Ancient History & Civilisation

Notes to the Text

Introduction

1.

For Cannae see chapter 8; Napoleon's belief that much could be learned from the study of ancient commanders, see D. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London, 1966), pp. 137-139; for twentieth-century studies of the Punic Wars see B. Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon - Scipio Africanus (Edinburgh, 1930), J. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World (London, 1954).

2.

For relatively recent studies see T. Dorey & D. Dudley, Rome against Carthage (London, 1971), B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), N. Bagnall, The Punic Wars (London, 1990) and Y. Le Bohec, Histoire militaire des guerres puniques (Paris, 1996) which cover the entire conflict; J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978, reprinted with new preface: Oklahoma, 1998), and The First Punic War (London, 1996), J. Peddie, Hannibal's War (Stroud, 1997), and S. Lancel (trans. A. Nevill), Hannibal (Oxford, 1998) deal with individual wars, and in 1993 there was also a reprint of T. Dodge,Hannibal (1891); there is also the stimulating collection of papers in

T. Cornell, B. Rankov & P. Sabin (edd.), The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996). All of these works include bibliographies mentioning many more books and articles published within recent years on aspects of the subject.

3 Bagnall (1990) and Peddie (1997), both of whom were highly experienced soldiers, comment perceptively on some of the practical aspects of the campaign. Peddie pays more attention to the problems of supply than most other authors. For a general treatment of the differences between different cultures' concepts and practice of war, see

J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, 1993).

1.

Silenus and Sosylus, see Nepos, Hannibal 13. 3.

1.

For Polybius see F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 1-37.

2.

See P. Walsh, Livy (Cambridge, 1961), and T. J. Luce, Livy, the Composition of his History (Princeton, 1977); Cynoscephalae, Polybius 18. 24. 8-9, Livy 34. 8. 13.

3.

See Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 26-35; Polybius' criticism of the partisan nature of Philinus and Fabius Pictor, 1. 14-15.

Chapter 1

1 For a useful survey of the Mediterranean world in the third century BC see A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy. Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1965), pp. 20-83.

1.

Origins of Carthage, see G. Picard & C. Picard, Carthage (rev. ed.: London, 1987), pp. 15-35, S. Lancel, Carthage (Oxford, 1995), pp. 1-34; Tarshish, Ezekiel 27. 12; Spain, Lancel (1995), pp. 9-14.

2.

Sacrifice to Melquart, Polybius 31. 12; religion and culture, Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 35-50, Lancel (1995), pp. 193-256, esp. 245-56.

3.

Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 56-124, Lancel (1995), pp. 78-102.

4.

Exploration & colonization, see Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 91-100, Lancel (1995), pp. 100-109; the Neapolis of fourth-century Carthage, 141-2.

5.

Lancel (1995), pp. 269-88; Agathocles, Diodorus Siculus 20. 8. 3-4.

6.

Contrast Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 125-81 with the more up to date view in Lancel (1995), pp. 111-21.

7.

Pyrrhus' lost manual, Plutarch, Pyrrhus 8; on Hellenistic warfare in general see F. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1957).

8.

On ship construction and naval warfare see chapter 5; for Carthage's harbour see Lancel (1995), pp. 172-8, H. Hurst, 'Excavations at Carthage, 1977-8', Antiquaries' Journal 59 (1979), pp. 19-.9.

10 Lonchophoroi, e.g. Polybius 3. 72. 3, 83. 3, 84. 14; for a discussion of the poor evidence
for Punic armies see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 14-16; for an
interesting discussion of Gallic, Spanish and other tribal contingents in Hannibal's army
see L. Rawlings, 'Celts, Spaniards, and Samnites: Warriors in a Soldiers' War', in

T. Cornell, B. Rankov & P. Sabin, The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996), pp. 81-95. D. Head, Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars attempts to reconstruct Punic equipment and organization in some detail, but many of his conclusions are highly conjectural.

1.

Exchange of troops in 218, Polybius 3. 33. 5-16. Note the difficulties in communicating with each other in the rebellious army during the Mercenary War, Polybius 1. 67. 3-13, 69. 9-13.

2.

Marriage alliances between Punic aristocrats and Numidian royalty, e.g. Polybius 1. 78. 1-9, Livy 29. 23. 2-8; in Spain, DS 25. 12, Livy 24. 51. 7, Silius Italicus 3. 97,106.

3.

Autaritus' Gauls, Polybius 2. 7. 6-11.

4.

500 Numidians, Livy 26. 38. 11-14; Libyans at Saguntum, Livy 21. 11. 8; Gauls at Tarentum, Polybius 8. 30. 1; speirai at Cannae, Polybius 3. 114. 4, cf. 6. 24. 5.

5.

For war elephants in general see H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World (London, 1974); Raphia, see Polybius 5. 84. 2-7.

6.

See chapter 12.

7.

A good recent survey of early Roman history is T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London, 1995).

8.

On this period see Cornell (1995), pp. 345-68, & S. Oakley, The Roman Conquest of Italy', in J. Rich & G. Shipley, War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 9-37; refusal to negotiate with Pyrrhus, Plutarch, Pyrrhus 18-20.

9.

On aristocratic funerals see Polybius 6. 53-4.

10.

Factions dominate most modern accounts of the Punic Wars, e.g. B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 20, 83-4, and to a lesser extent Lazenby (1978), pp. 4,108. H. Scullard, Roman politics 220-150 BC (London, 1951) represents an extreme form of this view.

11.

Polybius' famous description, Polybius 6. 11-19, 43-58, and F. Walbank, A Historical

Commentary on Polybius [3 vols] (Oxford, 1970), pp. 673-97, 724-746. For Roman politics in general see M. Gelzer, The Roman 'Nobility (London, 1968), M. Crawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow, 1978), P. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London, 1978), pp. 1-73, F. Millar, The political character of the Classical Roman Republic', Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984), pp. 1-19, and T. Wiseman (ed.), Roman Political Life 90 BC-AD 69 (Exeter, 1985).

22 For a good introduction to the development of the Roman army see L. Keppie, The
Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), E. Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army
and Allies (Berkeley, 1976), A. Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare (London, 2000),

F. Adcock, The Roman Art of War under the Republic (Cambridge, 1960), and

E. Rawson, 'The literary sources for the pre-Marian Roman Army', Papers of the British

School at Rome 39 (1971), pp. 13-31.

1.

Polybius 6. 19-42, and Walbank 1 (1970) pp. 697-723.

1.

Polybius 11. 23. 1, 33,1, and Walbank 2 (1970), p. 302. See also M. Bell, Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army', Historia 14 (1965), pp. 404-22.

2.

On the find of a probable Roman scutum see W. Kimmig, 'Ein Keltenschild aus Aegypten', Germania 24 (1940), pp. 106-111. For Roman equipment in general see

P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), pp. 129-42, and 'Pilum, gladius and pugio in the Late Republic', Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 8 (1997), pp. 41-57, and M. Bishop & J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), pp. 48-64.

1.

Polybius 2. 33. 4 records an occasion in 224 when the hastati were given the triarii's spears, indicating that the former normally carried another weapon, presumably the pilum. On the pilum see Bishop & Coulston (1993), pp. 48-50.

2.

For the 'reform' of 211, see the unconvincing arguments in M. Samuels, 'The Reality of Cannae', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7-31.

3.

Cato's grandfather, Plutarch, Cato 1; on the saddle see P. Connolly, 'The Roman Saddle', in M. Dawson (ed.), Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War, BAR 336 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 7-27.

4.

Sentries sleeping on guard, Polybius 6. 35. 6-37. 6, Livy 44. 33; punishments in general, Polybius 6. 37. 7-38. 4.

5.

This decision-making process is implicit in our narrative accounts, and explicit in Vegetius 3. 1.

6.

Telamon, Polybius 2. 24-31, esp. 27. 1-6.

7.

E.g. Spurius Ligustinus mentioned in Livy 42. 34.

8.

For the importance of virtus see N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 114-51.

9.

Space allocated to each legionary, Polybius 18. 30. 5-8, Vegetius 3. 14,15, and discussion in A. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC-AD 200 (Oxford, 1996), pp.179-80.

10.

Roman armies ambushed, e.g. Polybius 2. 25, 3. 118, Livy 38. 40-1, & chapter 7. Livy noted that in 193 a consul sent out scouts even though he was marching in daylight, which implies that this was not normal, Livy 35. 4. For accidental encounters see Polybius 2. 27-8, 3. 61, 65, Livy 31. 33, Polybius 18. 19. For military intelligence in general see M. Austin & B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995).

11.

Delays before battle, see Polybius 3. 89-90,110-113, 10. 38-9, 11. 21, 14. 8, Livy 34. 46, 38. 20, and esp. Livy 37. 38-9; armies camped near each other for long periods without fighting, see Polybius 1. 19, 57-8, Appian Iberica 11. 65; strategems to cover

withdrawal when in close contact with the enemy, Polybius 2. 25, 3. 68, 93-4, Livy 31. 38-9.

1.

Forming up Roman armies, Polybius 3. 72,113, 6. 31, Livy 34. 46, 40. 31, 40. 48, 41. 26; Punic armies also apparently using the processional method, Polybius 3. 113. 6, 11. 22; Macedonians at Cynoscephalae, Polybius 18. 22-5; confusion in deploying a Spanish army in haste in 195, Livy 35. 14; references to Roman tribunes being closely involved in deployment, Polybius 11. 22. 4, Livy 44. 36.

2.

For the role of optiones see M. Speidel, The Framework of an Imperial Legion. The fifth Annual Caerleon Lecture (Cardiff, 1992), pp. 24-6.

3.

For a detailed discussion of this issue see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 138-40.

4.

For a stylized account of the line system see Livy 8. 8. esp. 9-13. For a discussion of infantry combat in this period, see P. Sabin, 'The mechanics of battle in the Second Punic War', in Cornell, Rankov and Sabin (1996), pp. 59-79, esp. 64-73 and for the Roman tactical system see P. Sabin, 'The Multiple Line System in Republican Roman Armies', Journal of Roman Studies (forthcoming). For a detailed discussion on combat in a slightly later period see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 171-247; on the role of the commander see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 116-70.

5.

See chapters 7 and 8.

Chapter 2

1.

Thucydides 1, esp. 1. 23, 89-117.

1.

Polybius 1. 7. 1-5. See F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 52-3 for a discussion of the chronology.

2.

Polybius 1. 7. 6-13. Dionysius of Halicarnassus 20. 4 claims that the garrison was installed to defend the city against the Bruttians.

3.

Appian, Samnite History 9.3.

4.

Polybius 1. 8. 3-9. 8. For the chronology of Hiero's career see Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 54-5. See Diodorus Siculus 22. 13 for an account of the action at the River Longanus.

5.

Polybius 1. 10. 1-2; Hannibal's deception of Hiero, Diodorus Siculus 22. 13; inevitability of Carthaginian conquest of Sicily once they controlled Messana, Polybius 1. 10. 7-8, Zonaras 8. 8. For discussion of the war's causes see J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), pp. 31-42, B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 8-16, Walbank 1 (1970), pp. 56-63.

6.

Polybius 1. 10. 3-9.

7.

Polybius 1. 11. 1-3. See also Walbank 1, p. 62, Lazenby (1996), p. 39. For a detailed discussion of the process involved see J. Rich, Declaring war in the Roman Republic in the period of transmarine expansion (Collection Latomus 149, Brussels, 1976).

8.

The Philinus treaty, Polybius 3. 26. 2-5; Polybius' account of the three preserved treaties, 3. 22-26, cf. Livy 7. 27. 2,9. 43. 26, Periochae 13, and Diodorus Siculus 16. 91. 1; Livy's 306 treaty, Per. 14. For discussion of these see Walbank 1 (1970), p. 337-56, Lazenby (1996), pp. 31-5; Caven (1980), pp. 15-16, and S. Lancel, Carthage (Paris, 1995), pp. 86-8, 362, both favour accepting Philinus' treaty. For a recent discussion of relations betweeen Rome and Carthage see R. Palmer, Rome and Carthage at Peace. Historia Einzelschriften Heft. 113 (Stuttgart, 1997). On the incident at Tarentum see LivyPer. 14, Zonaras 8. 6, Orosius 4. 3. 1-2.

10 Dio 11. l-A, Zonaras 8. 8.

1.

For Defensive Imperialism see T. Mommsen, The History of Rome (trans. M. W. P. Dickson) (London, 1877-80), T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York, 1914), M. Holleaux, Rome, la Grke et Us monarchies hellenistiques au Hie siecle avant J.C. (273-205) (Paris, 1921), E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Oxford, 1968), R. M. Errington, The Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power (London, 1971).

2.

For the economic motives for Roman imperialism see M. K. Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge, 1978); the strongest argument for the Roman political and social systems encouraging aggression is W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford, 1979), esp. pp. 9-104. For a more balanced view see J. Rich, Tear, greed and glory: the causes of Roman war-making in the middle Republic', in

J. Rich & G. Shipley, War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 38-68, where he comments on the varying intensity of Roman war-making.

1.

Harris (1979), pp. 183-5.

1.

Polybius 1. 11. 3-11; the request for ships from the allies, Polybius 1. 20. 13-14. The story of C. Claudius, Dio 11. 5-10, Zonaras 8. 8-9.

2.

See Lazenby (1996), pp. 43-6 for criticism of this tradition. The loss of the Carthaginian quinquereme, Polybius 1. 20. 15; Hanno's threat, Dio 11. 9, Zonaras 8. 9; Diodorus' account of the negotiations, 23. 1. 4.

3.

Polybius 1.11. 9-12. 4,14. 1-8; on the defeat of the Roman cavalry, Zonaras 8. 9.

4.

Polybius 1.16.1-11,Zonaras 8.9. On the name Messala, see Pliny Natural History 35. 22.

5.

Polybius 1. 16. 4-17. 1. Eutropius 2. 19. 2 and Orosius 4. 7. 3 claim that Hiero paid 200 talents.

Chapter 3

1.

Mercenaries, Polybius 1. 17. 3-4; reduction in Roman army, 1. 17. 1-2; four legions again sent to Sicily, 1. 17. 6.

2.

J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Brill, 1999), p. 158,171-2,288, 316, 318.

3.

General narrative, Polybius 1. 17. 6-13; the pickets outside the camp 1. 17. 11-12 and 6.37. 11. This institution is attested at the siege of Jerusalem in AD 70, Josephus, Helium Judaicum 5. 482-3.

4.

Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 2. 32, Cicero De Officiis 1. 35.

5.

Polybius 1. 18. 1-7.

6.

Polybius 1. 18. 8-19. 4; size of the Punic army, Polybius 1. 19. 2, Diodorus Siculus 23. 8. 1. The much later source of Orosius gives only 30 elephants, 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, 4. 7. 5.

7.

Zonaras 8. 10; Polybius 1. 19. 6.

8.

Polybius 1. 19. 7-11, DS23. 8. 1, 9. 1, 7.

9.

B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 25, Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), p. 58.

1.

Zonaras 8. 10, Frontinus, Strategemata 2. 1. 4

1.

Agrigentum, Polybius 1. 19. 13-15; Hiero supplying the Roman army, Polybius 1. 18. 11; extension of Roman war-aims, Polybius 1. 20. 1-2, and F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), p. 72, who cites Polybius' claim that the victory at Telamon in 225 BC encouraged the Senate to plan to expel the Celts entirely from Transpadine Gaul, 2. 31. 7.

1.

Defections to Rome, DS23. 4. 1; unsuccessful operations, DS 23. 3. 1 and 23. 4. 2. It is possible that these places were misidentified by Diodorus' excerpter, see Lazenby (1996) p. 53; Mytistratus, DS23. 9. 2-3; Herbesus, DS 23. 8. 1; Camarina, DS 23. 9. 4; Enna DS23.9. 5.

2.

Lipara a trap, Polybius 1. 21. 5-8, 8. 35. 9, Zonaras 8. 10, Livy Per. 17; Thermae, DS 23. 19. 1; the Gauls, Zonaras 8. 10, DS 23. 8. 3, Frontinus Strat. 3. 16. 3.

3.

Thermae, Polybius 1. 24. 3-4, DS 23. 9. 4; annual changes in commanders, Zonaras 8. 16. The main drafts of reinforcements for the Punic armies in Sicily mentioned by Polybius were in 262, 1. 18. 8, and in 255 including 140 elephants, 1. 38. 2-3.

4.

Polybius 1. 29. 1-10; Italian prisoners, Zonaras 8. 12; Kerkouane, Lancel (1995), pp. 268-9, 367.

5.

Regulus' reluctance to take command, Dio 11. 20; his army, Polybius 1. 29. 9; First Legion, Polybius 1. 30. 11; Roman generalship, see A. Goldsworthy '"Instinctive Genius"; The Depiction of Caesar the general', in K. Welch and A. Powell (edd.), Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. The War Commentaries as Political Instruments (Swansea, 1998), pp. 192-219.

6.

Polybius 1. 30. 1-7; see Lazenby (1996), p. 100 for a discussion of the possible identity of Adys.

7.

Roman officers spot the Carthaginian error, Polybius 1. 30. 9.

8.

Polybius 1. 30. 10-14; dawn attack, Polybius 1. 30. 10; night attack, Zonaras 8. 13.

9.

Use of Tunis as base, Polybius 1. 30. 15; desire to gain credit for ending war, 1. 31. 4-5; similar behaviour by other Roman commanders, e.g. Tiberius Sempronius Longus at Trebia in 218, Polybius 3. 70. 7, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus during the negotiations with Philip V of Macedonia in 198-197, Polybius 18. 11-12.

10.

Polybius 1. 31. 1-8, Dio 11. 22-3.

11.

Polybius 1. 32. 1-9; Xanthippus' arrival, DS 23. 16. 1; his competence, Polybius 1. 32. 7.

12.

Polybius 1. 33. 1-6; see Lazenby (1996), p. 104 for a discussion of the possible site of the battle.

13.

Polybius 1. 33. 9, see also Lazenby (1996), p. 104-5. For cases of more than three lines being formed by legions in the first-century BC, see Pharsalus, Caesar Bellum Civile 3. 89; examples of whole legions in reserve include Emporion in 195, Livy 34. 15, a victory over the Boii in 193, Livy 35. 5; examples from the Second Punic War include Numistro, Livy 27. 2,12, and in Spain in 205, Livy 29. 2.

14.

Polybius 1. 33. 8-34. 12.

15.

For possible later service in Egypt see Lazenby (1996), p. 106, who mentions that Ptolemy III appointed a Xanthippus to a governorship in 245, Hieronymus In Daniel 11. 7-9; for the Regulus myth see Diodorus 23. 16. 1, DS 24. 12, and discussion in A. Pauly, G. Wissowa et al., Real-encyclopadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1893-), Atilius (51), cols. 2088-92.

16.

For Hamilcar's campaigns against the Numidians see Orosius 4. 9. 9. The chronology of Hanno's operations in Libya are uncertain, Polybius 1. 73. 1, 74. 7, DS 24. 10.

17.

Polybius 1. 39. 7-40. 16. It does not really matter for our purposes whether Metellus fought the battle as a consul or proconsul. For a discussion of the relevant sources see Lazenby (1996), p. 120.

18.

Casualties, Eutropius 2. 24, Orosius 4. 9.15; elephants, Polybius 1. 38. 2, DS 23. 21, Zonaras 8. 14, Pliny Natural History 8. 16; Gauls, DS 23. 21.

1.

Polybius 1. 41. 4-48. 11. Polybius gives the strength of the garrison as 10,000, 1. 42. 11, but Diodorus says that they consisted of only 7,000 infantry and 700 cavalry, DS 24. 1. However, he also says that a draft of4,000 men was taken into the city by sea. The same passage gives the Roman strength.

2.

Polybius 1. 56. 1-58. 9; Eryx, DS24.8

Chapter 4

1.

Polybius 1. 20. 6-14.

1.

For the early history of Roman seapower see J. Thiel, A history of Roman sea-power before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam, 1954), pp. 3-59; the assumption that classici derived from classis or fleet see Thiel 1954), pp. 33-4, (J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), p. 63 takes a more cautious line); the defeat of the Roman squadron by the Tarentines, Livy Per. 12, Appian, Samnite History 7. 1. For a general survey of ancient naval warfare see W. Rogers, Greek and, Roman Naval Warfare (Maryland, 1964), esp. pp. 266-305.

2.

For the claims of Messala, see Ineditum Vaticanum 4.

3.

T. Shaw (ed.) The Trireme Project: Operational Experience 1987-90; Lessons Learnt. Oxbow Monograph 32 (Oxford, 1993); for a brief summary of the findings see L. Casson, Ships and Seafaring in Ancient Times (London, 1994), esp. pp. 60-77.

4.

For the 'forty' see Casson (1971), pp. 50-51, 82-3; the 'thirties' see Athenaeus 5. 203c; also see Morrison (1996), pp. 1-40, and p. 309 for 'tens' as largest ships recorded as being used in battle; Carthaginians first to build 'fours', Aristode, Fragment 600; Syracuse built first 'five', Diodorus Siculus 4. 41. 3.

5.

See Casson (1971) pp. 84-5; Polybius 1. 20. 15.

6.

J. S. Morrison (& J. F. Coates) Greek and Roman Oared Warships (Oxbow, 1996), pp. 259-60, 270-72, and attempted reconstruction, pp. 312-17; for the perceived weakness of the outrigger, Lazenby (1996), p. 65.

7.

The Athlit ram, Casson, pp. 74, 90-91; the Marsala wreck, see L. Basch & H. Frost, 'Another Punic wreck in Sicily: its ram', International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 4 (1976), pp. 201-28 & H. Frost et alii, Lilybaeum (Marsala) - The Punic Ship: Final Excavation Report. Notizie Degli Scavi di Antichita Supplemento al vol. 30,1976 (Rome, 1981), pp. 267-70.

8.

The dogfight analogy, e.g. Lazenby (1996), p. 95, Shaw (1993), p. 99; for the diekplus, Shaw (1993), pp. 99-104.

1.

Innate conservatism of Romans, see Thiel (1954), pp. 66-7; 'five' as shorthand for 'warship' noted by W. W. Tarn, 'The Fleets of the First Punic War', Journal of Hellenic Studies 27 (1907), pp. 48-60, esp. pp. 59-60. F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), p. 74; Punic warship captured and used as model, Polybius 1. 20. 15; construction completed in sixty days, Pliny Natural History 16. 192, cf. Florus 1. 18. 7, Orosius 4. 7. 8.

2.

H. Frost, 'The prefabricated Punic Warship' in H. Deviyner & E. Lipinski, Studia Phoenica X: Punic Wars (Leuven, 1989), pp. 127-135, esp. pp. 132-4; 'fives' never built in Italy before, Polybius 1. 20. 10.

3.

For a discussion see Thiel (1954), pp. 73-8, Lazenby (1996), p. 65. For the census figures see P. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14 (Oxford, 1971), p. 13, 32; for the Samnites see Zonaras 8. 11.

4.

Treachery, Zonaras 8. 10; Asina, Pliny, NH 8. 169.

1.

Polybius 1. 21. 9-11; garbled account of Mylae see Lazenby (1996), p. 67, Tarn (1907), p.51, Thiel (1954), pp.122-7.

2.

Polybius 1. 22. 3-11; H. T. Wallinga, The Boarding-Bridge of the Romans (Gravenhage, 1956). See also Thiel (1954), pp. 101-28.

3.

DS23. 10. 1.

4.

Polybius 1. 23. 1-10, Rogers (1964), pp. 276-7; the corvi, 1. 23. 9-10, Thiel (1954), p. 115.

5.

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 12. 2. 25, the commentary including Mommsen's reconstruction of the text.

6.

Livy Per. 17.

7.

Hannibal, Polybius 1. 24. 5-7; the Lipari Islands, Polybius 1. 25. 1-4, Zonaras 8. 12.

8.

Polybius 1. 26. 7.

9.

See Tarn (1907), pp. 46, 53; Thiel (1954), pp. 83-96, esp. 94.

10.

As for instance in Thiel (1954), pp. 119-20, criticized by Lazenby (1996), pp. 87-8.

11.

E.g. G. K. Tipps, The battle of Ecnomus', Historia 34 (1985).

12.

Line 'thinner', Polybius 1. 27. 7.

13.

Lazenby (1996), pp. 95-6.

14.

Polybius 1. 26. 10-28. 14, Rogers (1964), pp. 278-91.

15.

Polybius 1. 29. 1, see Thiel (1954), p. 117.

16.

Zonaras 8. 14, Polybius 1. 36. 11.

17.

Numbers, DS 23. 18. 1, Orosius 4. 9. 8, Eutropius 22. 3. For doubts about the numbers see Tarn (1907), p. 53, Thiel (1954), p. 94. On the corvus see Thiel (1954), pp. 235-6, Lazenby (1996), p. 112. Roman reliance on biay Polybius 1. 37. 7-10.

18.

Polybius 1. 38. 5-10.

19.

Polybius 1. 39. 6.

20.

Polybius 1. 39. 8,15; Lilybaeum, 1. 41. 3-i; Hannibal, 1. 44. 1-7, 46. 1-3.

21.

Polybius 1.46. 4-47. 3.

22.

Polybius 1. 47. 3-10.

23.

Livy, Per. 19, Cicero, de natura deorum 2. 7, Florus 1. 19. 29, Suetonius Tiberius 2.

24.

Drepana, Polybius 1. 49. 3-51. 12, Rogers (1964), pp. 296-9; the trial see N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 35-6, 43, 79-80, 84-5,184-5.

25.

Polybius 1. 52. 4-54. 8, Zonaras 8. 15; the lemboi, Polybius 1. 53. 9.

26.

Raiding of Africa, Zonaras 8. 16; census figures Brunt (1971), pp. 26-33; for 265-264 Eutropius 2. 18, 252-251 Livy Per. 18, 247-246 Livy Per. 19; Claudia see Livy Per. 19, Suetonius, Tiberius 2.3, Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 10. 6.

27.

Polybius 1. 59. 7-8.

28.

Inability of smaller ships to damage a 'five' Polybius 15. 1. 3-2. 15, Livy 30. 25. 1-10; Morrison & Coates (1996), pp. 271-2, 285-91.

29.

Livy Per. 19.

30.

See Lazenby (1996), pp. 153-4.

31.

Aegates Islands, Polybius 1. 59. 8-61. 8; losses DS 24. 11. 1-2, and Rogers (1964), pp. 301-3.

1.

See Frost (1989), p. 128; dispute between Roman commanders, Valerius Maximus 2. 8. 2.

2.

Polybius 1. 62. 1-2.

1.

Note Polybius' comments on the higher quality of Roman marines out-balancing the Carthaginians' superior skills of seamanship, 6. 52. 8-9.

Chapter 5

1.

Diodorus Siculus24. 13. 1. Livy 21. 41. 6-7 implies that even so Hamilcar's soldiers were ransomed at 18 denarii a head.

2.

T. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London, 1995), pp. 188-9.

3.

Polybius 1. 62. 1-9, 3. 27. 2-6. For a slightly different version see Zonaras 8. 17.

4.

See J. Rich, 'The Origins of the Second Punic War', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov & P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 1-37, esp. pp. 23-4 with further references.

5.

See G. Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (Oxford, 1980), pp. 12-13, 32-3, 37.

6.

See J. Lazenby, The First Punic War (London, 1996), pp. 168-170 on the passivity of the Carthaginians during the war.

7.

Zonaras 8. 16.

8.

For office holding in the period see T. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (New York, 1951). In the two decades from 284 to 265, eleven of the consuls elected were holding the office for the second time. In 241-222 only seven men held office for a second time. On Caiatanus see Livy Per. 19, see also Lazenby (1996), pp. 137, 141.

9.

G. Picard & C. Picard, Carthage (London, 1987), p. 194.

1.

See N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 35-6, 43, 79-80, 184-5, and Lazenby (1996), pp. 136-7.

2.

Polybius' account of the Mercenary War, 1. 66.1-88. 7.

3.

Polybius 1. 77. 5, 2. 7.6-11.

4.

Polybius 1. 83. 5-11; Appian The Punic WarsS.

5.

Polybius 1. 83. 2-4.

6.

Polybius 1. 83. 11.

7.

S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), p. 246.

8.

Polybius 1. 88. 8-12, 3. 28. 1-4.

9.

See Dyson (1985), pp. 239-51.

10.

Zonaras 8. 18.

11.

DS25. 10. 4, 19. 1.

12.

Polybius 3. 13. 3-5.

13.

See Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 202-203, 222-229.

14.

Polybius criticizes Fabius Pictor for representing the Barcids as opposed by the majority of Carthage's elite, 3. 8. 1-11. Livy represents Hanno as leader of the faction opposed to the Barcids, e.g. 21. 3. 1-4. 1, 10. 1-11. 2. Zonaras 8. 17 claims Hamilcar went to Spain contrary to the wishes of the Punic leaders. DS 25. 8. 1 says Hamilcar won support of people by demagoguery and was voted an unlimited command in Spain. See also Nepos, Hamilcar 3.

15.

Appian, The Wars in Spain. 5.

1.

This seems to be the implication of Polybius' brief account, 2. 1. 5.

1.

Contrast Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 209-29, with S. Lancel, Carthage (Oxford, 1995), pp. 376-80.

2.

Embassy to Hamilcar, Dio 12. 48; Hasdrubal, Polybius 2. 13. 3-7, 3. 27. 9-10. For the presence of Roman traders see Dyson (1985), p. 180.

3.

For an account of the campaigns in Cisalpine Gaul see Dyson (1985), pp. 26-34. Polybius' account of the Gallic Wars, 2. 14. 1-35. 10; Telamon, 2. 26. 1-31. 7; Flaminius' land bill, 2. 21. 7-9, his campaign 32. 1-33. 9.

29 Plutarch, Marcellus 6-8.
Chapter 6

1.

Trade between Rome and Carthage, see R. Palmer, Rome and Carthage at Peace (1997), pp. 15-52. Guest friendship, Livy 27. 16. 5, 33. 45. 6.

2.

Physical boundaries were imposed on both sides in the earlier treaties between Rome and Carthage, Polybius 3. 22. 4-7, 24. 4,11; between Rome and Tarentum, Appian Samnite History 7, 79, between Carthage and Cyrene, Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum 2-10.

3.

Treaty with Saguntum, Polybius 3. 30. 1-2; arbitration in Saguntum's internal dispute, 3. 15. 7.

4.

Polybius 3.15.1-13,17.1-11, Livy 21. 6.1-9. 2,12.1-15. 2; Hannibal's wound, 21.7. 10.

5.

The embassy, Polybius 3. 20. 6-21. 8, 33. 1-4, Livy 21. 18. 1-19. 5. On Fabius Buteo see Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic no. 116. F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), p. 334 on the probability of a conditional vote for war before the ambassadors left Rome. The brusqueness of Roman diplomacy, e.g. with Queen Teuta in 229, Pdlybius 2. 8. 6-13, with Antiochus IV in 168, Livy 45. 12.

6.

Polybius 3. 9. 6-12. 7.

7.

Polybius 3.11.5-8.

8.

Polybius 3. 11. 5-8, Livy 21. 1. 4-5, Nepos, Hannibal 1. 2-6.

9.

The best and most thorough recent discussion of the causes of the war is J. Rich, 'The origins of the Second Punic War', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov & P. Sabin (edd.), The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), pp. 1-37. Rich cites around thirty major contributions on the subject.

1.

See Rich (1996), pp. 14-18, esp. p. 17. Hamilcar's recruitment of captured enemy warriors, Diodorus Siculus 25. 10. 1; his response to the Roman envoys, Dio 12. 48.

2.

On Hannibal's ambition see Livy 21. 5. 1-2.

3.

See Rich (1996), p. 30.

4.

On the Senate's plans and dispositions for 218, see Polybius 3. 40. 1-2,41. 2, Livy 21. 17. 1-9.

5.

Polybius 3. 40. 3-13, Livy 21. 25. 1-14.

6.

Polybius 3. 40. 14, 41. 1-3, Livy 21. 26. 1-2.

7.

For an incisive discussion of the naval situation see B. Rankov, 'The Second Punic War at Sea', in Cornell, Rankov and Sabin (1996), pp. 49-57, esp. pp. S2-A.

8.

Polybius 3. 33. 17-18.

9.

Polybius 3. 35. 1; the elephants, Appian, The Hannibalic War 1. 4.

1.

A. D. Domingucz-Monedero, 'La campana de Anibal contra los Vacceos, sus objectivos y su relaci6n con el initio de la segunda guerra punka', Latomus 45 (1986), pp. 241-58.

2.

Livy 21. 21. 9.

3.

Livy 22. 58. 3.

4.

For the view that Hannibal's strategy was to break up Rome's confederation of allies, see J. Lazenby, 'Was Maharbal right?', in Cornell, Rankov & Sabin (1996), pp. 39-48, and J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 29-32, 85-6, 88-9.

5.

Livy records the tradition that Hasdrubal had the young Hannibal summoned to Spain, implying that he had returned to Carthage at some earlier time. He implies that there were similar rumours about an unnatural relationship between Hannibal and Hasdrubal to the ones that had circulated concerning the latter and Hamilcar, Livy 21. 3. 1-6, cf. Nepos, Hamilcar 3. 1-2.

6.

Polybius 3. 69. 12-13, 9. 22. 1-26, Livy 21. 4. 1-8.

7.

Hannibal Monomachus, Polybius 9. 24. 4-8; Hannibal Barca's avarice, 9. 25. 1-26. 11.

8.

Livy 21. 38. 6-9. For studies of the route see P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), pp. 153-66, Lazenby (1978), pp. 34-48, 275-7, S. Lancel, Hannibal (Oxford, 1998), pp. 57-80, and D. Proctor, Hannibal's March in History (Oxford, 1971) as a small sample of the existing literature.

9.

Polybius 3. 35. 1-8, Livy 21. 22. 5-24. 1; distance to the Ebro, Polybius 3. 39. 6; crossing the Ebro in three columns, Livy 21. 23. 1.

10.

Caven (1980), pp. 98-101.

11.

Polybius 3. 35. 6-8, Livy 21. 23. 1-6; the Carpetani, Livy 21. 23. 4.

12.

Polybius 3. 42. 1-4, Livy 21. 24. 2-5, 26. 6-27. 1. Importance of boundaries in tribal warfare, see Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 2. 17, 6. 23.

13.

Polybius 3. 42. S-43. 12, Iivy 21. 27. 2-28. 4.

14.

Polybius 3. 44. 4,45. 6-12, livy 21. 28. 5-12, also mentions an alternative version.

15.

Polybius 3. 44. 3-13, Livy 21. 29. 1, 30. 1-31. 1.

16.

Polybius 3. 41. 4-9, Livy 21. 26. 3-5.

17.

Polybius 3. 45. 1-5, Livy 21. 29. 1-7.

18.

See M. Austin and B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995), esp. pp. 12-86 .

19.

Polybius 3. 45. 5, 47. 1-5, Iivy 21. 30. 1-31. 5.

20.

Polybius 3. 49. 5-13, Livy 21. 31. 1-12.

21.

Polybius 3. 50. 1-51. 13, Livy 21. 32. 6-33. 11.

22.

Polybius 3. 52. 1-53. 10, Livy 21. 34. 1-35. 1.

23.

Polybius 3. 54. 5-55. 9, Livy 21. 36. 1-37. 6; the story of the vinegar, 21. 37. 2-3; importance of wide-ranging knowledge for a commander, Polybius 9. 12. 1-20. 10; examples of ingenuity by other generals, e.g. Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 3. 271-81.

24.

Times for the journey, Polybius 3. 56. 3. Earlier he mentions that it took nine days to reach the summit of the first pass, 3. 53. 9. Fifteen days certainly seems inadequate considering the number of days' rest Polybius mentions.

Chapter 7

1 Polybius 3. 56. 4, 3. 60. 5 for the army sizes. For the idea of leaving garrisons in southern France see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), p. 34, m. 9, citing G. Picard

& C. Picard The Life and Death of Carthage (1968, rev. ed. 1987), pp. 248, 250. Hasdrubal's attempt to march to Italy in 215, Livy 23. 27. 9. In 1812 Napoleon's army suffered huge attritional losses during the initial stages of the invasion of Russia, see D. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London, 1966), pp. 780, 816.

1.

Polybius 3. 60. 8-10. For a discussion of Hannibal's supply problems see J. Shean, 'Hannibal's mules: the logistical limitations of Hannibal's army and the battle of Cannae, 216 BC', Historian (1996), pp. 159-187.

2.

Polybius 3. 61. 1-12, Livy 21. 39. 3-10.

3.

On the speeches and gladiatorial fight see Polybius 3., Livy 21. 40. 1-44. 9; the promise of citizenship 21. 45. 5-6. For a discussion of the single combats see L. Rawlings, 'Warriors in a soldier's war', in Cornell, Rankov 8c Sabin (1996), pp. 81-95, esp. p. 89.

4.

Fluidity of cavalry combat, see Dio 56. 32, Tacitus Annals 6. 35. On the four-horned saddle see P. Connolly, 'The Roman Saddle', in M. Dawson (ed.), Roman Military Equipment: The Accoutrements of War, BAR 336 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 7-27.

5.

Accounts of Ticinus see Polybius 3. 64. 1-65. 11 8c 10. 3. 3-6, Livy 21. 45. 1^16. 10.

6.

Polybius 3. 66. 1-8, Livy 21. 47. 1-8.

7.

Polybius 3. 66. 9-68. 8, Livy 21. 48. 1-8.

8.

Polybius 3. 68. 9-15, Livy 21. 51. 5-7. For a discussion see Lazenby (1978), pp. 55-6.

1.

Polybius 3. 69. 1-14; his praise of Hannibal's decision not to fight, 69. 12-13; Livy 21. 48. 9-10, 52. 1-11.

2.

Polybius 3. 70. 1-12, Livy 21. 53. 1-11.

3.

C. Duffy, Austerlitz (London, 1977), p. 72.

4.

Accounts of Trebia, see Polybius 3. 71. 1-74. 11; numbers 72. 2, 7-8,11-13; elephants 72. 9, 74. 2. Livy 21. 54. 1-56. 8; numbers 55. 2-4; elephants 55. 2, 7-56. 1. Polybius 3. 74. 1 implies that Mago's troops were mainly Numidians. For a discussion see Lazenby (1978), pp. 55-58, P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), pp. 168-171, J. Kromayer & G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder in Italien undAfrika (Berlin, 1912), III. 1, pp. 47-99, and H. Delbriick (trans. W. Renfroe), History of the Art of War. Volume 1: Warfare in Antiquity (Nebraska, 1975), pp. 333-4.

5.

This was the number of horsemen commanded by Gaius Centenius, Polybius 3. 86. 3, Livy 22. 8. 1.

6.

The probably fictitious battle, livy 21. 59. 1-9; Hannibal's disguises, Polybius 3. 78. 1-4, Livy 22. 1. 3.

7.

Dispositions for the year, Polybius 3. 80. 1, 86. 1, Livy 22. 2. 1,4.

8.

On Flaminius' character, see Polybius 3. 80. 3-82. 8, Livy 21. 63. 1-15, 22. 3. 3-14.

9.

Livy 21. 63. 5.

10.

N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 54-91.

11.

Polybius 3. 78. 5-79. 12, Livy 22. 2. 1-3. 1. For the Porretta Pass see Lazenby (1978), pp. 60-61, fh. 20; for the Colline Pass see B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 119. Cato claimed that the bravest elephant in Hannibal's army was called the Syrian (Surus), Pliny Natural History 8. 5. 11.

12.

The problem of supply, see Shean (1996), pp. 159-87, esp. 175-85.

13.

Polybius 3. 80. 1-2, 82. 1-8, Livy 22. 3. 7-14.

14.

On the possible battle sites see Lazenby (1978), pp. Connolly (1981), pp. 172-5, and Kromayer 8c Veith (1912), pp. 148-93.

1.

Livy 35. 4 mentions that in 193, the consul Merula took the precaution of sending out scouts even though he was marching in daylight, which implies that the practice was not normal.

2.

Accounts of Trasimene, see Polybius 3. 9-85. 5, Livy 22. 4. 1-7. 5. Ovid mentions the date of the battle as dies nefas, Fasti 6. 767-8. Silius Italicus says that Flaminius wore a crine Suevo - Suebic scalp, clearly intended to mean Gallic, although the Suebi were a German people - as a crest, Silius Italicus, Punica 5. 132. For a discussion of the different versions of Flaminius' death see Rosenstein (1990), pp. 115-17.

3.

Polybius 3. 86. 1-5, Livy 22. 8. 1.

4.

Livy 22. 7. 6-14, 8. 2-A.

5.

Polybius 3. 87. 6-9, Livy 22. 8. 5-7.

6.

Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 1-4.

7.

Livy 22. 9. 7-10. 10.

8.

Livy 22.11.1-9; on the request to be allowed to ride a horse, Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 4.

9.

Polybius 3. 86. 8-87. 5, Livy 22. 9. 1-5.

10.

Polybius 3. 88. 1-90. 6, Livy 22. 12. 1-12. See P. Erdkamp, 'Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy', Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127-47, which argues convincingly that Livy grossly exaggerated the impact of Fabius' attempts to deprive Hannibal of food. For a discussion of the armies' possible routes during this campaign see Lazenby (1978), pp. 66-71, Connolly (1981), pp. 177-82. Plutarch mentions the military slang, 'kicking in the stomach', in LucullusW. 1.

11.

Polybius 3. 90. 7-92. 10, Livy 22. 13. 1-15. 1.

12.

Polybius 3. 93. 1-94. 6, Livy 22. 15. 2-18.

13.

Fabius' nickname, Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 5; the election of Minucius and his subsequent defeat, Polybius 3. 100. 1-105. 11, Livy 22. 18. 5-10, 23. 1-30. 10.

Chapter 8

1.

W. Heckmann, Rommel's War in Africa (London, 1981), p. 113; A. Beevor, Stalingrad (London, 1998), p. 297.

2.

Polybius 3. 107. 8-15, Livy 22. 35. 1-36. 5. For modern views see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 75-6, and F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 1 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 439-40, who support Polybius' figures; B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 134-41, and P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), p. 419 are amongst those who reject them.

3.

Livy's claims of Varro's radical politics, 22. 25. 18-19, 34. 2-35. 4, 38. 6. See also

R. Feig Vishnia, State, Society and Popular Leaders in Mid Republican Rome 241-167 BC (London, 1995), pp. 57-8.

1.

Paullus' speech, Polybius 3. 108. 1-13; mood of the allies, Polybius 3. 107. 6; Livy's improbable version of a conversation between Fabius Maximus and Paullus, Livy 22. 38. 6-40. 4.

2.

Polybius 3. 107. 1-7.

3.

The Roman approach to Cannae, 3. 110. 1; Livy's version, 22. 40. 5-44. 1. For the battle site see Lazenby (1978), pp. 77-8, P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), p. 184, H. Delbriick (trans. W. Renfroe), History of the Art of War. Volume 1: Warfare in Antiquity (Nebraska, 1975), pp. 324-5 , and for a contrasting view see J. Kromayer & G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder (Berlin, 1903-31) III. 1,

pp. 278-388, who place the battle south of the river, but a little nearer to the coast.

1.

Polybius 3. 110. 2-11, Livy 22. 44. 1-3.

1.

Near desertion of the Spanish, Livy 22. 40. 7-8, but see P. Erdkamp, 'Polybius, Livy and the Fabian Strategy', Ancient Society 23 (1992), pp. 127-47. For the conversation with Gisgo see Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 15. 2-3.

2.

Polybius 3. 112. 1-5, livy 22. 44. 4-45. 4. As Connolly (1981), p. 184 points out, the spur on which San Ferdinando di Puglia now lies stands out as the most obvious spot for Hannibal's camp.

1.

Livy 22. 45. 5 claims that Varro did not consult Paullus. For the suggestion that Paullus was in fact in command see Connolly (1981), pp. 184-6.

2.

At Metaurus, the consul G. Claudius Nero controlled the right, the praetor L. Porcius Licinus the centre and the other consul M. Livius Drusus Salinator the left, in spite of the fact that the battle was fought under his command, Livy 27. 98.

3.

For the Roman deployment see Polybius 3. 113. 1-5, Livy 45. 5-8.

4.

Aemilius Paullus sent the triarii to protect the baggage and begin construction of a camp and kept the rest of the army to cover them before Pydna, Livy 44. 37, and Merula ordered his triarii to guard the baggage when he encountered the Boii on the march in 193 BC, Livy 35. 4. However, in each case the commander had not planned to fight a battle. Lazenby (1978), p. 79 suggests that the 10,000 men consisted of one legion and its ala.

5.

Hannibal's deployment see Polybius 3. 113. 6-114. 8, Iivy 22. 46. 1-7.

6.

Polybius 3. 115. 1-4, Livy 22. 47. 1-3; Paullus wounded, Livy 49. 1.

7.

Livy 22. 47. 5.

8.

Polybius 3. 115. 5-116. 4, Livy 22. 47. 4-10. For the use of Corps and Division sized columns by Napoleon's army and their inherent problems see J. Elting, Swords Around a Throne (London, 1988), pp. 536-7.

9.

livy claims that 500 Numidians pretended to desert, 22. 48. 2-4, but in Appian's version it is 500 Celtiberians who do so, The Hannibalic War 22.

10.

Polybius 116. 5-8, Livy 22. 48. 1-6.

11.

Polybius 116. 9-117. 12, Livy 22. 49. 1-18. For a discussion of the figures see Lazenby (1978), pp. 84-5. For a vivid attempt at depicting the final stages of the battle see

V. Hanson, 'Cannae', in R. Cowley (ed.) Experience of War (1992). See also P. Sabin, 'The Mechanics of Battle in the Second Punic War', in Cornell, Rankov 8c Sabin (edd.), The Second Punic War (1996), pp. 59-79, esp. 67, which discusses the proportion of casualties usually suffered by each side in the battles of this period.

1.

M. Middlebrook, The First Day of the Somme (1971), pp. 262-4.

2.

Iivy22. 51. 5-9.

3.

Polybius 3. 117.4-5.

4.

Livy 22. 52. 4, 7, 53. 1-54. 6.

5.

Livy 22. 51. 1-4.

1.

Field Marshal Sir Bernard Mongomery, A History of Warfare (London, 1968), p. 97. For the argument against Livy's judgement see Lazenby (1978), pp. 85-6 and 'Was Hannibal Right?', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov, and P. Sabin (edd.) The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996), 39-48. The view is not new; Delbruck (1975), pp. 336-44 came to much the same conclusion.

2.

Livy 22. 58. 1-9.

1.

Revival of exchange system from First Punic War, Livy 22. 23. 6-8, Plutarch, Fabius Maximus 7; for Cincius Alimentus, Livy 21. 38. 3.

2.

Hannibal fighting for honour and power, Livy 22. 58. 3.

3.

Polybius 6. 58. 1-13, Livy 22. 58. 9-61. 10.

4.

Postumius' disaster, Polybius 3. 118. 6, Livy 23. 24. 6-13.

5.

Livy 22. 57. 10-12, 23. 14. 1-4.

6.

N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 139-40, Livy 22. 61. 14-5.

7.

Livy 22. 56. 4^5, 57. 2-9, cf. Polybius 6. 56. 6-12.

8.

Livy 26. 11.6.

Chapter 9

1.

For the desire of the poorer classes for change and the general loyalty of the aristocracies to Rome see Livy 23. 14. 7-12, 24. 13. 8, and esp. 24. 2. 8-11; examples of aristocratic leaders forcing a defection, 23. 30. 8, 24. 47. 6, and attempting to do so, 24. 13; aristocratic leaders claiming popular support, 24. 13. 2-3.

2.

Defections, noting the exceptions in each area, Livy 22. 61. 11-13. Roman garrisons in Etruria, livy 23. 5. 4, replaced 26. 28. 4-6; trouble anticipated at Arretium, 27. 21. 6-7, 22. 5.

3.

The Bruttians' disappointment following their attack on Rhegium, Livy 24. 2. 1-11; appeals for protection from Roman raids, Livy 23. 42. 3 by Samnites, and 24. 12. 1-2, 25. 15. 1-3,22. 15-16 by Campanians.

4.

The deputation to Varro, Livy 23. 4. 1-6. 8; rebellion and the treaty with Hannibal, 23. 7. 1-3; Hannibal's occupation and the arrest of Decius Magius, 23. 7. 4-10. 13. Zonaras 9. 2. blames Hannibal for the bath house massacre.

5.

Attempts at Naples, Livy 23. 1. 5-10, 14. 5,15. 1-6; Nola, 23. 15. 7-17. 1.

6.

Livy 23. 17. 7-18. 9,19. 1-20. 3.

7.

Battle of River Calor, Livy 24. 15. 1-16. 5; Beneventum 212, 25. 13. 3-14. 14; Bomilcar, Livy 23. 41. 10-12.

8.

On legionary numbers in general see P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), pp. 416-22. On the legions in 215-214 see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), p. 95.

9.

Livy 25. 20. 4.

1.

Elections for 215, Livy 23. 24. 1-3, 31. 7-9,12-14; for 214, 24. 7. 10-9. 3.

1.

Capture of Casilinum, Livy 24. 19. 1-11; Arpi, 24. 45. 1-47. 11; desertions 23,46. 6-7, 24. 47. 8,11; co-operation between the consuls, 23. 39. 5-8, 24. 19. 3-9.

2.

Lucius Bantius, Livy 23. 15. 7-16. 1, Plutarch Marcellus 10, cf. Plutarch Fabius Maximus 20.

3.

Livy 23. 11.7-13. 8.

4.

Livy 24. 13. 1-5, 20. 9-15.

5.

Polybius 8. 24. 125. 11, Livy 25. 7. 10-1(8)8. 10.

6.

Polybius 8. 24. 4-34. 13, Livy 25. 8. 1-11. 20. Livy was uncertain whether to date this episode to 213 or 212, but the latter seems most likely, see Lazenby (1978), p. 110.

7.

For a discussion of damage to crops, see V. Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 16, 30, 34-5, 50-52, 58-60, 106, 212-13, 219.

1.

Earlier fighting around Tarentum, livy 23. 46. 9-11, 25. 15. 1-3,19. 1-20. 5, 26. 4. 1-10; single combats, 23. 46. 12-17. 8, 25. 18. 4-15.

2.

Livy 26. 1. 2, defection of Campanians, 24. 47. 12-13.

3.

Livy 26. 4. 3-10, see M. Samuels, 'The Reality of Cannae', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), pp. 7-29, esp. 11-15, who argues unconvincingly for a major reform.

4.

Polybius 9. 3. 1-7. 10, Livy 26. 5. 1-6. 13.

5.

Livy 26. 6. 14-17,12. 1-16. 13.

6.

Livy 27. 15. 4-16. 9, Plutarch FabiusMaximus21, including the tradition involving Fabius' former mistress.

7.

Livy 27. 16. 10-16.

8.

Betrayal of Salapia, Livy 26. 38. 11-14; 1st Hcrdonea, Livy 25. 21. 1-10; 2nd Herdonea, 27. 1. 3-15; other battles employing whole legions in reserve, 27. 2. 1-12, 12. 7-17,13. 11-14. 15. A clear example of an army forming in more than one set of triplex acies straight from the line of march came in 193, Livy 35. 4-5. At Emporion in 195 Cato kept an entire legion in reserve, but may have significantly outnumbered the enemy, Livy 34. 15. 3.

9.

Trial of Fulvius, N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 106-8,120,146, 188-9 and Livy 26. 2. 7-3. 12; death of Marcellus and Crispinus, Livy 27. 26. 7-27. 14, cf. Plutarch, Marcellus 29-30; attempt on Salapia, Livy 27. 28. 1-13.

10.

Surrender of Lucanians and others, Livy 27. 15. 2-3; for African deserters fighting for the Romans in Spain see 28. 20. 1.

11.

Scandal involving army contractors, Livy 25. 3. 8-4. 11; censors reduce equestrians, 27. 11. 15-16; Latin colonies, 27. 9. 7-10. 10.

12.

Planned expedition in 216, Livy 23. 27. 9-12; actual march in 208, 27. 36. 1-4.

13.

Livy 27. 39. 1-14, 43. 1-3; Iicinus' legions under strength, 27. 39. 2.

14.

Livy 27. 43. 4-46. 5.

15.

Appian, The Hannibalic War 52.

16.

Polybius 11. 1. 1-2. 11, Livy 27. 46. 6-49. 9; for the date of the battle and the tradition that Hasdrubal committed suicide, see Ovid, Fasti 6. 770; location of the battlefield see J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Antike Schlactfelder in Italien undAfrika (Berlin, 1913), III. 1, pp. 424-94; for one view of the improvements in Roman armies see J-P. Brisson, 'Les Mutations de la Seconde Guerre Punique', in J-P. Brisson, Problemes de la Guerre a Rome (Paris, 1969), pp. 33-59.

17.

Thanksgiving, Livy 27. 51. 8; the triumph, 28. 9. 2-20.

18.

Livy 28. 46. 7-13, 29. 4. 6, 30. 18. 1-19. 6.

19.

Hannibal's recall, Livy 30. 19. 12-20. 9.

Chapter 10

1.

On Spain in general see S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), pp. 174-84.

2.

Polybius 3. 76. 1-13, Livy 21. 50. 1-51. 11. Polybius 3. 76. 8-9 claims that Hasdrubal knew of Hanno's defeat before he attacked, but Livy denies this, 21. 51. 1. Livy's account of the fighting after this is normally rejected under the assumption that he has mistaken a different version of the same events for later operations.

1.

Polybius 3. 95. 2-96. 6, Livy 22. 19. 1-20. 3; the later raiding, Livy 22. 20. 4-21. 8.

2.

Polybius 3. 97. 1-99. 9.

1.

Livy 23. 26. 1-29. 17. For comparisons between Ibera and Cannae see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978) pp. 128-9, and B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 140, 180.

2.

Lazenby (1978), p. 129.

3.

The Romans later tried to take advantage of this tendency amongst the Celtiberians, Livy 34. 19. 2-8.

4.

Livy 25. 32. 1-39. 18; Marcius' rank see Cicero, pro Balbo 34, Valerius Maximus 2. 7. 15.

5.

For military intelligence in the Republican period see M. Austin & B. Rankov, Exploratio (London, 1995), pp. 18-108.

1.

Polybius 5. 108. 1-110. 11.

1.

The treaty, Polybius 7. 9. 1-17; the negotiations and the capture of the envoys, Livy 23. 33. 1-24. 9.

2.

Livy 23. 38. 8-10, 48. 3,24. 10. 4,40. 1-17.

3.

Supplementum Fpigraphicum Graecum 13. 382, Livy 26. 24. 1-25. 15.

4.

For a discussion of the importance of booty see W. Harris, War and Imperialism in Mid Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford, 1979), pp. 58-104.

5.

For the Aetolians' reluctance to ally with Rome and delay over the treaty's ratification see Lazenby (1978), p. 116.

6.

Echinous, Polybius 9. 41. 1-42. 4. For a narrative account with references to the sources see Lazenby (1978), pp. 161-7. For Hellenistic armies see F. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley, 1962) and B. Bar Kochva, The SeleucidArmy (Cambridge, 1976).

7.

Attempted mediation, Livy 27. 30. 4-7; Mantineia, Polybius 11. 11. 1-18. 10; the Aetolians conclude peace with Philip V, Livy 29. 12. 1-4.

8.

Livy 29. 12. 2-16.

9.

Sicily, Livy 21. 49. 1-51. 4; Sardinia, Livy 23. 9-12, 34. 10-17,40. 1-41. 9. For a discussion see S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), pp. 251-4.

10.

Polybius 7. 2. 1-8. 9, Iivy 24. 4. 1-7. 9. Hiero sends aid, Polybius 3. 75. 7-8.

11.

Livy 24. 27. 6-33. 8.

12.

Polybius 8. 3. 1-7. 12, Livy 24. 33. 9-34. 16, Plutarch Marcellus 14-17.

13.

Livy 24. 35. 1-39. 13.

14.

Polybius 8. 37. 1-13, Livy 25. 23. 1-25. 13, Plutarch Marcellus 18.

15.

Livy 25. 26. 1-15, 25. 27. 2-13.

16.

Livy 25. 27. 6-7, 28. 1-31. 11, Plutarch Marcellus 19-20.

17.

Livy 25. 40. 1-41. 7; Marcellus' ovation 26. 21. 1-13, Plutarch Marcellus 21-22.

18.

Punic reinforcements, see Livy 26. 21. 14-17; Laevinus, Livy 26. 40. 1-15. Muttines appears on a later inscription from Delphi as Marcus Valerius Muttines along with his four sons, Inscriptions Graecae 585, and he and one of the sons are mentioned as still serving with the army in 188 BC by Livy 38. 41. 12; Moericus, 26. 21. 10-13.

19.

Livy 26. 40. 15-16

Chapter 11

1.

Marcius as propraetor senatui, Livy 26. 2. 1-6; Nero, 26. 17. 1-2, Appian The Wars in Spain. 17; his campaign, Livy 26. 17. 2-16.

2.

Scipio's appointment to the Spanish command, Livy 26. 18. 1-19. 9, and H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (London, 1970), p. 31; for interpretations based on factional politics see J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), p. 133 and

B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 191-2.

1.

Scipio's character, Polybius 10. 2. 1-5. 10, and Scullard (1970), pp. 18-23, 27-32. On the virtues attributed to Scipio and later Roman commanders see S. Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971), passim, esp. pp. 35-6, 113,136, 228, 224.

2.

Scipio's forces, Polybius 10. 6. 7,9. 6, Livy 26. 19. 10; for Punic dispositions contrast Polybius 10. 7. 5.

3.

Seven-day march, Polybius 10. 9. 7; Scipio's speech, Polybius 10. 11. 5-8, Livy 26. 43. 2-8.

4.

Polybius 10. 9. 8-10. 13, 12. 1-11, Iivy 26. 44. 1-4.

5.

Proximity of Punic armies, Polybius 10. 7. 5; Scipio's direction of the assault, Polybius 10. 13. 1-5.

6.

On the difficulty of renewing an assault after a failure see Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 3. 280-88,4. 30-53,62-83, 6. 29-67,131-148.

7.

Polybius 10. 13. 6-15. 7, Iivy 26. 44. 5-46. 10. See also A. Ribera, I Lacomba con M. Calvo Galvez, 'La primera evidencia arqueol6gica de la destruction de Valentia por Pompeyo', Journal of Roman Archaeology 8 (1995), pp. 19-40 for evidence of Roman atrocities, although in this case committed during a civil war.

1.

Polybius 10. 15. 8-17. 16, Iivy 26. 47. 1-49. 10. For discussion of Roman plundering see A. Ziolkowski' Urbs direpta, or how the Romans sacked cities', in J. Rich and M. Shipley, War and Society in the Roman World (London, 1993), pp. 69-91, although not all his conclusions have been generally accepted.

2.

E.g. Lazenby (1978), pp. 136-7, F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 2 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 192-6, Scullard (1970), pp. 39-67.

3.

Polybius 10. 18. 1-19. 7, Livy 26. 49. 11-50. 14, cf. Plutarch, Alexander 21.

4.

Polybius 10. 20. 1-8, Livy 26. 51. 3-14.

5.

Polybius 10. 38. 7-10.

6.

Battle and aftermath, Polybius 10. 39. 1^*0. 12, Livy 27. 17. 1-20. 8; the mention of calones fighting, 27. 18. 12.

7.

The defeat of Hanno, Livy 28. 1. 1-2. 12; the campaign in Baetica, 28. 1. 13-4. 4.

8.

Polybius 11. 20. 1-9, Livy 28. 12. 10-13. 5.

9.

Polybius 11. 21. 1-6, Livy 28. 13. 6-10.

10.

Polybius 11. 21. 7-24. 9, Livy 28. 14. 1-15. 11.

11.

For discussion of the location of the battle and Scipio's manoeuvre see Lazenby (1978), pp. 147-9, Walbank 2 (1970), pp. 296-304, and Scullard (1970), pp. 88-92.

12.

Livy 28. 15. 12-16. 13.

13.

Polybius 11. 25. 1-33. 6, Livy 28. 19. 1-29. 12, 31. 5-35. 12. See also S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), pp. 184-7.

14.

Polybius 11. 24. 1-4, Livy 28. 16. 11-12,16. 14-18. 12, 35. 1-13.

Chapter 12

1.

Livy 28. 38. 6-12, 40. 1-45. 10, Plutarch Fabius Maximus 25-26; rumour that Scipio would bring a bill before the People, 28. 45. 1.

2.

Volunteers and contributions from allied communities, Livy 28. 45. 13-46. 1; size of army taken to Africa, 29. 25. 1-4. J. Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), p. 203 is reluctant to accept the large size of the legions claimed by Livy, but does not provide convincing arguments to justify his decision.

3.

Laelius' expedition, Livy 29. 1. 14, 2. 7-5. 1; intensive training in Sicily, 29. 1. 2-14, 22. 1-5; criticism of Scipio's delay, Lazenby (1978), pp. 195-6; the supply of Scipio's expedition, see J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Brill, 1999), pp. 161, 226.

4.

Livy 29. 6. 1-9. 12.

5.

Livy 29. 15. 4-21. 13, Plutarch Cato the Elder 3; different versions of the fate of Pleminius, Livy 29. 22. 7-10.

6.

Livy 29. 24. 10-27. 5.

7.

Livy 29. 27. 6-29. 3.

8.

Livy 29. 29. 4-33. 10; Syphax's marriage to Sophonisba, 29. 23. 2-10. For a more detailed summary see Lazenby (1978), pp. 198-9, 202.

9.

Livy 29. 34.1-17; Iivy's belief that there were two distinct actions involving commanders named Hanno, 29. 35. 1-2, cf. Lazenby (1978), pp. 205-6; Roman plundering 29. 35. 3-5; the parentage of the second Hanno see Livy 29. 34. 1, Dio 17. 65.

1.

The siege and arrival of Syphax, Polybius 14. 1. 1-15, Livy 29. 35. 6-15; castra Cornelia, see Caesar, Bellum Civile 2. 24; the Numidian camp, Livy 30. 3. 1-10; centurions disguised as slaves, 30. 4. 1-3.

2.

Polybius 14. 2. 1-6. 5, Livy 30. 4. 4-6. 9.

3.

See Lazenby (1978), pp. 207-8, F. Walbank A Historical Commentary on Polybius 2 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 427-9.

4.

Supplies of clothing, Livy 29. 36. 1-3.

5.

Polybius 14. 6. 6-7. 9, Livy 30. 7. 1-13; for the possible locations of the battlefield see Lazenby (1978), pp. 208-9, Walbank 2, p. 447, H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (London, 1970), pp. 127-31.

6.

Polybius 14. 8. 1-14, Livy 30. 8. 1-9. 1; the reasons for the Celtiberians' stubbornness, 30. 8. 8; war weariness of Libyan towns, Polybius 14. 9. 4-5.

7.

Polybius 14. 9. 1-5, Livy 30. 9. 2; for a discussion of generals' consilia in a later period see Goldsworthy (1996), pp. 131-3.

8.

Polybius 14. 9. 6-10. 1, Livy 30. 9. 3-9.

9.

Polybius 14. 10. 2-12, Livy 30. 9. 10-1. 21; for a discussion see Lazenby (1978), pp. 209-11.

10.

Livy 30. 11. 1-15. 14.

11.

Livy 30. 16. 3-14.

12.

Livy 30. 17. 1-14, 21. 11-23. 8; Polybius 15. 1. 2-4 states that the treaty was ratified by Rome.

13.

Livy 30. 24. 5-12, Polybius 15. 1. 1.

14.

Polybius 15. 1. 3-2. 15, Livy 30. 25. 1-10.

1.

Brutality of the campaign, Polybius 15. 3. 14; the extension of Scipio's command, Iivy 30. 1. 10-11; Caepio, 30. 24. 1-i; the consuls of 202, 30. 27. 1-5.

2.

Polybius 15. 3. 4-5. 4, 5. 1-8. 14, Livy 30. 29. 1-10, cf. Frontinus, Strategemata 1. 1. 3, 6. 2. 1, 2.

3.

Location of the battlefield see discussions in Lazenby (1978), p. 218, Walbank 2 (1970), pp. 445-51, Scullard (1970), pp. 142-55, 271-4, and J. Kromayer & G. Veith, Antike Schlahtfelder in Italien und Afrika (Berlin, 1912), III. 2 pp. 598-712.

4.

Polybius 15. 9. 1-11. 12, Livy 30. 32. 1-33. 11, Appian, Punic Wars 40-41; the Macedonian 'legion', Livy 30. 26. 3, 33. 5.

5.

Different officers speak to each of the Punic lines, Polybius 15. 11. 4-6, Livy 30. 33. 8-12.

6.

Suggestion that Hannibal ordered his cavalry to flee and draw the Romans into pursuit, Lazenby (1978), p. 223.

7.

Problematic passage in Polybius, 15. 13. 1; quotation of Homer, Iliad 4. 437, Polybius 15. 12. 9; description of Romans banging weapons against shields, 15. 12. 8.

8.

Repeated charges, Livy 30. 34. 2; on the offensive use of shield see Livy 30. 34. 3, cf. Plutarch, Caesar 16, Tacitus, Annals 14. 36-7, Agricola 36; for the size and weight of Republican shields see M. Bishop & J. Coulston, Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), pp. 58-9, P. Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (London, 1981), p. 131. Lazenby (1978), p. 224, and Walbank 2 (1970), p. 469 claim that the principes were not committed, but Polybius' text is ambiguous and their arguments rely on supposition.

9.

The veterans' refusal to let fugitives into their ranks, Polybius 15. 13. 9-10.

10.

Accounts of the battle, Polybius 15. 12. 1-16. 6, Livy 30. 33. 12-35. 11. Little or no useful detail is included in the heroic narrative of Appian, Punic Wars 40-47, or the brief account in Zonaras 9. 14. Appian gives Roman casualties as 2,500 plus more of Masinissa's men, Punic Wars 48.

11.

Livy 30. 36. 1-11; the consul in 201, 30. 40. 7-41. 1; Scipio's consilium considers the destruction of Carthage, livy 30. 36. 10-11.

12.

Polybius 15. 18. 1-8, Livy 30. 37. 1-6.

13.

Polybius 15. 19. 1-9, Livy 30. 37. 7-38. 5; Appian Punic Wars 54.

Chapter 13

1.

Counting as pitched battles, Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae, Ibera, the River Calor, First and Second Herdonea, Baecula, Metaurus, Ilipa, the defeat of Mago, the Great Plains, and Zama.

2.

On foraging and raiding see J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Brill, 1999), pp. 117-55, 286-92; for a detailed discussion of raiding and crop destruction in Greek warfare see V. D. Hanson, Warfare and agriculture in Classical Greece, rev. ed. (California, 1998).

3.

Role of sieges in propaganda, see J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London, 1993), pp. 151-2.

4.

For views on Hannibal's strategy see B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), p. 141, J. F. Lazenby Hannibal's War (Warminster, 1978), pp. 85-6 and 'Was Maharbal Right?', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin (edd.) The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996), pp. 39-48, H. Delbriick Warfare in Antiquity, (trans, by W. J. Renfroe: Lincoln and New York, 1975), pp. 336-44, B. D. Hoyos 'Hannibal: What kind of genius?', Greece and Rome 30 (1983), pp.171-80, esp. pp.177-8, and S. Lancel, Hannibal (Oxford, 1997), pp. 109-11.

1.

See S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), pp. 186-98.

2.

Dyson (1985), pp. 35-86, 87-125.

1.

Livy 31. 1. 6-2. 4, 5. 16. 1. For discussion of other motives for the war, see F. Walbank, 'Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy', Journal of Roman Studies 53 (1963) 1-13

(= Collected Papers (1988)), P. Derow, 'Polybius, Rome and the East', JRS 69 (1979) 1-15, Harris (1978), pp. 212-18.

1.

Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus 19; for Hellenistic armies see also B. Bar Kochva, The Seleucid Army (Cambridge, 1976).

2.

Recruitment of veterans from Scipio's army in 200, Livy 31. 14. 1-2.

1.

Cynoscephalae, Polybius 18. 19. 1-33. 7, Livy 33. 6. 1-10. 10; Magnesia, Livy 38. 37-44, Appian, Syrian Wars, 30-36, Bar Kochva (1976), pp. 163-73; Pydna, Livy 44. 40-42, Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus 18-22.

2.

Polybius 18. 44. 1-45. 12, Livy 33. 30. 1-11; concerns over discipline were reflected in Paullus' careful training of the army in Macedonia, Livy 44. 33-4, 36-40; the slaves, Plutarch, Flamininus 13.

3.

Livy 37. 45.

4.

R. Kallett-Marx, Hegemony to Empire (California, 1995), pp. 11-96.

5.

For an introduction to this period see M. Crawford, The Roman Republic (London, 1978), pp. 49-83.

6.

For Manlius Vulso see Livy 38. 44-50.

7.

H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (London, 1970), pp. 21044.

8.

For the trial of the Scipiones see Livy 38. 50-56.

9.

For Cato's career in general see A. E. Astin, Cato the Censor (Oxford, 1978); for Sums see Pliny Natural History 8. 5. 11.

10.

For the black stone see Livy 29. 10. 4-11. 8, 29. 14. 5-14. The suppression of the Bacchic rites see Livy 39. 8-19, InscripHones Latinae Selectae 18 = Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 1. 2. 581.

11.

Famously when Gaius Popilius Laenas browbeat Antiochus IV into submission, Livy 45. 12. On the growth of latifundia see K. Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge, 1978).

12.

For Hannibal's remaining in charge of the army, Nepos, Hannibal 7. 1-4, his turning the soldiers to agriculture, Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus 37. 3, S. Lancel, Carthage (Oxford, 1995), pp. 277,402, 8c (1997), pp. 180-185. His conflicts with other politicians and eventual exile, Livy 33. 45. 6-49. 8.

13.

The wealth of Carthage, Lancel (1995), pp. 401-409; Punic spies, Zonaras 8. 11.

14.

Livy 39. 51.

15.

Livy 35.14.

Chapter 14

1.

For criticism of the Roman behaviour see W. Harris, War and Imperialism in Mid Republican Rome 327-70 BC (Oxford, 1979), pp. 234-40.

2.

Carthaginian politics after 201, Appian, Punic Wars 67-8, and G. Picard 8c C. Picard, Carthage (London, 1987), pp. 272-82; Ariston of Tyre, see Livy 34. 61. 1-6, 62. 6-7; Mago the Bruttian, Polybius 36. 5. 1. For a discussion of the motives for Roman war-making in this period see J. Rich, 'Fear, greed and glory', in Rich 8c Shipley (edd.) War

and Society in the Roman World, pp. 38-68, esp. p. 64.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 69, Plutarch, Cato the Elder 26-7, Livy Per. 47, and A. Astin, Cato the Elder (Oxford, 1978), pp. 125-30.

2.

For the wars in Spain see S. Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier (Princeton, 1985), pp. 199-218; Scipio Aemilianus in 151, Polybius 35. 4. 1-14; Galba, Appian, Hispania. 60.

3.

For Flamininus see Polybius 18. 11. 1-12. 5.

4.

For Masinissa's character see Polybius 36. 16. 1-12, Appian, Punic Wars 106. See Picard & Picard (1987), p. 272 for a useful comparison with the attitudes in modern times of former colonies to their old masters.

5.

Appian, Punic Wars 67-9; Polybius 31. 21. 1-8 and for a discussion of the dating of this incident and others described by Livy see F. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius 3 (Oxford, 1970), pp. 489-91; see also B. Caven, The Punic Wars (1980),

pp. 263-70, Picard & Picard (1987), pp. 279-90.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 70-73.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 74.

1.

Polybius 36. 1. 1-6. 6, Appian, Punic Wars 75. The 'sixteen' captured from Perseus, Livy 45. 35.

2.

Appian, Punic Wars 76-90. Cicero noted Censorinus' tendency towards Platonism, Cicero, Acad. 2. 32. 102.

12 Appian, Punic Wars 91-3.
Chapter 15

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 95-6; for the archaeological evidence see S. Lancel, Carthage (1995), pp. 415-19, and 'L'enceinte periurbaine de Carthage lors de la troisieme guerre punique', Studia Phoenicia, X: Punic Wars, pp. 251-78.

2.

The Roman forces, Appian, Punic Wars 75, cf. P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), p. 428 and Appendix 26, Appian, Punic Wars 93.

3.

Appian, Punic Wars 97.

4.

Appian, Punic Wars 98; it was common practice in the later Roman army to exploit the rivalry between different units and branches of the service, e.g. Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 1. 39-41, Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 5. 502-3, Tacitus Hist. 3. 24, 5. 16, Inscriptions Latinae Selectae 5795.

5.

Scipio's early life and character, Polybius 31. 25. 2-30. 3; actions in 151, Polybius 35. 4. 8-5. 2; in general see A. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford, 1967), pp. 12-47.

6.

Appian, Punic Wars 99.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 100.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 101-09. For the identification of Nepheris with the area of Djebel Zaghouan, see Lancel (1995), p. 419.

2.

Appian, Punic Wars 110-11.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 112.

1.

See B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), pp. 282-3, Astin (1967), pp. 48-60 for first year of the war, 61-9 for Scipio's election.

2.

Appian, Punic Wars 113-14.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 115-18.

2.

Appian, Punic Wars 119-20; unfair distribution of supplies, Polybius 38. 8. 11.

3.

Appian, Punic Wars 121-3, Lancel (1995), pp. 422-4.

4.

E.g. Antonius Primus in AD 69, Tacitus, Histories 3. 17.

5.

Appian, Punic Wars 124-6.

1.

Appian, Punic Wars 127-30; for the archaeology of this area see Lancel (1995), pp. 156-72,425-6.

2.

Appian, Punic Wars 130-1; Polybius' portrayal of Hasdrubal 38. 7. 1-8. 15.

3.

Appian, Punic Wars 132-5; on the survival of some remains from Punic Carthage see Lancel (1995), pp. 428-9.

4.

Appian, Punic Wars 132.

5.

For the later career of Scipio Aemilianus see Astin (1967), pp. 80-241; the capture of Numantia, Appian, The Wars in Spain. 90-91; rumours concerning his death, see Appian, Bellum Civile 1. 19-20, Astin (1967), p. 241.

6.

The Elder Pliny rated Caesar as the greatest Roman commander because he had won more battles than anyone else, Natural History 7. 91-2, cf. Plutarch Caesar 15, Appian, Bellum Civile 2. 149-154.

7.

Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 6. 403-8 for end of siege of Jerusalem.

8.

On Roman involvement in Greece and the creation of the province of Macedonia see R. Kallet Marx, Hegemony to Empire (California, 1996), pp. 57-96.

Chapter 16

1.

Qui vincit non est victor nisi victus fatebur, Ennius, Fragment. 31, 493.

2.

P. Brunt, Italian Manpower (Oxford, 1971), pp. 422-34.

3.

Trophies taken from temples after Cannae, Livy 22. 57. 10-11.

1.

For logistics see J. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 264 BC -AD 235 (Leiden, 1999).

2.

For the change in the coinage see M. Crawford, 'War and finance', Journal of Roman Studies 54 (1964), pp. 29-32.

3.

See L. Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (London, 1984), E. Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army and Allies (Oxford, 1976), and R. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army (Manchester, 1958) for the army in this period.

4.

A. Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy. 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965) represents the most forceful argument for the long-term impact of the Second Punic War. Brunt (1971) criticized this view and cast doubt on the extent of devastation during the Italian campaigns. A good and insightful survey of the debate is to be found in T. Cornell, 'Hannibal's Legacy: The effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy', in T. Cornell, B. Rankov 8c

P. Sabin, The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal British Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 67 (London, 1996), pp. 97-117.

1.

E.g. Sallust, Bellum Catilinae 51. 38.

1.

For the dominance of commercial concerns in Punic thinking see B. Caven, The Punic Wars (London, 1980), passim, esp. pp. 291-4.

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