I. AFFAIRS OF ITALY
Embassy of the Lacedaemonians to Rome
At this time the embassy which the Lacedaemonians had sent to Rome arrived disappointed in their hopes. For they had been sent on the subject of the hostages and villages, but regarding the villages the senate replied that they would give orders to the legates they were sending, and as for the hostages they must consult further about the matter. As to the old exiles they said they wondered why the Spartans did not call them home, now that Sparta was free.
Embassy of the Aetolians
Immediately upon the announcement of the naval victory,  the Romans ordered the people to observe nine days of rest,  i.e. to keep a general holiday and sacrifice to the gods in thanks for their success. After this they introduced into the Senate the Aetolian embassy and the legates from Glabrio. After both had addressed them at some length, the senate decided to give the Aetolians the choice of two courses, either to submit all matters to the decision of the senate or to pay at once a thousand talents and enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Rome. When they demanded a definite statement of what matters were to be submitted to the senate's decision, that body refused to admit any distinction, and therefore the Aetolians remained in statu belli.
 That of the Roman fleet over that of Antiochus, off Phocaea. See Livy XXXVI.43.
 A supplicatio.
Embassy from Philip
At about the same time the senate gave a hearing to the envoys of Philip; for he had sent this embassy to call attention in his favour to the goodwill and readiness to help he had shown in the war with Antiochus. After listening to him the senate at once set free his son Demetrius, who was their hostage, and also promised to relieve him of some of the payments due, if he kept his faith with them under present circumstances. They also set free the Lacedaemonian hostages except Armenas, the son of Nabis, who soon after this sickened and died.
II. Affairs of Greece
Eumenes and Achaea
In Greece, too, when an embassy reached Achaea from King Eumenes proposing an alliance, the Achaean people meeting in a general assembly voted the alliance and sent off soldiers—a thousand foot and a hundred horse under the command of Diophanes of Megalopolis.
The Aetolians and the Roman Governors
While Glabrio, the Roman general, was besieging Amphissa, the Athenian people, hearing of the distress of the Amphissians and the arrival of Publius Scipio, sent an embassy at the head of which was Echedemus, with instructions to salute Lucius and Publius Scipio and to attempt to procure terms of peace for the Aetolians. Publius was very glad of their arrival and paid much attention to them, as he saw they would be of service to him in the projects he entertained. For the general wished to settle the Aetolian matter, and even if the Aetolians did not submit, had in any case resolved to neglect them and cross to Asia, as he well knew that the object of the war and the whole expedition was not to subdue the Aetolian League but to conquer Antiochus and become masters of Asia. Therefore as soon as the Athenians mentioned peace, he readily accepted the proposal, and told them to sound the Aetolians also. Echedemus, having sent a message in advance, proceeded himself to Hypata, and spoke about the question of peace to the Aetolian authorities. They also readily lent an ear, and delegates were appointed to meet the Romans. Upon reaching Publius, whom they found encamped at a distance of sixty stades from Amphissa, they made a long speech reminding him of all the kindness they had shown the Romans. When Scipio addressed them in a still milder and kinder tone, recounting his action in Spain and Africa, and explaining how he had dealt with people in those countries who had relied on him, and when he finally expressed his opinion that they ought to place themselves in his hands and rely on him, all those present at first became most sanguine, thinking that peace would be at once concluded. But when, upon the Aetolians inquiring on what conditions they should make peace, Lucius Scipio informed them that there were two alternatives open to them, either to submit entirely to Rome or to pay a thousand talents at once and make a defensive and offensive alliance, the Aetolians present were exceedingly distressed to find that this decision was not conformable to their previous conversation. They, however, said they would submit the conditions to the people of Aetolia.
These delegates, then, returned home to discuss the matter, and Echedemus meeting the Apocleti also talked it over. One of the alternative conditions was impossible owing to the magnitude of the sum demanded, and the other frightened them owing to what had taken place on the occasion of their former mistake, when after having assented to absolute submission they came very near being placed in chains. Consequently, in their difficulty and distress, they sent off the same envoys again to beg either that the sum might be reduced so that they would be able to pay it, or that their politicians and their women should be excluded from the total submission. Meeting Publius and his brother they communicated the decree of the Aetolians on the subject, but when Lucius said that he was only empowered by the senate to propose the conditions he had stated, they again returned to Aetolia, and Echedemus following them to Hypata, advised the Aetolians, since there was this obstacle at present to the conclusion of peace, to ask for an armistice and gaining thus a temporary relief from present ills, to send an embassy to the senate, when if they were successful in obtaining their request well and good, but if not they might watch for a change of circumstances. For it was impossible for their situation to be worse than it actually was, but there were many reasons why it might improve. Echedemus's advice seemed to them to be good, and it was decided to send envoys asking for a truce. So coming to Lucius they begged him to grant them for the present a truce for six months, in order to send an embassy to the Senate. Publius, who had for long been eager to play a part in Asiatic affairs, soon persuaded his brother to accede to the request. Upon the signature of the agreement, Glabrio, after raising the siege and handing over his whole army and his stores to Lucius, at once left for Rome with his military tribunes.
III. Affairs of Asia
State of Phocaea
(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 9. 1.)
The Phocaeans, partly because the Romans left in the ships were quartered upon them and partly because they objected to the enforced contributions, became disaffected.
At the same date the magistrates of Phocaea, afraid both of the excited state the people were in owing to the dearth of corn and of the active propaganda of the partisans of Antiochus, sent envoys to Seleucus,  who was on the borders of their territory, begging him not to approach the town, as it was their intention to keep quiet and await the issue of events, after which they would yield obedience to orders given them. Of these envoys Aristarchus, Cassander and Rhodon were attached to Seleucus and his cause, while Hegias and Gelias were opposed to him and inclined to favour the Romans. Upon their meeting him, Seleucus at once admitted the three first into his intimacy, neglecting Hegias and Gelias. But when he heard of the excitement of the populace and the dearth of corn he advanced to the town without giving the envoys a formal audience.
 Son of Antiochus the Great, afterwards King Seleucus IV.
(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 11. 7.)
Two Galli or priests of Cybele with images and pectorals came out of the town, and besought them not to resort to extreme measures against the city.
The engine for throwing fire used by Pausistratus, the Rhodian admiral, was funnel-shaped. On each side of the ship's prow noosed ropes were run along the inner side of the hull, into which were fitted poles stretching out seawards. From the extremity of each hung by an iron chain the funnel-shaped vessel full of fire, so that, in charging or passing, the fire was shot out of it into the enemy's ship, but was a long way from one's own ship owing to the inclination.
Pamphilidas, the Rhodian admiral, was considered more adequate to any occasion than Pausistratus because he was by nature rather wise and steadfast than venturesome. For most men are good at judging of a situation rather from what happens to occur than by reasoning things out. They had appointed Pausistratus for this very reason, that he was energetic and daring, but all of a sudden they entirely changed their minds owing to his disaster.
(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 18. 10.)
At this time letters reached Samos addressed to Lucius Aemilius Regulus and Eumenes from Lucius Scipio the consul and from Publius Scipio informing them of the truce made with the Aetolians and of the march of the Roman army towards the Hellespont. The Aetolians had also informed Antiochus and Seleucus of this.
Diophanes of Megalopolis
Diophanes of Megalopolis had had great practice in war, because during the long war against Nabis, which was waged in the immediate vicinity of Megalopolis, he had constantly served under Philopoemen and thus acquired actual experience in the methods of warfare. Add to this that the man I am speaking of was both in personal appearance and in personal combat very powerful and redoubtable. And, most importantly of all, he was a gallant man-at-arms and exceptionally skilled in their use.
(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 18. 6.)
King Antiochus had entered the territory of Pergamus, where hearing of the arrival of King Eumenes, and seeing that both the naval and military forces were coming up to the assistance of that prince, was desirous of making proposals for peace simultaneously to the Romans, to Eumenes and to the Rhodians. Setting out, then, with his whole army he came to Elaea, and seizing on an eminence opposite the town, established his infantry there, encamping his cavalry, more than six thousand in number, under the walls of the town. He accompanied the latter force, and sent a messenger to Lucius Aemilius, who was within the town, on the subject of peace. The Roman general, summoning Eumenes and the Rhodians to meet him, begged them to give him their view of the situation. Eudamus and Pamphilidas were not opposed to peace, but the king said that for the present peace neither befitted their dignity nor was possible. "For how," he said, "can the result fail to be undignified if we make peace while we are shut up within the walls? And indeed how is it even possible for the present? For how can we, unless we await the arrival of a general of consular rank, confirm any agreement we arrive at without his consent? And, apart from this, if we managed at all to come to some semblance of an agreement with Antiochus, I scarcely suppose that your naval and military forces can return home, unless the Senate and People ratify your decision. All that will be left for you to do, then, is to spend the winter here awaiting their pronouncement, perfectly inactive, but exhausting the stores and material of your allies; and afterwards, if the Senate does not approve of your making peace, you will have to begin the war afresh from the beginning, after having thrown away the present opportunity we have of putting an end by the grace of God to the whole business." Eumenes spoke so, and Aemilius, approving his advice, replied to Antiochus that it was impossible for peace to be made before the arrival of the proconsul. Antiochus, on hearing this, at once began to lay waste the territory of Elaea. After this, while Seleucus remained in this neighbourhood, Antiochus made constant incursions into the so-called plain of Thebe, and lighting upon this most fertile district, abounding in produce, plentifully supplied his army with every variety of booty.
Antiochus approaches Prusias
(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 37. 25.)
King Antiochus, on returning to Sardis from the expedition I have described, sent frequent messages to Prusias inviting him to enter into alliance with him. Prusias previously had not been disinclined to join Antiochus, for he was very much afraid of the Romans crossing to Asia with the object of deposing all the princes there. But on a letter reaching him from the brothers Publius and Lucius Scipio, after having received and read it, he hesitated considerably and foresaw tolerably well what would happen, as the Scipios in their communication employed many clear arguments in confirmation of their assertions. For they not only pleaded their own policy but the universal policy of Rome, pointing out that not only had the Romans deprived no former prince of his kingdom, but had even themselves created some new kingdoms, and had augmented the power of other princes, making their dominion many times more extensive than formerly. In Spain they cited the cases of Andobales and Colichas, in Africa that of Massanissa, and that of Pleuratus in Illyria; all of whom they said they had made real and acknowledged kings out of petty and insignificant princelets. In Greece itself they adduced the cases of Philip and Nabis. As for Philip, after they had crushed him in war and tied his hands by imposing hostages and tribute on him, no sooner had they received from him a slight proof of his goodwill than they had restored to him his son and the other young men who were held as hostages together with Demetrius; they had remitted the tribute and given him back many of the cities taken in the war. And while they could have utterly annihilated Nabis, they had not done so, but spare him, although he was a tyrant, on receipt of the usual pledges. They wrote begging Prusias, in view of this, not to be afraid about his kingdom, but confidently to take the side of the Romans, for he would never repent of his decision. Prusias, then, after reading the letter, changed his mind, and when Gaius Livius also arrived on an embassy to him, after meeting that legate he entirely relinquished all hope in Antiochus. Antiochus thus disappointed, proceeded to Ephesus, and calculating that the only way to prevent the enemy's army from crossing and generally avert the war from Asia was to obtain definite command of the sea, determined to give battle by sea and thus decide matters.
Flight of the Pirates
(Suid.; cp. Livy XXXVII. 27. 5.)
The pirates, when they saw the Roman fleet advancing on them, turned and fled.
Attempt of Antiochus to make peace
(Livy XXXVII. 34-36.)
Antiochus, who, after his defeat in the naval engagement,  remained in Sardis neglecting his opportunities and generally deferring action of any kind, on learning that the enemy had crossed to Asia, was crushed in spirit and, abandoning all hope, decided to send to the Scipios to beg for peace. He therefore appointed and dispatched Heracleides of Byzantium, instructing him to say that he gave up Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria Troas, the towns which were the cause of the war, as well as such other places in Aeolis and Ionia as they chose to take among those which had sided with Rome in the present war. He also engaged to pay half the expenses which their quarrel with him had caused them. These were the instructions that his envoy was to deliver in his public audience, and there were other private ones he was to convey to Scipio of which I will give a detailed account further on. Heracleides, on reaching the Hellespont and finding the Romans still encamped on the place where they had pitched their tents immediately after crossing, was at first glad of this, thinking that the fact that the enemy remained stationary and had as yet not attempted to make any progress would tell in his favour at the audience; but on learning that Publius Scipio still remained on the further side, he was distressed, as the result very largely depended on the intentions of that commander. The real reason why both the army remained in its first camp and Scipio was apart from it was that the latter was one of the Salii. These are, as I said in my book on the Roman constitution, one of the three colleges whose duty it is to perform the principal sacrifices, and, no matter where they happen to be, it is forbidden for them to change their residence for thirty days during the celebration of the sacrifices. This was now the case with Scipio; for just as his army was crossing, he was caught by this period, so that he could not change his residence. The consequence was that he was separated from his army and stopped behind in Europe, while the legions after crossing remained inactive, and were unable to make any progress as they were awaiting his arrival.
 In the bay of Teos. See Livy XXXVII.30.
When Scipio arrived a few days afterwards, Heracleides was summoned for an audience to the Army Council and addressed them on the subject of his instructions, saying that Antiochus offered to retire from Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria, and such other cities of Aeolis and Ionia as had made common cause with Rome, and that he also offered to pay half the expenses they had incurred in the present war. He spoke at considerable length on the subject, exhorting the Romans first to remember that they were but men and not to test fortune too severely, and next to impose some limit on the extent of their empire, confining it if possible to Europe, for even so it was vast and unexampled, no people in the past having attained to this. But if they must at all hazards grasp for themselves some portions of Asia in addition, let them definitely state which, for the king would accede to anything that was in his power. After this speech the council decided that the consul should answer that in justice Antiochus should pay not half the expense but the whole, for the war was originally due to him and not to them. He must also not only set free the cities of Aeolis and Ionia, but retire from all the country subject to him on this side Taurus. Upon hearing this from the Council the envoy, as these demands far exceeded the conditions he had asked for, did not give them consideration, but withdrawing from the public audience devoted himself to cultivating relations with Publius Scipio.
As soon as he had a fitting opportunity, he spoke to Scipio according to his instructions. These were to tell him that in the first place the king would restore his son to him without ransom—for at the beginning of the war Scipio's son had happened to fall into the hands of Antiochus; secondly that he was ready to give to Scipio at present any sum he named and afterwards to share the revenue of his kingdom with him, if he helped him now to obtain the terms of peace he proposed. Scipio answered that he accepted the promise about his son, and would be most grateful to Antiochus if he fulfilled it; but as to the rest he made a great mistake and had entirely failed to recognize the king's own true interest not only in this private interview with himself, but at his audience before the Council. For had he made these proposals while he was still master of Lysimachia and the approach to the Chersonese, he would soon have obtained his terms. Or again, even after retiring from those positions, had he proceeded to the Hellespont with his army, and showing that he would prevent our crossing, had sent to propose the same terms, it would still have been possible for him to obtain them. "But now," he said, "that he has allowed our army to land in Asia, when after letting himself not only be bitted but mounted he comes to us asking for peace on equal terms he naturally fails to get it and is foiled in his hopes." He advised him, therefore, to take better counsel in his present situation and look facts in the face. In return for his promise about his son, he would give him a piece of advice equal in value to the favour he offered, and that was to consent to everything and avoid at all cost a battle with the Romans. Heracleides, after listening to this, returned, and on joining the king, gave him a detailed report. But Antiochus, thinking that no more severe demands than the present could be imposed on him even if he were worsted in a battle, ceased to occupy himself with peace, and began to make every preparation and avail himself of every resource for the struggle.
Conditions imposed by Scipio after the Battle of Magnesia
(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 45. 3.)
After the victory gained by the Romans over Antiochus they occupied Sardis and its citadels, . . . and Musaeus came from Antiochus under flag of truce. Upon Scipio receiving him courteously, he said that Antiochus wished to send envoys to discuss the whole situation. He therefore desired that a safe conduct should be given to this mission. Upon Scipio's consenting, he returned, and after a few days the king's envoys arrived. They were Zeuxis, the former governor of Lydia, and Antipater the king's nephew. They were anxious first of all to meet King Eumenes, as they were alarmed lest owing to previous friction he might be somewhat disposed to do them injury. But on finding him, contrary to their expectation, quite reasonable and gentle, they at once took steps to obtain a public audience. Upon being summoned to the Army Council, they first of all made a general appeal of some length to the Romans, exhorting them to use their success mildly and magnanimously, and saying that this would not so much further the interest of Antiochus as that of the Romans themselves, now that Fortune had made them rulers and masters of the whole world. But their main object was to ask what they must do in order to secure peace and alliance with Rome. The members of the Council had previously sat to consider this, and they now asked Scipio to communicate their decision.
Scipio said that victory had never made the Romans more exacting nor defeat less so: therefore they would now give them the same answer as they had formerly received, when before the battle they came to the Hellespont. They must retire from Europe and from all Asia on this side Taurus: Antiochus must pay to the Romans for the expenses of the war 15,000 Euboean talents, 500 at once, 2500 upon the peace being ratified by the People, and the remainder in twelve yearly instalments of 1000 talents each: he must also pay to Eumenes the 400 talents he still owed him and the corn he had not yet delivered according to the terms of his agreement with his father Attalus. In addition he was to give up Hannibal the Carthaginian, Thoas the Aetolian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, and Philo and Eubulidas of Chalcis. As security Antiochus was to give at once the twenty hostages whose names were appended. Such was the decision which Scipio pronounced in the name of the whole Council. Upon Antipater and Zeuxis accepting the terms, it was universally decided to send envoys to Rome to beg the Senate and People to ratify the peace, and on this understanding the envoys took leave. On the following days the Romans divided their forces . . . and a few days afterwards, when the hostages arrived at Ephesus, Eumenes and the envoys of Antiochus prepared to sail for Rome, as well as embassies from Rhodes, Smyrna, and almost all peoples and cities on this side Taurus.
IV. Affairs of Italy
The Embassies at Rome
(Cp. Livy XXXVII. 52-56.)
At the beginning of the summer following the victory of the Romans over Antiochus, King Eumenes, the envoys of Antiochus, and those from Rhodes and elsewhere arrived at Rome: for nearly all the communities of Asia Minor sent envoys to Rome immediately after the battle, as the whole future of all of them depended on the senate. The senate received all the arrivals courteously, but treated with especial splendour, both in the mode of their reception and the richness of the gifts they bestowed on them, King Eumenes, and after him the Rhodians. When the date fixed for the audience arrived, they called in first the king and begged him to speak frankly stating what he wished the senate to do for him. Eumenes said that had he wished to ask a kindness of any other people, he would have taken the advice of the Romans so that he might neither nourish any immoderate desire nor make any exorbitant demand, but now that he appeared as a suppliant before the Romans he thought it best to commit to them the decision about himself and his brothers. Here one of the senators interrupted him and bade him not to be afraid, but say what he thought, as the senate were resolved to grant him anything that was in their power, but Eumenes held to his opinion. After some time had elapsed, the king took his departure, and the senate considered what they should do. It was resolved to beg Eumenes to appear alone and indicate to them frankly the object of his visit. For he knew more accurately than anyone which was in his own interest so far as Asia was concerned. After this decision he was again called in; and, upon one of the senators showing him the decree, he was compelled to speak about the matter at issue. He said, then, that he had nothing further to say about what concerned him personally but adhered to his resolution, giving the senate complete authority to decide. But there was one point on which he was anxious, and that was the action of the Rhodians; and for this reason he had now been induced to speak about the situation. "For the Rhodians," he said, "have come to promote the interests of their country, with just as much warmth as we at the present crisis plead for our dominions. But at the present crisis, whatever they say is meant to give an impression quite contrary to their real purpose, and this you will easily discover. For when they enter this house they will say that they have come neither to beg for anything at all from you nor with the wish to harm myself in any way, but that they send this embassy to plead for the freedom of the Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor. They will say that this is not so much a favour to themselves as your duty, and the natural consequence of what you have already achieved. Such will be the false impression their words will be meant to produce on you, but you will find that their actual intentions are of quite a different character. When the towns for which they plead are set at liberty their own power in Asia will be immensely increased, and mine will be more or less destroyed. For this fine name of freedom and autonomy will, the moment it becomes evident that you have decided to ask so, entirely detach from me not only the cities now about to be liberated, but those previously subject to me, and add them all to the Rhodian dominion. For such is the nature of things: thinking that they owe their freedom to Rhodes, they will be nominally the allies of the Rhodians, but in reality ready to obey all their orders, feeling indebted to them for the greatest of services. Therefore, I beg you, sirs, to be suspicious on this point, in case unawares you strengthen some of your friends more than is meet and unwisely weaken others, at the same time conferring favours on your enemies and neglecting and making light of those who are truly your friends. As for myself I would, as regards other matters, make any necessary concession to my neighbours without disputing it, but I would never, as long as I could help, yield to any men alive in my friendship with you and the goodwill I bear you. And I think my father, were he still alive, would give utterance to the same words. For he, who was, I think, the first of the inhabitants Asia and Greece to gain your friendship and alliance, most nobly maintained these until the day of his death, and not only in principle, but by actual deeds, taking part in all your wars in Greece and furnishing for these wars larger military and naval forces than any other of your allies; contributing the greatest quantity of supplies and incurring the greatest danger; and finally ending his days in the field of action during the war with Philip, while he was actually exhorting the Boeotians to become your friends and allies. On succeeding to the throne I adhered to my father's principles—those indeed it was impossible to surpass; but I surpassed him in putting them into practice; because the times were such as to try me as by fire in a way he never had been tried. For when Antiochus was anxious to give me his daughter in marriage, and to cement our union in every respect, giving me back at once the cities he had formerly alienated from me, and next promising to do everything for me if I would take part in the war against you, I was so far from accepting any of these offers that I fought at your side against Antiochus with larger naval and military forces than any other of your allies, and contributed the greatest quantity of supplies to meet your needs when they were most urgent: I shared unhesitatingly with your generals the danger of all the battles that were fought, and finally suffered myself to be besieged in Pergamus itself and risk my life as well as my kingdom, all for the sake of the goodwill I bore to your people. Therefore, ye men of Rome, many of whom saw with your own eyes and all of whom know that what I say is true, it is but just for you to take fitting thought for my welfare. For of all things it would be most shameful if after making Massanissa, who was once your enemy and finally sought safety with your accompanied by only a few horsemen, king of the greater part of Africa, simply because he kept faith with you in one war against Carthage: if after making Pleuratus, who did absolutely nothing except maintain his faith to you, the greatest prince in Illyria, you now ignore myself, who from my father's days onwards have taken part in your greatest and most splendid achievements What is it then that I beg of you and what do I think you ought to do for me? I will speak quite frankly, as you begged me to state my real opinion. If you decide to remain in occupation of certain parts of Asia on this side Taurus which were formerly subject to Antiochus, I should be exceedingly gratified to see that happen. For I think that my kingdom would be more secure with you on my frontiers, and a portion of your power falling to my share. But if you decide not to do this, but entirely to evacuate Asia, I think there is no one to whom you could cede the prizes of the war with more justice than to myself. But surely, you will be told, it is a finer thing to set free those in servitude. Well perhaps, if they had not ventured to fight against you with Antiochus. But since they suffered themselves to do so it is far finer to give your true friends a fitting token of your gratitude than to confer favours on those who were your enemies."
Eumenes, after having spoken in this capable manner, withdrew. The senate gave a kind reception to the king himself and to his speech, and they were ready to grant him any favour in their power. After him they wished to call in the Rhodians; but as one of the envoys was late in appearing, they summoned those of Smyrna. The latter pleaded at length the goodwill and promptness they had shown in helping the Romans in the late war. As they had the undisputed approbation of the house, since of all the autonomous states of Asia they had been far the most energetic supporters of Rome, I do not think it necessary to report their speech in detail. Next them came the Rhodians, who after a brief reference to their particular services to Rome soon brought their speech round to the question of their country. Here, they said, their chief misfortune on the occasion of this embassy was that the very nature of things placed them in opposition to a prince with whom their relations both in public and in private were most close and cordial. To their country it seemed most noble and most worthy of Rome that the Greeks in Asia should be freed and obtain that autonomy which is nearest to the hearts of all men. But this was not at all in the interest of Eumenes and his brothers; for every monarchy by its nature hated equality and strove to make all men or at least as many as possible subject and obedient to it. But although the facts were so, still, they said, they were confident that they would attain their purpose, not because they had more influence with the Romans than Eumenes, but because their plea must appear indisputably the more just and more advantageous to every one concerned. For if the only way in which the Romans could show their gratitude to Eumenes was by giving up to him the autonomous cities, the question at issue admitted of some doubt; since they would have either to overlook a true friend, or else pay no heed to the call of honour and discovery and tarnish and degrade the aim and purpose of these achievements. "But if," they said, "it is possible to provide satisfactorily for these two objects, why show any further hesitation? Nay, just as at a sumptuous banquet, there is surely enough and more than enough of everything for all. For Lycaonia, Hellespontic Phrygia, Pisidia, the Chersonese, and the parts of Europe adjacent thereto are at your disposal to give to whom you will. Any one of these, if added to the kingdom of Eumenes, would make it ten times as big as it is now, and if all or most of them were assigned to him, he would not be inferior to any other king. So it is in your power, ye men of Rome, to give a magnificent accretion of strength to your friends, and yet not diminish the splendour of your own rôle. For the ends you propose to achieve are not the same as those of other people. Other men are impelled to armed action by the prospect of getting into their power and annexing cities, stores, or ships. But the gods have made all these things superfluous to you, by subjecting the whole world to your dominion. What is it, then, that you really are in want of, and what should you most intently study to obtain? Obviously praise and glory among men, things difficult indeed to acquire and still more difficult to keep when you have them. What we mean we will try to make plainer. You went to war with Philip and made every sacrifice for the sake of the liberty of Greece. For such was your purpose and this alone—absolutely nothing else—was the prize you won by that war. But yet you gained more glory by that than by the tribute you imposed on Carthage. For money is a possession common to all men, but what is good, glorious, and praiseworthy belongs only to the gods and those men who are by nature nearest to them. Therefore, as the noblest of the tasks you accomplished was the liberation of the Greeks, if you now thus supplement it, your glorious record will be complete; but if you neglect to do so, the glory you have already gained will obviously be diminished. We then, ye men of Rome, who have been the devoted supporters of your purpose, and who have taken a real part in your gravest struggles and dangers, do not now abandon our post in the ranks of your friends, but have not hesitated to remind you frankly of what we at least think to be your honour and advantage, aiming at nothing else and estimating nothing higher than our duty."
The Rhodians in this speech seemed to all the house to have expressed themselves modestly and well about the situation, and they next called in Antipater and Zeuxis, the envoys of Antiochus. Upon their having spoken in a tone of supplication and entreaty, the senate voted its approval of the terms made with Scipio in Asia and when, a few days afterwards, the People also ratified the treaty, the oaths of adherence to it were exchanged with Antipater and his colleague. After this the other envoys from Asia were introduced, and the Senate, having given them a short hearing, returned to all the same answer. This was that they would send ten legates to pronounce on all disputes between the towns. After giving this answer they appointed the ten legates, leaving matters of detail to their discretion, but themselves deciding on the following general scheme. Of the inhabitants of Asia on this side Taurus those provinces formerly subject to Antiochus were to be given to Eumenes, with the exception of Lycia and the part of Caria south of the Meander, which were to go to Rhodes: of the Greek cities those which formerly paid tribute to Attalus were to pay the same to Eumenes, and only in the case of those which were tributary to Antiochus was the tribute to be remitted. Having laid down these general principles for the government of Asia, they dispatched the ten legates there to join Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, the proconsul. But after all had been thus arranged the Rhodians came before the Senate again on behalf of the people of Soli in Cilicia; for they said that owing to their tie of kinship with this city it was their duty to espouse its cause, the people of Soli being colonists of Argos, like the Rhodians themselves; so that the two were in the position of sisters, which made it only just that the Solians should receive their freedom from Rome through the good graces of the Rhodians. The senate after listening to them summoned the envoys of Antiochus, and at first ordered him to withdraw from the whole of Cilicia; but when the envoys refused to assent to this, as it was contrary to the treaty, they renewed the demand confining it to Soli alone. But upon the envoys stubbornly resisting it, they dismissed them, and calling in the Rhodians informed them of the reply they had received from Antipater and his colleague, adding that they would go to any extremity, if the Rhodians absolutely insisted on this. The Rhodian envoys however were pleased with the cordial attention of the senate and said that they would make no further demand, so that this matter remained as it was.
The ten legates and the other envoys were preparing to depart, when Publius and Lucius Scipio, who had defeated Antiochus in the sea battle, arrived at Brundisium and after a few days entered Rome and celebrated their triumph.
V. Affairs of Greece
The Situation in Aetolia and Western Greece
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 3.)
Amynander, the king of Athamania, thinking now that he had for certainty recovered his kingdom, sent envoys to Rome and to the Scipios in Asia—they were still in the neighbourhood of Ephesus— excusing himself for having to all appearance returned to Athamania with the help of the Aetolians, and also bringing accusations against Philip, but chiefly begging them to receive them once more into their alliance. The Aetolians, thinking this a favourable opportunity for annexing Amphilochia and Aperantia, decided on an expedition to the above districts and, Nicander their strategus having assembled their total forces, they invaded Amphilochia. Upon most of the inhabitants joining them of their own accord, they went on to Aperantia, and when the people there also voluntarily joined them, they invaded Dolopia. The Dolopians made a show of resistance for a short time; but, with the fate of Athamania and the flight of Philip before their eyes, they soon changed their minds and also joined the Aetolians. After this unbroken series of successes Nicander took his army back to their own country, thinking that by the annexation of the above countries and peoples Aetolia was secured against damage from any quarter. But just after these occurrences, and while the Aetolians were still elated by their success, came the news of the battle in Asia, and when they learnt that Antiochus had been utterly defeated, their spirits were again dashed. And when now Damoteles arrived from Rome and announce that the state of war still subsisted, and that Marcus Fulvius Nobilior with his army was crossing to attack them, they fell into a state of utter helplessness, and were at their wits' end as to how they should meet the danger which threatened them. They decided, then, to send to Athens and Rhodes begging and imploring those states to send embassies to Rome to deprecate the anger of the Romans, and to avert by some means the evils that encompassed Aetolia. At the same time they dispatched to Rome two envoys of their own, Alexander the Isian and Phaeneas accompanied by Chalepus, Alypus of Ambracia and Lycopus.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 3. 9.)
Upon envoys from Epirus reaching the Roman consul he took their advice about his expedition to Aetolia. These envoys recommended him to march on Ambracia—for at the time the Ambracians were members of the Aetolian League— alleging that if the Aetolians were disposed to meet his legions in the field, the country round that city was the best for the purpose; but that if they declined to give battle, the situation of the town itself made it easy to besiege it, since the country afforded abundant material for the construction of siege-works and the river Aratthus, which ran under its walls, would be of help to him both as a source of water supply to his army, it being now summer, and a defence of their works. The advice they gave was considered good, and the consul led his army through Epirus to Ambracia. On arriving there and on the Aetolians not venturing to meet him, he went round the city to survey it and made energetic preparations for its siege.
Meanwhile the envoys sent by the Aetolians to Rome were observed and caught by Syburtes of Petra off Cephallenia and were brought in to Charadrus. The Epirots at first decided to lodge them in Buchetus and keep careful guard over them, but after some days they demanded ransom for them, as they were at war with the Aetolians. Alexander happened to be the richest man in Greece and the others were not badly off, but far poorer than he was. At first the Epirots demanded five talents from each, which the others were not entirely disposed to pay, but rather wished to do so, as they valued their safety above all things. Alexander, however, said he would not yield to the demand, as the sum was too large, and spent sleepless nights bewailing his mischance if he had to pay five talents. The Epirots, foreseeing what was, as a fact, about to happen, and fearing much lest the Romans, on learning that they had arrested envoys on their way to Rome, might write and demand their release, reduced their demand to three talents for each envoy. The others were only too glad to accept, and were allowed to depart after giving surety, but Alexander said he would not pay more than a talent, and even that was too much. Finally he gave up all hope, and remained in prison, being then advanced in years and possessing a fortune of more than two hundred talents. And, I think, he would have perished rather than pay the three talents: so strong is the impulse and so great the eagerness of some people to make money. In this case, however, chance furthered his cupidity, so that, owing to the outcome, this foolish avarice met with universal praise and approval; for a few days afterwards a letter arrived from Rome ordering the envoys to be liberated, and he alone escaped without paying ransom. The Aetolians when they heard of the misfortune that had befallen him appointed Damoteles again ambassador to Rome; but having sailed as far as Leucas he heard that Marcus Fulvius was advancing through Epirus with his army on Ambracia, and abandoning his mission returned to Aetolia.
Siege of Ambracia
(Hero's Treatise on Sieges; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 5.)
The Aetolians, besieged in Ambracia by the Roman consul Marcus Fulvius, gallantly resisted the assaults of rams and other machines. For the consul, after securing his camp, had begun siege operations on an extensive scale. He brought up three machines through the level country near the Pyrrheium at some distance from each other but advancing on parallel lines, a fourth at the Aesculapium and a fifth at the acropolis. As the assault was vigorously conducted at one and the same time in all these places, the besieged were terrified by the prospect of what awaited them. While the rams continued to batter the walls and the long sickle-shaped grapplers to drag down the battlements, the defenders of the city made efforts to counter-engineer them, dropping by means of cranes leaden weights, stones, and stumps of trees on to the rams and after catching the sickles with iron anchors dragging them inside the wall, so that the pole of the apparatus was smashed against the battlement and the sickle itself remained in their hands. They also made frequent sallies, sometimes attacking by night those who slept on the machines, and sometimes openly attempting in daylight to dislodge the day shift, thus impeding the progress of the siege.
(From Hero; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 5-6.)
Nicander, who was hovering round outside the Roman lines, had sent five hundred horse to the town, who forced an entrance by breaking through the entrenchments of the enemy. He had ordered them on a day agreed upon to make a sortie and attack the Roman works, engaging to come to their assistance . . . But although they made a gallant dash out of the city and fought bravely, the plan failed because Nicander failed to appear, either because he was afraid of the risk, or because he thought the task on which he was actually occupied more urgent.
(From Hero; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 7. 4.)
The Romans, working constantly with their rams, continued to break down portions of the wall, but they were not able to force their way in through the breach, as the defenders worked hard at counter-walling, and fought gallantly on the ruins. So, as a last resource, they took to mining and digging underground. Having secured the middle one of the three machines they previously had on this site and covered it carefully with wattle screens, they constructed in front of it a covered gallery running parallel to the wall for about a hundred yards, from which they dug continuously by day and night, employing relays. For a good many days they carried out the earth by the underground passage without being noticed by the defenders, but when the heap of earth became considerable and visible to those in the city, the leaders of the besieged set vigorously to work to dig a trench inside the wall parallel to the wall itself and to the gallery in front of the towers. When it was sufficiently deep, they lined the side of the trench next the wall with exceedingly thin plates of brass, and advancing along the trench with their ears close to these, listened for the noise made the miners outside. When they had noted the spot indicated by the reverberation of some of the brass plates, they began to dig from within another underground passage at right angles to the trench and passing under the wall, their object being to encounter the enemy. This they soon succeeded in doing, as the Roman miners had not only reached the wall but had underpinned a considerable part of it on both sides of their gallery of approach. On meeting, they first of all fought underground with their pikes, but when they found that they could not effect much by this, as on both sides they used bucklers and wattles to protect themselves, some one suggested to the besieged to put in front of them a large corn-jar exactly broad enough to fit into the trench. They were to bore a hole in the bottom of it, and insert into this an iron tube as long as the jar: next they were to fill the whole jar with fine feathers and place quite a few pieces of burning charcoal round its extreme edge: they were now to fit on the mouth of the jar an iron lid full of holes and introduce the whole carefully into the mine with its mouth turned towards the enemy. When they reached the latter they were to stop up completely the space round the rim of the jar, leaving two holes, one on either side, through which they could push their pikes and prevent the enemy from approaching it. They were then to take a blacksmith's bellows and fitting it into the iron tube blow hard on the lighted charcoal that was near the mouth of the vessel among the feathers, gradually, as the feathers caught fire, withdrawing the tube. Upon all those instructions being followed, a quantity of smoke, especially pungent owing to its being produced by feathers, was all carried up the enemy's mine, so that the Romans suffered much and were in an evil case, as they could neither prevent nor support the smoke in their diggings. While the siege thus continued to be prolonged, the strategus of the Aetolians decided to send envoys to the Roman consul.
Peace made with Aetolia
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 9.)
At this time the envoys from Athens and Rhodes arrived at the Roman camp to assist in making peace. Amynander, the king of Athamania, also came to attempt to deliver the Ambraciots from their dangerous situation, having received a safe-conduct from Marcus Fulvius, who availed himself of the opportunity; for this king was on very good terms with the Ambraciots, having lived in the town for a considerable time during his exile. Some representatives of Acarnania also arrived a few days afterwards bringing Damoteles and those with him; for Fulvius, on learning of their unfortunate situation, had written to the people of Thyrrheium to send the men to him. All the above bodies having thus met, negotiations for peace proceeded energetically. Amynander, in pursuance of his purpose, approached the Ambraciots begging them to save themselves and not to run into the extremity of danger, which was not far off, unless they were better advised in their proceedings. After he had more than once ridden up to the wall and spoken to them, the Ambraciots decided to invite him to enter the city. Having received permission from the consul to do so, he went in and conversed with the Ambraciots about the situation. Meanwhile the envoys of Athens and Rhodes, approaching the Roman consul privately, attempted by various arguments to mitigate his anger. Some one also suggested to Damoteles and Phaeneas to address themselves to Gaius Valerius and cultivate relations with him. He was the son Marcus Valerius Laevinus, who had been the first to make an alliance with the Aetolians, and was brother by the mother's side of Marcus Fulvius the present consul, besides which, as he was young and active, he especially enjoyed the consul's confidence. Upon Damoteles and his colleague soliciting his good offices, thinking that it was his own business and his duty of act as protector of the Aetolians, he exerted himself in every way, labouring to rescue that nation from the dangers that beset them. So that, as the matter was pushed forward energetically from all quarters, it was brought to a conclusion. For the Ambraciots, yielding to the advice of the contract, placed themselves at the mercy of the Roman consul, and surrendered their city on condition that the Aetolians were allowed to depart under flag of truce. For this was the first condition they wrested from him, keeping their faith to their allies. Fulvius next agreed with the Aetolians to make peace on the following conditions. They were to pay two hundred Euboic talents at once and three hundred more in six years in yearly instalments of fifty; they were to restore to the Romans in six months without ransom the prisoners and deserters who were in their hands; they were neither to retain in their League nor to receive into it in future any of the cities which after the crossing of Lucius Cornelius Scipio had been taken by the Romans or had entered into alliance with them; the whole of Cephallenia was to be excluded from this treaty.
Such were the general conditions of peace then roughly sketched. They had first of all to be accepted by the Aetolians and then submitted to Rome. The Athenians and Rhodians remained on the spot awaiting the decision of the Aetolians, while Damoteles and Phaeneas returned home and explained the conditions. On the whole the people were satisfied with them, for they were all such as they had not hoped to obtain. For a certain time they hesitated about the cities belonging to their League; but finally agreed to the proposal. Fulvius, having entered Ambracia, allowed the Aetolians to depart under flag of truce; but carried away all the decorative objects, statues, and pictures, of which there were a considerable number, as the town had once been the royal seat of Pyrrhus. A crown  of a hundred and fifty talents was also presented to him. Having settled everything there, he marched into the interior of Aetolia, being surprised at receiving no answer from the Aetolians. On arriving at Amphilochian Argos, which is a hundred and eighty stades distance from Ambracia, he encamped there. Here he was met by Damoteles, who informed him that the Aetolians had passed a decree ratifying the conditions he had agreed to; and they then separated, the Aetolians returning home and Fulvius proceeding to Ambracia. He there occupied himself with preparations for taking his army across to Cephallenia; and the Aetolians appointed and dispatched Phaeneas and Nicander as envoys to Rome about the peace; for nothing at all in it was valid without the consent of the Roman People.
 No doubt "crown" is used in the sense of a customary gift.
These envoys, then, taking with them those of Athens and Rhodes, sailed on their mission; and Fulvius also sent Gaius Valerius Laevinus and some others to further the peace. But when they reached Rome the anger of the People against Aetolia had been revived by King Philip, who, thinking that the Aetolians had unjustly deprived him of Athamania and Dolopia, sent messages to his friends at Rome begging them to participate in his indignation and refuse to accept the peace. In consequence when the Aetolians were admitted, the senate paid little heed to them; but when the Rhodians and Athenians spoke on their behalf, they grew more respectful and listened to them with attention. And indeed Leon, son of Kichesias, who followed Damon, was judged to have spoken well on the whole and to have employed in his speech a similitude apt to the present case. He said that they were justified in being angry with the Aetolians; for that people after receiving many benefits from the Romans had not shown any gratitude for them but had much endangered the Roman supremacy by stirring up the war against Antiochus. In one respect, however, the senate was wrong and that was in being wroth with the populace. For what happened in states to the people was very much the same as what befalls the sea. The sea by its proper nature was always calm and at rest, and in general of such a character that it would never give trouble to any of those who approach it and make use of it; but when violent winds fall upon it and stir it up, compelling it to move contrary to its own nature, nothing was more terrible and appalling than the sea. "And this," he said, "is just what has happened to the Aetolians. As long as no one tampered with them, they were of all the Greeks your most warm and trustworthy supporters. But when Thoas and Dicaearchus, blowing from Asia, and Menestas and Damocritus from Europe stirred up the people and compelled them, contrary to their nature, to become reckless in word and deed, then of a truth in their folly the Aetolians desired to do you evil but brought evil on their own heads. Therefore, while being implacable to the men who instigated them, you should take pity on the people, and make peace with them, well knowing, that when again they have none to tamper with them and once more owe their preservation to you, they will again be the best disposed to you of all the Greeks." By this speech the Athenian envoy persuaded the Senate to make peace with the Aetolians.
When the Senate had passed a consultum, and the people also had voted it, the peace was ratified. The particular conditions were as follows: "The people of Aetolia shall preserve without fraud the empire and majesty of the Roman people: they shall not permit any armed forces proceeding against the Romans, or their allies and friends, to pass through their territory or support such forces in any way by public consent: they shall have the same enemies as the Roman people, and on whomsoever the Romans make war the people of Aetolia shall make war likewise: the Aetolians shall surrender all deserters, fugitives, and prisoners belonging to the Romans and their allies, always excepting such as after being made prisoners of war returned to their own country and were afterwards recaptured, and such as were enemies of the Romans during the time when the Aetolians were fighting in alliance with Rome; all the above to be surrendered, within a hundred days of the peace being sworn, to the chief magistrate of Corcyra; but if some are not to be found up to that date, whenever they are discovered they shall be surrendered without fraud, and such shall not be permitted to return to Aetolia after peace has been sworn: the Aetolians shall pay in silver specie, not inferior to Attic money, two hundred Euboic talents at once to the consul then in Greece, paying a third part of the sum if they wish, in gold at the rate of one gold mina for ten silver minae; and for the first six years after the final conclusion of the treaty fifty talents per annum, this sum to be delivered in Rome: the Aetolians shall give the consul forty hostages each of more than twelve and less than forty years of age at the choice of the Romans and to serve as such for six years, none of them being either a strategus, a hipparch, or a public secretary or one who has previously served as hostage; these hostages also to be delivered in Rome, and any one of them who dies to be replaced: Cephallenia is not to be included in the treaty: of the cities, villages, and men formerly belonging to Aetolia but captured by the Romans during or subsequent to the consulship of Lucius Quintius Flamininus and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus none are to be annexed by the Aetolians: and the city and territory of Oeniadae shall belong to Acarnania." After the oaths had been taken, peace was established on these conditions and such was the seal finally set on the affairs of Aetolia and Greece in general.
Capture of Same in Cephallenia by Fulvius
(Suid.; Livy XXXVIII. 29. 10.)
Fulvius by a secret understanding occupied part of the acropolis by night and introduced the Romans.
Wisdom of Philopoemen
(Suid.; Livy XXXVIII. 30.)
What is good very seldom coincides with what is advantageous, and few are those who can combine the two and adapt them to each other. Indeed we all know that for the most part the nature of immediate profit is repugnant to goodness and vice versa. But Philopoemen made this his purpose and attained his object. For it was a good act to restore to their country the Spartan exiles who were prisoners, and it was an advantageous one to humble the city of Sparta by destroying the satellites of the tyrants. And being by nature a man of sound sense and a real leader, he saw that money is at the root of the re-establishment of all kingly power, and did his best to prevent the receipt of the sums advanced.
VI. Affairs of Asia
Manlius and the Gallic War
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 12. 1.)
At the same time that the embassies were negotiating at Rome concerning the peace with Antiochus and the fate of Asia Minor in general, and while the war against the Aetolian League still continued in Greece, the war against the Gauls in Asia, which I am now about to describe, was begun and ended.
(Suid; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 12. 7.)
Manlius was favourably impressed by the young man, Attalus, at this interview and at once allowed him to proceed to Pergamus.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 14. 3.)
Moagetes was tyrant of Cibyra. He was a cruel and treacherous man and worthy of more than a passing notice.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 14. 4.)
When Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, the Roman consul, approached Cibyra and sent Helvius to find out what the mind of Moagetes was, the latter sent envoys begging Helvius not to lay the country waste as he was the friend of the Romans and ready to do anything they told him. He at the same time offered a gold crown of fifteen talents. Helvius, after listening to those envoys, promised to spare the country himself, but referred them to the consul for a general settlement. Manlius, he said, was close behind him with his army. Upon this being done, Moagetes having sent his brother in addition to the other envoys, Manlius met them on his march and spoke to them in a threatening and severe manner, saying that not only had Moagetes proved more hostile to the Romans than any other Asiatic prince, but had done all in his power to subvert their rule, and therefore deserved animadversion and chastisement rather than friendship. The envoys, alarmed by the vehemence of his anger, neglected their other instructions and begged him to grant an interview to Moagetes himself. On his agreeing to this request they returned to Cibyra; and next day the tyrant and his friends came out to meet him dressed and escorted in the simplest and most unassuming manner, and in a submissive speech, bewailing his own powerlessness and the weakness of the towns subject to him, begged Manlius to accept the fifteen talents— the places he ruled over being, besides Cibyra, Syleium and that called the town in the Lake. Manlius, amazed at his impudence, said not another word, but merely that if he did not pay five hundred talents and thank his stars, he would not only lay waste his territory, but besiege and sack the city itself. So that Moagetes, in dread of the fate that threatened him, implored him to do nothing of the kind; and, raising his offer little by little, persuaded Manlius to accept a hundred talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat and to receive him into his alliance.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 15. 3.)
While Manlius was crossing the river Colobatus, envoys reached him from the city of Isinda begging him to help them; for the Termessians, summoning Philomelus to their assistance, had devastated their territory and pillaged their city and were now besieging the citadel in which all the citizens with their wives and children had sought refuge. Manlius, after listening to their request, said he would be very pleased to come to their help; and, looking upon this chance as a godsend, began to march towards Pamphylia.
On approaching Termessus he received that people into his alliance on receipt of fifty talents, and likewise the people of Aspendus. After receiving the envoys of the other Pamphylian cities, and producing on all of them on the occasion of their audience an impression similar to that I have described, he first raised the siege of Isinda and then again began to march against the Gauls.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 15. 7.)
Manlius, after capturing the city of Cyrmasa and a quantity of booty, continued his march. While they were advancing along the shore of the lake there came envoys for Lysinoë to announce its submission; and after receiving them he entered the territory of Sagalassus and, having carried off a large amount of booty, waited to see what the mind of those in the city would be. Upon their envoys reaching him he received them, and after accepting a crown of fifty talents, twenty thousand medimni of barley, and twenty thousand of wheat, admitted that city into his alliance.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 1-3.)
Manlius, the Roman consul, sent legates to the Gaul Eposognatus asking him on his part to send envoys to the Galatian princes. Eposognatus thereupon sent envoys to Manlius begging him not to take the initiative in attacking the Galatian Tolistobogii, as he would communicate with their princes suggesting alliance with Rome, and was convinced that they would accept any reasonable terms.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 7.)
Manlius, the Roman consul, on his passage through Asia, bridged the river Sangarius which here runs between deep banks and is very difficult to cross. As he was encamped close to the river, two Galli,  with pectorals and images, came on behalf of Attis and Battacus, the priests of the Mother of the Gods at Pessinus, announcing that the goddess foretold his victory. Manlius gave them a courteous reception.
 See Chapter 6 above.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 18. 10.)
While Manlius was near the small town of Gordium envoys from Eposognatus reached him informing him that he had gone in person to speak with the Galatian princes, but that they simply refused to make any advances: they had collected on Mount Olympus their women and children and all their possessions, and were prepared to give battle.
(From Plutarch, The Virtuous Deeds of Women, XXII; cp. Livy XXXVIII. 24. 2.)
Chiomara, the wife of Ortiagon, was captured with the other women when the Asiatic Gauls were defeated by the Romans under Manlius. The centurion into whose hands she fell took advantage of his capture with a soldier's brutality and did violence to her. The man was indeed an ill-bred lout, the slave both of gain and of lust, but his love of gain prevailed; and as a considerable sum had been promised him for the woman's ransom, he brought her to a certain place to deliver her up, a river running between him and the messengers. When the Gauls crossed and after handing him the money were taking possession of Chiomara, she signed to one of them to strike the man as he was taking an affectionate leave of her. The man obeyed and cut off his head, which she took up and wrapped in the folds of her dress, and then drove off. When she came into the presence of her husband and threw the head at his feet, he was astonished and said, "Ah! my wife, it is good to keep faith." "Yes," she replied, "but it is better still that only one man who has lain with me should remain alive." Polybius tells us that he met and conversed with the lady at Sardis and admired her high spirit and intelligence.
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 25.)
While the Romans after their victory over the Gauls were encamped near Ancyra and Manlius the consul was about to advance, there came envoys from the Tectosages begging him to leave his army where it was and to come out himself next day to the space between the camps, where their princes also would come and communicate with him about peace. Upon Manlius agreeing to this, and keeping the appointment accompanied by five hundred horse, the princes did not come on that occasion, but after he had returned to his camp, the envoys came again offering some excuses on behalf of the princes, but begging him to come once more, as they would send out their leading men to exchange views about the whole situation. Manlius agreed to come, but himself remained in his own camp, sending out Attalus and some of the military tribunes with an escort of three hundred horse The Gaulish envoys kept their appointment and spoke about the questions at issue, but said it was impossible then to come to a final agreement about matters or ratify anything that was decided. On the following day, however, they engaged that the princes should come to arrive at an agreement and complete the negotiations, if the consul Manlius met them in person. Attalus then promised that Manlius would come, and they separated on this understanding. The object of the Gauls in making these postponements and practising these stratagems against the Romans was partly to gain time transport certain of their relations and some of their property across the river Halys; but chiefly, if they could, to capture the Roman consul, or at any rate to kill him. With this intention they awaited next day the arrival of the Romans, keeping about a thousand horsemen in readiness. Manlius, after listening to Attalus and believing that the princes would come, went out as usual with an escort of five hundred horse. But it so happened that on previous days the Romans who left their camp to collect wood and forage went out in this direction under cover of the cavalry who were going to the conference. On this day the same thing took place, the foragers being very numerous, and the tribunes ordered the cavalry which used to protect them to go out in this direction. This was done, and thus by chance the proper step was taken to meet the danger which menaced the consul.
VII. Affairs of Asia
Further Negotiations with Manlius and the Peace with Antiochus
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 38.)
At this period, while Gnaeus Manlius, the Roman consul, was wintering in Ephesus, in the last year of this Olympiad embassies arrived from the Greek cities in Asia and from several other quarters to confer crowns on him for his victories over the Gauls. For all the inhabitants of the country on this side Taurus were not so much pleased at the defeat of Antiochus and at the prospect of the liberation of some of them from tribute, of others from garrisons, and of all from royal domination, as at their release from the fear of the barbarians and at the thought that they were now delivered from the lawless violence of these tribes. Musaeus also came on the part of Antiochus, and some envoys from the Gauls to discover on what terms they might be reconciled with Rome, and likewise an embassy from Ariarathes, the king of Cappadocia; for he too had made common cause with Antiochus and had taken his part in the battle against the Romans, and he was now alarmed and doubtful as to what would befall him; so that he had sent several embassies to learn by what concessions or by what course of conduct he could atone for his error. The consul after thinking and courteously entertaining all the embassies from the towns, dismissed them and replied to the Gauls that he would wait for the arrival of King Eumenes before coming to terms with them. As for Ariarathes he told him to pay six hundred talents and consider himself at peace. He arranged with the envoy of Antiochus to come with his army to the borders of Pamphylia to get the two thousand five hundred talents and the corn that Antiochus had to give to the Roman soldiers before peace was made, by the terms of his agreement with Lucius Scipio. After this he reviewed his army, and as the season admitted it, left Ephesus, taking Attalus with him, and reaching Apamea in eight days, remained there for three days and on the fourth left that town and advanced by forced marches. Reaching the place he had agreed upon with Antiochus on the third day, he encamped there. Upon Musaeus meeting him and begging him to have patience, as the carriages and animals which were bringing the corn and money were delayed on the road, he was persuaded to do so, and waited for three days. When the supplies came he divided the corn among his soldiers and handing over the money to one of his tribunes ordered him to convey it to Apamea.
Hearing now that the commander of the garrison at Perga appointed by Antiochus was neither withdrawing the garrison nor leaving the town himself, he marched against the place with his army. When he was near it the commander came out to meet him, entreating him not to condemn him unheard; for he was doing what was part of his duty. He had been entrusted by Antiochus with the city and he was holding it until he was again informed by his master what he should do, but up to now he had received no instructions from anyone on the subject. He therefore asked for thirty days' grace in order that he might send and ask the king how to act. Manlius, as he saw that Antiochus was faithful to his obligations in all other respects, allowed him to send and inquire, and after a few days he received an answer and surrendered the town.
The ten legates and King Eumenes arrived by sea at Ephesus in early summer, and after resting there for two days after their voyage, went up the country towards Apamea. Manlius, on hearing of their arrival, dispatched his brother Lucius with four thousand men to Oroanda, the iron hand in the velvet glove, to obtain payment of the part still owing of the sum the people of that place had agreed to pay. He himself left in haste with his army, as he was anxious to meet Eumenes. Upon reaching Apamea and meeting Eumenes and the ten legates, he sat with them in council discussing the situation. It was decided in the first place to ratify the treaty with Antiochus, about the terms of which I need make no further remarks, but will quote the actual text.
The terms in detail were as follows: "There shall be friendship between Antiochus and the Romans for all time if he fulfills the conditions of the treaty: King Antiochus and his subjects shall not permit the passage through their territory of any enemy marching against the Romans and their allies or furnish such enemy with any supplies: the Romans and their allies engage to act likewise towards Antiochus and his subjects: Antiochus shall not make war on the inhabitants of the islands or of Europe: he shall evacuate all cities, lands, villages, and forts on this side of Taurus as far as the river Halys and all between the valley of Taurus and the mountain ridges that descend to Lycaonia:  from all such places he is to carry away nothing except the arms borne by his soldiers, and if anything has been carried away, it is to be restored to the same city: he shall not receive either soldiers or others from the kingdom of Eumenes: if there be any men in the army of Antiochus coming from the cities which the Romans take over, he shall deliver them up at Apamea: if there be any from the kingdom of Antiochus dwelling with the Romans and their allies, they may remain or depart at their good pleasure: Antiochus and his subjects shall give up the slaves of the Romans and of their allies, and any prisoners of war they have taken, if there be such: Antiochus shall give up, if it be in his power, Hannibal son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, Eubulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and all Aetolians who have held public office: he shall surrender all the elephants now in Apamea and not keep any in future: he shall surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more than ten decked ships of war, nor shall he have any galley rowed by more than thirty oars, nor a moneres  to serve in any war in which he is the aggressor: his ships shall not sail beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory unless conveying tribute, envoys or hostages: Antiochus shall not have permission to hire mercenaries from the lands under the rule of the Romans, or to receive fugitives: all houses that belonged to the Rhodians and their allies in the dominions of Antiochus shall remain their property as they were before he made war on them; likewise if any money is owing to them they may exact payment, and if anything has been abstracted from them it shall be sought for and returned: merchandise meant for Rhodes shall be free from duties as before the war: if any of the cities which Antiochus has to give up have been given by him to others, he shall withdraw from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them: and if any cities afterwards wish to desert to him, he shall not receive them: Antiochus shall pay to the Romans twelve thousand talents a year, the talent not to weigh less than eighty Roman pounds, and five hundred and forty thousand modii of corn: he shall pay to King Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the next five years, paying seventy talents a year at the same time that is fixed for his payments to the Romans and in lieu of the corn, as Antiochus estimated it—one hundred and twenty-seven talents and twelve hundred and eight drachmas, the sum Eumenes agreed to accept as a satisfactory payment to his treasury: Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, replacing them every three years, not below eighteen years of age and not above forty: if any of the money he pays does not correspond to the above stipulations, he shall make it good in the following year: if any of the cities or peoples against which Antiochus is forbidden by this treaty to make war begin first to make war on him, he may make war on such, provided he does not exercise sovereignty over any of them or receive them into his alliance: all grievances of both parties are be submitted to a lawful tribunal: if both parties desire to add any clauses to this treaty or to remove any by common decree, they are at liberty to do so.
 I supply from Livy what is missing in the text of Polybius.
 A ship with one bank of oars.
The proconsul having sworn to this treaty he at once dispatched Quintus Minucius Thermus and his own brother Lucius Manlius, who had just returned bringing the money from Oroanda, to Syria with orders to exact the oath from Antiochus and make sure that the treaty would be carried out in detail. He then sent dispatches to Quintus Fabius Labeo, the commander of the fleet, ordering him to sail back to Patara, and, taking possession of the ships there, to burn them.
(Suid. cp. Livy XXXVIII. 39. 6.)
Manlius the proconsul exacting three hundred talents from Ariarathes received him into the Roman alliance.
Final Settlement of Asia Minor
(Cp. Livy XXXVIII. 39. 7-17.)
In Apamea the ten legates and Manlius the proconsul, after listening to all the applicants, assigned, in cases where the dispute was about land, money, or other property, cities agreed upon by both parties in which to settle their differences. The general dispositions they made were as follows. All autonomous towns which formerly paid tribute to Antiochus but had now remained faithful to Rome were freed from tribute: all which had paid contributions to Attalus were to pay the same sum as tribute to Eumenes: any which had abandoned the Roman alliance and joined Antiochus in the war were to pay to Eumenes whatever tribute Antiochus had imposed on them. They freed from tribute the Colophonians inhabiting Notium, the people of Cymae and Mylasa, and in addition to this immunity they gave to Clazomenae the island called Drymussa and restored to the Milesians the holy district, from which they had formerly retired owing to the wars. They advanced in many ways Chios, Smyrna, and Erythrae, and assigned to them the districts which they desired to acquire at the time and considered to belong to them by rights, out of regard for the goodwill and activity they had displayed during the war, and they also restored to Phocaea her ancient constitution and her former territory. In the next place they dealt with the claims of Rhodes, giving her Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander, except Telmessus. As for King Eumenes and his brothers they had made all possible provision for them in their treaty with Antiochus, and they now added to their dominion the following: in Europe the Chersonese, Lysimachia and the adjacent forts and territory, and in Asia Hellespontic Phrygia, Greater Phrygia, that part of Mysia of which Prusias had formerly deprived Eumenes, Lycaonia, the Milyas, Lydia, Tralles, Ephesus, and Telmessus. Such were the gifts they gave to Eumenes. As for Pamphylia, since Eumenes maintained it was on this side of the Taurus, and the envoys of Antiochus said it was on the other, they were in doubt and referred the matter to the senate. Having thus settled nearly all the most important questions, they left Apamea and proceeded towards the Hellespont, intending on their way to put matters in Galatia on a safe footing.
THE END OF BOOK XXI