the regeneration of India: “All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, misery and degradation? The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the new ruling class has been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindus themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether” (pp29-30).
14 As above, pp59, 60, 63.
15 R Mukerjhee, Spectre of Violence: The 1857 Kanpur Massacre (New Delhi, 1998), p175.
16 One of the few academic discussions of torture is D Peers, “Torture, the Police, and the Colonial State in the Madras Presidency 1816-55”, Criminal Justice History, 12 (1991). See also A Rao, “Problems of Torture, States of Terror: Torture in Colonial India”, Interventions, 3 (2001).
17 T Walrond (ed), The Life and Diaries of the English Lord Elgin (London, 1878), pp199-200.
18 W H Russell, Indian Mutiny, pp284-285.
19 W Trousdale (ed), War in Afghanistan: The Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe Macgregor (Detroit, 1985), p157.
20 K Marx and F Engels, The First Indian War of Independence, p40.
21 S Gopal, British Policy in India, (London, 1965), p1.
22 K Marx and F Engels, The First Indian War of Independence, pp32-33.
23 Sir G MacMunn, The Indian Mutiny In Perspective (London, 1931), px.
24 S L Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, p162. He writes that “she was hanged without trial for ‘egging on the mutineers’”, observing that British writers invariably ignore “the killing by the British themselves of a British woman”.
25 For popular involvement in the rebellion see in particular R Mukerjhee, Arwadh in Revolt; T Roy, The Politics of a Popular Uprising: Bundelkand in 1857 (Delhi, 1994); and E Stokes, The Peasant Armed: The Indian Rebellion of 1857 (Oxford, 1986). These are all invaluable although written from differing perspectives. See also G Bhadra, “Four Rebels of Eighteen-Fifty-Seven”, Subaltern Studies, iv, and the special Indian Rebellion issue of Social Scientist, 26 (1998), in particular P Rag, “1857: Need for Alternative Sources”. Urban involvement in the rebellion urgently requires exploration.
26 D Domin, India in 1857-59: A Study of the Role of the Sikhs in the People’s Uprising (Berlin, 1977), p2.
27 R Mukherjee, Spectre of Violence. See also R Muckherjee, “‘Satan Let Loose Upon Earth’: The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857”, Past and Present, 128 (1990); B English, ‘The Kanpur Massacres in India in the Revolt of 1857’, Past and Present, 142 (1994); and Mukherjee’s rejoinder, “Reply”, Past and Present, 142 (1994). For Nana Sahib see P C Gupta, Nana Sahib and the Rising at Cawnpore (Oxford, 1963).
28 According to Michael Edwardes it was the hangings and shootings carried out by Colonel James Neill that “led to the massacre of his countrywomen at Cawnpore”. See his Red Year: The Indian Rebellion of 1857 (London, 1973), p84. John Pemble also argues that the women and children “had been murdered in retaliation for British atrocities”—see his The Raj, The Indian Mutiny and the Kingdom of Oudh 1801-1859 (Hassocks, 1977), p179. And more recently Heather Streets has insisted that Neill’s murder of thousands “of sepoys and suspected rebels as well as innocent men, women and children” bears “directly on the events surrounding the Kanpur Massacre”. See her Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857-1914(Manchester, 2004), p39.
29 K Marx and F Engels, The First Indian War of Independence 1857-1859, pp74-75.
30 W H Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, p29.
31 See S Malik, “The Panjab and the Indian Mutiny: A Reassessment”, Journal of Indian History, l (1972).
32 E Stokes, The Peasant Armed, pp48, 49.
33 C A Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780-1870 (Cambridge, 1996), p317.
34 See I Husain, “The Rebel Administration in Delhi”, Social Scientist, 26 (1998).
35 B Watson, The Great Indian Mutiny: Colin Campbell and the Campaign at Lucknow (Westport, Ct, 1991), p68. See also the discussion in K Roy, From Hydaspes to Kergil: A History of Warfare in India (New Delhi, 2002), pp149-181.
36 F Cooper, The Crisis in the Punjab (Lahore, 1858), pp38, 98-100, 108.
37 F A V Thurburn, Reminiscences of the Indian Rebellion of 1857-1858 (London, 1889), p35.
38 M Edwardes, “The Mutiny and its Consequences”, p84.
39 R H Haigh and P W Turner, The Lions of the Punjab (Sheffield, 1998), p204.
40 W H Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, p45.
41 J Pemble, The Raj, The Indian Mutiny and the Kingdom of Oudh, pp177-178.
42 Sir J Kaye, History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-8, 2 (London, 1889), pp301, 302.
43 C J Griffiths, A Narrative of the Siege of Delhi (London, 1910), pp90, 101, 102, 106, 108. See also P Speer, A History of Delhi Under the Later Moghuls (London, 1951), pp218-228.
44 Lord Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, 1 (London, 1897), pp328-329.
45 C Hibbert, The Great Mutiny: India 1857 (London, 1980), p341.
46 Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier’s Life (London, 1903), p306.
47 G B Malleson, History of the Indian Mutiny, 4 (London, 1889), p133.
48 C Hibbert, The Great Mutiny, p341.
49 W Forbes-Mitchell, Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny 1857-59 (London, 1894), p170.
50 W H Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, pp87, 110, 114, 161.
51 M Maclagan, “Clemency” Canning (London, 1962), pp140.
52 H Anson, With HM 9th Lancers During the Indian Mutiny (London, 1896) pp177-178, 225-226, 229, 231, 266.
53 S Malik, “Nineteenth Century Approaches to the Indian ‘Mutiny’,” Journal of Asian History, 7 (1973), pp105, 113.
54 W Oddie, “Dickens and the Indian Mutiny”, The Dickensian, 68 (1972,) pp4-5.
55 N Edsall, Richard Cobden, Independent Radical (Cambridge, Ma, 1986), pp312-313; W H Dawson, Richard Cobden and Foreign Policy (London, 1926), p199.
56 J Byrne, “British Opinion and the Indian Revolt”, in P C Joshi (ed), Rebellion 1857: A Symposium (New Delhi, 1957), pp302-311.
57 J Saville, Ernest Jones, Chartist (London, 1952), pp66, 219-221. The most recent biography of Jones, Miles Taylor’s Ernest Jones, Chartist and the Romance of Politics 1819-1869 (Oxford, 2003), devotes just over a page to his support for the Great Rebellion which, of course, tells you considerably more about Taylor than it does about Jones.
58 S L Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, pp176-177; A Sharar (ed), The Lucknow Omnibus (New Delhi, 2002), pp32-33.
59 L James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London, 1997), p257.
60 C A Bayly, Empire and Information, p332.
61 W Forbes-Mitchell, Reminiscences of the Great Mutiny, pp183-192.
The Invasion of Egypt, 1882
1 E F Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform (Cambridge, 1992), pp405, 409.
2 W E Gladstone, Political Speeches in Scotland (London, 1879), pp36, 49.
3 As above, pp202-203.
4 T Rothstein, Egypt’s Ruin (London, 1910), pp34-41.
5 J Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (London, 1965), p91.
6 L H Jenks, The Migration of British Capital to 1875 (London, 1927), p311.
7 J Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956, p91.
8 T Rothstein, Egypt’s Ruin, p39.
9 R A Atkins, British Policy Towards Egypt (Ann Arbor, 1969), p12.
10 T J Spinner, George Joachim Goschen: the Transformation of a Victorian Liberal (London, 1973), p53.
11 M Schwartz, The Politics of British Foreign Policy in the Era of Gladstone and Disraeli (Basingstoke, 1985), p30.
12 R Wilson, Chapters from my Official Life (London, 1916), p182.
13 W S Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York, 1922), p9. For Blunt see M Berdine, The Accidental Tourist, Wilfred Scawen Blunt and the British Invasion of Egypt in 1882 (London, 2005).
14 For “Muslim Modernism” see F Rahman, “Revival and Reform in Islam”, in P M Holt, A K S Lambton and B Lewis (eds), The Cambridge History of Islam, 2B (Cambridge, 1977), pp632-656. For al-Afghani see N R Keddie, Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din “Al-Afghani”: A Political Biography(Berkeley, 2001).
15 R A Atkins, British Policy Towards Egypt, p200.
16 J I Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East (Cairo, 1999), p44.
17 W S Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, p157.
18 J I Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East, p16.
19 Sir E Malet, Egypt 1879-1883 (London, 1909), pp239, 242, 248-250. See also J S Galbraith and A L al-Sayyid Marsot, “The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 9 (1978).
20 J I Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East, p255.
21 D Nicholls, The Lost Prime Minister: A Life of Sir Charles Dilke (London, 1995), p97.
22 J Galbraith and A Marsot, “The British Occupation of Egypt”, p485.
23 P Knaplund, Gladstone’s Foreign Policy (London, 1970), p183.
24 C Royle, The Egyptian Campaigns 1882-1885 (London, 1900), p63.
25 Sir P Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy (London, 1919), pp47, 48.
26 Sir R Harrison, Recollections of Life in the British Army (London, 1908), p261.
27 Sir W F Butler, Autobiography (London, 1911), p219.
28 M E Chamberlain, “Sir Charles Dilke and the British Intervention in Egypt 1882”, British Journal of International Studies, 2 (1976), p272.
29 D Nicholls, The Lost Prime Minister, p102.
30 R A J Walling, The Diaries of John Bright (New York, 1931), p489, 486.
31 J Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, 3 (London, 1904), p85. The best account of Gladstone and Egypt is R T Harrison’s Gladstone’s Imperialism in Egypt (Westport, 1995).
32 W S Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt, p181.
33 W F Butler, Autobiography, pp235-236, 251.
34 Rev A Male, Scenes Through the Battle Smoke (London, 1901), pp453-454, 477.
35 M W Daley (ed), The Road to Shaykan: Letters of General William Hicks Pasha (Durham, 1983), p25.
36 D W R Bahlman, The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1 (Oxford, 1972), pp325, 339, 342, 344.
37 H C G Matthew, The Gladstone Diaries, 10 (Oxford, 1990), pplxxii-lxxiii.
38 London Illustrated News, 23 September 1882. Contemporary critics of the invasion of Egypt condemned it as a bondholders’ war, fought to put down a legitimate nationalist movement aspiring to parliamentary government. The invasion’s supporters championed it as a war of liberation to free the Egyptian people from military dictatorship and/or as necessary to protect vital British strategic interests, that is the Suez Canal. In 1961 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson published their Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961) arguing that the British motive was indeed primarily strategic. This thesis was effectively answered quite early on by D A Farnie’s magisterial East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History (Oxford, 1969). Recent research has reinforced this rebuttal. While not denying the importance of strategic concerns as a factor in imperial motivation, the Egyptian war was indeed a bondholders’ war.
39 D W R Bahlman, The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1, p352.
40 W S Blunt, Gordon at Khartoum (London, 1912), pp79-80.
41 T Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley, 1991), p97.
42 D W R Bahlman (ed), The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 2 (Oxford, 1972), p794.
43 Commonweal, March 1885. Available at marxists.org/archive/bax/1885/03/gordon.htm
44 N Kelvin, The Collected Letters of William Morris 1885-1888, 3 (Princeton 1987), pp388, 410.
45 E M Spiers, The Victorian Soldier in Africa (Manchester, 2004), p151.
46 M W Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1898-1934 (Cambridge, 1986), pp3, 4.
47 J Pollock, Kitchener (London, 2002), p150.
The Post-War Crisis, 1916-26
1 Lloyd George himself revealed what the war was all about: “We have nothing to complain of in this war. We shall get Mesopotamia, Palestine, the German colonies in South Africa and the islands in the Pacific, including one containing mineral deposits of great value…Mesopotamia contains some of the richest oil fields in the world”—from C Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War Coalition 1918-1922 (Hemel Hempstead, 1990), pp181-182.
2 K Jeffery (ed), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918-1922 (London, 1985), pp177-178.
3 See K Morgan, Harry Pollitt (Manchester, 1993), pp19-20.
4 See my Rebel City: Larkin, Connolly and the Dublin Labour Movement (London, 2004), pp135-153.
5 The most recent and best accounts of the Easter Rising are M Foy and B Barton, The Easter Rising (Stroud, 2000), and C Townshend, The Easter Rising (London, 2005).
6 V I Lenin, British Labour and British Imperialism (London, 1969), p166.
7 R Taylor, Michael Collins (London, 1958), pp57-58; H Talbot, Michael Collins’s Own Story (London, 1923), p41.
8 For Michael Collins see in particular, G Doherty and D Keogh (eds), Michael Collins and the Making of the Irish State (Dublin, 1998).
9 M Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence (Dublin, 2002), p41.
10 For the radical potential of the Irish revolutionary movement see C Kostik, Revolution in Ireland: Popular Militancy 1917-1923 (London, 1996), and my Rebel City, pp156-171.
11 For MacSwiney, see F J Costello, Enduring The Most: The Life and Death of Terence MacSwiney (Dingle, 1995).
12 M Gilbert (ed), Winston S Churchill, companion vol 4, July 1919-March 1921, part 2 (London, 1997), pp1194-1195, 1214.
13 As above, p1237.
14 M Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, pp90-91.
15 The quality of British intelligence is shown by the report written by the head of the organisation in Ireland, Ormonde Winter. Here he advised that “the Irishman, without any offence being intended, somewhat resembles a dog, and understands firm treatment”, and that “the heads of the rebel organisation are recruited from a low and degenerate type, unequipped with intellectual education.” See P Hart (ed), British Intelligence In Ireland 1920-1921 (Cork, 2000), pp65, 94.
16 M Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence, p83.
17 F J Costello, The Irish Revolution and Its Aftermath 1916-1923 (Dublin, 2003), p107.
18 K Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922 (Manchester, 1984), p90.
19 As above, p93.
20 For the situation in the North see M Farrell, The Orange State (London, 1976) and J McDermott, Northern Divisions: The Old IRA and the Belfast Pogroms (Belfast, 2001).
21 A Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-1939 (Basingstoke, 1986), p112.
22 J Beinin and Z Lockman, Workers On The Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the Egyptian Working Class 1882-1954 (Princeton, 1987), p91.
23 P J Vatikotis, The History of Egypt (London, 1980), p255.
24 J Keay, Sowing The Wind (London, 2004), p107.
25 K Jeffery (ed), p98-99.
26 J Keay, Sowing the Wind, p117.
27 A Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, p133.
28 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947 (Basingstoke, 1989), pp171-177.
29 S Sen, Working Class of India (Calcutta, 1997), pp114-115.
30 D A Low, “The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement 1920-1922”, in R Kumar (ed), Essays on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 (Oxford 1971), p321.
31 G Minault, The Khilafat Movement (New York, 1982), p70.
32 J M Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven, 1989), p132.
33 H Fein, Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jalliarwalla Bagh and British Judgement 1919-1920 (Honolulu, 1977), pp20, 21. See also N Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (London, 2005), and K H Tuteja, “Jalliarwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian National Movement”, Social Scientist, 25 (1997).
34 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, p192.
35 See D Sayer, “British Reactions to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920”, Past and Present, 131 (1991).
36 See B Robson, Crisis On The Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919-1920 (Staplehurst, 2002), and A Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, pp159-179. For the debate over the use of poison gas see E M Spiers, “Gas and the North-West Frontier”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 4 (1980).
37 M Jacobsen (ed), Rawlinson In India (Stroud, 2002), pp12, 16.
38 B Chandra and others, India’s Struggle For Independence (New Delhi, 1989), p189.
39 G Minault, The Khilafat Movement 1885-1947, p167.
40 S Sarkar, Modern India, pp205, 206.
41 R Hardgrave, “The Mappilla Rebellion, 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar”, Modern Asian Studies, 11 (1977), pp88-89.
42 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, p217.
43 R Hardgrave, “The Mappilla Rebellion, 1921”, p89.
44 See the innovative study by S Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922-1992 (Berkeley, 1995).
45 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, pp225-226. He also makes the point that when the British sentenced 172 people to death for the Chauri Chaura killings, there were no nationalist protests, “a matter of shame”. In the event 19 were hanged and the rest transported for life.
46 R Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire (Boston, 2004), p1.
47 G Simons, Iraq: From Sumer to Post-Saddam (Basingstoke, 2004), p200.
48 See S Eskander, “Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and Termination of the First Kurdish Government 1918-1919”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27 (2000).
49 M Jacobson, “‘Only By The Sword’: British Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 1920”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2 (1991), p323.
50 E B Maunsel, Prince of Wales’s Own, The Scinde Horse (London, 1926), p280. See also H C Wylly, History of the Manchester Regiment, 2 (London, 1925), pp218-221. High Commissioner Wilson himself acknowledged that when the prisoners were released they had “a healthy and well-nourished appearance…only one having died in captivity”—from A Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London, 1931), pp298-299.
51 M Jacobsen, “‘Only By The Sword’”, p341.
52 A Wilson, Mesopotamia 1917-1920, p293.
53 C Townshend, “Civilization and ‘Frightfulness’: Air Control in the Middle East Between the Wars” in C Wrigley (ed), Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics (London, 1986), p148. Churchill, it should be noted, was a strong advocate of the use of “poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes”—G Simons, Iraq, p213.
54 As above, p214. See also J Cox, “A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air of its role in Iraq 1919-32”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 13 (1985).
55 For the undeservedly neglected Jangali movement see C Chaqueri, The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran (Pittsburgh, 1995).
56 H Sabahi, British Policy in Persia 1918-1925 (London, 1990), p39.
57 As above, p75.
58 As above, pp164-165.
59 According to M G Majd, “Iran was completely controlled by Britain” in the decades after 1918 with Reza Khan richly rewarded for his compliance. He writes of “massive financial corruption and embezzlement by Reza Khan…at the time of his abdication in 1941, he had on deposit at Bank Melli more than 760 million rials ($50 million). Vast amounts were deposited in foreign banks.” He also had between £20-30 million deposited in London, “an unbelievable amount in 1941” as well as “vast sums in Swiss and New York banks”. Out of the $155 million paid to Iran in oil royalties during his rule, “at least $100 million was stolen by Reza Shah”—see Great Britain and Reza Khan (Gainesville, 2001), pp3, 9. Reza Shah was the model for later pro-Western dictators such as Marcos of the Philippines and Suharto of Indonesia.
60 See N Clifford, Shanghai 1925: Urban Nationalism and the Defence of Foreign Privilege (Ann Arbor, 1979).
61 R Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London, 2003), pp166, 170.
62 R Rigby, The May 30 Movement (Canberra, 1980), p63. See also S A Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai 1895-1927 (Durham NC, 2002), pp168-169.
63 C L Kit-Ching, From Nothing To Nothing: The Chinese Communist Movement and Hong Kong 1921-1936 (New York, 1999), p58. See S Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong (New York, 2004), pp92-101 and J Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927 (Stanford, 1968), pp290-318.
The Palestine Revolt
1 A W Kayyali, Palestine: A Modern History (London, 1973), p56.
2 See M Verete, “The Balfour Declaration and its Makers”, Middle Eastern Studies, 6 (1970).
3 For an interesting discussion see A W Kayyali, “Zionism and Imperialism: The Historical Origins”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 6 (1977).
4 S Tebeth, Ben Gurion: The Burning Ground 1886-1948 (Boston 1987), pp85-91. Ben Gurion supported Turkey during the First World War because “Russia was the Jews’ worst enemy in the world” (p91); G Sheffer, Moshe Sharett (Oxford, 1996), p24.
5 R Sharif, Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History (London, 1983), p122.
6 See A W Kayyali, “Zionism and Imperialism”, pp107-108.
7 I Friedman, The Question of Palestine 1914-1918 (London, 1973), pp38-39. See also J Kimche, The Unromantics: the Great Powers and the Balfour Declaration (London, 1968), pp3, 8 15-16.
8 D Lloyd George, The Truth About The Peace Treaties, 2 (London, 1938), pp1117, 1121, 1122, 1139. See also M Levene, “The Balfour Declaration: A Case of Mistaken Identity”, English Historical Review, 107 (1992).
9 J Reinharz, “The Balfour Declaration and its Maker: A Reassessment”, Journal of Modern History, 64 (1992), p496.
10 The standard work on the Balfour Declaration remains Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961). As for Balfour himself, he was an anti-Semite. When he was prime minister, his government had introduced the 1905 Aliens Act to rescue Britain from “the undoubted evils that had fallen upon the country from an immigration that was largely Jewish”: M Egremont, Balfour (London, 1980), p205. Later he was to defend the declaration, for which he actually bore little personal responsibility, as something of benefit to “western civilisation” because it would remove a presence “too long regarded as alien and even hostile, but which it was equally unable to expel or absorb”: J Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy (London, 1997), p206.
11 Samuel was home secretary at the time of the Easter Rising in Dublin and had gone along with the decision to hang Sir Roger Casement, which his biographer describes with some understatement “as one of the less creditable episodes in Samuel’s career”—B Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: A Political Life (Oxford, 1992), p185.
12 Viscount Samuel, Memoirs (London, 1945), pp156, 168.
13 S Huneidi, A Broken Trust: Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians (London, 2001), pp22, 95,107. While acting as an adviser to the Zionist leaders before his appointment as high commissioner, Samuel had gone along with the “removal” of the Palestinians, but only “with some kind of financial inducement” and “with complete agreement and goodwill” (p91).
14 P A Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983 (London, 1984), p33
15 M Y Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York, 1938), p71. See also N Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism before World War 1 (Berkeley, 1980). He writes of Zionist immigrants being “genuinely taken aback to find Palestine inhabited by so many Arabs”, p31.
16 A W Kayyali, Palestine, p64.
17 S K Farsoun with C Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians (Boulder Colorado, 1997), p71.
18 Y Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929 (London, 1974), p243.
19 According to Simha Flapan, the Revisionists had “earned for themselves a reputation as fascists due to the viciousness of their anti-socialist propaganda, their unbridled hatred of kibbutzim, their ‘character assassinations’, the unconcealed sympathy of some members towards authoritarian regimes (Hitler, for example, was described as the saviour of Germany, Mussolini as the political genius of the century), and their military parades, drills, training and brown shirts…resembled the fascist movements in Europe”—S Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians (London, 1979), pp111-112. During the Second World War, Jabotinsky’s successor, Abraham Stern, actually tried to ally the Revisionist movement with the Italians and the Germans. He proposed a Zionist state allied with Germany and urged the recruitment of an army of 40,000 European Jews, under Nazi auspices, to invade Palestine and drive the British out—see C Shindler, Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream (London, 1995), p25. When Yitzhak Shamir, a follower of Stern, became Israeli prime minister in 1983, the peculiar trajectory of the Zionist right meant that Israel was the only country in the world led by a man who had regarded Hitler as an ally during the Second World War.
20 M Kolinsky, Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine 1928-1935 (Basingstoke, 1993), p42.
21 Y Porath, The Palestinian National Movement: From Riots To Rebellion 1929-1939 (London, 1977), pp39, 140. The immigration figures were, of course, for legal entry. There were thousands more people being illegally smuggled into the country.
22 N Barbour, Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy (London, 1946), p155.
23 W Khalidi, Palestine Reborn (London, 1992), p33.
24 G Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, 1938), p411.
25 F R Nicosia, The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (London, 1935), pp57, 63, 161. See also K Polkehn, “The Secret Contacts: Zionism and Nazi Germany 1933-1941”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 5 (1976), and G Deschner, Heydrich (London, 1981), pp149-152.
26 L Brenner, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (London, 1983), p149.
27 P A Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians, pp52, 53.
28 For the Histadrut see Z Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948 (Berkeley, 1996). See also Steven Glazer, “Picketing for Hebrew Labour: A Window on Histadrut Tactics and Strategy”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 30, 2001.
29 P A Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians, p54.
30 N Barbour, Nisi Dominus, p161.
31 P Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem (New York, 1988), p67.
32 A W Kayyali, Palestine, p181.
33 S Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p141.
34 R Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants To Revolutionaries (London, 1979), p43.
35 Stephen Howe, for example, in his standard work, Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918-1964 (Oxford, 1993) does not mention the revolt.
36 P Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem, pp70, 71.
37 G Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p406.
38 Z Lockman, Comrades, p243.
39 Y Porath, Palestinian National Movement: From Riot to Rebellion, p171.
40 A W Kiyyali, Palestine, p196.
41 J Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine (London, 1946), p160.
42 Y Heim, Abandonment of Illusions: Zionist Political Attitudes Towards Palestinian Arab Nationalism 1936-1939 (Boulder, 1983), p88.
43 S Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians, p263.
44 P Keleman, “Looking the Other Way: The British Labour Party, Zionism and the Palestinians”, in C Collette and S Bird (eds), Jews, Labour and the Left 1918-1948 (Aldershot, 2000), p147. Labour’s commitment to Zionism came under serious strain when the Attlee government was in power. The Zionist settlement was seen as compromising the British position throughout the Middle East and this led to armed conflict. Once the British had evacuated Palestine, the Labour Party once again embraced Zionism.
45 Sir A Kirkbride, A Crackle of Thorns (London, 1956), pp99, 100.
46 A M Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine 1917-1939 (Ithaca, 1979), p124.
47 H Foot, A Start In Freedom (London, 1964), pp48-49.
48 E Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem (London, 1994), pp192-193.
49 A W Kayyali, Palestine, p215.
50 J Baynes, The Forgotten Victor (London, 1989), p52.
51 D Smiley, Irregular Regular (Norwich, 1994), pp15-16.
52 A J Sherman, Mandate Days (London, 1997), pp108-109.
53 E Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, p191.
54 N Shepherd, Ploughing The Sand: British Rule in Palestine (London, 1999), p212.
55 C Townshend, Britain’s Civil Wars, (London, 1986), p110.
56 C Bowyer, RAF Operations 1918-1938, (London, 1988), p142.
57 T Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past (Minneapolis, 1995), p109.
58 J Baynes, The Forgotten Victor, pp61-62.
59 H Foot, A Start in Freedom, pp51-52.
60 B Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-1999 (London, 1999), p47.
61 For Zionist relations with the Soviet Union see A Krammer, The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc 1947-1953 (Urbana, 1974).
1 For Reginald Reynolds see his My Life and Career (London, 1956).
2 S R Bakshi, Gandhi and the Mass Movement (New Delhi, 1988), pp133-134.
3 S N Qanungo, “The Struggle for Purna Swaraj”, in R Kumar, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress 1919-1935, ii (Delhi, 1986), p212.
4 L Fischer, Gandhi and the Mass Movement (New York, 1950), pp298-299.
5 S R Bakshi, Gandhi and the Mass Movement, p142.
6 D G Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bombay, 1967), pp68-70.
7 S N Qanungo, “The Struggle for Purna Swaraj”, pp239-240.
8 S Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin 1926-1931 (Oxford, 1957), p73.
9 S Sen, Working Class of India (Calcutta, 1997), p284.
10 D Arnold, Gandhi (Harlow, 2001), p148.
11 S Wolpert, Nehru: A Tryst With Destiny (Oxford, 1996), p118. He was released at the end of January 1931 as part of moves towards the so-called Gandhi-Irwin Pact.
12 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947 (Basingstoke, 1983), p271.
13 For the Meerut trial see P Ghosh, Meerut Conspiracy Case and the Left-Wing in India (Calcutta, 1978).
14 One looks in vain in recent histories of the Labour Party for any account of the colonial repression in India during this period. There is no mention in Andrew Thorpe’s A History of the British Labour Party (Basingstoke, 1997); in Duncan Tanner and others, Labour’s First Century(Cambridge, 2000); or in Matthew Worley’s Labour Inside The Gate (London 2005). Similarly with biographies of MacDonald: see D Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), and A Morgan, J Ramsay MacDonald (Manchester, 1987).
15 S Wolpert, Nehru, p97.
16 J Nehru, An Autobiography (London, 1936), p176.
17 P S Gupta, “British Labour and the Indian Left”, in his Power, Politics and the People, (London, 2002), p389.
18 J Nehru, An Autobiography, p174.
19 The popular outrage felt at Lajpat Rai’s death prompted an underground revolutionary group, the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, to shoot the police officer responsible, Superintendent J A Scott. Raj Guru and Bhagat Singh shot the wrong man, Assistant Superintendent J P Saunders, on 18 September 1928. The assassination was tremendously popular and widely regarded even within the ranks of the Congress as vindicating the nation’s honour. See S R Bakshi, Revolutionaries and the British Raj (New Delhi, 1988).
20 B Porter, Critics of Empire (London, 1968), p185-186.
21 J R MacDonald, Labour and the Empire (London, 1907), pp108-109. MacDonald’s sentiments were often positively Blairite, reflecting a shared taste for empty, pious rhetoric.
22 H H Tiltman, James Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1929), p247.
23 R Lyman, The First Labour Government 1924 (London, 1957), p106.
24 P Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack (Woodbridge, 1998), p185.
25 A Roberts, The Holy Fox (Basingstoke, 1991), p39. In 1934 Irwin was to become Lord Halifax by which title he is best known as one of the architects of appeasement.
26 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, p322.
27 C Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics (Cambridge, 1985), pp77-78.
28 C Ponting, Churchill (London, 1994), p342.
29 MacDonald had actually suggested Thomas for the post, but the king had not been impressed with the idea and they had finally agreed on Lord Willingdon—H Tinker, Viceroy: Curzon to Mountbatten (Oxford, 1997), p127.
30 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, p321.
31 Under the 1935 act nearly 7 million adults had the vote (13.4 percent), and of the 250 seats in the Legislative Assembly, only 48 were elected by the general franchise; the rest were allocated to 17 different groups. This arrangement was weighted very heavily against Congress. One of the 17 groups was the British who were allocated 25 seats (0.0004 percent of the population elected 10 percent of the seats). See M Bose, Raj, Secrets, Revolution: A Life of Subhas Chandra Bose (London, 2004), pp149-150.
32 R Chandravarkar, Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State (Cambridge, 1998), p225.
33 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, p362.
34 C Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, p168.
35 For the ILP in this period, see T Cliff and D Gluckstein, The Labour Party: A Marxist History (London, 1986).
36 For the Congress Socialist Party see A K Chaudhuri, Socialist Movement in India 1934-1947 (Calcutta, 1980).
37 For the CPI role during the war see A Shourie, “The Only Fatherland”: Communists, Quit India and the Soviet Union (New Delhi, 1991).
38 D N Panigrahi, Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom (New Delhi, 1984), pp13-14.
39 See M Bose, Raj, Secrets, Revolution, pp179-189.
40 This was eventually attached to the SS and, apparently quite horrifically, took part in operations against the French Resistance in 1944.
41 The standard account of the Cripps Mission is R J Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-1945 (Oxford, 1979). See also N Owen, “The Cripps Mission of 1942: A Reinterpretation”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 30 (2002).
42 A Sharma, The Quit India Movement (Delhi, 1992), p121.
43 The British had already discussed what to do if Gandhi went on hunger strike once he was arrested. Leo Amery, the secretary of state for India, on 3 August had argued that if “he insists on committing suicide, surely he might just as well do it”. This he informed Linlithgow was the cabinet position. Linlithgow replied on the day of the arrests that the provincial governors were convinced that if Gandhi died in British custody there would be an “explosion of hatred which will get right down to the villages…we would have few friends left”—from N Massergh (ed), Constituional Relations Between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-1947 vol II: Quit India 30 April-21 September 1942 (London, 1971) pp550, 632, 637.
44 Years later Francis Williams asked Attlee about his “ordering the arrest of Gandhi and Nehru” and was told, “Yes. It was necessary… If they chose to set themselves against the government in war they had to answer for it”—from F Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers (London, 1961), pp205-206.
45 A C Bhuyan, The Quit India Movement (New Delhi, 1975), p67.
46 R Callahan, Churchill: Retreat From Empire (Tunbridge Wells, 1984), p199.
47 D N Panigrahi, Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom, p25.
48 N Massergh, Constituional Relations Between Britain and India, p835.
49 D N Panigrahi, India’s Partition: A Story of Imperialism in Retreat (London, 2004), pp236-237.
50 N Massergh, Constituional Relations Between Britain and India, pp662, 669, 707, 733-734, 853-854.
51 P Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, 2, (London, 1963), p308.
52 V Damodaran, Broken Promises: Popular Protest, Indian Nationalism and the Congress Party in Bihar (Delhi, 1992), p241; S Hanningham, “Quit India in Bihar and Eastern United Provinces: The Dual Revolt”, from R Gruha (ed), Subaltern Studies, 11 (Delhi, 1983), p158; F Hutchins, India’s Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement (Cambridge, Ma, 1973), pp242-243.
53 R H Niblett, The Congress Rebellion in Azamgarh (Allahabad, 1957), pp12-17. See also S Chakravarty, Quit India Movement (Delhi, 2002), p192.
54 F Hutchins, India’s Revolution, p232.
55 For the revolutionary or parallel governments see in particular A K Jana, Quit India Movement in Bengal (Delhi, 1991); A B Shinde, The Parellel Government of Satara (New Delhi, 1990); and G Pandey (ed), The Indian Nation in 1942 (Calcutta, 1989).
56 N B Bonarjee, Under Two Masters (London, 1970), pp190, 193.
57 R H Niblett, The Congress Rebellion in Azamgarh, pp26, 40, 41, 47.
58 S R Bakshi, Congress and Quit India Movement (New Delhi, 1986), pp276-277, 282.
59 D N Panigrahi, Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom, p7.
60 See S Sengupta and G Chatterjee, Secret Congress Broadcasts and Storming Railway Tracks (New Delhi, 1988).
61 See P Greenough, “Political Mobilization and the Underground Literature of the Quit India Movement 1942-44”, Modern Asian Studies, 17 (1983).
62 V Damodaran, Broken Promises, p260.
63 J P Narayan, Towards Struggle: Selected Manifestoes, Speeches and Writings (Bombay, 1946), p47. See also V Nargolkar, J P’s Crusade For Revolution (New Delhi, 1975).
64 B M Bhatia, Famines in India (Delhi, 1991), p321. See also P Greenough, Poverty and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-1944 (Oxford, 1982); and M S Veskataramani, Bengal Famine of 1943: The American Response (Delhi, 1973).
65 J Nehru, Discovery of India (London, 1947), p429.
66 S Gopal, “Churchill and India”, in R Blake and W R Louis (eds), Churchill (Oxford, 1993), p465.
67 J Barnes and D Nicholson (eds), The Empire At Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries 1929-1945 (London, 1988), pp943, 950.
68 P Moon (ed), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (London, 1973), pp54, 123.
69 S Gopal, “Churchill and India”, pp465-466.
70 J Barnes and D Nicholson (eds), The Empire at Bay, pp812, 842; W R Louis, In The Name of God Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age of Churchill (New York, 1992), p172.
71 J Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London, 1985), p563.
72 The subject is completely ignored in the more recent biographies—G Best, Churchill: A Study in Greatness (London, 2001); R Jenkins, Churchill (Basingstoke, 2001); P Addison, Churchill: The Unexpected Hero (Oxford, 2005). Even Martin Gilbert’s massive Road To Victory: Winston S Churchill 1941-1945 (London, 1986), in over 1,300 pages of text, has no space for the Bengal Famine.
73 N B Bonarjee, Under Two Masters, p294. As he points out, by the end of the war the Indian army was 2.5 million strong and during the conflict the Indian armed forces suffered over 30,000 men killed fighting for the British Empire.
74 N Owen, “‘Responsibility Without Power’: The Attlee governments and the end of British rule in India”, in N Tiratsoo, The Attlee Years (London, 1991), pp167, 181. See also H V Brasted and C Bridge, “15 August 1947: Labour’s Parting Gift To India”, in J Masselos, India: Creating A Modern Nation (New Delhi, 1990).
75 A I Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship 1947-1956 (London 1993), p12.
76 R Pearce (ed), Patrick Gordon Walker: Political Diaries 1932-1971 (London, 1991), pp23-24.
77 W R Louis, Imperialism At Bay 1941-1945 (Oxford, 1977), p14.
78 B Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London, 1985), p577.
79 A I Singh, The Origins of Partition in India 1936-1947 (Delhi, 1987), pp146-147.
80 A M Wainwright, Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India and the Balance of Power in Asia (Westport, Ct, 1994), pp60, 62.
81 G Chattopadhyay, “Bengal Students in Revolt Against the Raj 1945-46”, in A K Gupta (ed), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India 1945-47 (New Delhi, 1987), p157.
82 G Chattopadhyay, “The Almost Revolution: A Case Study of India in February 1946”, in Essays in Honour of Professor S. C. Sarkar (New Delhi, 1976), pp431, 435.
83 S Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, pp423-425. See also S Mahajan, “British Policy, Nationalist Strategy and Popular National Upsurge in 1945-46” in A K Gupta (ed), Myth and Reality.
84 J Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (Basingstoke, 1988), p92.
85 P Moon (ed), Wavell, p399. For the little-known A V Alexander see J Tilley, Churchill’s Favourite Socialist: The Life of A V Alexander (Manchester, 1995).
86 A Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (London, 1983), pp360-361.
87 There has not been space here to deal with issues of communalism. For partition, however, see D N Panigrahi, India’s Partition (London, 2004), and A I Singh, The Origins of Partition in Imdia 1936-1947.
88 A Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten (London, 1972), p221.
The Suez Invasion: losing the Middle East
1 E Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-1956 (London, 1986), p187.
2 J Bill, “America, Iran and the politics of intervention, 1951-1953”, in J Bill and W R Louis (eds), Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil (London, 1988), pp262-263.
3 E Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran”, Science and Society, 65 (2001), p186.
4 As above, p193.
5 A Ansari, Modern Iran Since 1921 (London, 2003), p112.
6 E Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran”, p189.
7 W R Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 (London, 1984), p673.
8 N Owen, “Britain and decolonisation: The Labour government and the Middle East 1945-51”, in M Cohen and M Kolinsky (eds), Decline of the British Empire in the Middle East (London, 1998), p5.
9 B Donoghue and G W Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London, 1973), pp497-498.
10 W R Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, p675.
11 The best account of “Operation Buccaneer” is in J Cable, Intervention at Abadan: Plan Buccaneer (London, 1991). “This book”, Cable wrote, “relates how, in 1951, Britain planned to use force in order to retain control of the world’s largest oil refinery…Units of the British navy, army and air force were deployed, given their preparatory orders and, at one point, brought to three hours’ notice…under strong pressure from the President of the United States, British forces were stood down, British subjects withdrawn from Abadan and oil-wells, pipelines and refinery abandoned” (pix).
12 W R Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, p688.
13 For the coup see in particular M Gasiorowski and M Byrne (eds), Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (New York, 2004). Also S Dorril, MI6 (London, 2000), and R J Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London, 2001). And for its wider significance see Z Karabell, Architects of Intervention: The United States, the Third World and the Cold War 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge, 1999).
14 W R Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, pp226, 227.
15 See M Mason, “Killing Time: The British Army and its Antagonists in Egypt, 1945-1954”, War and Society, 12 (1994), and C Tripp, “Egypt 1945-52: the Uses of Disorder”, in M Cohen and M Kolinsky (eds), Decline of the British Empire in the Middle East.
16 J C Hurewitz, “The Historical Context” in W R Louis and R Owen, Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford, 1989), pp24-25.
17 M J Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East (London, 1997), pp132-142. In the end some £2 million was spent on developing Abu Sueir for B-29 use. The Egyptian government was, of course, never told of the plan to bomb the Soviet Union from its territory. When the Egyptian prime minister Mustafa Nahas Pasha was told by the British that the bases were necessary to protect Egypt against Russian attack, he quite correctly pointed out that the only reason the Russians had for attacking Egypt was the presence of British bases.
18 Anwar Sadat quoted in D Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990 (London, 1993), p24.
19 P Hahn, The United States, Great Britain and Egypt 1945-1956 (Chapel Hill, 1991), p133.
20 G Blaxland, The Regiments Depart (London, 1971), pp226, 230.
21 M Mason, “‘The Decisive Volley’: The Battle of Ismailia and the Decline of British Influence in Egypt, January-July 1952”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 19 (1991), p50.
22 D A Farnie, East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History (Oxford, 1969), p701.
23 D Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General: The Life of General Lord Robertson of Oakridge (London, 1996), p163.
24 M J Cohen, “The strategic role of the Middle East after the war”, in M Cohen and M Kolinsky (eds), Decline of The British Empire in the Middle East, p33.
25 For recent biographies of Nasser see in particular S K Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (London, 2004), and A Alexander, Nasser (London, 2005).
26 M Holland, America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower (Westport, Ct, 1996), pp23, 28.
27 W R Louis, “Churchill and Egypt”, in R Blake and W R Louis (eds), Churchill, (Oxford, 1993), p477.
28 E Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p75.
29 As above, p76.
30 Churchill hoped for an opportunity to attack the Egyptians right up until the last moment, but in the end the realities of the situation prevailed. The Egyptian bases were costing £56 million a year and the exchequer was demanding cuts in military spending of £180 million. There were just not the resources for another colonial war. Moreover, the army was itself increasingly sceptical of the value of bases that had to be defended against a hostile population. See W R Louis, “The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954”, in W R Louis and R Owen, Suez 1956, 1956.
31 S K Aburish, Nasser, p88.
32 A Nutting, Nasser (London, 1972), p126.
33 A Nutting, No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez (London, 1967), pp36, 37.
34 E Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, pp340, 341.
35 A Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp35, 36. In the book Nutting uses the word “removal”, but he later admitted that Eden had in fact said “murdered”. For MI6’s attempt to assassinate Nasser see S Dorrill, MI6, pp600-651.
36 For Operation Straggle see A Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria 1949-1961 (London, 1995). This was a joint CIA-MI6 operation, but the Syrians involved called it off at the time of the Suez invasion “since any move against the Syrian government would be regarded as being in league with Israel and the West” (p122).
37 W R Louis, “Harold Macmillan and the Middle East Crisis of 1958”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 94 (1996), p211.
38 B Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (London, 1997), p252.
39 P Cradock, Know Your Enemy (London, 2002), p116.
40 J Campbell, Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism (London, 1987), p319. The Tribune editorial line was strongly against the invasion.
41 W S Lucas, “The Missing Link? Patrick Dean, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee”, in S Kelly and A Gorst (eds), Whitehall and the Suez Crisis (London, 2000), p119.
42 For the Sèvres Protocol see A Shlaim, “The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot”, in D Tal (ed), The 1956 War (London, 2001). At Sèvres the Israeli prime minister, David Ben Gurion, tried to interest his new allies in a “redivision” of the Middle East. Once Egypt had been dealt with he proposed that Israel should occupy Lebanon up to the Litani River, leaving a rump Christian state as a French protectorate. He also proposed the partition of Jordan, with Israel taking the West Bank, while Iraq, a British client, took the rest. These were too large ambitions for Britain and France.
43 M Dayan, The Story of My Life (New York, 1992), p196.
44 Sir H Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution (London, 1970), p105.
45 R A B Butler, The Art of the Possible (London, 1971), p192.
46 Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), pp283, 284.
47 M Heikal, Cutting The Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London, 1988), p195.
48 S Meers, “The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatamala”, Diplomatic History, 16 (1992). She writes, “When the commander of the bombed ship Springfiord returned to London, he told the press that his crew had been silenced by the British diplomats in Guatemala, who also confiscated a roll of film documenting the sinking of the ship… British diplomats in Guatemala spent months deflecting inquiries and making sure that the Springfiord’s aerial assailants remained unknown” (p426). See also T Petersen, The Middle East Between The Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Co-operation 1952-7 (Basingstoke, 2000), pp49-53.
49 H Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959 (London, 1971), p157.
50 A Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p116.
51 J Amery, “The Suez Group: A Retrospective on Suez”, in S I Troes and M Shemesh (eds), The Suez-Sinai Crisis: Retrospective and Reappraisal (London, 1990), p121. He put American behaviour down to “Washington’s determination to break the British predominance in the Middle East”. The defeat led to “a collapse of the will to rule” (pp119-120, 124).
52 B Johnson and E Bramall, The Chiefs (London, 1992), p301.
53 S Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London, 1978), pp78, 93.
54 R Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke, 1998), p120.
55 Lord Kilmuir, Political Adventure (London, 1964), p278. As home secretary, Kilmuir had refused clemency for Derek Bentley in the 1952 Croydon police shooting despite the jury’s recommendation. Bentley was hanged so as to maintain police morale, See S Chibnall, Law-And-Order News (London, 1977), pp56-60.
56 See N J Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser (Basingstoke, 1996), pp100-101.
57 There is a growing literature on the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 but see in particular H Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, 1978).
58 H Macmillan, Riding The Storm 1956-1959, p511.
59 W R Louis, “Harold Macmillan and the Middle East Crisis of 1958”, in Proceedings of the British Academy, 94 (1996).
Crushing the Mau Mau in Kenya
1 E Huxley, White Man’s Country, 1 (London 1935), p157.
2 G H Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), pp84, 143, 161, 164. Charles Eliot, a future vice-chancellor of Sheffield University and ambassador to Japan, confessed in his account of the protectorate that he was “not sanguine as to the future of the African race”. When discussing white settlement, he wrote with almost prophetic insight that the part of the country “where the land question is likely to present real difficulties is Kikuyu, as here we have the combination of a climate and country suitable for Europeans and a numerous native population”. He insisted that “the interior of the Protectorate is a white man’s country” but there would be a place for the Africans as labourers on the white men’s farms—The East African Protectorate(London, 1905), pp103, 104, 304.
3 A Wipper, “The Gusii Rebels”, in R I Rotberg, Rebellion in Black Africa (Oxford, 1971), pp167-169.
4 G H Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912, p195.
5 C G Rosberg and J Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau (New York, 1966), p15.
6 N Leys, Kenya (London, 1924), p350.
7 E Huxley, The Flame Trees of Thika (London, 1959), p16.
8 Lord Cranforth, A Colony In The Making (London, 1912), pp85, 173.
9 F Furedi, “The Social Composition of the Mau Mau Movement in the White Highlands”, Journal of Peasant Studies, 4 (1974).
10 D Anderson, Histories of the Hanged (London, 2005), p200.
11 See D Barnett and K Njama, Mau Mau From Within (London, 1966), pp54-55. See also S Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency 1944-1960 (Leicester, 1995), p132. For a recent discussion of the origins of the Mau Mau name see J Lonsdale, “Authority, Gender and Violence: The War Within Mau Mau’s Fight for Land and Freedom”, in E S Atieno Odhiambo and J Lonsdale (eds), Mau Mau and Nationhood (London, 2003), pp59-60.
12 For the role of the trade unions see F D Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (London, 1960), pp255-258. See also S Stichter, “Workers, Trade Unions and the Mau Mau Rebellion”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 9 (1975). For the general strike see M Singh, History of Kenya’s Trade Union Movement to 1952 (Nairobi, 1969), pp274-279; and most recently D Hyde, “The Nairobi General Strike 1950: From protest to insurgency”, Azania, 36-37 (2001-2002).
13 F D Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, p159.
14 A Clayton, Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952-1960 (Nairobi, 1976), p7.
15 For the most recent account of the Lari massacre and of the reprisals, both official and unofficial, that followed it, see D Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, pp19-180.
16 The most recent account of the trial is J Lonsdale, “Kenyatta’s Trials: Breaking and Making an African Nationalist”, in P Coss (ed), The Moral World of the Law (Cambridge, 2000); but see also D N Pritt, The Defence Accuses (London, 1966), and P Evans, Law and Disorder (London, 1956).
17 Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Parliamentary Delegation to Kenya 1954 (London, 1954), p7.
18 Sir M Blundell, So Rough a Wind (London, 1960), pp170-171.
19 A Clayton and D Savage, Government and Labour in Kenya (London 1974), p389. Tom Askwith, the official put in charge of the authorities’ rehabilitation programme, actually argued that internment was a form of social welfare. In his memoirs, he wrote, “If my assessment that the Mau Mau constituted a form of Spartacus uprising of the unemployed and landless Kikuyu is accepted then detention enabled them at least to be fed, sheltered and provided with useful and acceptable employment”—from T Askwith, From Mau Mau to Harambee (Cambridge, 1995), p112.
20 M Carver, Out of Step (London, 1989), p261.
21 For the Kikuyu experience of resettlement see C Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London, 2005).
22 For the counter-gangs see my “A Counter-Insurgency Tale: Kitson in Kenya”, Race and Class, 31 (1990).
23 R Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (London, 1990), pp144, 159.
24 C Elkins, Britian’s Gulag, p87. For an enthusiastic firsthand account of police activity including the torture and murder of prisoners, both men and women, see W Baldwin, Mau Mau Movement (New York, 1957).
25 D Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, p313.
26 As above, p353.
27 M Gilbert, New Despair: Winston Churchill 1945-1965 (London, 1988), p834; S Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds, p176.
28 F Kitson, Gangs and Counter-Gangs (London, 1960), p46.
29 D Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, pp199-200.
30 P Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd (London, 1999), p210. Lennox-Boyd had famously turned up to blackleg during the general strike in top hat and tails. He was sympathetic to the British Union of Fascists in the 1930s, and had been one of a number of Conservative MPs who were members of Mosley’s January Club, a BUF front intended to maintain links with the Conservatives. His fascist sympathies did not stop him becoming a junior minister in 1938. After his retirement he was to be one of the founders of the Monday Club, a racist organisation conceived very much along the lines of the January Club.
31 C Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London, 1976), pp39, 42.
32 C Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, p355.
33 D Percox, Britain, Kenya and the Cold War (London, 2004), pp171, 173-174.
34 P Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London, 1996).
35 A Verrier, The Road To Zimbabwe 1890-1930 (London, 1986), p19.
36 F C Selous, Sunshine and Storm in Rhodesia (London, 1896), p46.
37 F Sykes, With Plumer in Matebeleland (London, 1897) pp4, 8.
38 R Blake, A history of Rhodesia (London 1977), p114. See also R Rotberg, The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power (Johannesburg, 1988), pp557-562.
39 R Baden-Powell, The Matabele Campaign 1896 (London, 1897), p64. Baden-Powell’s execution of Chief Unwini caused considerable controversy at the time—see T Jeal, Baden-Powell (London 1989), pp180-185.
40 The best account of this episode remains T O Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7 (London, 1979).
41 P Ziegler, Wilson (London, 1993), p276.
42 H Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford, 1997), p178.
43 See M Bailey, Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal (London, 1979).
44 For the second Chimurenga see D Martin and P Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London, 1981).
Malaya and the Far East
1 W S Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p81.
2 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (London, 1968), p43.
3 For these developments see S Tonnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945 (London, 1991). One British historian has compared the American refusal to support the French in Vietnam at this time with the conduct “of the Russians towards the Warsaw rising the year before”—D C Watt, Succeeding John Bull (Cambridge, 1984), p239. See also J Saville, The Politics of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government 1945-46 (London 1993).
4 P Ziegler, Mountbatten (London, 1985), p331.
5 G Rosie, The British in Vietnam (London, 1970), p70. For a recent academic discussion see J Springhall, “‘Kicking Out The Vietminh’: How Britain Allowed France to Re-occupy South Indochina 1946-46”, Journal of Contemporary History, 40 (2005).
6 P M Dunn, The First Vietnam War (New York, 1985), p264.
7 G Rosie, The British in Vietnam, p75.
8 E Taylor, Richer By Asia (Boston, 1947), p386.
9 R Singh, Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: Post-War Occupation Forces (Delhi, 1958), p199.
10 H Isaacs, No Peace for Asia (New York, 1947), pp127-128.
11 A J F Doulton, The Fighting Cock (Aldershot, 1951), p243.
12 A Roadnight, “Sleeping With the Enemy: Britain, Japanese Troops and the Netherlands East Indies 1945-1946”, History, 87 (2002), pp254-255.
13 For a reconstruction of Mallaby’s death see J G A Parrott, “Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby?”, Indonesia, 20 (1975), and J Springhall, “‘Disaster in Surabaya’: The Death of Brigadier Mallaby during the British Occupation of Java 1945-1946”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 24 (1966). See also R McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia 1945-1946 (London, 2005), pp31-58.
14 Sir D Lee, Eastward (London, 1984), p49.
15 D Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia (London, 1948), p66.
16 C R B Knight, Historical Records of the Buffs 1919-1948 (London, 1951), pp432-433. A recent academic account of the battle of Surabaya is provided by D Jordan, “‘A Particularly Exacting Operation’: British Forces and the Battle for Surabaya, November 1946”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11 (2000).
17 P Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace (Manchester, 1987), pp133, 246.
18 M C Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (London, 1980), p205.
19 J Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution (New York, 1964), pp151-152.
20 A Reid, The Blood of the People (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p169.
21 P Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace, p149.
22 L Allen, The End of the War in Asia (London, 1976), p95.
23 Neither Kenneth Morgan’s Labour in Power 1945-1951 (Oxford, 1984) nor Peter Hennessey’s Never Again: Britain 1945-1951 (London, 1972) mention the episode. Nor does Trevor Burridge’s Clement Attlee (London, 1985) or Francis Beckett’s Clem Attlee (London, 1997). The silence is deafening.
24 For a British account of life with the Communist guerrillas during the Japanese occupation see S Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (London, 1949). For the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army see C Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya (Singapore, 1983).
25 H W Yin, Clans and Communalism in Malaya (London, 1983), pp76-85.
26 For Chin Peng see his remarkable memoir, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History (Singapore, 2003), and a series of academic discussions with him—C C Chin and K Hack (eds), Dialogues With Chin Peng: New Light on the Malaysian Communist Party (Singapore, 2004).
27 T N Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge, 1999), p138.
28 M Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of Malayan Trade Unionism”, in M Amin and M Caldwell (ed), Malaya: The Making of a Neo-Colony (Nottingham, 1977), p182. See also M Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya (London, 1970).
29 M Morgan, “The Rise and Fall of Malayan Trade Unionism”, p157, and R Ovendale, “Britain and the Cold War in Asia”, in R Ovendale (ed), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-51 (Leicester, 1984), p125.
30 N J White, Business, Government and the End of Empire (Kuala Lumpur, 1996), p5.
31 Sir R Thompson, Make For The Hills (London, 1989), p94.
32 M Caldwell, “From ‘Emergency’ to ‘Independence’ 1945-1957”, in M Amin and M Caldwell, Malaya, pp221-222; A Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 (London, 1975), pp383-385.
33 Sir R Thompson, Make For The Hills, p93.
34 For Batang Kali see B Lapping, End of Empire (London, 1985), pp168-169.
35 S Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insurgency (London, 1995), p100.
36 For the Briggs Plan see in particular R Clutterbuck, The Long War (London, 1966), and Sir R Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (London, 1966). Both books were written very much with the Vietnam War in mind.
37 For Templer’s career see J Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya (London, 1985). Templer was strongly in favour of invading Iraq in 1958.
38 As above, p260.
39 P F Cecil, Herbicidal Warfare (New York, 1986), p17.
40 J Cloake, Templer, p254.
41 A Chin, The Communist Party of Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1995), p50.
42 See I Beckett, “Robert Thompson and the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam in 1961-1965”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 8 (1997), and J P Cross, In Gurkha Company (London, 1986), p23.
43 There is a huge literature on the Malayan Emergency but a number of books deserve mention: R Clutterbuck, The Long Long War (London, 1966); A Short, The Communist Insurrection In Malaya 1948-1960 (London, 1977); R Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare (London, 1989); and K Hack, Defence and De-colonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-68 (Richmond, 2001).
44 D Easter, Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960-66 (London, 2004), p5.
45 See K Conboy, Feet To The Fire: CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia 1957-1958 (Annapolis, Md, 2000), and M Jones, “‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’: Britain, the United States and the Indonesian Rebellion 1957-58”, English Historical Review, 114 (1999).
46 D Healey, The Time of My Life (London, 1990), pp287-290.
47 J Wylie, The Influence of British Arms (London, 1984), p68.
48 D Easter, “British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the ‘Confrontation’ 1963-66”, in R J Aldrich, Gary D Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T Rawnsley (eds), The Clandestine Cold War in Asia 1945-65 (London, 2000).
49 G Simons, Indonesia: The Long Oppression (Basingstoke, 2000), p181.
50 D Easter, Britain and the Confontation with Indonesia 1960-1966, pp167, 170. See also J Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno (Basingstoke, 2000), pp175-176.
51 M Curtis, Web of Deceit (London, 2003), p193.
Britain and the American Empire
1 P Knightley, The First Casualty (London, 2003), pp374-375.
2 C MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam (Basingstoke, 1986), pp84-85.
3 P Knightley, The First Casualty, pp377-378, and T Shaw, “The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War 1950-53”, Journal of Contemporary History, 34 (1999).
4 For an path-breaking account of the British warfare state see D Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain 1920-1970 (Cambridge, 2005).
5 P Jones, America and the British Labour Party (London, 1997), pp57,59.
6 See L V Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Government (Oxford, 1993).
7 S Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom (Basingstoke, 1987), p35.
8 P Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London, 1986), p177.
9 C MacDonald, Korea, p71. As he notes, on 20 November, the US administration did indeed authorise a study on “the use of the bomb against military targets in Korea, Manchuria and China”.
10 W Stueck, Rethinking The Korean War (Princeton, 2004), p125.
11 Attlee, it is worth remembering, had supported the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—see T Burridge, Clement Attlee (London, 1985), p237. What General MacArthur proposed was the use of at least 26 atom bombs (he later said he would have used between 20 and 50) which would, he believed, have won the war—see B Cumings, Korea’s Place In The Sun (New York, 1997), p291.
12 S Greenwood, “‘A War We Don’t Want’: Another Look at the British Labour Government’s Commitment in Korea 1950-51”, Contemporary British History, 17 (2003), p19.
13 C MacDonald, Korea, p258.
14 A R Millett, Their War for Korea (Washington DC, 2002), p266.
15 Only two Labour MPs, S O Davies and Emrys Hughes, actually voted against British participation in the Korean War, although a number of others opposed it privately. Supporters of the war included many on the left of the Labour Party, among them Fenner Brockway, Michael Foot and, of course, Aneurin Bevan. See K Morgan, Labour In Power (Oxford 1984), pp424-425.
16 R N Rosencrance, Defense of the Realm (New York, 1968), pp140-141. See also J Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (Basingstoke, 2001), p45.
17 The king, George VI, told Gaitskell that he was right behind him with regard to NHS charges: “I really don’t see why people should have false teeth free any more than they should have shoes free.” This was, of course, particularly rich coming from someone who did not pay for false teeth, shoes or anything else for that matter. Gaitskell’s wife, Dora, assured the King that her husband was “rather right wing”, which apparently everyone thought hilarious. See P Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951 (London, 1992), p417.
18 When one strips away Labour’s self-serving triumphalism, “the statistical sources show that post-war Britain was a low spender on social services by comparison with European nations. By contrast British defence expenditures, after the Second World War, were high by Continental European standards.” See D Edgerton, Warfare State, p68.
19 G W Davies, “Brothers in arms: Anglo-American Defence Cooperation in 1957”, in J Gorst, L Johnson and W S Lucas (eds), Postwar Britain 1945-1964 (London, 1989), pp206-207.
20 I Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America 1957-1962 (Oxford, 1994), p10.
21 J Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p126.
22 R Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Intelligence (London, 2001), p609.
23 D Reynolds, Britannia Overruled (Harlow, 1991), p216.
24 R Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston 1990), p44. See also J Prados, Operation Vulture (New York, 2002), pp221-222. One Democratic senator urging Eisenhower to intervene militarily in Indochina was Lyndon Johnson, no less (p125).
25 See P Busch, “Killing the Vietcong: The British Advisory Mission and the Strategic Hamlet Programme”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 25 (2002). See also P Busch, All The Way With JFK: Britain, the US and the Vietnam War (Oxford, 2003).
26 For the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign see in particular D Widgery, The Left In Britain 1956-1968 (London, 1976), and T Ali, Street-Fighting Years (London, 2005).
27 C Wilson, “Rhetoric, Reality and Dissent: The Vietnam Policy of the British Labour Government 1964-1970”, Social Science Journal, 23 (1986), p22.
28 J W Young, The Labour Governments 1964-1970: International Policy (Manchester, 2003), p75.
29 J Neale, The American War: Vietnam 1960-1975 (London, 2001), p62.
30 J Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p154. When the Americans attacked Falluja in Iraq in November 2004, somewhat symbolically Tony Blair sent the Black Watch to assist their assault.
31 For the seizure of what became British Guiana, see Chapter 1.
32 S Rabe, US Intervention in British Guiana (Chapel Hill, 2005), pp93, 134.
33 J Campbell, Edward Heath (London, 1993), pp341-342, 344, 350.
34 C Meyer, DC Confidential (London, 2005), p1.
35 The best account of George W Bush is M C Miller’s The Bush Dyslexicon (New York, 2002). See also his Cruel and Unusual: Bush/Cheney’s New World Order (New York, 2004). Bush is, of course, in reality merely the mascot for a team of professionals dominated by vice-president Dick Cheney and secretary for defence Donald Rumsfield. For Cheney see J Nichols, Dick: The Man Who Is President (New York, 2004).
36 For a recent account see S Lansley, Rich Britain: The Rise and Rise of the New Super-Wealthy (London, 2006).
37 For New Labour and business see D Osler, New Labour PLC (Edinburgh, 2002). For the privatisation of the NHS see Allyson Pollock, NHS PLC (London, 2004).
38 D Coates and J Krieger, Blair’s War (Cambridge, 2004), pp106-107.
39 Although Clare Short established herself as one of the scourges of New Labour “spin”, she conveniently neglects to tell readers of her An Honourable Deception? (London, 2004) about her department’s sponsorship of privatisation and the lucrative contracts awarded to the Adam Smith Institute. For this relationship see the War On Want study by J Hilary, Profiting From Poverty(London, 2004).
40 For American Imperialism today see in particular A Callinicos, The New Mandarins of American Power: The Bush Administration’s Plans for the World (Oxford, 2003), and V K Fouskas and B Gokay, The New American Imperialism (Westport, Cn, 2005).
41 From the right, P Oborne has dissected New Labour mendacity in his The Rise of Political Lying (London, 2005), and from the left, see N Fairclough in his New Labour, New Language? (London, 2002), which gives a more theoretical approach. See also L Panitch and C Leys (eds), Socialist Register 2006: Telling The Truth (London, 2005), for an international perspective.
42 For Campbell see P Oborne and S Walters, Alistair Campbell (London, 2004).
43 J Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London, 2004), pp16-17, 28.
44 R Fisk, The Great War for Civilization (London, 2005), p871.
45 M Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Role in the World (London, 2003), pp134-141. See also M Haynes, “Theses on the Balkan War”, International Socialism, 83 (1999).
46 For America’s longstanding relationship with Islamism see R Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How The United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York, 2005). See also M Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror (New York, 2005).
47 See W Blum, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (London 2003). See also J Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York, 2006), for more recent developments. For the CIA’s long involvement in torture see A McCoy, A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War On Terror (New York, 2006).
48 See M Begg and V Brittain, Enemy Combatant: A British Muslim’s Journey to Guantanamo and Back (New York, 2006). For the New Labour government’s shameful “rendering” of British residents into American hands see G Mickum, “Britain’s Shadowy Role in the Guantanamo scandal”, in the Independent, 16 March 2006.
49 For the Blair government’s attempts to create a climate of fear for domestic purposes see P Oborne, The Use and Abuse of Terror: The Construction of a False Narrative on the Domestic Terror Threat (London, 2006). For the ricin plot that never was see in particular pp21-25.
50 See T Ali, Rough Music: Blair, Bombs, Baghdad, London, Terror (London, 2005), and M Rai, 7/7: The London Bombings, Islam and the Iraq War (London, 2006).
51 See J Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, and more recently S Kettel, Dirty Politics?New Labour, British Democracy and the Invasion of Iraq (London, 2006).
52 For the Stop the War Coalition and the great 15 February demonstration see A Murray and L German’s marvellous Stop The War: The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement (London, 2003). For the invasion’s illegality see P Sands, Lawless World (London, 2006), pp174-204.
53 See R Cook’s The Point of Departure (London, 2004) for a forensic demolition of the Blair case for war. Wisely perhaps, the book does not deal with his own period at the Foreign Office. He was sacked as foreign secretary by Blair because he would not have been acceptable to the Bush administration, and was replaced by Jack Straw, an inoffensive nonentity, who could be relied on to do what he was told. He was himself sacked in May 2006 for publicly expressing scepticism about the need to attack Iran.
54 For George Galloway see his I’m Not The Only One (London, 2005).
55 G Dyke, Inside Story (London, 2004), p314. Dyke, a former New Labour supporter, summed up Alistair Campbell, with admirable restraint, as “a deranged, vindictive bastard” (p31). It should be noted here that under Dyke the BBC had maintained a scandalous news blackout with regard to the Stop the War movement. The largest protest movement in British history went virtually unreported by the Corporation.
56 See in particular R Fisk, The Great War for Civilization; P Rogers, Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency 2004/2005 (London, 2006), and C Parenti, The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq (New York, 2004).