Ancient History & Civilisation


1. Compare Richard Robinson’s splendid description of his personal reaction to Aristotle’s style (Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV, Oxford, 1962, pp. xxvii–xxx). He remarks inter alia: ‘… unlike most people, I really enjoy it… Aristotle’s style is… dense, tightlipped and sketchy…. His style is beautiful.’

2. On the other categories of Aristotle’s works, see page 32 footnote 3 and page 34, footnote 2.

1. R. Weil briefly and judiciously assesses the character of Aristotle’s writings in Aristote et l’histoire: essai sur la ‘Politique’ (Paris, 1960), pp. 52–6; cf. Newman II, pp. xxxv–xxxix (see page 478 below for full reference). A fuller review is by W. J. Verdenius, ‘The nature of Aristotle’s scholarly writings’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles’ Werk und Wirkung I, Aristoteles und seine Schule (Berlin and New York, 1985), 12–21.

1. See H. Jackson’s entertaining account of the equipment of Aristotle’s lecture room, ‘Aristotle’s lecture-room and lectures’, Journal of Philology. 35 (1920), pp. 191–200. For an exhaustive discussion of the Lyceum’s status and organization, see J. P. Lynch,Aristotle’s School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution (Berkeley, 1972).

2. Cf. J. L. Stocks, ‘The composition of Aristotle’s Politics’, Classical Quarterly, 21 (1927), pp. 177–87, esp. p. 180: ‘The architectonic seems to me to point rather to the library than to the lecture room’, and I. Düring, ‘Notes on the history of the transmission of Aristotle’s writings’, Symholae Philologicae Goto-burgenses, 56. 3, 1958: ‘… an oral tradition in written form.’

3. For an account of Aristotle’s ‘exoteric’ or non-specialized works, which were written in a more finished style and for a wider circulation, see e.g. G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought (Cambridge, 1968). pp. 9–13.

4. Most accounts of Aristotle’s life and works rehearse the intriguing details.

1. W. D. Ross, Aristotle (5th ed., Oxford, 1949), p. 15 (The divisions into books and chapters are not Aristotle’s, though they are mostly neat enough and no doubt often occur at what he himself would have regarded as the ‘natural breaks’.)

1. For the Platonic reminiscences in these books, see also E. Barker, Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors (London, 1918), pp. 380–82; 5th ed. (1960), pp. 443–4.

2. These ‘Constitutions’, and other collections of facts on a wide variety of topics, are the ancient forerunners of our modern surveys based on systematic fieldwork and/or questionnaires. Aristotle’s conclusions about Creek politics are sometimes so familiar that they seem true to the point of triteness; yet given the state of communications in the ancient world, and the paucity of reliable records, the ability to base even obvious conclusions, let aloneunobvious ones, on a survey of the relevant facts is in itself a tremendous achievement. Not that Aristotle himself, in all probability, wrote more than a few of the ‘Constitutions’; presumably most were compiled by persons we should today call ‘research assistants’ or ‘research students’, who could cut their scholarly teeth in this manner, much as a modern research student writes his dissertation. Perhaps Aristotle laid down a certain standard pattern of presentation and supervised the day-to-day work; certainly he exploited the results: see ‘Preface to Book I’. One ‘Constitution’ has survived, but in incomplete form; there is a translation of it in Penguin by P. J. Rhodes (The Athenian Constitution, 1984).

1. For full references to the work of Jaeger and von Arnim, see the Select Bibliographies.

2. See C. J. Rowe’s sensible judgement: ‘We may need the genetic method to explain the peculiarities of the form of the Politics; but in the end it will not, I think, seriously affect our interpretation of its contents’ (‘Aims and methods in Aristotle’s Politics’, Classical Quarterly, 27 (1977), pp. 159–172 (171)).

1. On Aristotle’s teleological assumptions, see J. Hintikka, ‘Some conceptual presuppositions of Greek political theory’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 2 (1967), pp. 11–25, and R. Robinson, Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV (Oxford, 1962), pp. xvii ff.

2. The concept of nature in Aristotle’s political thought is discusssd by G. Boas, ‘A basic conflict in Aristotle’s philosophy’, American Journal of Philology, 64 (1943), pp. 172–93.

3. See e.g. Aristotle’s recognition in the first paragraph of III xii of the need for political philosophy, and cf. E. F. Miller, ‘Primary questions in political inquiry’, Review of Politics, 39 (1977), pp. 298–331.

4. Though Aristotle would admit that the nature of the subject-matter of political solutions prevents their being expressed with the same degree of precision and rigour.

1. Some of these large issues are discussed by E. M. Wood and N. Wood, Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Social Context (Oxford, 1978), pp. 5–12. See also J. H. Plumb, The Death of the Past (London, 1969), and R. Robinson, Aristotle’s Politics, Books III and IV (Oxford, 1962), pp. xii–xv.

1. Cf. the treatment of the past in George Orwell’s 1984 (Penguin edition), esp. pp. 198–200, and the Appendix, ‘On the Principles of Newspeak’, ad init.: ‘The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted… a heretical thought… should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words.’

1. See the last paragraph of his introduction: ‘In an attempt to convey something of the complexity of meaning attaching to certain Greek terms different English words have been used to translate them.’ That indeed does great service, and makes for idiomatic translation; there are problems, as I explain. Sinclair drew attention to key terms in his italic comments inserted at intervals in the text, but not extensively or systematically; thus my own more elaborate way of coping with the problem builds on a good foundation laid down by Sinclair himself.

2. On this central dilemma of a translator, see further my article, ‘The Penguinification of Plato’, Greece and Rome, 22 (1975). pp. 19–28, esp. p. 27.

1. I have also tried to translate with some degree of consistency a number of rarer or less important words; but they are not included in the glossaries, which clearly need to be of manageable size. The potential ramifications are endless, and if not strictly controlled rapidly generate glossaries of Himalayan bulk. Further notes on the scope and use of the glossaries will be found as a preface to them (p. 489).

1. There is an abundance of comprehensive accounts of Aristotle’s political thought which could usefully supplement the two brief introductions in this volume: see the Select Bibliographies.

1. The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomson, revised with notes and appendices by Hugh Tredennick, introduction and bibliography by Jonathan Barnes (Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth 1976), Book 1, Chapter iii.

1. It is not included in Thomson’s translation of the Ethics.

* Translation and notes by Hugh Tredennick, extracted from his revised edition of the The Ethics of Aristotle (Penguin Classics, 1976), p. 342. On note 2, see further pp. 34–5 above.

1. This concluding passage was obviously written to connect the Ethics to the Politics; but written by whom? Opinions have been sharply divided. The implication that Plato had nothing of importance to say about education by legislation, or about types of constitution and their changes, seems perverse and is in fact inconsistent with the actual procedure in the Politics, where Plato’s views are nearly always traceable as underlying A.’s thought, and often explicitly criticized or rejected. At the same time the fact that the outlined programme does not correspond very accurately with the actual treatment may tell for no less than against authenticity, because an ‘editor’ might have been expected to produce a neater and more convincing link. The problem can only be stated here: it does not yet seem to have been solved.

2. According to tradition A. wrote 158 such Constitutions, of which the Constitution of Athens is the only survivor.

1. Hē koinōnia politikē: ‘the association that takes the form of a polis (state)’.

2. Politikos, ‘statesman’, in the sense explained in the introduction to this chapter.

3. The formulation is adequate as far as it goes; but Aristotle’s point is that a king and a statesman differ sharply in kind: a king is set apart in some fundamental respect from his subjects, while a statesman is the equal of his; cf. I vii and xii.

4. The analytical method described in the introduction to this chapter.

5. Technikos.

6. Of statesman, household-manager, etc.

1. Male and female are ‘incapable of existing without each other’ not as individuals but as members of a species, over a period of many generations. Note the contrast between instinctive nature (phusis) and rational and purposive choice (prohairesis); on the latter, see Nicomachean Ethics III ii.

2. Evidently a knife capable of more than one mode of cutting, and not perfectly adapted to any one of them.

3. I.e of marriage.

4. Somewhat confusingly, Aristotle uses ‘slave’ both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense. In non-Greek societies a woman and a slave are ‘in the same position’ in that their de facto rulers (husband and master respectively) have not the wisdom and the rationality nature demands in a ‘natural’ ruler: authority is exercised by persons who are in point of fitness for rule no better than slaves. The ‘slave’ husband makes a ‘slave’ of his wife.

5. Euripides, Iphigeneia in Aulis 1400.

6. Works and Days 405.

7. Charondas was a lawgiver of Catana, in Sicily, probably of the sixth century: Aristotle refers to him several times. Epimenides was a Cretan seer and wonder-worker of about 600.

8. Apoikia: ‘settlement’, ‘colony’, ‘extension’.

9. I.e. ‘sucklings of the same milk’.

10. Odyssey IX. 114–5.

11. Themisteuei. ‘lays down themis’ (‘ordinance’, ‘customary law’. a term in early Greek social and legal thought).

12. Autarkeia, ‘political and/or economic independence’. Aristotle’s use of the word here is however somewhat wider than this, and embraces opportunities to live the ‘good’ life according to the human virtues.

13. Aristotle makes succinct use of his teleological technicalities: the ‘aim’ (‘that-for-the-sake-of-which’, to hou heneka) is the ‘final cause’, the ‘end’ or purpose towards which a process of development is directed and in which it culminates.

14. Politikon zōon, ‘who lives whose nature is to live, in a polis (state)’; cf. Nicomachean Ethics, I vii ad fin.

15. Iliad IX, 63.

16. Athemistos: see n. 11.

17. I.e. without a state. It is such a person’s pugnacity that Aristotle seems to regard as marking him out as in some sense non-human; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1177b9.

18. A slightly comic sentence; but obviously it is the notion of the state as an association that Aristotle has in mind. On this sentence see R. G. Mulgan, ‘Aristotle’s doctrine that man is a political animal’, Hermes, 102 (1974), pp. 438–45, and cf. Aristotle, History of Animals 487b33–488a13.

19. Aisthēsis.

20. Literally ‘destroyed’, ‘ruined’ (by the dismemberment apparently envisaged in the preceding sentence).

21. Of not having a function and a capacity.

22. E.g. limbs (individuals : state :: limbs : body).

23. Politikēs koinōnias taxis, ‘the framework or organization of the association that takes the form of a polis (state)’.

24. In this paragraph dikaiosunē, the ‘virtue’ or ‘sense’ of justice, seems to be distinguished from dikē, ‘justice’, the concrete expression or embodiment of that virtue or sense in a legal and administrative system. ‘What is just’ (dikaion) evidently means particular and individual just relationships arrived at or (in courts) reestablished by the application of dikaiosunē through the medium of the system of justice, or just system, dikē.

1. See I i.

2. Despotikē (‘of a master’), with some such noun as archē (‘rule’) to be supplied here and (in the plural, archai) after ‘three’ in the next sentence. In the case of ‘matrimonial’ (gamikē, ‘to do with marriages’), and ‘paternal’ (teknopoiētikē, ‘procreative’), Aristotle gropes for words. He lacks an adjective for a husband’s authority over his wife and for all their relationships in general, including the sexual, and for the relationship (mainly of authority) of both parents to their children, not only of the father (for which he couldhave used patrikē); cf. I xii. For once, a Greek did not ‘have a word for it’.

1. Homer, Iliad XVIII, 376: Hephaestus’ statues were fitted with wheels. Daedalus’ statues were so lifelike that they were thought to move.

2. A ‘plucker’ was the instrument with which the strings or the lyre were played by the performer.

3. Praktikon, ‘with which to do something’.

4. I.e. separate from its possessor (unlike the hand in I ii, which loses its power when severed from its owner).

1. E.g. mind and body form a continuous combination (an individual living being); master and slave form a discontinuous combination.

2. A clipped reference to the special position of the note mesē in the scale: see [Aristotle], Problems 920a19–23, b7–15, 922a22–7.

3. See I i.

4. That is, I take it, mind commands body, but intelligence has to persuade desire.

5. I.e. by a master.

6. Aisthanesthai, cf. aisthēsis, I ii, n. 19.

7. I.e. other than man.

8. Politikos bios, ‘the political life, life as a member of a polis’.

l. I.e. as well as a ‘natural’ slavery.

2. Dikaion.

3. In the Athenian Assembly a charge ‘of illegality’ (paranomōn) could be brought against a proposer of a law which contravened existing law.

4. Cf. Thrasymachus’ arguments in Plato, Republic I.

5. (a) ‘virtue, when… force’; (b) ‘anything which… good’.

6. Those outlined in the first paragraph of the chapter?

7. Cf. Plato, Republic 469bc.

8. A tragic poet of the mid fourth century. The quotation is fr. 3 in A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1889), p. 802.

9. Cf. I iv.

1. See I i.

2. A line of Philemon (fourth–third centnry), a poet of the New Comedy (fr. 54 in T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, Leipzig, 1880–88, II i).

3. Timē.

4. The knowledge appropriate to a slave and the knowledge appropriate to his master as user.

5. A reflection evidently suggested by the preceding chapter (presumably with a tacit restriction that those enslaved by the ‘just’ method of acquisition must be ‘natural’ slaves: see also I viii and VII xiv, end).

1. See I i.

2. Fr. 13, line 71 in J. H. Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus I (London and New York, Loeb edition, 1931).

1. Chrēmatistikē, ‘the acquisition of goods’ in the unfavourable sense (type (3) in the introduction to this chapter).

2. The ‘natural’ kind, described in the last paragraph of I viii.

3. Because it carries exchange beyond the extent necessary to adjust natural inequalities in the distribution of goods.

4. Technikos; cf. ‘skill’ at end of first paragraph.

5. In shops, etc.: see end of next paragraph.

6. An etymological point: ‘coinage’ = nomisma; ‘convention’ = nomos.

7. A legendary King of Phrygia. notorious for extreme wealth. He prayed to the god Dionysus that everything he touched should turn to gold: the prayer was granted, and naturally he found he could not eat.

8 See the quotation from Solon in I viii.

9 Not, at any rate, without limit. See the first paragraph of I viii and the first two of I x: the function of household-management is to use goods (and use sets limits to their acquisition).

1. I viii ad init.

2. See I i.

3. Tokos (‘offspring’).

1Of the acquisition of goods.

2. I.e. the foregoing details, though abundant, are nevertheless so incomplete as to be mere summaries.

3 Chrēmatistikē in sense (3) in the introduction to I ix.

1. Cf. I iii ad init. Despotikē = ‘rule of a master’ (over slaves); patrikē = ‘rule of a father’, ‘paternal’; gamikē = ‘to do with marriages’, ‘matrimonial’.

2. Politikē archē, in the particular sense of citizens ruling over fellow-citizens; cf. I i, v, vii.

3. Herodotus (II 172) relates how King Amasis of Egypt (sixth century), being reproached for his humble origins, had a foot-basin refashioned into a statue of a god, which the Egyptians then worshipped – the moral being that it is what one is now that matters.

4. Iliad I, 144.

1. Aretē.

2. Architektōn, ‘chief maker’, ‘master builder’. This rather curious remark seems to mean that a slave has moral virtue only in so far as he is required by his master to have it to fulfil hisfunction, with little or no intellectual appreciation of its natureand reasons. But his master has ethical virtue in its entirety, a full intellectual and rational understanding of it, and of why andhow far his slave must possess it to perform his tasks well.

3. I.e. wrongly thought that in some sense they were the same (Xenophon, Symposium II, 9; Plato, Republic 452e ff., Meno 71e ff.).

4. As reported at the beginning of Plato’s Meno. Gorgias was a ‘sophist’ of the fifth century.

5. Sophocles, Ajax 293.

6. Aristotle expresses himself rather mysteriously, but he probably means that the craftsman, though legally free, is ‘slavish’ because of his occupation, and like the slave attains moral virtue only in so far as he is controlled and instructed by a master/employer.

7. Presumably a reference to Plato, Laws 777e.

1.Koinōnia politikē; see I i init.

2. Whether written or actual, presumably.

3. The argument depends partly on the obvious verbal connection between koinōnia (‘association’) and koinōnein/koinōnos (‘to share’/‘sharer’).

4. Republic 427c ff. ‘Held in common’ = koina.

1. Perhaps a reference to Republic 472–3.

2. Republic 422e ff., 462a ff.

3. Nicomachean Ethics, V v. ‘Reciprocal equivalence’, to ison to antipeponthos, the principle of mutually supporting diversity of function, whereby (to take a simple example) a shoemaker provides shoes for a baker, who provides bread in return. Here, however, Aristotle uses the term in a wider and more political sense, to summarize the ‘services’ ruler and ruled render to each other by the proper performance of the duties of each role.

4. Politikē koinōnia, i.e. the state: see I i.

5. I.e. that those in charge should always be the same. The sentence is cloudily written, and not improved by Ross’s punctuation, which seems to me plainly wrong: I replace the full stop in 1261b2 by a comma.

6. That is to say self-sufficiency, which is desirable, is incompatible with unity: the individual (a unity) is least self-sufficient, whereas the state is most self-sufficient, though least a unity. If it were made a unity, its self-sufficiency would vanish.

1. Republic 462c.

2. I.e. even where terms are used with more than ordinary care.

3. I.e. ‘all separately’: each object held in common would be called ‘his own’ by each person individually in the usual strong and private sense of ‘own’.

4. I.e. ‘all together’: each object held in common would be called ‘his own’ by each person, but in the weak sense of ‘own’, as being possessed by many others also.

5. Phratria, a formally organized kinship-group.

6. ‘Just’, because in producing offspring like the stallion she gave ‘good value’. Pharsalus was a city of Thessaly.

1. Republic 403a ff.

2. I.e. where these persons were ignorant of each other’s identity.

3. Symposium 191a and 192de.

4. I.e. one like the Republic’s, which, by making wives and children common, aims at excessive unity, as in the Symposium.

5. Literally, ‘in this sort of politeia’ and ‘people whose politeia is run in this manner’ (politeuomenoi). Politeia is used here in a wide general sense of ‘politico-social structure’. The reference is of course to the Républic.

6. Republic 415b ff.

1‘Affection’, ‘fond’ etc. = philia, philein etc.; ‘selfishness’ = philauton (‘lover of self); ‘friends’ = philoi.

2 I.e. by the abolition of private ownership.

3. Philanthrōpos.

4.Republic 464c ff.

5. I.e. there are so few common owners that their quarrels, when measured against the sheer numbers of private owners, are rare. When measured against the numbers of common owners, the quarrels would be seen to be frequent.

6. II ii.

7. Literally ‘philosophy’, in a broad and non-technical sense.

8. I.e. families and property, on a private basis.

9. Republic 422e.

10. I.e., apparently, like the citizens of an occupied state.

11. Republic 425d.

12. I.e. as among the Guardians.

13. The farmers’, etc.

14. I.e. the Auxiliary Guardians, who have military and administrative functions.

15. Republic 415a ff.

16. Republic 419a ff., 465e ff., 519b ff.

1. Republic 373e ff., 412d ff.

2. Republic 451d ff.

3. Koinoteros, ‘more common’.

4. Laws 781, 737e; Republic 423a.

5. Laws 704 ff., 735a ff., 747d, 842c–e, 848a ff. and various other passages deal with these topics. Plato is not in fact inattentive to foreign affairs: see 737d, 758c, 949e ff.; cf. Jaeger (in Select Bibliographies) 288 ff.

6. I.e. of contact with the outside world, from which Plato’s state in the Laws was largely insulated.

7. Koinos: literally, ‘the common life of the state’.

8. Laws 737c–d.

9. Plato discusses these matters at Laws 740b–741a.

10. VII v, x, xvi.

11. Laws 734e–735a.

12. Laws 744e. Plato actually speaks of ‘four times’, but Aristotle is probably accurate. See T. J. Saunders, ‘The property classes and the value of the κῆρος in Plato’s Laws’, Éranos, LIX (1961), pp. 29–39.

13. Laws 745c ff., 775e ff.; but compare Aristotle’s own proposal in VII x.

14. See Laws 693e ff., 701e and esp. 756e.

15. Laws 751–68 is the chief discussion.

16. Laws 764a.

17. E.g. Laws 763de.

18. Laws 756b–e. The procedure is complex: see G. R. Morrow, Plato’s Cretan City (Princeton, 1960), p. 166 ff. (In 1266a17 I read τούς, not τοῖς: see my note in Liverpool Classical Monthly, 3 [1978], pp. 179–80.)

19. IV vii–ix, xi–xiii.

20. Laws 753a–d, 756b–e.

1. See I i.

2. Laws 744 e; cf. II vi, n. 12.

3. Koinōnia politikē: cf. I i.

4. Solon (Archōn of Athens, appointed probably in 594) introduced a variety of economic measures designed to reduce the very great and oppressive differences of wealth existing at that time, though he certainly did not wish to equalize the property of all.

5. Homer, Iliad IX, 319.

6. (i)Those who commit crimes to obtain the necessities of life; (ii) those who do so to obtain more than necessities to satisfy desires and obtain pleasure; (iii) those who want more than necessities in order to be able to live a life of ‘pleasures that bring no pain’. In the last case, Aristotle seems to mean that ‘philosophy’ is a ‘cure’ in that leading a philosophic life makes many or all of one’s desires for other things subside: the pleasures of philosophy make one independent of pleasure from other sources.

7. I.e. once a man has the necessities of life, to become a tyrant is a greater crime than mere thieving.

8. Eubulus was a banker who in the confused political situation in Asia Minor, c. 359 B.c., had gained control of Atarneus and Assos.

9. The reference is to the diōbelia: for a discussion and references see P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), pp. 355–6,492.

10. Cf. VII x, fin. Nothing further is known of Diophantus’ proposal.

1. Hubris

2. That is to say, enjoy citizenship, the right to hold office under the constitution.

3. Hippodamus.

4. I.e. to work the common land in support of the fighters.

5. His own and that of a warrior.

6. I.e. requiring only ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ as a verdict.

7. Cf. Plato, Laws 677b.

8. Cf. III xi fin., Nicomachean Ethics, V x; Plato, Politicus 294a–c and Laws 925d ff.

1. I.e. menial, mechanical, routine; ‘freedom’ = scholē, ‘leisure’.

2. Cf. Plato, Laws 776 ff.

33. Presumably Lycurgus, and so throughout this chapter unless otherwise stated (see introductory note): cf. Plato, Laws init.

4. In 369. The next words may also be rendered: ‘they were useless, like women in other states, and caused…’

5. Literally ‘parts’ (merē), cf. Plato, Laws 630 d ff.

6. Cf. Plato, Laws 779e ff., 804e ff.

7. In the 4th and 5th paragraphs of this chapter. See P. Cartledge, ‘Spartan Wives: Liberation or Licence?’, Classical Quarterly, 31 (1981), pp. 84–105.

8. The train of thought is probably, ‘so far from there being such restrictions, heiresses, who may possess substantial property, may actually be given…’.

9. ‘Heir’ in a presumably very limited sense: he merely hands over the estate, with its owner the heiress whom he has ‘Inherited’, to someone prepared to marry her.

10. The battle of Leuctra, against Thebes, in 371.

11. Dēmagōgein, ‘act like a demagogue, turn demagogue’, in order to deal with them.

12. Either Theopompus, a king of Sparta in the eighth/seventh century (cf. V xi), or Lycurgus (see introductory note).

13. It is usually assumed that the method employed was the same as for the election of the Elders; see note 15.

14. The scrutiny or audit, euthuna, undergone by Athenian officials and those of many other Greek states on the expiry of their term of duty.

15. See Plutarch, Lycurgus 26: the choice was made by elaborately managed acclamation. For the following sentiments, cf. Plato, Republic 347b–d; 519b ff.

16. See III xiv–xviii.

17. I.e. on an hereditary basis.

18. I.e. two Ephors.

19. ‘Messes’, sussitia, designed to foster social and military solidarity, and compulsory for all adult male Spartans if they were to remain full citizens. Cf. II x.

20. I init., and 666e, 688a, 705d.

21. See under ‘property’ earlier in this chapter.

1. Plutarch Lycurgus 3–4; cf. Herodotus I 65, Pausanias III 3.

2. A Greek ‘colony’ was not a ‘subject territory’ in the modern sense, but simply a new state formed by citizens who left their homeland (though the mother state would naturally exercise some influence and control over the new foundation).

3. King of Crete in the remote past, famed as a legislator (cf. Plato, Laws init.), and after his death one of the judges of the souls in the underworld.

4. I.e. men’s meals or gatherings.

5. Cf. II ix, 2nd paragraph from end.

6. Literally ‘liturgies’ (leitourgiai), ‘public services’, payments to defray the cost of certain public functions (e.g. festivals). ‘Communal’ seems to indicate that in Crete such services were paid for not by wealthy individuals (as at Athens), but by the state.

7. Evidently enough was left over from the common meals for each man to take home something for his wife and children.

8. No such discussion is to be found in Aristotle.

9. See II ix.

10. A ‘power-group’ is a dunasteia, a cabal of ‘powerful people’ (dunatoi) acting in an arbitrary and sharply oligarchial manner: see IV v, vi.

11. Koinōnia politikē, ‘the association that takes the form of a polis (state)’; cf. I i.

12. Literally, ‘its distance has created xenēlasiai,’ i.e. ‘extrusions of aliens’, for which Sparta was notorious.

13. The event referred to is uncertain.

1. Cf. I ix, ‘The Ephors’, and I x.

2. From the perfection of the ‘ideal’ state, presumably, as distinct from that of the ‘best possible’ (i.e. the variety of aristocracy Aristotle calls a ‘polity’): cf. Il, ix init.

3. The Greek does not make it clear whether the unanimity and the ‘power of decision’ are about the referral itself, or about the actual matter under consideration; nor whether ‘unanimity’ (literally ‘if all agree’) means ‘both of the two kings and all the elders’ or (more probably) ‘kings and elders’ (thought of as two bodies, presumably with majority voting in the second).

4. ‘Pentarchies’.

5. I.e. as well as to virtue (aretē).

6. Politikōteron, ‘more fitted to (be the practice or policy of) a statesman, politikos’, i.e. a citizen (politēs) in his capacity as an office-bearer in a state (polis); or perhaps ‘more characteristic of a polity’.

7. Probably II ii, 3rd paragraph.

8. And therefore liable to dissolution by revolt of the less wealthy. Apparently the remedy was to enrich part of the common people on occasion by dispatching them to lucrative positions in ‘the states’ mentioned at the end of the sentence. Presumably these states were either Carthaginian ‘colonies’ (see II x, n. 2 and Plato, Laws 740e), or other places somehow subject to Carthaginian control.

1. In this paragraph, ‘political’ has the sense ‘to do with the state (polis)’ and ‘experience of politics’ = politeuthentes, ‘having taken part in state affairs’. ‘Drafted laws’ = nomōn dēmiourgos, ‘workman, or maker, or framer, of laws’; cf. Pittacus in the final paragraph of the chapter.

2.For Lycurgus and the Spartan constitution, see II ix. Solon legislated for Athens in 594 B.C., or possibly somewhat later. His chief reform was to abolish existing debts contracted on security of land or person, and to forbid debts on security of person in the future. He thus sharply curtailed the economic and political power of the Eupatridae (rich nobles), who had by lending reduced many poorer Athenians to slavery. See Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 1–14.

3. Areopagus means ‘Hill of Ares’. Before Solon the Council consisted exclusively or mainly of Eupatridae; in the course of time, under democratic pressure, it came to include members of other classes also.

4. Ephialtes was a democratic politician. His measures of 462–1 deprived the Areopagus of political powers, and it then retained only certain judicial functions, notably as the court for cases of deliberate homicide. Pericles (495–429) was in 462–1 an associate of Ephialtes. ‘Leader of the people’ = ‘demagogue’: see pp. 310 and 324. n. 3.

5. Solon’s constitution distinguished four property-classes, based on annual income of measures (medimnoi) of corn or equivalent in money or other produce: Pentacosiomedimnoi (‘500 measures men’), Knights (Hippeis, ‘cavalry’, 500–300 measures), Zeugitae (possibly ‘yoke of oxen men’, 300–200), and Thetes (labourers, less than 200).

6. Dates: Zaleucus and Thales, probably mid seventh century; Charondas, probably sixth century. This Cretan Thales (otherwise Thaletas) should not be confused with Thales the Milesian philosopher. The tangled details of this parenthesis apparently refer to attempts to trace the origin of the art of legislation to Crete; cf. II x init.

7. 728.

8. See n. 6. Episkēpsis is a technical term of Greek law: ‘giving notice of intention to prosecute’ (here an allegedly false witness).

9. II vii.

10. II i–vi.

11. Laws 640c–e, 671a–672a.

12. Laws 794d ff.

13. Draco produced Athens’ first written legal code, probably in 621–20.

14. Ruler of Mytilene, 589–79.

15. The point of this somewhat paradoxical sentence seems to be that Pittacus, although accepting the principle that drunkenness is an excuse of a kind, decided, in view of the close correlation between crime and drunkenness, that the principle had to be overridden on social grounds in favour of a policy of deterring intoxication by extra penalties. For the possibly political point of Pittacus’ law, see O. Murray, ‘The Greek Symposium in History’, in E. Gabba (ed.). Tria Corda, Scritti in onore di Arnoldo Momigliano(Como, 1983) 257–72 [268].

16. Mentioned here only.

1. Such citizens would acquire the status other than by birth (presumably for services rendered, or honoris causa), but exercise none or only some of its privileges.

2. I.e. between states. ‘Legal processes’ = dikaia.

3. I.e. as citizens.

4. Ekklēsia, an assembly of all the citizens of a state.

5. I.e. in point of length of tenure.

6. A technically worded generalization prompted by the particular point which follows immediately. Constitutions (‘substrata’, ‘underlying conditions’) to which citizens (‘things’) belong, differ in kind and rank in an order of merit, so that (e.g.) a citizen in an oligarchy differs so radically from a citizen in a democracy as to preclude there being anything much in common between the two, in so far as they are citizens (and not simply men, for example).

7. III vi fin., cf. II xi.

8. I.e. not in regular courts with juries of citizens, as in general at Athens, but by various separate and more select bodies or officials, as exemplified in the next sentence.

9. Kritikē, ‘to do with giving judgements’.

1. Gorgias was a famous Sicilian ‘sophist’, who paid a visit to Athens in 427. Dēmiourgos was the Greek word for ‘workman’, and, in some states including apparently Larissa, for a certain type of public official; and the word ‘Larissaean’ was used to describe both a citizen of Larissa and a kind of pot made there. Gorgias’ point is that to be ‘made’ a Larissaean (citizen) by a ‘workman’ (official) is a perfectly good criterion of citizenship.

2. At the end of III i.

3. Thus making them citizens, in 510. (I omit metoikous from the text, as a gloss on xenous.)

1. III i ad init.

2. Presumably members of the new regime. ‘Entered into’: literally ‘took’, presumably the money or goods, without giving the agreed return.

3. I.e. not at all. One cannot have it both ways: if the acts of a tyrant may be disowned on the grounds that he is not acting in the common interest, so too may those of a democracy, if its aims are similarly unacceptable.

4. I.e. the social and political sense, and the territorial.

5. V iii and VII iv.

6. Aristotle is probably thinking of Heraclitus’ celebrated remarks on unity and change, notably ‘Upon those who step into the same rivers ever-changing waters flow’ (fr. 12 in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I, 6th ed., Berlin, 1951–2).

1. Sōtēria, ‘safety’, ‘stability’, a major preoccupation of Greek states, and an important topic in the analysis of the causes of constitutional change in V–VI.

2. It is inevitable, because of their inevitable diversity of function, and therefore of virtue.

3. Phronimos, ‘possessing practical wisdom’, phronēsis.

4. From Euripides’ Aeolus: part of lines 2 and 3 of fr. 16 in A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1889).

5. I.e. one who is ruling wisely and well in a ‘best’ state.

6. This unintelligible sentence reflects the apparently garbled and lacunose condition of the Greek.

7. I.e. of citizens over fellow-citizens, by turns; cf. I i.

8. I.e. not the same as the self-control and justice exercised in being ruled.

1. I.e. the hypothesis (hupothesis) that they will grow up to become citizens.

2. Supply something like, ‘without actually going to that extreme… ’.

3. Probably a reference to III i.

4. Timai, ‘status’, ‘respect’, ‘privileges’, such as are peculiarly gained from holding office.

5. Iliad, IX 648, XVI 59.

6. Sunoikountōn, i.e. that part of the total population which is excluded from citizenship etc., and merely lives in the same state together with its citizens.

1. In this chapter both ‘office’ and ‘authority’ translate archē, literally ‘rule’. ‘Rule of a master’ translates despoteia.

2. Politikon zōon, ‘an animal whose nature is to live in a polis (state)’; cf. I ii, n. 14.

3. Politikē koinōnia, ‘the association that takes the form of a polis (state)’; cf. I i.

4. Or, ‘external (“extra-mural”?) or published treatises’.

5. I.e. since a ruler looks after the interests of the ruled, the former claims in due course reciprocal service from the latter.

6. Leitourgein; cf. IV iv, n. 11.

1. If, that is, they are to be called citizens.

2. ‘Monarch’ means literally ‘the rule of one’.

3. Aristos means ‘best’.

4. Politeia means ‘constitution’.

1. I.e. over slaves; the reference is to the end of III vi.

2. Because we expect to find the ruling class in democracy to be poor, and in an oligarchy to be rich.

3. In III vii.

4. I.e. to control it, by being citizens and therefore entitled to hold office.

1. I.e. it is just to give more (property, privileges, etc) to the more deserving (persons), less to the less deserving. The reference is to Nicomachean Ethics, V iii.

2. I.e. to agree that two things are equal (in size, value, etc.) is easy; to agree that two persons are equal (in worth or merit) is difficult, because the criteria are highly disputable.

3. I.e. the association in question: see I i.

4. ‘Happiness’ is the customary but inadequate translation of eudaimonia. the state of well-being which consists in living in the exercise of all, especially the highest (i.e. rational and ethical), faculties of man.

5. Lycophron’s date is uncertain. He was probably a pupil of Gorgias (c. 483–376), and had sceptical views about the merits of noble birth. Little else is known of him. On this passage, see R. G. Mulgan, Journal of the History of Ideas, 40 (1979), pp. 121–8, and W. K. C. Guthrie’s reply (p. 128).

6. Dikaia. (neuter plural), literally ‘just things’; perhaps ‘justclaims’.

7. Genē, ‘kinship-groups’, ‘clans’.

8. Kalos, ‘fine’, ‘good’.

1. III xii–xvii, IV, VI.

2. Apparently that of III x, ‘who should be sovereign?’

3. Cf. II xii, and Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians 7–8.

4. Or perhaps ‘sense’: the word is aisthēsis, which picks up ‘senses’ (aisthēseis, plural) in the first paragraph.

5. In the first paragraph of this chapter.

6. Of allowing to the people the power of choosing officials and scrutinizing their conduct.

7. That broached in III x.

8. III x ad fin.

9. For ‘correct’ and ‘deviated’ constitutions, see III vi–vii,

1. Politikē dunamis.

2. Nicomachean Ethics, V vi.

3. Politikē philosophia, ‘philosophy about the polis (stale)’.

4. Politika dikaia, ‘just things in the context of the polis’.

5. E.g. if a given amount, a, of (say) wealth is ‘greater’ (or ‘better’, kreitton) than a given degree, d, of virtue, there must be some amount of wealth, less than a, which is equal to d.

6. Politikē aretē, especially in their capacity as politikoi: see introduction to I i.

1. III vi–vii, and cf. introduction to III ix.

2. Cf. III ix.

3. Koinos, koinōnikos, ‘in common’, ‘communal’.

4. Aretē, ‘virtue’.

5. Dikaion, i.e. the ‘partly just’ principle based on wealth or merit, invoked by more than one ‘rich’ or ‘better’ person to establish their right to rule.

6. In the second part of the preceding sentence. ‘Right’ = orthos, ‘straight’, ‘correct’.

7. Politikē dunamis, the ability to contribute to the life of the state (polis) by proper discharge of the functions of a citizen (politēs) in his capacity as a ‘statesman’ (politikos), i.e. one who rules and is ruled by turn.

8. Cf. Plato, Politicus.303b.

9. ‘Show us your claws and your teeth.’ Antisthenes was a devoted follower of Socrates, and wrote extensively on ethical topics.

10. Periander was tyrant of Corinth from c. 625 to 585, Thrasybulus being tyrant of the Miletus at about the same time; see Herodotus, V 92, and V x, n. 11, and V xi, n. 2.

11. Archē, ‘rule’.

12. In 427 (Thucydides III 2 ff., 36 ff.), 424 (Thucydides IV 51), and 440–39 (Thucydides I 115–18) respectively.

13. Of removing rivals.

14. Politikon III xii, n. 4.

15. Of the ruling element, whatever this happens to be.

16. Or ‘influence’: cf. earlier in this chapter 2813’

17. That is. presumably, by holding offices turn and turn about with Zeus; cf. III xvii ad fin.

1 There were two of them: cf. II ix.

2Iliad, II 391–3, with some omissions and the addition of ‘for… hand’.

3. About 590; fr. 160 of Alcaeus in J. M. Edmonds, Lyra Graecal (Loeb Classical Library, 2nd ed., 1928). See also F. E. Romer, p. 487 below.

1. Parekbainein, the verb used to describe a constitution as ‘deviant’ (e.g. III vi). ‘This man’ is presumably the ruler.

2. Cf. III xi.

3.Spoudaioi tēn psuchēn, literally ‘sound in respect of soul’.

4. ‘Aristocracy’ means literally, ‘power (held by) the best’.

5. The numbers of the rich rulers, presumably: wealth, the qualification for ruling, became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

6. These last three words are not in the Greek. I take the point to be that the king will not hand over to one of his sons if none of them is suitable.

7. I.e. one who rules according to law.

1. III xv init.

2. ‘Much less expedient’, Newman.

3. The formulation echoes that of the Athenian juryman’s oath.

4. Kurios, usually ‘sovereign’. ‘Customary’ = literally ‘laws by habit’ (ethos, ethē), which we obey more or less without thinking. The paragraph seems to argue against Plato, Politicus 296b ff.

5. Homer, Iliad X 224 and II 372.

6. Presumably the advocates of the rule of law, or simply men in general.

1 ‘Statesmen’ are fellow-citizens, who rule turn and turn about: see I i.

2. III xiii, ad fin.

3. Genos, so too ‘family’ subsequently.

4. Of utterly outstanding virtue.

5. Meros, ‘part’; kata meros, ‘in turn’, ‘alternately’. The point is that rule by turns is suitable for parts; but parts are not superior to the whole; ‘such a man’ is superior to the whole; therefore rule by turns is not suitable for him.

1. See III vii.

2. Genos, cf. III xvii.

3. III iv–v.

4. Ethē: cf. III xvi, n. 4.

1. Epistēmē, translated as ‘science’ elsewhere in this chapter.

2. I.e. the lesser.

3. Koinos.

4. In the preceding paragraph? Or perhaps III viii is meant.

1. Evidently III vii in particular.

2. III xiv–xviii.

3. III vii, xv, xvii.

4. III xvii.

5. See especially IV viii and ix.

6. Probably a reference to Plato, Politicus 303ab.


8.VI i–vii.

9. V in toto.

1. Possibly III xii ad fin.

2. The Dorian and Phrygian ‘modes’ (harmoniai) were two of several Greek ‘styles’ of music, each of which tended to be associated with particular kinds of theme and treatment. See further VIII v–vii.

3. Literally, tēs eu kekramenēs harmonias, ‘from the well-mixed mode’.

4. Despotikos, ‘like a mastership (of slaves)’.

1. I.e. of participants in the constitution.

2. I.e. if we consider the number of rulers as the sole criterion of nomenclature.

3. Wealth and freedom, as opposed to numbers.

4. Early seventh century, when Gyges was king of Lydia.

5. IV iii ad init.

6. 369b–371e.

7. Dikaiosunē dikastikē, ‘justice in trials’, as determined by jury men (dikastai); cf. I ii, n.24.

8. Syneseōs politikēs ergon, a fine expression, literally ‘activity of insight connected with the polis’.

9. I.e. the occupations present in Plato’s ‘first’ state, and Aristotle’s additions.

10. I.e. to say nothing of other kinds of fighter.

11. Literally, ‘render leitourgiai, public services’ (cf. II x, n. 6). ‘Liturgies’ were compulsory payments by the richer citizens towards the expenses of certain public functions, e.g. of dramatic and musical festivals. In the case of the eighth part the point is presumably that to hold office is a ‘contribution’ or ‘expenditure’ of a kind, analogous to the expenditure of money by the seventh part: cf. III vi.

12. In the preceding paragraph.

13. Literally, ‘according to the same difference, i.e. distinguishing principle’. That is to say, under one heading come advantages (wealth, etc.); under another, disadvantages.

14. As to birth, it seems; cf. IV vi, n. 3.

15. Iliad, II 204–5.

16. Literally, monarchia, ‘rule by one’.

1. Probably existing ‘sharers in the constitution’: see the penultimate paragraph of IV vi.

2. I.e. ‘those without a share in the constitution’, though qualified in point of property.

1. In order to hold office.

2. The text and meaning of this sentence are uncertain. As it stands, the train of thought seems to be ‘… but democracies, in imposing no property-qualification, do not solve the problem: participation still requires office-holders to be compensated from revenue for “loss of income” ’.

3. Anupeuthunoi: cf. IV iv, n. 14.

4. Monarchia.

5. I.e. a law providing for the restricted entry, presumably.

1. Aristocracy.

2. III iv, v, vii, xv, xviii contain relevant material.

3. Cf. III iv. On the ‘assumed situation’ (hupothesis), cf. IV xi, n. 9.

4. Oligarchy and polity.

5. Carthage and Sparta.

6. Aristocracy is characteristically oligarchic: see III vii, IV ii.

1. I.e. from polity and the aristocracies mentioned. The reference is perhaps to III vii, where polity is briefly described; cf. II vi, 1265b26.

2. Mē aristokratoumenē, ‘run not as an aristocracy (aristos = ‘best man’), but ponērokratoumenē, ‘run by the bad’ (ponēroi, i.e. oligarchs).

3. Wealth commonly leads to the virtues characteristic of an aristocracy of the ‘people of quality’ (kaloi kagathoi); only when it does not do we have a polity, as distinct from an aristocracy.

4. The triple mixture consists of freedom, wealth and virtue; the dual omits virtue. The ‘true and primary’ aristocracy pays regard to virtue alone.

1. IV vii–viii.

2. E.g. Nicomachean Ethics I x, II ii, vi, VII xiii, X vii.

3. Politikē koinōnia, ‘partnership/association that takes the form of a state’; cf. I i.

4. Fr. 12 in E. Diehl, Anthologia Lyrica Graeca (Leipzig, 1949–52), fase. I. Phocylides was a gnomic poet of sixth-century Miletus.

5. V viii.

6. For Solon see II vii, n. 4 and II xii, n. 2; for Lycurgus see II ix, introduction; for Charondas see I ii, n. 7 and II xii.

7. The Athenians and the Spartans.

8. Solon? See n. 6. A. I. Dovatur, Philologus, 116 (1972), pp. 309–11, suggests Alexander the Great; G. Huxley, On Aristotle and Greek Society (Belfast, 1979), pp. 55–6, argues for Hermias of Atarneus.

9. Hupothesis, i.e. a particular set of circumstances demanding ad hoc modification of the preferences of theory; cf. IV vii ad init.

1. I.e. respectively the weak and the extreme form of democracy; cf. IV vi.

2. Koinoteros; cf. II vi, n. 3 and IV i, n. 3.

1. I.e. an oath that one cannot afford to hold the position.

2. See I ii, n. 7 and II xii.

3. Literally, ‘the politeia, constitution, should be made up exclusively of those who carry arms’, i.e. they alone should be politai, citizens. By politeia Aristotle may however mean polity: see introduction to chapter.

4. Heavy-armed infantry.

5. Taxeis, ‘systems’.

1. Dēmnlikon = ‘demnnratic’ dēmos = ‘common people’.

2. Not otherwise known.

3. Cf. IV iv ad fin., VI vi fin.

4. Or, ‘of a polity with an aristocratic leaning’ (politeia aristo-kratikē).

5. I.e. the number of persons by which the democrats exceed the notables (gnōrimoi).

6. Of the committee.

7. Or, ‘in polities’. On this passage see J. L. Creed, Liverpool Classical Monthly, 8 (1983), 122–3.

1. See I i.

2. Chorēigoi, persons appointed to meet the expenses of dramatic performances.

3. Oikonomikat epimeleiai, ‘economic’ responsibilities.

4. Who of course vary in character, tastes, views, etc., as indicated, according to the constitution under which they live. Aristotle debates the compatibility of various offices in various constitutions. The last few lines of this paragraph are however not entirely clear, and I have interpreted some details of the Greek in a way which may not command assent: see my note in Liverpool Classical Monthly, 4 (1979), pp. 93–5

5. Abbreviated to ‘some’ in what follows, when the reference is to persons: ‘some’ as opposed to ‘all’. ‘Some’ is also used in reference to offices/officials: ‘some’ as opposed to ‘others’.

6. The reference is uncertain.

7. The essence of this paragraph is as follows. (A) Appointers: (i) All, (ii) some, (iii) all to some offices, some to others. (B) Appointed: (i) All, (ii) some, (iii) all to some offices, some to others. (C) Mode: (i) Election, (ii) lot, (iii) election for some offices, lot for others. Confusingly, all cases of (iii) are reserved for the last sentence of the paragraph.

8. On the two ferociously complex and textually corrupt paragraphs that follow, see Newman’s commentary, Ross’s and Barker’s translations, and the appendix to this chapter.

9. I.e. the use of election for some offices, the lot for others.

10. I.e. in no case do ‘all’ appointers appoint together as a body; some of them appoint to some offices, others to others.

11. I.e. some offices filled from among all, others from among some.

12. The appointera here are presumably as described in note 10.

1. For a discussion of this court, see D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester, 1963), pp. 82–4.

2. The minor transactions of court (8), which in the Greek text immediately precede ‘I will say…’.

3. I.e. either all panels are (i) chosen by lot or (ii) elected, or (iii) some cases go to elected panels, some to panels chosen by lot, or (iv) some cases go to mixed panels.

4. In IV xv, presumably.

1. See III ix, xii–xiii.

2. I.e. superior.

3. Of Sparta, c. 399 (cf. V vii, n. 3); for Pausanias, see V vii, 1st paragraph.

4. Whose joint presence leads to the formation of oligarchies and democracies. Many good men would lead presumably to some form of aristocracy.

5. I.e. in effect against those persons who favour oligarchy.

1. VI.

2. I.e. presumably changes from one constitution to another.

1. The officials, presumably.

2. See V v, n. 2. Many of the other historical details of this paragraph are too vague for certain identification and dating.

3. Where Thebes fought Athens in 456.

4. 485–478; cf. V x, 1312b10 ff.

5. Phtheiretai, ‘is spoiled, wrecked’, the same verb as was used to describe the destruction of democracy in the preceding paragraph. Cf. I ii, n. 20.

6. I.e. ‘those who died on the seventh day (of the month)’; or perhaps ‘those in the seventh tribe’. The date is probably 494.

7. I.e. disproportion.

8. Perhaps in 377.

9. About 720.

10. This paragraph seems misplaced at this point.

11. I.e. they are superior.

12. I.e. the geographical.

1. Perhaps in 485, before Gelon’s tyranny, or a little earlier: cf. V iii, n. 4.

2. I.e. a bad start which vitiates the first half is as serious as all the mistakes of the second half, and so stands in the ‘same proportion’ to the whole as they all do, i.e. the proportion of a half. Aristotle may he punning on the word archē, which means not only ‘start’ but ‘rule’/‘ruler’/‘official’: if so, perhaps ‘stages’ (merē) ought to be rendered ‘parts’ (of the state).

3. 428: cf. Thucydides III i ff.

4. Proxenos, ‘representative’ of a foreign state, but not a citizen of it. Dexander would therefore have been a Mytilenean, not an Athenian.

5. 355–347, against Thebes.

6. About 581; cf. V x, n. 14. Ambracia was a city in N.W. Greece.

7. In Athens, 411.

1. Perhaps in 357.

2. Probably in 390, perhaps in 357; cf. V iii. The suits would have been brought by contractors for equipment etc. who had not been paid by the naval commanders (triērarchoi).

3. Heraclea Pontica was founded as a colony of Megara about 560. ‘Confiscate’ = dēmeuein.

4. Leitourgiai: see IV iv, n. 11.

5. The reference is possibly to Thrasybulus’ seizure of a tyranny, c. 610. The precise functions and powers of the Milesian ‘president’(prutanis) at this time are obscure.

6. Peisistratus was tyrant of Athens from 561 to 527, apart from certain intervals spent in exile. The ‘dwellers on the plain’ were wealthy land-owners.

7. The date of Theagenes’ tyranny is during the second half of the seventh century.

8. Dionysius I was tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367.

9. Election by tribes could take various forms. The advantage that Aristotle sees here is that it hinders the direct relationship between people and popular leader.

1. The ‘Thirty Tyrants’ who held power in Athens 404–403.

2. The Athenian oligarchy of 411.

3. Aristotle seems to mean, ‘not manned exclusively by…’.

4. I.e. in trials in which the demagogues are litigants.

5. I.e. those who are now excluded.

6. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367.

7. I.e. because he had run out of money.

8. ‘Favoured the group in power’: dunasteutikē, literally, ‘appropriate to a power-group’ (dunasteia, cf. Il x, n. 10).

9. Assassinated by his brother Timolcon, c. 365.

10. V vi.

11. Despotikos, i.e. ‘like that of a master (despotēs) over slaves’.

12. Cf. IV iv–v.

1. V vi ad init.

2. ‘Sons of maidens’, born as a result of a drive to replenish the population, depleted during the first Messenian war (eighth century). The ‘Equals’ (cf. ‘Peers’) were the Spartiatae, the full Spartan citizens, who had equal political rights: see II ix. ‘Equal’ in this and the preceding sentence =homoioi, not isoi.

3. Lysander was a Spartan general whose policies were frustrated by the Spartan Kings, 405–395.

4. 398

5. ‘Good Order’, Eunomia. Tyrtaeus composed in Sparta about the middle of the seventh century; the Messenian war mentioned here was the second.

6. I.e. in how the mixing is done.

7. Perhaps in 413.

8. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367. An offspring of the marriage, Dionysius II, exercised a harsh tyranny over Locri, 356–346.

9. V iii–iv.

10. Newman believes it ‘likely’ that the following events may be dated to the fourth century.

1. Of illegality, or change, presumably; cf. 1308a34 and V iv, n. 2.

2. IV xiii ad init.

3. Dēmos = ‘people’, dēmagogues are ‘people-leaders’. The reference is to V vi.

4. Cf. V vi, fin.

5. I.e. entitling one to be a citizen (politēs), a member of the citizen-body (politeuma), i.e. one who ‘shares in’ the constitution (politeia).

6. I.e. when the total value has decreased.

7. I.e. when the total value has increased.

8. I.e. to both sections.

9. Oikonomia.

10. Leitourgiai, see IV iv, n. 11.

1. Cf. I ii fin. ‘Notion of justice’ = dikaiosunē. ‘Justice’ = dikaion: cf. III ix, xii–xiii, V i–ii.

2. Epieikeia.

3. Akrateis (noun akrasia) ‘weak’, ‘to know what is right but to be unable to resist temptation to do wrong’ (see especially Nicomachean Ethics VII). Akrasia is a condition which, as Aristotle implies, calls for the cultivation of virtue by education and the formation of good habits.

4. Sc. ‘what their own interests are’, or possibly ‘their moral duty’.

5. I.e. they do not realize that just as each constitution, e.g. democracy, can take more than one form, and be more or less extreme (cf. IV i–vii), so too ‘this virtue’ (i.e. the particular virtue, or indeed virtues, suitable to the constitution in question) can (and presumably must) take several forms.

6. I.e. in sculpture or painting.

7. Fr. 891 in A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (2and ed., Berlin, 1889). For the comment in the next two sentences, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics A x, 1075a18 ff.

1. Virtue (aretē) or merit (axia): cf. IV ii and 1310b31 ff.

2. Dēmiourgiai: cf. III ii, n. 1.

3. Offices, in effect. Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigentum in S.W. Sicily, c. 570–c. 554, was noted for his brazen bull in which he roasted victims alive.

4. Tyrant of Athens 561–527, with intermissions. For Cypselus, see V xi, n. 5.

5. Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367.

6. An early, perhaps legendary, king of Athens. Learning that the Dorians would defeat Athens if he survived, he gave his life to save his city.

7. Cyrus freed Persia from the Medes in the mid sixth century.

8. E.g. III vii ad fin.

9. To kalon.

10. I.e. mercenaries.

11. See III xiii, n. 10, and V xi.

12. Hubris: here apparently, and probably throughout the chapter, with special reference to the overbearing arrogance with which injustice and injury may be inflicted.

13. 514. Hippias, son and successor of Peisistratus (see n. 4), fell four years later.

14. Cf. V iv, n. 6.

15. Of Macedonia, 336 (cf. n. 32 for the implications for the dating of this part of the Politics).

16. Literally, ‘for vaunting over’ it, i.e. for having made Derdas his boy-beloved.

17. Ruler of Salamis in Cyprus from 411 until his death in 374.

18. I.e. sexual offences.

19. King of Macedonia from c. 413 to 399.

20. King of Thrace, 382–359.

21. The ruling family of early Mytilene.

22. See n. 19 Euripides (c. 485–c. 406) spent the last few years of his life at Archelaus’ court.

23. Earlier in this chapter, 1311a22ff.

54. King of Persia 485–465. Darius was Xerxes’ son, Artapanes his chief bodyguard.

25. King of the Assyrians, 668–626.

26. Tyrant of Syracuse, 367–356 and 346–343. Cf. nn. 29 and 33.

27. King of Media, overthrown by Cyrus in 559.

28. Literally ‘honour’ (timē).

29. Dion, a relative of Dionysius I (see n. 5), tried to educate Dionysius II (see n. 26) along Platonic lines, and later turned against his pupil. See Plato, Letters III, VII and VIII.

30. Works and Days 25.

31. See V iii, n. 4.

32. Nûv, ‘in our day’, referring to 356; but in view of n. 15, hardly a secure indication of the date of this chapter.

33. Dionysius II (see nn. 26 and 29).

34. V iii, v, vi.

35. Literally ‘divided’, i.e. among several people.

36. Aristotle seems here to treat monarchia as a disreputable form of sole rule, like tyranny, as opposed to kingship, an acceptable form.

l. A king of Sparta, eighth-seventh century.

2. See III xiii, n. 10, and V x, n. 11.

3. Possibly a reference to V x, fifth paragraph.

4. Tyrant of Syracuse, 478–467.

5. Cypselus was tyrant of Corinth, c. 657–c. 625, and was succeeded by his son Periander (see n. 2), who died in 585.

6. See V x, nn. 4 and 13.

7. Tyrant of Samos in the late sixth century.

8. See V x, n. 5.

9. I.e. to attack him.

l0. Aristotle uses the saying loosely: it commonly referred to the expulsion of like by like (cf. the drunkard’s hopeful cure: ‘a hair of the dog that bit me’).

11. Oikonomos, oikonomia.

l2. I.e. of publishing accounts.

l3. See IV iv, n. 11.

l4. Semnos, translated by ‘proud’ earlier in this chapter.

l5. Hubrizō, hubris; cf. V x, n. 12.

l6. Possibly a reference to the public works described in the 3rd paragraph of this chapter: the wise tyrant will undertake them, but in a different spirit.

17. Hubrizesthai, cf. n. 15.

18. A partly verbatim report of fr. 85 in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I (6th ed., Berlin, 1951–2). ‘Life’ = psuchē, in this translation usually rendered ‘soul’. Heraclitus of Ephesus wrote around the turn of the sixth and fifth centuries.

1. Literally, ‘were slaves to the laws’. The tyranny of Orthagoras’ family lasted from c. 665 to c. 565; Cleisthenes was tyrant from c. 600 to 570.

2. See V v, n. 6 and V x, nn. 4 and 13.

3. See III xiii, n. 10, V x, V xi, n. 5. Gorgus was Periander’s successor.

4. See V iii, n. 4 and V xi, n. 4. Thrasybulus succeeded Hiero in 467.

5. See Republic 546c.

6. Of the cycle; presumably the moment when the ‘best’ constitution begins to deteriorate.

7. Republic 544c ff. ‘This’ constitution is ‘the best’.

8. See references at II x, n. 1.

9. I.e. from commerce: Republic 550e. Cf. I ix and III v.

10. Republic 551d.

11. Republic 555d. ‘The changes’ are from oligarchy to democracy.

1. IV xiv–xvi.

2. In Book V as a whole.

3. VI iv, in the case of democracy.

4. Executive, judicial, deliberative: see IV xiv, init.

5. Nor does Aristotle himself discuss them.

6. IV xii.

7. E.g. IV vi, cf. xv.

8. I.e. it becomes a different kind of democracy.

9. V ix.

10. Ēthē

1. I.e., I take it, ‘to be ruled by alternation’. More fully and literally, ‘… and it [the second defining principle (?)] makes a contribution in this way’, i.e. by operating not in the full form of ‘live as you like’/‘not being ruled at all’, but in the modified form of ‘to be ruled by alternation’. On ‘living as you like’, see F. D. Harvey, Classical Review, 32 (1982), p. 49.

2. IV xv.

3. Or perhaps ‘… by lot instead of by election’.

4. The last two words presumably amount to ‘… and the most inclusive idea of what makes a “people” ’, i.e. rich and poor together.

1. E.g. if the minimum qualification for political rights is 2x of property, then 500 rich men, each of whom owns 2x, will qualify; but 1,000 poor, each of whom owns 1x, will not. Equality of power is achieved by ‘dividing’ the minimum qualification 2x into a fraction of itself, 1x. Each poor man has now 1x of power, each rich man 2x. Since 500 × 2 = 1,000 × 1, the two blocks have equal power. Cf. VI iv, end of 3rd paragraph, and VI vi.

2. In the first alternative, there are two blocks, 1,000 and 500; whether they meet separately or together is not clear (though the example explained in note 5 suggests the latter); in either case they would be equal in ‘power’. In the second alternative, each block is given the same number ofrepresentatives, presumably to some larger body. In both alternatives, therefore, the wealthy individual is in a sense given a ‘weighting’, but the wealthy block is not: its power is no greater than that of the other and poorer block.

3. III x.

4. The crucial point here is that whereas in an oligarchy the rich would exercise final power alone, and in a democracy the poor, under Aristotle’s proposal both sides would have some voice, proportionate to their property, in the making of decisions.

5. In this example, if each of ten rich men has 2x property and 2 votes, and each of twenty poor men 1x property and 1 vote, then side A has (6 × 2) + (5 × 1) votes = 17, and side B has (4 × 2) + (15 × 1) votes = 23. Side B therefore wins.

1. IV, iv, vi, xi, all useful preliminary reading for this chapter.

2. I.e. as well as other constitutions.

3. I.e. they have to work to get them.

4. Evidently that described in the preceding paragraph, without the Mantinean modification.

5. An ancient king of Elis, in the Peloponnese.

6. I.e. when citizenship is extended to a lower group, the next lower group, which is inferior, should be excluded. Aristotle makes the point in. a curiously negative way; a democrat would have said, positively, ‘include the next lower class at each stage’,

7. In Book V.

8. Possibly in 401.

9. See III ii.

1. In Book V.

2. Of the property of the rich.

3. I.e. involving the public interest, not a private one.

4. Inflicted on unsuccessful prosecutors.

5. Forty-nine daughters of Danaus murdered their husbands on their wedding-night, and were punished in Hades by being obliged to go on filling leaky jars for evermore.

6. See IV iv, n. 11.

1. Poluapthrōpia, evidently in the sense of ‘a large citizen-body’.

1. Hoplites.

2. ‘Themselves’ = oligarchs who establish a light-armed force drawn from the poor.

3. VI vi.

4. See IV iv, n. 11.

5. Because to hold office for profit rather than honour is a characteristic of democracy.

1. IV xiv, xv, xvi.

2. IV xv.

3. Probably ‘every exaction’ is meant.

4. I.e. custody of prisoners, to ensure their appearance at trial. (Imprisonment was not in use as a punishment.) ‘The same stratagem’ is presumably the separation of this custodial function from other functions. The example of The Eleven is odd, as in fact they performed a dual duty of custody and of executing certain sentences; but Aristotle probably thought of them as custodians first and foremost.

5. I.e. the exaction of penalties.

6. Or, ‘There must be an element to convene the sovereign element of the constitution’.

7. Plēthos.

8. Cf. IV xv (12gga18), VII xii. ‘Offices of state’ = politikai [archai].

1. III 310.

2. What these were, and whose, is not clear. Jaeger (276 ff.) believes that in VII i–iii Aristotle is ‘basing himself’ on material in his own early work, the Protrepticus, an exhortation to the philosophic life.

3. Literally, ‘things external, things in (of) the body, and things in (of) the soul.’ ‘Things’ are in effect ‘goods’, though agatha is not in the Greek at this point.

4. These last four words slightly expand the Greek, in the interests of clarity.

5. See Physics II iv–vi: to automaton: ‘coincidence of events’; tuchē: ‘fortune’.

6. Kalōs prattein. Some such slightly uncouth English is difficult to avoid here, if the verbal force of the Greek is to be conveyed. ‘Do good actions’ = kala prattein. See the introduction to the chapter.

7. Phronimos; ‘practical wisdom’ = phronēsis.

8. I.e. to ‘the Platonic identification of virtue and happiness’ (P. Shorey, Classical Philology, 26 (1931), p. 429).

1. Politikē koinōnia, ‘the partnership that is the state (polis)’; see I i. Such partnership is enjoyed by the citizen (politēs), who as ‘statesman’ (politikos) rules and is ruled by turn.

2. Politikos bios; cf. n. 1.

3. I.e. with the interests of the ruled in mind, presumably (who should be free, and equal in status to the ruler: cf. III iv).

4. Nomima.

5. Nomimon.

6. VII xiii and xiv.

1. See introduction to VII i: presumably (a) and (b) are in question in this sentence; ‘do well’ renders prattein eu, eupragia, and eupraxia.

2. I vii.

3. That is to say, thought has an end or aim (telos), which is to ‘do well’ (eupraxia), which is thus action (praxis); when therefore thought is ‘for its own sake’, its end or aim (action) is thought; thought is therefore, qua aim, action; thought is therefore ‘active’ in a double sense, as both agent and aim.

1. Hoplites, i.e. citizen-soldiers wealthy enough to possess heavy armour.

2. I.e. the limitation of being small enough to facilitate order, taxis, which is essential to beauty.

3. A span is a few inches, a stade about 202 yards.

4. Literally, ‘a first state’, one which just satisfies the minimum criteria of ‘stateness’. Cf. I ii, about households and villages, and Plato, Republic II 367 ff.

5. Literally, ‘get a share in the constitution’.

1. No such discussion is to be found in the remainder of the Politics, but see II v and II vi, 5th paragraph.

1. Literally, ‘a leading life, as between states’ (politikos), i.e. an active as distinct from the ‘private’ life discussed in VII ii and iii.

2. Pertoikoi; see VII ix, VII x and the introduction to II ix. The ‘troops’ and ‘free men’ are citizens; the ‘crews’ and ‘sailors’ are not.

1. VII iv.

2. Apoliteuta, i.e. they do not live in states, poleis.

3. See Plato, Republic, II–IV, esp. 375a ff.

4. Fr. 67 in J. M. Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, II London and Cambridge, 1931, Loeb edition). Archilochus of Paros flourished about the middle of the 7th century; he wrote combative and passionate poetry on many topics, notably love.

5. The first quotation is Euripides fr. 975 in A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1889); the second is ibid., fr. adesp. 78.

1. Koinōnia, koinōnos, koinos respectively.

2. E.g. slaves; cf. I iv.

3. Because the ‘parts’ too are essential to the state (while not all ‘essentials’ are ‘parts’).

1. E.g. IV xiv.

2. VII i.

3. Hupothesis, here the basic assumptions and demands of some constitution other than the best. Cf. III iv, IV vii, IV xi, n. 9, and V ix init.

4. Throughout their lives, presumably.

5. I.e. neither young soldiers nor older men will both fight and deliberate.

6. Axia, ‘desert, merit’.

7. Genos, ‘type’, ‘sort’.

8. Tēs aretēs dēmiourgos, perhaps a reminiscence of Plato, Republic 500d.

9. Perioikoi, but here apparently not Greeks; cf. VII vi, VII x and introduction to II ix.

10. Literally, ‘hoplite’ (heavy armed).

11. I.e. the essentials (slaves, etc.) are permanently sundered from the parts (citizens); the parts are separated from each other by turns, in that a (young) soldier eventually becomes an (old) deliberator.

1. Literally, ‘those who philosophize about constitutions’. ‘Class’ in this chapter = genos, ‘type’, ‘sort’.

2. VII v and ix.

3. Probably Plato is meant: see e.g. Republic 416d ff., Laws 739b ff., and cf. II v.

4. In fact, no such passage is to be found in the Politics.

5. Literally, ‘… too cautiously, even contrary to what is fine’ (to kalon).

6. Cf. VII vi, VII ix, n. 9, and introduction to II ix.

1. VII v.

2. Literally, ‘an acropolis’.

3. See II viii.

4. To modify slightly Newman’s explanation ad loc., ‘Aristotle’s plan will be to drive straight wide streets between rows of “clumps” or “clusters” of houses, but to leave the interior of each cluster a tangle of narrow lanes.’

5. Probably a reference to Plato, Laws 778d.

6. Aretē, ‘virtue’.

7. Philosophein, literally ‘philosophize’, ‘be a lover of wisdom’.

1. Agora.

2. For modesty/deference/respect (aidōs) as a ‘good fear’, cf. Plato, Laws 647a, 673c, 698b, 699c ff.

1. To eu zēn, ‘to live well’. A few lines below, ‘good life’ = to zēn kalōs, ‘to live finely’. See the introduction to VII i.

2. Arista politeuesthai, ‘to be best run under a constitution, best governed, best administered’, etc. Cf. politeuesthai kalōs, ‘have a well-run constitution’, in the first sentence of this chapter.

3. Nichomachean Ethics, I vii.

4. ‘Moral’ = kalos, kalōs, cf. nn. 1, 2 and 5. The word ‘utilize’ in these two paragraphs is chrēsthai, to ‘use’, ‘employ’, ‘handle’. ‘Conditionally’ = ex hupotheseōs, ‘in an assumed situation’; cf. references in VII ix, n. 3.

5. Kallistai (superlative of kalos); cf. nn. 1, 2 and 4.

6. E.g. Nicomachean Ethics, III iv; cf. Plato, Laws 661c.

7. Kalōs, obviously this time in a non-moral sense.

8. I.e. in the mass, collectively, with some individual exceptions.

9. VII vii.

1. Politikē koinōnia. see I i.

2. I.e. between rulers and ruled.

3. Scylax travelled to India in the late sixth or early fifth century: see Herodotus, IV 44.

4. VII ix.

5. I.e. ‘being ruled’ is his contribution, and the privilege of ruling will be the ‘return’ he gets in due course.

6. III iv and vi.

7. Or, ‘for whose sake’, tinos heneka being ambiguous as between ‘for the sake of what’ and ‘for the sake of whom’.

8. Kalon.

9. I.e. the intrinsically rational part of the soul.

10. That is, all three (kinds of action) or the two (kinds of action), the three being those (a) of theoretical reason, (b) of practical reason, and (c) of the second of the two parts of the soul, i.e. of the part which ‘listens to’ reason. ‘The two’ are presumably (b) and (c).

11. Kala; cf. VII xiii, esp. nn. 1, 2, 4 and 5, VIII iv, n. x.

12. War, peace, etc.

13. Not otherwise known.

14. To zēn kalōs: cf. n. 11 and references.

15. Kalliōn, comparative of kalos.

1. VII xiv.

2. Phiiosophia, not in the strong academic sense but roughly ‘cultural and intellectual activity’.

3. See Hesiod, Works and Days, 170–4 and Pindar, Olympians II, 70 ff.; and compare Homer, Odyssey IV, 561 ft

4. I.e. courage.

5. There is something missing from the Greek, probably the end of one sentence and the beginning of the next. Apart from ‘they value’, I have refrained from conjectural supplementation; see Newman ad loc.

6. VII xiii.

7. VII vii.

8. In less austere language, in any sequence (here the birth and growth of a human being) the completion of one stage is itself the beginning of a further stage.

9. Nous, and so for the remainder of the chapter.

10. Orexis, and so for the remainder of the chapter.

1. I.e., at their parents’ death, to their estate – the culmination of a period of mutual service as between them and the children, facilitated by an age-gap neither too wide nor too narrow.

2. Ta gennōmena, ‘the children being produced’. In the first paragraph, probably of both born and unborn children; in the third, probably of born children only; in the fourth, of the unborn only (cf. Plato, Laws 788c ff.).

3. ‘Do not cut (i.e. plough) a new (i.e. young) furrow.’

4. I.e. in marriage.

5. If written, not now extant.

6. To hosion kai to mē, literally ‘that which is holy/lawful/permitted, and that which is not’.

7. Leitourgein, on which see IV iv, n. 11.

8. E.g. Solon, fr. 27 in J. M. Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus, I (Loeb edition, London and Cambridge, 1931).

9. I.e. the husband’s.

10. Mē kalon, ‘not fine, not admirable’: for some idea of the range of kalon, cf. VII xiv (esp. references in n. 11).

1. Plato, Laws 792a – if indeed it is Plato who is referred to: the Greek says merely ‘those who prohibit in the(ir) laws’.

2. Enacted on stage, I take it.

3. Notably Dionysus; see e.g. Aristotle, Poetics IV.

4. The iambic metre was often used for scurrilous purposes.

5. No such discussion survives.

6. Cf. Plato, Republic 466e ff., Laws 643b ff.

7. Cf. VII xvi, n. 8.

1. I.e. of the persons living under the constitution in question.

1. Ascholon. ‘without leisure’.

2. In the first paragraph.

1. Cf. II ix ad fin., VII xiv–xv. ‘… our own nature itself: literally, ‘Nature herself’, apparently quasi-personified.

2. The first line is not in Homer as we have him, but in view of the similarity of the second quotation to Odyssey, XVII 385, it may have belonged to that context. The third quotation is Odyssey, IX 7 and part of 8.

3. There is no such discussion.

4. Megalopsuchos, ‘great-souled’, ‘magnanimous’.

1. E.g. II ix ad fin., VII xiv–xv.

2. Kalon; cf. VII xvi, n. 10.

3. Cf. Aristotle’s remarks on the narrowing and degrading results of excessive concentration on reaching a high standard of performance in music in VIII v and vi, and cf. VIII ii. A man trained only to fight is as much a ‘mechanic’ in the use of his body (and weapons) as a highly trained musician, or any other skilled worker, is in the use of instruments and tools.

4. I.e.warfare: hē polemikē, the skill of fighting, is a part of hē politikē, the skill of statesmanship, of being a statesman, politikos.

1. VIII iii.

2. Bacchae 381. ‘Of serious importance’ = spoudaia.

3. Telos, ‘an end’; ‘incomplete’ here means ‘not yet adult’.

4. See VIII vi.

5. To kalon; cf. e.g. V x, n. 9, VII xiv, n. 11, VII xvi, n. 10, and VIII iv.

6. A mythical singer.

7. A Phrygian composer for the pipes, perhaps mythical; if his torical, of the seventh century.

8. The drift of these last nine words is not very clear. I take Aristotle to mean that indications of character can be most effectively conveyed by a sculpture or painting when it is a representation of someone under the influence of emotion.

9. Artists of the fifth century, of whom Aristotle remarks in the Poetics (1448a5) that Polygnotus portrayed men as better than they are, whereas Pauson portrayed them as worse.

10. Literally, ‘excellent statements of those who have philosophized on…’: cf. VII xi, n. 7. On the ‘modes’ (harmoniai), see introduction to VIII vii.

11. E.g. the Pythagoreans.

12. Apparently a glancing reference to Plato, Phaedo 93c. On harmonia (roughly ‘ordered construction’) see introduction to VIII vii.

1. VIII v, 2nd and 3rd paragraphs.

2. Presumably the Sicilian mathematician of the early fourth century, who carried out research into mechanics and acoustics. The final sentence of the parenthesis seems to be a piece of waggish cynicism: education keeps older children out of mischief, just as rattles did when they were younger.

3. I.e. of making men ‘mechanics’ (banausos).

4. I.e. the pleasure music gives, presumably.

5. In the technical sense of ‘arousing excitement of the kind associated with the frenzied celebration of orgia’ (the rites of certain ecstatic religions, notably the Dionysiac).

6. ‘Way… emotions’ translates katharsis; cf. VIII vii.

7. Megalopsuchos: cf. VIII iii, n. 4.

8. Chorēgos: cf. IV xv, n. 2. The point is that the accompaniment on the pipes would normally have been delegated to someone of humble status.

9. Presumably one recording a victory in a competition, and the fact that Thrasippus played the pipes in it. Ecphantides was an Athenian comic playwright of the fifth century.

10. Epistēmē, usually ‘knowledge’.

11. In this chapter ‘professional’ = technikos (adjective), technitēs (noun); cf. third paragraph.

1. Literally ‘law-like’, i.e. by stating broad principles, without regard to the details of particular cases.

2. I omit Ross’s conjectural rηγ in 1341b35.

3. Katharsis, ‘purification’, ‘purgation’; cf. VIII vi, n. 6.

4. Apparently a reference to a part of the Poetics not now extant (or indeed never written), since in the celebrated sixth chapter the term katharsis is taken for granted, without discussion.

5. Cf. VIII vi. n. 5.

6. A technical term, indicating broadly extreme elaboration. See Anderson (VIII v, introduction), pp. 139, 144–5 (with notes), and For Greek music in general the detailed account in the Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd ed.), s.v. ‘Music’.

7. VIII v.

8. 399a ff.

9. A dithyrambic poet, 436–380. Dithyrambs were choral songs which, at least in the early history of the genre, had special connections with the god Dionysus.

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