I. AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA AND GREECE
Flamininus and Philip
When the time fixed for the conference came, Philip arrived, having sailed from Demetrias to the Melian gulf with five galleys and a beaked ship in which he travelled himself. He was accompanied by the Macedonians Apollodorus and Demosthenes, his secretaries, by Brachylles from Boeotia, and by Cycliadas the Achaean, who had had to leave the Peloponnesus for the reasons stated above. Flamininus had with him King Amynander and the representative of Attalus Dionysodorus, and on the part of cities and nations Aristaenus and Xenophon from Achaea, Acesimbrotus, the admiral, from Rhodes, and from Aetolia the strategus Phaeneas and several other politicians. Flamininus and those with him reached the sea at Nicaea and waited standing on the beach, but Philip on approaching land remained afloat. When Flamininus asked him to come ashore he rose from his place on the ship and said he would not disembark. Upon Flamininus again asking him of whom he was afraid Philip said he was afraid of no one but the gods, but he was suspicious of most of those present and especially of the Aetolians. When the Roman general expressed his surprise and said that the danger was the same for all and the chances equal, Philip said he was not right; for if anything happened to Phaeneas, there were many who could be strategi of the Aetolians, but if Philip perished there was no one at present to occupy the throne of Macedon. He seemed to them to have opened the conference with little dignity, but Flamininus, however, begged him to state his reasons for attending it. Philip said it was not his own business to speak first, but that of Flamininus, and he therefore asked him to explain what he should do to keep the peace. The Roman general said that what it was his duty to say was simple and obvious. He demanded that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece after giving up to each power the prisoners and deserters in his hands; that he should surrender to the Romans the district of Illyria that had fallen into his power after the treaty made in Epirus, and likewise restore to Ptolemy all the towns that he had taken from him after the death of Ptolemy Philopator.
Flamininus after speaking thus stopped, and turning to the others bade them each speak as they had been instructed by those who had commissioned them. Dionysodorus, the representative of Attalus, was the first to speak. He said that Philip must give up those of the king's ships he had taken in the battle of Chios, together with the men captured in them, and that he must restore to their original condition the temple of Aphrodite and the Nicephorium which he had destroyed. Next Acesimbrotus, the Rhodian admiral, demanded that Philip should evacuate the Peraea which he had taken from the Rhodians, withdraw his garrisons from Iasus, Bargylia, and Euromus, permit the Perinthians to resume their confederacy with Byzantium, and retire from Sestus and Abydus and all commercial depots and harbours in Asia. After the Rhodians the Achaeans demanded Corinth and Argos undamaged, and next the Aetolians first of all, as the Romans had done, bade him withdraw from the whole of Greece, and next asked him to restore to them undamaged the cities which were formerly members of the Aetolian League.
After Phaeneas, the strategus of the Aetolians, had spoken thus, Alexander called the Isian, a man considered to be a practical statesman and an able speaker, took part in the debate and said that Philip neither sincerely desired peace at present nor did he make war bravely when he had to do so, but that in assemblies and conferences he laid traps and watched for opportunities and behaved as if he were at war, but in war itself adopted an unfair and very ungenerous course. For instead of meeting his enemies face to face he used to flee before them, burning and sacking cities, and by this course of conduct though beaten he spoilt the prizes of the victors. Not this but quite the reverse had been the object of the former kings of Macedon; for they used to fight constantly with each other in the field but very seldom destroyed or ruined cities. This was evident to everybody from the war that Alexander waged against Darius in Asia, and from that long dispute of his successors in which they all took up arms against Antigonus for the mastery of Asia; and their successors again down to Pyrrhus had acted on the same principle; they had always been ready to give battle to each other in the open field and had done all in their power to overcome each other by force of arms, but they had spared cities, so that whoever conquered might be supreme in them and be honoured by his subjects. But while destroying the objects of war, to leave war itself untouched was madness and very strong madness. And this was just what Philip was now doing. For when he was hurrying back from the pass in Epirus he destroyed more cities in Thessaly, though he was the friend and ally of the Thessalians, than any of their enemies had ever destroyed. After adding much more to the same effect, he finally argued as follows. He asked Philip why, when Lysimachia was a member of the Aetolian League and was in charge of a military governor sent by them, he had expelled the latter and placed a garrison of his own in the city; and why had he sold into slavery the people of Cius, also a member of the Aetolian League, when he himself was on friendly terms with the Aetolians? On what pretext did he now retain possession of Echinus, Phthian Thebes, Pharsalus, and Larisa?
When Alexander had ended this harangue, Philip brought his ship nearer to the shore than it had been, and standing up on the deck, said that Alexander's speech had been truly Aetolian and theatrical. Everyone, he said, was aware that no one ever of his own free will ruins his own allies, but that by changes of circumstance commanders are forced to do many things that they would have preferred not to do. The king had not finished speaking when Phaeneas, whose sight was badly impaired, interrupted him rudely, saying that he was talking nonsense, he must either fight and conquer or do the bidding of his betters. Philip, though in an evil case, could not refrain from his peculiar gift of raillery, but turning to him said, "Even a blind man, Phaeneas, can see that"; for he was ready and had a natural talent for scoffing at people. Then, turning again to Alexander, "You ask me," he said, "Alexander, why I annexed Lysimachia. It was in order that it should not, owing to your neglect, be depopulated by the Thracians, as has actually happened since I withdrew to serve in this war those of my troops who were acting not as you say as its garrison, but as its guardians. As for the people of Cius, it was not I who made war on them, but when Prusias did so I helped him to exterminate them, and all through your fault. For on many occasions when I and the other Greeks sent embassies to you begging you to remove from your statutes the law empowering you to get booty from booty, you replied that you would rather remove Aetolia from Aetolia than that law. When Flamininus said he wondered what that was, the king tried to explain to him, saying that the Aetolians have a custom not only to make booty of the persons and territory of those with whom they are themselves at war, but if any other peoples are at war with each other who are friends and allies of theirs, it is permissible nevertheless to the Aetolian without any public decree to help both belligerents and pillage the territory of both; so that with the Aetolians there is no precise definition of friendship and enmity, but they promptly treat as enemies and make war on all between whom there is a dispute about anything. "So what right have they," he continued, "to accuse me now, because, being a friend of the Aetolians and the ally of Prusias, I acted against the people of Cius in coming to the aid of my ally?" But what is most insufferable of all is that they assume they are the equals of the Romans in demanding that the Macedonians should withdraw from the whole of Greece. To employ such language at all is indeed a sign of haughtiness, but while we may put up with it from the lips of the Romans we cannot when the speakers are Aetolians. And what," he said, "is that Greece from which you order me to withdraw, and how do you define Greece? For most of the Aetolians themselves are not Greeks. No! the countries of the Agraae, the Apodotae, and the Amphilochians are not Greece. Do you give me permission to remain in those countries?"
Upon Flamininus smiling, "That is all I have to say to the Aetolians," he said, "but my answer to the Romans and Attalus is that a fair judge would pronounce that it would be more just for them to give up the captured ships and men to me than for me to give them up to them. For it was not I who first took up arms against Attalus and the Rhodians, but they cannot deny that they were the aggressors. However, at your bidding I cede the Peraea to the Rhodians and the men and ships that still survive to Attalus. As for the damage done to the Nicephorium and the sanctuary of Aphrodite, it is not in my power to repair it otherwise, but I will send plants and gardeners to cultivate the place and see to the growth of the trees that were cut down." Flamininus again smiled at the jest, and Philip now passed to the Achaeans. He first enumerated all the favours they had received from Antigonus and those he himself had done them, next he recited the high honours they had conferred on the Macedonian monarchs, and finally he read the decree in which they decided to abandon him and go over to the Romans, taking occasion thereby to dwell at length on their inconsistency and ingratitude. Still, he said, he would restore Argos to them, but would consult with Flamininus as to Corinth.
After speaking to the others in these terms he asked Flamininus, saying that he was now addressing himself and the Romans, whether he demanded his withdrawal from those towns and places in Greece which he had himself conquered or from those also which he had inherited from his forbears. Flamininus remained silent, but Aristaenus on the part of the Achaeans and Phaeneas on that of the Aetolians were at once ready with a reply. However, as the day was now drawing to a close, they were prevented from speaking owing to the hour, and Philip demanded that they should all furnish him with their terms for peace in writing; for he was alone and had no one to consult, so he wished to think over their demands. Flamininus was by no means displeased by Philip's jests, and not wishing the others to think he was so, rallied Philip in turn by saying, "Naturally you are alone now, Philip, for you have killed all those of your friends who would give you the best advice." The Macedonian monarch smiled sardonically and made no reply.
They all now, after handing to Philip their decisions in writing—decisions similar to those I have stated—separated, making an appointment to meet next day again at Nicaea. On the morrow Flamininus and all the others arrived punctually at the appointed place, but Philip did not put in an appearance.
When it was getting quite late in the day and Flamininus had nearly given up all hope, Philip appeared at dusk accompanied by the same people, having, as he himself asserted, spent the day in puzzling over the conditions and dealing with the difficult points, but in opinion of others his object was to prevent, by cutting down the time, the accusations of the Achaeans and Aetolians. For on the previous day at the moment of his departure he saw they were both ready to join issue with him and load him with reproach. So that now, approaching nearer, he asked the Roman general to converse with him in private about the situation, so that there should not be a mere skirmishing with words on both sides but that an end of some kind should be put to the dispute. When he begged and demanded this repeatedly, Flamininus asked those present what he ought to do. Upon their bidding him meet Philip and hear what he had to say, Flamininus taking with him Appius Claudius, then military tribune, told the rest, who had retired a short distance from the seashore, to remain where they were and asked Philip to come ashore. The king left the ship accompanied by Apollodorus and Demosthenes, and meeting Flamininus conversed with him for a considerable time. It is difficult to tell what each of them said on that occasion, but Flamininus, after Philip had left, in explaining to the rest the king's proposals, said that he would restore Pharsalus and Larisa to the Aetolians, but not Thebes, he would give up the Peraea to the Rhodians, but would not withdraw from Iasus and Bargylia, but to the Achaeans he would surrender Corinth and Argos. He would give up to Rome his possessions in Illyria and would restore all prisoners of war, and restore also to Attalus his ships and all who survived of the men captured in the naval engagements.
When all present expressed their dissatisfaction with these terms and maintained that Philip should in the first place execute their common demand—that is withdraw from the whole of Greece, apart from which the different concessions were absurd and worthless— Philip, noticing the discussion that was going on and fearing the complaints they would bring against him, proposed to Flamininus to adjourn the conference till next day because, apart from other things, it was getting late: then he said he would either convince them or be convinced of the justice of their demands. Flamininus yielded to this request and after agreeing to meet on the beach at Thronion they separated, and all next day arrived in time at the appointed place. Philip now in a short speech begged them all and especially Flamininus not to break off negotiations now that they were on the verge of a settlement of most questions, but if possible to come to an agreement among themselves about the disputed points. If not, however, he said he would send an embassy to the senate and either persuade that body about these points or do whatever it ordered him. On his making this proposal all the others said they ought to continue the war and not accede to the request; but the Roman general said that while he too was quite aware that there was no probability of Philip's really doing anything they demanded, yet as the king's request in no way interfered with their own action, it perfectly suited them to grant it. For as things stood, nothing they now said could be made valid without consulting the senate, and besides the general advantage of arriving at a knowledge of the will of the senate, the immediate future was a favourable time for taking this course. The armies, in fact, could do nothing owing to the winter, and therefore to devote this time to referring the matter to the senate was by no means useless, but in the interest of them all. They all soon gave their consent as they saw that Flamininus was evidently not averse from referring things to the senate, and it was decided to allow Philip to send an embassy to Rome, and that they also should each send ambassadors to speak before the senate and accuse Philip.
The conference having led to a result agreeable to Flamininus and in accordance with his original calculations, he at once set to work to complete the texture of his design, securing his own position and giving Philip no advantage. For granting him an armistice of two months he ordered him to finish with his embassy to Rome within that time and to withdraw at once his garrisons from Phocis and Locris. He also took energetic steps on behalf of his own allies to guard against their suffering any wrong from the Macedonians during this period. Having communicated with Philip to this effect by writing, he henceforth went on carrying out his purpose without consulting anyone. He at once dispatched Amynander to Rome, as he knew that he was of a pliable disposition and would be ready to follow the lead of his own friends there in whichever direction they chose to move, and that his regal title would add splendour to the proceedings and make people eager to see him. After him he sent his own legates, Quintus Fabius, the nephew of his wife, Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius Nero. The ambassadors from Aetolia were Alexander the Isian, Damocritus of Calydon, Dicaearchus of Trichonium, Polemarchus of Arsinoë, Lamius of Ambracia, Nicomachus, one of the Acarnanians who had been exiled from Thurium and resided in Ambracia, and Theodotus of Pherae, who was exiled from Thessaly and lived in Stratus; the envoy of the Achaeans was Xenophon of Aegae; Attalus sent Alexander alone, and the Athenian people Cephisodorus.
The envoys arrived in Rome before the senate had decided whether the consuls of the year should be both sent to Gaul or one of them against Philip. But when the friends of Flamininus were assured that both consuls were to remain in Italy owing to the fear of the Celts, all the envoys entered the senate-house and roundly denounced Philip. Their accusations were in general similar to those they had brought against the king in person, but the point which they all took pains to impress upon the senate was that as long as Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias remained in Macedonian hands it was impossible for the Greeks to have any thought of liberty. Philip's own expression when he pronounced these places to be the fetters of Greece, was, they said, only too true, since neither could the Peloponnesians breathe freely with a royal garrison established in Corinth, nor could the Locrians, Boeotians, and Phocians have any confidence while Philip occupied Chalcis and the rest of Euboea, nor again could the Thessalians and Magnesians ever enjoy liberty while the Macedonians held Demetrias. Therefore his withdrawal from the other places was a mere show of concession on the part of Philip in order to get out of his present difficulty, and if he commanded the above places he could easily bring the Greeks under subjection any day he wished. They therefore demanded that the senate should either compel Philip to withdraw from these towns or abide by the agreement and fight against him with all their strength. For the hardest task of the war had been accomplished, as the Macedonians had now been twice beaten and had expended most of their resources on land. After speaking thus they entreated the senate neither to cheat the Greeks out of their hope of liberty nor to deprive themselves of the noblest title to fame. Such or very nearly such were the words of the ambassadors. Philip's envoys had prepared a lengthy argument in reply, but were at once silenced; for when asked if they would give up Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias they replied that they had no instructions on the subject.
Thus cut short they stopped speaking, and the senate now, as I above stated, dispatched both consuls to Gaul and voted to continue the war against Philip, appointing Flamininus their commissioner in the affairs of Greece. This information was rapidly conveyed to Greece, and now all had fallen out as Flamininus wished, chance having contributed little to help him, but nearly all being due to his own prudent management. For this general had shown a sagacity equal to that of any Roman, having managed both public enterprises and his own private dealings with consummate skill and good sense, and this although he was yet quite young, not being over thirty. He was the first Roman who had crossed to Greece in command of an army.
Definition of Treachery
I have often had occasion to wonder where the truth lies about many human affairs and especially about the question of traitors. I therefore wish to say a few words on the subject appropriate to the times I am dealing with, although I am quite aware that it is one which is difficult to survey and define; it being by no means easy to decide whom we should really style a traitor. It is evident that we cannot pronounce offhand to be traitors men who take the initiative in engaging in common action against certain kings and princes, nor again those who at the bidding of circumstances induce their countries to exchange their established relations for other friendships and alliances. Far from it; in view of the fact that such men have often conferred the greatest benefit on their country. Not to draw examples from far-off times, what I say can easily be observed from the very circumstances we are dealing with. For if Aristaenus had not then in good time made the Achaeans throw off their alliance with Philip and change it for that with Rome, the whole nation would evidently have suffered utter destruction. But now, apart from the temporary safety gained for all the members of the League, this man and that council were regarded as having beyond doubt contributed to the increase of the Achaean power; so that all agreed in honouring him not as a traitor, but as the benefactor and preserver of the land. And the same is the case with others who according to change of circumstances adopt a similar policy of action.
It is for this reason that while we must praise Demosthenes for so many things, we must blame him for one, for having recklessly and injudiciously cast bitter reproach on the most distinguished men in Greece by saying that Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas in Arcadia were betrayers of Greece because they joined Philip, and for saying the same of Neon and Thrasylochus, the sons of Philiadas in Messene, Myrtis, Teledamus and Mnaseas in Argos, Daochus and Cineas in Thessaly, Theogeiton and Timolas in Boeotia, and several others in different cities. But in fact all the above men were perfectly and clearly justified in thus defending their own rights, and more especially those from Arcadia and Messene. For the latter, by inducing Philip to enter the Peloponnesus and humbling the Lacedaemonians, in the first place allowed all the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus to breathe freely and to entertain the thought of liberty, and next recovering the territory and cities of which the Lacedaemonians in their prosperity had deprived the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, unquestionably increased the power of their native towns. With such an object in view it was not their duty to fight against Philip, but to take every step for their own honour and glory. Had they in acting thus either submitted to have their towns garrisoned by Philip, or abolished their laws and deprived the citizens of freedom of action and speech to serve their own ambition and place themselves in power, they would have deserved the name of traitor. But if preserving the rights of their respective countries, they simply differed in their judgement of facts, thinking that the interests of Athens were not identical with those of their countries, they should, I maintain, not have been dubbed traitors for this reason by Demosthenes. Measuring everything by the interests of his own city, thinking that the whole of Greece should have its eyes turned on Athens, and if people did not do so, calling them traitors, Demosthenes seems to me to have been very much mistaken and very far wide of the truth, especially as what actually befel the Greeks then does not testify to his own admirable foresight but rather to that of Eucampidas, Hieronymus, Cercidas, and the sons of Philiadas. For the opposition offered to Philip by the Athenians resulted in their being overtaken by the gravest disasters, defeated as they were at the battle of Chaeronea. And had it not been for the king's magnanimity and love of glory, their misfortune would have been even more terrible and all due to the policy of Demosthenes. But it was owing to the men whose names I mentioned that two states of Arcadia and Messene obtained public security and rest from Lacedaemonian aggression, and that so many private advantages to their citizens resulted.
It is, then, difficult to define who are the men to whom we may legitimately give this name, but one would most nearly approach the truth by applying it to those who in a season of imminent danger, either for their own safety or advantage or owing to their differences with the opposite party, put their cities into the hands of the enemy, or still more justifiably to those who, admitting a garrison and employing external assistance to further their own inclinations and aims, submit their countries to the domination of a superior power. It would be quite fair to class all the above as traitors. The treachery of these men never resulted in any real advantage or good to themselves, but in every case, as no one can deny, just the reverse. And this makes us wonder what their original motives are; with what aim and reckoning on what they rush headlong into such misfortune. For not a single man ever betrays a town or army or fort without being found out, but even if any be not detected at the actual moment, the progress of time discovers them all at the end. Nor did any one of them who had once been recognized ever lead a happy life, but in most instances they meet with the punishment they deserve at the hands of the very men with whom they tried to ingratiate themselves. For generals and princes often employ traitors to further their interest, but when they have no further use for them they afterwards, as Demosthenes says, treat them as traitors, very naturally thinking that a man who has betrayed his country and his original friends to the enemy could never become really well disposed to themselves or keep faith with them. And if they should happen to escape punishment at the hands of their employers, it is by no means easy for them to escape it at the hands of those they betrayed. Should they, however, give the slip to the retribution of both, their evil name among other men clings to them for their whole life, producing many false apprehensions and many real ones by night and by day, aiding and abetting all who have evil designs against them, and finally not allowing them even in sleep to forget their offence, but compelling them to dream of every kind of plot and peril, conscious as they are of the estrangement of everybody and of men's universal hatred of them. But in spite of all this being so, no one ever, when he had need of one, failed to find a traitor, except in a very few cases. All this would justify us in saying that man, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the animals, may with good reason be called the least intelligent. For the other animals are the slaves of their bodily wants alone and only get into trouble owing to these, but man, for all the high opinion that has been formed of him, makes mistakes just as much owing to want of thought as owing to his physical impulses. I have now said enough on this subject.
Attalus at Sicyon
King Attalus had received exceptional honours on a former occasion also from the Sicyonians after he had ransomed for them at considerable expense the land consecrated to Apollo, in return for which they set up a colossal statue of him ten cubits high, next that of Apollo in their market-place. And now again, upon his giving them ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, his popularity increased fourfold, and they voted his portrait in gold and passed a law enjoining the performance of an annual sacrifice to him. Attalus, then, having received these honours left for Cenchreae.
Cruelty of the Wife of Nabis at Argos
Nabis the tyrant, leaving Timocrates of Pellen in command of Argos, as he placed the greatest reliance on him and employed him in the most ambitious of his enterprises, returned to Sparta and after some days sent off his own wife, ordering her upon reaching Argos to set about raising money. Upon her arrival she greatly surpassed Nabis in cruelty. For summoning the women, some of them singly and others with their families, she subjected them to every kind of outrage and violence until she had stripped them nearly all not only of their gold ornaments, but of their most precious clothing. . . .
Attalus, discoursing at some length, reminded them of the valour their ancestors had always displayed.
Campaign of Flamininus in Thessaly and Battle of Cynoscephalae
Flamininus, not being able to discover where the enemy were encamped, but knowing for a certainty that they were in Thessaly, ordered all his soldiers to cut stakes for a palisade to carry with them for use when required. This appears to be impossible when the Greek usage is followed, but on the Roman system it is easy to cut them. For the Greeks have difficulty in holding only their pikes when on the march and in supporting the fatigue caused by their weight, but the Romans, hanging their long shields from their shoulders by leather straps and only holding their javelins in their hands, can manage to carry the stakes besides. Also the stakes are quite different. For the Greeks consider that stake the best which has the most and the stoutest offshoots all round the main stem, while the stakes of the Romans have but two or three, or at the most four strange lateral prongs, and these all on one side and not alternating. The result of this is that they are quite easy to carry—for one man can carry three or four, making a bundle of them, and when put to use they are much more secure. For the Greek stakes, when planted round the camp, are in the first place easily pulled up; since when the portion of a stake that holds fast closely pressed by the earth is only one, and the offshoots from it are many and large, and when two or three men catch hold of the same stake by its lateral branches, it is easily pulled up. Upon this an entrance is at once created owing to its size, and the ones next to it are loosened, because in such a palisade the stakes are intertwined and criss-crossed in few places. With the Romans it is the reverse; for in planting them they so intertwine them that it is not easy to see to which of the branches, the lower ends of which are driven into the ground, the lateral prongs belong, nor to which prongs the branches belong. So, as these prongs are close together and adhere to each other, and as their points are carefully sharpened, it is not easy to pass one's hand through and grasp the stake, nor if one does get hold of it, is it easy to pull it up, as in the first place the power of resistance derived from the earth by all the portions open to attack is almost absolute, and next because a man who pulls at one prong is obliged to lift up numerous other stakes which give simultaneously under the strain owing to the way they are intertwined, and it is not at all probable that two or three men will get hold of the same stake. But if by main force a man succeeds in pulling up one or two, the gap is scarcely observable. Therefore, as the advantages of this kind of palisade are very great, the stakes being easy to find and easy to carry and the whole being more secure and more durable when constructed, it is evident that if any Roman military contrivance is worthy of our imitation and adoption this one certainly is, in my own humble opinion at least.
To resume—Flamininus, having prepared these stakes to be used when required, advanced slowly with his whole force and established his camp at a distance of about fifty stades from Pherae. Next day at daybreak he sent out scouts to see if by observation and inquiry they could find any means of discovering where the enemy were and what they were about. Philip, at nearly the same time, on hearing that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, left Larisa with his entire army and advanced marching in the direction of Pherae. When at a distance of thirty stades from that town he encamped there while it was still early and ordered all his men to occupy themselves with the care of their persons. Next day at early dawn he aroused his men, and sending on in advance those accustomed to precede the main body with orders to cross the ridge above Pherae, he himself, when day began to break, moved the rest of his forces out of the camp. The advanced sections of both armies very nearly came into contact at the pass over the hills; for when in the early dusk they caught sight of each other, they halted when already quite close and sent at once to inform their respective commanders of the fact and inquire what they should do. It was decided to remain for that day in their actual camp and to recall the advanced forces. Next day both commanders sent out some horse and light-armed infantry—about three hundred of either arm to reconnoitre. Among these Flamininus included two squadrons of Aetolians owing to their acquaintance with the country. The respective forces met on the near side of Pherae, in the direction of Larisa, and a desperate struggle ensued. As the force under Eupolemus the Aetolian fought with great vigour and called up the Italians to take part in the action, the Macedonians found themselves hard pressed. For the present, after prolonged skirmishing, both forces separated and retired to their camps. Next day both armies, dissatisfied with the ground near Pherae, as it was all under cultivation and covered with walls and small gardens, retired from it. Philip for his part began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army. But Flamininus, suspecting his purpose, put his army in motion at the same time as Philip with the object of destroying the corn in the territory of Scotussa before his adversary could get there. As there were high hills between the two armies in their march neither did the Romans perceive where the Macedonians were marching to nor the Macedonians the Romans. After marching all that day, Flamininus having reached the place called Eretria in Phthiotis and Philip the river Onchestus, they both encamped at those spots, each ignorant of the position of the other's camp. Next day they again advanced and encamped, Philip at the place called Melambium in the territory of Scotussa and Flamininus at the sanctuary of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still in ignorance of each others' whereabouts. In the night there was a violent thunderstorm accompanied by rain, and next morning at early dawn all the mist from the clouds descended on the earth, so that owing to the darkness that prevailed one could not see even people who were close at hand. Philip, however, who was in a hurry to effect his purpose, broke up his camp and advanced with his whole army, but finding it difficult to march owing to the mist, after having made but little progress, he intrenched his army and sent off his covering force with orders to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy.
Flamininus lay still encamped near the sanctuary of Thetis and, being in doubt as to where the enemy were, he pushed forward ten squadrons of horse and about a thousand light-armed infantry, sending them out with orders to go over the ground reconnoitring cautiously. In proceeding towards the pass over the hills they encountered the Macedonian covering force quite unexpectedly owing to the obscurity of the army. Both forces were thrown somewhat into disorder for a short time but soon began to take the offensive, sending to their respective commanders messengers to inform them of what had happened. When in the combat that ensued the Romans began to be overpowered and to suffer loss at the hands of the Macedonian covering force they sent to their camp begging for help, and Flamininus, calling upon Archedamus and Eupolemus the Aetolians and two of his military tribunes, sent them off with five hundred horse and two thousand foot. For the Romans, encouraged by the arrival of the reinforcements, fought with redoubled vigour, and the Macedonians, though defending themselves gallantly, were in their turn pressed hard, and upon being completely overmastered, fled to the summits and sent to the king for help.
Philip, who had never expected, for the reasons I have stated, that a general engagement would take place on that day, had even sent out a fair number of men from his camp to forage, and now when he heard of the turn affairs were taking from the messengers, and as the mist was beginning to clear, he called upon Heraclides of Gyrton, the commander of the Thessalian horse, and Leo, who was in command of the Macedonian horse, and dispatched them, together with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace, under the command of Athenagoras. Upon their joining the covering force the Macedonians, having received such a large reinforcement, pressed hard on the enemy and in their turn began to drive the Romans from their heights. But the chief obstacle to their putting the enemy entirely to rout was the high spirit of the Aetolian cavalry who fought with desperate gallantry. For as much as the Aetolian infantry is inferior in the equipment and discipline required for a general engagement, by so much is their cavalry superior to that of other Greeks in detached and single combats. Thus on the present occasion they so far checked the spirit of the enemy's advance that the Romans were not as before driven down to the level ground, but when they were at a short distance from it turned and steadied themselves. Flamininus, upon seeing that not only had his light infantry and cavalry given way, but that his whole army was flustered owing to this, led out all his forces and drew them up in order of battle close to the hills. At the same time one messenger after another from the covering force came running to Philip shouting, "Sire, the enemy are flying: do not lose the opportunity: the barbarians cannot stand before us: the day is yours now: this is your time"; so that Philip, though he was not satisfied with the ground, still allowed himself to be provoked to do battle. The above-mentioned hills are, I should say, called "The Dog's Heads" (Cynoscephalae): they are very rough and broken and attain a considerable height. Philip, therefore, foreseeing what difficulties the ground would present, was at first by no means disposed to fight, but now urged on by these excessively sanguine reports he ordered his army to be led out of the entrenched camp.
Flamininus, having drawn up his whole army in line, both took steps to cover the retreat of his advanced force and walking along the ranks addressed his men. His address was brief, but vivid and easily understood by his hearers. For pointing to the enemy, who were now in full view, he said to his men, "Are these not the Macedonians whom, when they held the pass leading to Eordaea, you under Sulpicius attacked in the open and forced to retreat to the higher ground after slaying many of them? Are these not the same Macedonians who when they held that desperately difficult position in Epirus you compelled by your valour to throw away their shields and take to flight, never stopping until they got home to Macedonia? What reason, then, have you to be timid now when you are about to do battle with the same men on equal terms? What need for you to dread a recurrence of former danger, when you should rather on the contrary derive confidence from memory of the past! And so, my men, encouraging each other dash onto the fray and put forth all your strength. For if it be the will of Heaven, I feel sure that this battle will end like the former ones." After speaking thus he ordered those on the right to remain where they were with the elephants in front of them, and taking with him the left half of the army, advanced to meet the enemy in imposing style. The advanced force of the Romans thus supported by the infantry of the legions now turned and fell upon their foes.
Philip at this time, now that he saw the greater part of his army drawn up outside the entrenchment, advanced with the peltasts and the right wing of phalanx, ascending energetically the slope that led to the hills and giving orders to Nicanor, who was nicknamed the elephant, to see that the rest of his army followed him at once. When the leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left, and occupied the summits above it; for, as the Macedonian advanced force had pressed the Romans for a considerable distance down the opposite side of the hills, he found these summits abandoned. While he was still deploying his force on the right his mercenaries appeared hotly pursued by the Romans. For when the heavy-armed Roman infantry had joined the light infantry, as I said, and gave them their support in the battle, they availed themselves of the additional weight thus thrown into the scale, and pressing heavily on the enemy killed many of them. When the king, just after his arrival, saw that the light infantry were engaged not far from the hostile camp he was overjoyed, but now on seeing his own men giving way in their turn and in urgent need of support, he was compelled to go to their assistance and thus decide the whole fate of the army on the spur of the moment, although the greater portion of the phalanx was still on the march and approaching the hills. Receiving those who were engaged with the enemy, he placed them all, both foot and horse, on his right wing and ordered the peltasts and that part of the phalanx he had with him to double their depth and close up towards the right. Upon this being done, the enemy being now close upon them, orders were sent out to the men of the phalanx to lower their spears and charge, while the light infantry were ordered to place themselves on the flank. At the same moment Flamininus, having received his advanced force into the gaps between the maniples, fell upon the enemy.
As the encounter of the two armies was accompanied by deafening shouts and cries, both of them uttering their war-cry and those outside the battle also cheering the combatants, the spectacle was such as to inspire terror and acute anxiety. Philip's right wing acquitted themselves splendidly in the battle, as they were charging from higher ground and were superior in the weight of their formation, the nature of their arms also giving them a decided advantage on the present occasion. But as for the rest of his army, those next to the force actually engaged were still at a distance from the enemy and those on the left had only just surmounted the ridge and come into view of the summits. Flamininus, seeing that his men could not sustain the charge of the phalanx, but that since his left was being forced back, some of them having already perished and others retreating slowly, his only hope of safety lay in his right, hastened to place himself in command there, and observing that those of the enemy who were next the actual combatants were idle, and that some of the rest were still descending to meet him from the summits and others had halted on the heights, placed his elephants in front and led on his legions to the attack. The Macedonians now, having no one to give them orders and being unable to adopt the formation proper to the phalanx, in part owing to the difficulty of the ground and in part because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line, did not even wait until they were at close quarters with the Romans, but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.
Most of the Romans followed up these fugitives and continued to put them to the sword: but one of the tribunes with them, taking not more than twenty maniples and judging on the spur of the moment what ought to be done, contributed much to the total victory. For noticing that the Macedonians under Philip had advanced a long way in front of the rest, and were by their weight forcing back the Roman left, he quitted those on the right, who were now clearly victorious, and wheeling his force in the direction of the scene of combat and thus getting behind the Macedonians, he fell upon them in the rear. As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right about face or to fight man to man, he now pressed his attack home, killing those he found in his way, who were incapable of protecting themselves, until the whole Macedonian force were compelled to throw away their shields and take to flight, attacked now also by the troops who had yielded before their frontal charge and who now turned and faced them. Philip at first, as I said, judging from the success of those under his own leadership, was convinced that his victory was complete, but now on suddenly seeing that the Macedonians were throwing away their shields and that the enemy had attacked them in the rear, retired with a small number of horse and foot to a short distance from the scene of action and remained to observe the whole scene. When he noticed that the Romans in pursuit of his left wing had already reached the summits, he decided to fly, collecting hastily as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could. Flamininus, pursuing the fugitives and finding when he reached the crest of the ridge that the ranks of the Macedonian left were just attaining the summits, at first halted. The enemy were now holding up their spears, as is the Macedonian custom when they either surrender or go over to the enemy, and on learning the significance of this he kept back his men, thinking to spare the beaten force. But while he was still making up his mind some of the Romans who had advanced further fell on them from above and began to cut them down. Most of them perished, a very few escaping after throwing away their shields.
The battle being now over and the Romans everywhere victorious, Philip retreated towards Tempe. He spent the following night under canvas at a place called "Alexander's Tower" and next day went on to Gonni at the entrance of Tempe, and remained there wishing to pick up the survivors of the rout. The Romans, after following up the fugitives for a certain distance, began, some of them, to strip the dead and others to collect prisoners, but most of them ran to plunder the enemy's camp. Finding, however, that the Aetolians had anticipated them there and considering themselves defrauded of the booty that was rightfully theirs, they began to find fault with the Aetolians and told their general that he imposed the risk on them and gave up the booty to others. For the present they returned to their own camp and retired to rest, and spent the next day in collecting prisoners and what was left of the spoil and also in advancing in the direction of Larisa. Of the Romans about seven hundred fell and the total Macedonian loss amounted to about eight thousand killed and not fewer than five thousand captured.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Phalanx
Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae between the Romans and Philip. In my sixth Book I promised that when a suitable occasion presented itself I would institute a comparison between the Roman and Macedonian equipment and formation, showing how they differ for the better or worse, and I will, now that we see them both in actual practice, endeavour to fulfil this promise. For since the Macedonian formation in former times was proved by the experience of facts to be superior to other formations in use in Asia and Greece and that of the Romans likewise showed itself superior to those in use in Africa and among all the peoples of western Europe, and since now in our own times not once, but frequently, these two formations and the soldiers of both nations have been matched against each other, it will prove useful and beneficial to inquire into the difference, and into the reason why on the battle-field the Romans have always had the upper hand and carried off the palm, so that we may not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any reason for it, but may, knowing the true causes of their success, give them a reasoned tribute of praise and admiration.
It will not be necessary to dilate upon the battles of the Romans with Hannibal and their defeats therein; for there they met with defeat not owing to their equipment and formation but owing to Hannibal's skill and cleverness. This I made sufficiently clear in dealing with battles in question, and the best testimony to the justice of what I said was, first of all, the actual end of the war. For very soon when the Romans had the advantage of the services of a general of like capacity with Hannibal then victory was an immediate consequence of this. And secondly, Hannibal himself, discarding his original armament at once on winning the first battle, armed his own forces with the Roman weapons and continued to employ these up to the end. As for Pyrrhus he employed not only Italian arms but Italian forces, placing cohorts of these and cohorts composed of men from the phalanx in alternate order in his battles with the Romans. But still even by this means he could not gain a victory, but the result of all their battles was always more or less doubtful.
It was necessary for me to preface my comparison by these few words in order that my statements may meet with no contradiction. I will now proceed to the comparison itself.
That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can easily be understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth, and the length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but as adapted to actual need fourteen cubits, from which we must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length of the weighted portion of the pike behind which serves to keep it couched—four cubits in all—it is evident that it must extend ten cubits beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth, as Homer expresses it in these verses:
Spear crowded spear,
Shield, helmet, man press'd helmet, man, and shield;
The hairy crests of their resplendent casques
Kiss'd close at every nod, so wedged they stood. 
 Homer, Iliad, XIII.131, Cowper's translation.
This description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a distance of two cubits from the next.
From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back and the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. They therefore do not severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to face about.
Such being in general and in detail the disposition of the phalanx, I have now, for purposes of comparison, to speak of the peculiarities of the Roman equipment and system of formation and the points of difference in both. Now in the case of the Romans also each soldier with his arms occupies a space of three feet in breadth, but as in their mode of fighting each man must move separately, as he has to cover his person with his long shield, turning to meet each expected blow, and as he uses his sword both for cutting and thrusting it is obvious that a looser order is required, and each man must be at a distance of at least three feet from the man next him in the same rank and those in front of and behind him, if they are to be of proper use. The consequence will be that one Roman must stand opposite two men in the first rank of the phalanx, so that he has to face and encounter ten pikes, and it is both impossible for a single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their points away, as the rear ranks can be of no help to the front rank either in thus forcing the pikes away or in the use of the sword. So it is easy to see that, as I said at the beginning, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves its characteristic formation and force.
What then is the reason of the Roman success, and what is it that defeats the purpose of those who use the phalanx? It is because in war the time and place of action is uncertain and the phalanx has only one time and one place in which it can perform its peculiar service. Now, if the enemy were obliged to adapt themselves to the times and places required by the phalanx when a decisive battle was impending, those who use the phalanx would in all probability, for the reasons I stated above, always get the better of their enemies; but if it is not only possible but easy to avoid its onset why should one any longer dread an attack of a body so constituted? Again, it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation. Every one would also acknowledge that it is almost impossible except in very rare cases to find spaces of say twenty stades or even more in length with no such obstacles. But even if we assume it to be possible, supposing those who are fighting against us refuse to meet us on such ground, but force round sacking the cities and devastating the territory of our allies, what is the use of such a formation? For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but cannot even ensure its own safety. For the arrival of supplies will easily be prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed command of the open country. But if the phalanx leaves the ground proper to it and attempts any action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy. And again, if it is decided to engage the enemy on level ground, but instead of availing ourselves of our total force when the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, we keep out of action even a small portion of it at the moment of the shock, it is easy to tell what will happen from what the Romans always do at present, the likelihood of the result I now indicate requiring no argument but only the evidence of actual facts. For the Romans do not make their line equal in force to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but part of their forces remain in reserve and the rest engage the enemy. Afterwards whether the phalanx drives back by its charge the force opposed to it or is repulsed by this force, its own peculiar formation is broken up. For either in following up a retreating foe or in flying before an attacking foe, they leave behind the other parts of their own army, upon which the enemy's reserve have room enough in the space formerly held by the phalanx to attack no longer in front but appearing by a lateral movement on the flank and rear of the phalanx. When it is thus easy to guard against the opportunities and advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the proper moment to act against it, the one kind of formation naturally proves in reality superior to the other. Again, those who employ the phalanx have to march through and encamp in every variety of country; they are compelled to occupy favourable positions in advance, to besiege certain positions and to be besieged in others, and to meet attacks from quarters the least expected. For all such contingencies are parts of war, and victory sometimes wholly and sometimes very largely depends on them. Now in all these matters the Macedonian formation is at times of little use and at times of no use at all, because the phalanx soldier can be of service neither in detachments nor singly, while the Roman formation is efficient. For every Roman soldier, once he is armed and sets about his business, can adapt himself equally well to every place and time and can meet attack from every quarter. He is likewise equally prepared and equally in condition whether he has to fight together with the whole army or with a part of it or in maniples or singly. So since in all particulars the Romans are much more serviceable, Roman plans are much more apt to result in success than those of others. I thought it necessary to speak on this subject at some length because many Greeks on the actual occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat considered the event as almost incredible, and many will still continue to wonder why and how the phalanx comes to be conquered by troops armed in the Roman fashion.
Philip had done his best in the battle, but on being thus thoroughly defeated, after first picking up as many as he could of the survivors from the battle himself hastily retired through Tempe to Macedonia. He had sent one of his aides-de-camp on the previous night to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the royal correspondence, acting like a true king in not forgetting his duty even in the hour of disaster: for he well knew that if the documents fell into the hands of the Romans he would be giving them much material to use against himself and his friends. Perhaps in the case of others also it has happened that in seasons of prosperity they have not been able to wear their authority with the moderation that befits a man, yet in the hour of danger have exercised due caution and kept their heads, but this was particularly so with Philip, as will be evident from what I am about to say. For just as I have clearly pointed out his early impulse to do what was right, and again the time, reasons, and circumstances of the change for the worse in him, narrating with documentary proofs his actions after this change, so must I in the same manner point out his new change of mind and the ability with which, adapting himself to the reverses of fortune, he faced the situation in which he found himself until his death with exceptional prudence.
After the battle Flamininus took the requisite steps regarding the prisoners and other booty and then advanced towards Larisa . . . He was generally displeased with the overreaching conduct of the Aetolians about the booty, and did not wish, now he had expelled Philip, to leave them masters of Greece. Also he could ill brook their bragging, when he saw them claiming equal credit with the Romans for the victory and filling the whole of Greece with the story of their prowess. In consequence he was somewhat brusque in his replies when he had interviews with them and kept silent about public affairs, carrying out his projects himself or with the aid of his friends. While these stiff relations on both sides still continued there came a few days after the battle a legation from Philip composed of Demosthenes, Cycliades, and Limnaeus. Flamininus, after conferring with them at some length in the presence of his military tribunes, granted Philip an armistice of fifteen days at once, and arranged to return with them to confer with Philip about the situation during the armistice. As the interview had been conducted with perfect courtesy, the suspicions of Flamininus entertained by the Aetolians became twice as vehement. For since by this time bribery and the notion that no one should do anything gratis were very prevalent in Greece, and so to speak quite current coin among the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus's complete change of attitude towards Philip could have been brought about without a bribe, since they were ignorant of the Roman principles and practice in this matter, but judged from their own, and calculated that it was probable that Philip would offer a very large sum owing to his actual situation and Flamininus would not be able to resist the temptation.
If I were dealing with earlier times, I would have confidently asserted about all the Romans in general, that no one of them would do such a thing; I speak of the years before they undertook wars across the sea and during which they preserved their own principles and practices. At the present time, however, I would not venture to assert this of all, but I could with perfect confidence say of many particular men in Rome that in this matter they can maintain their faith. That I may not appear to be stating what is impossible, I will cite as evidence the names of two men regarding whom none will dispute my assertion. The first is Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus. For when he became master of the palace of the Macedonian kings, in which, apart from the splendid furniture and other riches, more than six thousand talents of gold and silver were fortified in the treasury alone, not only did he not covet any of his treasure, but did not even wish to look upon it, and disposed of it all by the hands of others, and this although his private fortune was by no means ample, but on the contrary rather meagre. At least when he died not long after the war, and his sons by birth, Publius Scipio and Quintus Fabius Maximus, wished to give back to his wife her dowry of twenty-five talents they found such difficulty in raising the sum that they could not possibly have done it had they not sold the household goods, the slaves, and some real property in addition. If what I say seems incredible to anyone he can easily assure himself of its truth. For though many facts and especially those concerning this matter are subjects of dispute at Rome owing to their political dissensions, still on inquiry you will find that the statement I have just made is acknowledged to be true by all. Again, take the case of Publius Scipio, known as the great. When he became master of Carthage, which was considered the wealthiest city in the world, he took absolutely nothing from it to add to his own fortune, either by purchase or by any other means of acquisition, and this although he was not particularly well off, but only moderately so for a Roman. And not only did he keep his hands off the treasure in Carthage itself, but in general allow any of that from Africa to be mixed up with his private fortune. In the case of this man again anyone who really inquires will find that no one disputes the reputation he enjoyed at Rome in this respect.
But regarding these men, when I find a more suitable opportunity I will speak more at large. Flamininus in the meanwhile, after fixing on a day to meet Philip, at once wrote to the allies instructing them at what date they should be present for the conference, and then a few days afterwards came to the entrance of Tempe at the time determined on. When the allies had assembled, and while the council was exclusively composed of them, the Roman proconsul got up and asked them to state severally on what terms peace should be made with Philip. King Amynander resumed his seat after speaking briefly and with moderation. For he begged them all to take steps for his protection, in case, when the Romans had left Greece, Philip might vent his anger on him. For, he said, the Athamanians were also easy victims of the Macedonians owing to their weakness and the closeness of the two countries. After him Alexander the Aetolian got up. He praised Flamininus for having called the allies to take part in the Peace Conference and for inviting them now to give their several opinions, but he said he was much mistaken and wide of the mark if he believed that by coming to terms with Philip he would ensure either peace for the Romans or liberty for the Greeks. For neither of these results was possible; but if he wished to carry out completely the policy of his country and fulfil the promises he had given to all the Greeks, there was but one way of making peace with Macedonia and that was to depose Philip. To do so, he said, was really quite easy, if he did not let the present opportunity slip. After speaking at some length in the same sense he resumed his seat.
Flamininus spoke next. He said that Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but as to his own particular design, and especially as to the interests of Greece. For neither did the Romans ever after a single war at once exterminate their adversaries, as was proved by their conduct towards Hannibal and the Carthaginians, at whose hands they had suffered injuries so grievous, but yet afterwards, when it was in their power to treat them exactly as they chose, they had not resolved on any extreme measures. Nor, he said, had he himself ever entertained the idea that they should wage war on Philip without any hope of reconciliation; but if the king had consented to the conditions imposed on him before the battle, he would gladly have made peace with him. "Therefore it indeed surprises me," he said, "that after taking part in the conferences for peace you are now all irreconcilable. Is it, as seems evident, because we won the battle? But nothing can be more unfeeling. Brave men should be hard on their foes and wroth with them in battle, when conquered they should be courageous and high-minded, but when they conquer, gentle and humane. What you exhort me to do now is exactly the reverse. Again it is in the interest of the Greeks that the Macedonian dominion should be humbled for long, but by no means that it should be destroyed." For in that case, he said, they would very soon experience the lawless violence of the Thracians and Gauls, as they had on more than one occasion. On the whole, he continued, he and the other Romans present judged it proper, if Philip agreed to do everything that the allies had previously demanded, to grant him peace after first consulting the Senate. As for the Aetolians, they were at liberty to take their own counsel. When Phaeneas after this attempted to say that all that had happened was of no use, for Philip, if he could wriggle out of the present crisis, would at once begin to re-establish his power, Flamininus interrupted him angrily and without rising from his seat, exclaiming, "Stop talking nonsense, Phaeneas; for I will so manage the peace that Philip will not, even if he wishes it, be able to wrong the Greeks."
On that day they broke up on these terms. Next day the king arrived, and on the following day, when all had assembled at the conference, Philip entered and with great skill and sound sense cut away the ground on which they all based their violent demands by saying that he yielded to and would execute all the former demands of the Romans and the allies, and that he submitted all other questions to the decision of the Senate. After he had said this, all the others remained silent, but Phaeneas the Aetolian representative said, "Why then, Philip, do you not give up to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes, and Echinus?" Philip told him to take them, but Flamininus said that they ought not to take any of the other towns, but only Phthiotic Thebes. For the Thebans, when on approaching the town with his army he demanded that they should submit to Rome, had refused. So that, now that they had been reduced by force of arms, he had a right to decide as he chose about them. When, upon this, Phaeneas grew indignant and said that in the first place the Aetolians should, as they had fought side by side with the Romans, receive back the towns which had formerly been members of their League, and next that the same resulted from the terms of their original alliance, by the way the possessions of those captured in war were to go to the Romans and the towns to the Aetolians, Flamininus said they were mistaken on both points. For the alliance had been dissolved, when, deserting the Romans, they made terms with Philip, and even if it still subsisted, they should receive back and occupy not the towns which had surrendered to the Romans of their own free will, as all the Thessalian cities had now done, but any that had fallen by force of arms.
Flamininus, in speaking thus, pleased the others, but the Aetolians listened to him sullenly, and we may say that the prelude of great evils began to come into being. For it was the spark of this quarrel that set alight the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus. What chiefly urged Flamininus to hasten to make peace, was the news that had reached him of Antiochus' having put to sea in Syria with an army directed against Europe. This made him fearful lest Philip, catching at this hope of support, might shut himself up in his towns and drag on the war, and that on the arrival of another consul, the principal glory of his achievement would be lost to him and reflected on his successor. He therefore yielded to the king's request and allowed him an armistice of four months. He was at once to pay Flamininus the two hundred talents and give his son Demetrius with some other of his friends as hostages, sending to Rome to submit the whole question to the Senate. They now separated after exchanging mutual pledges about the whole question, Flamininus engaging, if the peace were not finally made, to return the two hundred talents and the hostages. After this all the parties sent to Rome, some working for the peace and others against it. . . .
What can the reason be that we all, though deceived by the same means and through the same persons, cannot yet give over folly? For this sort of fraud had been practised often and by many. It is perhaps not surprising that it succeeds with others, but it is indeed astonishing that it does so with those who are the very fount of such trickery. The reason however is that we do not bear in mind Epicharmus's excellent advice, "Be sober and mindful to mistrust; these are the thews of the mind."
II. Affairs of Asia
Advantageous Site of Ephesus
King Antiochus was very anxious to get possession of Ephesus because of its favourable site, as it may be said to stand in the position of a citadel both by land and sea for anyone with designs on Ionia and the cities of the Hellespont, and is always a most favourable point of defence against Europe for the kings of Asia.
Character of Attalus
So died Attalus, and justice demands, as is my practice in the case of others, I should pronounce a few befitting words over his grave. He possessed at the outset no other quality fitting him to rule over those outside his own household but wealth, a thing that when used with intelligence and daring is of real service in all enterprises but, when these virtues are absent, proves in most cases the cause of disaster and in fact of utter ruin. For it is the source of jealousy and plotting, and contributes more than anything else to the corruption of body and soul. Those souls indeed are few who can arrest these consequences by the mere power that riches give. We should therefore reverence this king's loftiness of mind, in that he did not attempt to use his great possessions for any other purpose than the attainment of sovereignty, a thing than which nothing greater or more splendid can be named. He laid the foundation of his design not only by the largesses and favours he conferred on his friends, but by his success in war. For having conquered the Gauls, then the most formidable and warlike nation in Asia Minor, he built upon this foundation, and then first showed he was really a king. And after he had received this honourable title, he lived until the age of seventy-two and reigned for forty-four years, ever most virtuous and austere as husband and father, never breaking his faith to his friends and allies, and finally dying when engaged on his best work, fighting for the liberties of Greece. Add to this what is most remarkable of all, that having four grown-up sons, he so disposed of his kingdom that he handed on the crown in undisputed succession to his children's children.
III. Affairs of Italy
The Embassies to the Senate
After Claudius Marcellus, the consul, had entered upon office there arrived in Rome the ambassadors from Philip and also the legates sent by Flamininus and the allies on the subject of the peace with Philip. After considerable discussion in the Senate that body resolved to confirm the peace. But when the senatus-consultum was brought before the people, Marcus, who himself was desirous of crossing to Greece, spoke against it and did all in his power to break off the negotiation. But in spite of this the people yielded to the wishes of Flamininus and ratified the peace. Upon the conclusion of peace the Senate at once nominated ten of its most distinguished members and sent them to manage Grecian affairs in conjunction with Flamininus, and to assure the liberties of the Greeks. The Achaean legate Damoxenus of Aegae also spoke in the Senate on the subject of the alliance. But since some opposition was raised for the time being, because the Eleans made a claim against the Achaeans for Triphylia, the Messenians (who were then the allies of Rome) for Asine and Pylus, the decision was referred to the ten commissioners. Such was the result of the proceedings in the Senate.
IV. Affairs of Greece
Conduct of the Boeotians
While Flamininus was wintering in Elatea after the battle, the Boeotians, anxious to recover the men they had sent to serve under Philip in the campaign, sent an embassy to Flamininus begging him to provide for their safety, and he gladly consented as, foreseeing the arrival of Antiochus, he wished to conciliate the Boeotians. Upon all the men being very soon sent back from Macedonia, among them Brachylles, they at once appointed the latter boeotarch, and continued, no less than formerly, to advance and honour the others who were considered to be friends of the house of Macedon. They also sent an embassy to Philip thanking him for the return of the soldiers, thus depreciating the grace of Flamininus's act. When Zeuxippus, Pisistratus and all who were considered the friends of Rome saw this, they were much displeased, as they foresaw what might happen and feared for themselves and their relatives. For they well knew that if the Romans quitted Greece and Philip remained on their flanks, his strength continuing to increase together with that of their political opponents, it would by no means be safe for them to take part in public life in Boeotia. They therefore clubbed together and sent envoys to Flamininus at Elatea. On meeting him they used a great variety of arguments, pointing out the violent feeling against them at present existing among the people and the noted ingratitude of a multitude, and finally they made bold to say that unless they struck terror into the populace by killing Brachylles there would be no security for the friends of the Romans once the legions had left. Flamininus, after listening to this, said that he himself would take no part in this deed, but would put no obstacles in the way of anyone who wished to do so. He advised them on the whole to speak to Alexamenus, the Aetolian strategus. When Zeuxippus and the others acted on this advice and spoke about the matter, Alexamenus was soon persuaded and agreeing to what they said, arranged for three Aetolians and three Italian soldiers to assassinate Brachylles. . . .
For no one is such a terrible witness or such a dread accuser as the conscience that dwells in all our hearts.
Flamininus and the Roman Commissioners in Greece
At this time the ten commissioners who were to control the affairs of Greece arrived from Rome bringing the senatus-consultum about the peace with Philip. Its principal contents were as follows: All the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and subject to their own laws; Philip was to surrender to the Romans before the Isthmian games those Greeks subject to his rule and the cities in which he had garrisons; he was to leave free, withdrawing his garrisons from them, the towns of Euromus, Pedasa, Bargylia, and Iasus, as well as Abydus, Thasos, Myrina, and Perinthus; Flamininus was to write to Prusias in the terms of the senatus-consultum about restoring the freedom of Cius; Philip was to restore to the Romans all prisoners of war and deserters before the same date, and to surrender to them all his warships with the exception of five light vessels and his great ship of sixteen banks of oars; he was to pay them a thousand talents, half at once and the other half by instalments extending over ten years.
When the report of this senatus-consultum was spread in Greece, all except the Aetolians were of good heart and overjoyed. The latter alone, disappointed at not obtaining what they had hoped for, spoke ill of the decree, saying that it contained an arrangement of words and not an arrangement of things. Even from the actual terms of the document they drew certain probable conclusions calculated to confuse the minds of those who listened to them. For they said there were two decisions in it about the cities garrisoned by Philip, one ordering him to withdraw his garrisons and surrender the cities to the Romans and the other to withdraw his garrisons and set the cities free. The towns to be set free were named and they were those in Asia, while evidently those to be surrendered to the Romans were those in Europe, that is to say Oreum, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth. From this anyone could easily see that the Romans were taking over from Philip the fetters of Greece, and that what was happening was a readjustment of masters and not the delivery of Greece out of gratitude.
Such things were being said by the Aetolians ad nauseam. But Flamininus, moving from Elatea with the ten commissioners, came down to Anticyra and at once sailed across to Corinth. On arriving there he sat in conference with the commissioners, deciding about the whole situation. As the slanderous reflections of the Aetolians were becoming more current and were credited by some, he was obliged to address his colleagues at length and in somewhat elaborate terms, pointing out to them that if they wished to gain universal renown in Greece and in general convince all that the Romans had originally crossed the sea not in their own interest but in that of the liberty of Greece, they must withdraw from every place and set free all the cities now garrisoned by Philip. The hesitation felt in the conference was due to the fact that, while a decision had been reached in Rome about all other questions, and the commissioners had definite instructions from the Senate on all other matters, the question of Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias had been left to their discretion owing to the fear of Antiochus, in order that with an eye to circumstances they should take any course on which they determined. For it was evident that Antiochus had been for some time awaiting his opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Greece. However, Flamininus persuaded his colleagues to set Corinth free at once, handing it over to the Achaeans, as had originally been agreed, while he remained in occupation of the Acrocorinth, Demetrias, and Chalcis.
This having been decided and the Isthmian games being now close at hand, the most distinguished men from almost the whole world having assembled there owing to their expectation of what would take place, many and various were the reports prevalent during the whole festival, some saying that it was impossible for the Romans to abandon certain places and cities, and others declaring that they would abandon the places which were considered famous, but would retain those, which while less illustrious, would serve their purpose equally well, even at once naming these latter out of their own heads, each more ingenious than the other. Such was the doubt in men's minds when, the crowd being now collected in the stadium to witness the games, the herald came forward and, having imposed universal silence by his bugler, read this proclamation: "The senate order and Titus Quintius the proconsul having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, leave the following peoples free, without garrisons and subject to no tribute and governed by their countries' laws—the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians." At once at the very commencement a tremendous shout arose, and some did not even hear the proclamation, while others wanted to hear it again. But the greater part of the crowd, unable to believe their ears and thinking that they were listening to the words as if in a dream owing to the event being so unexpected, demanded loudly, each prompted by a different impulse, that the herald and bugler should advance into the middle of the stadium and repeat the announcement, wishing, as I suppose, not only to hear the speaker, but to see him owing to the incredible character of his proclamation. But when the herald, coming forward to the middle of the stadium and again silencing the noise by his bugler, made the same identical proclamation, such a mighty burst of cheering arose that those who listen to the tale to-day cannot easily conceive what it was. When at length the noise had subsided, not a soul took any further interest in the athletes, but all, talking either to their neighbours or to themselves, were almost like men beside themselves. So much so indeed that after the games were over they very nearly put an end to Flamininus by their expressions of thanks. For some of them, longing to look him in the face and call him their saviour, others in their anxiety to grasp his hand, and the greater number throwing crowns and fillets on him, they all but tore the man in pieces. But however excessive their gratitude may seem to have been, one may confidently say that it was far inferior to the greatness of the event. For it was a wonderful thing, to begin with, that the Romans and their general Flamininus should entertain this purpose incurring every expense and facing every danger for the freedom of Greece; it was a great thing that they brought into action a force adequate to the execution of their purpose; and greatest of all was the fact that no mischance of any kind counteracted their design, but everything without exception conduced to this one crowning moment, when by a single proclamation all the Greeks inhabiting Asia and Europe became free, ungarrisoned, subject to no tribute and governed by their own laws.
When the festival was over, the commissioners first gave audience to the ambassadors of Antiochus. They ordered him, as regards the Asiatic cities, to keep his hands off those which were autonomous and make war on none of them and to withdraw from those previous subject to Ptolemy and Philip which he had recently taken. At the same time they enjoined him not to cross to Europe with an army, for none of the Greeks were any longer being attacked by anyone or the subjects of anyone, and they announced in general terms that some of their own body would come to see Antiochus. Hegesianax and Lysias returned on receiving this answer, and after them the commissioners called before them all the representatives of different nations cities, and explained to them the decisions of the board. As for Macedonia they gave autonomy to the tribe called Orestae for having joined them during the war, and freed the Perrhaebians, Dolopes, and Magnesians. Besides giving the Thessalians their freedom they assigned to Thessaly the Phthiotic Achaeans, taking away from it Phthiotic Thebes and Pharsalus; for the Aetolians had claimed Pharsalus with great vehemence, saying that it ought to be theirs according to the terms of the original treaty and Leucas as well. The members of the board deferred their decision until the Aetolians could lay the matter before the senate, but allowed them to include the Phocians and Locrians in their League, as had formerly been the case. They gave Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraea to the Achaeans, and most members were in favour of giving Oreum and Eretria to Eumenes. But Flamininus having addressed the board on that subject, the proposal was not ratified, so that after a short time these towns were set free by the senate as well as Carystus. To Pleuratus they gave Lychnis and Parthus, which were Illyrian but subject to Philip, and they allowed Amynander all the forts he had wrested from Philip in war.
After making this arrangements they separated. Publius Lentulus sailed to Bargylia and set it free, and Lucius Stertinius proceeded to Hephaestia, Thasos and the Thracian cities for the same purpose. Publius Villius and Lucius Terentius went to King Antiochus and Gnaeus Cornelius to King Philip. Encountering him near Tempe he conveyed his other instructions to him and advised him to send an embassy to Rome to ask for an alliance, that they might not think he was watching for his opportunity and looking forward to the arrival of Antiochus. Upon the king's accepting this suggestion, Lentulus at once took leave of him and proceeded to Thermae, where the general assembly of the Aetolians was in session. Appearing before the people he exhorted them, speaking at some length, to maintain their original attitude and keep up their friendliness to Rome. Upon many speakers presenting themselves, some gently and diplomatically rebuking the Romans for not having used their success in a spirit of partnership or observed the terms of the original treaty, while others spoke abusively saying that the Romans could never have landed in Greece or conquered Philip except through the Aetolians, he refrained from replying to these different accusations, but begged them to send an embassy, as they would obtain complete justice from the senate. This he persuaded them to do. Such was the situation at the end of the war against Philip.
V. Affairs of Asia
If, as the phrase is, they are at their last gasp, they will take refuge with the Romans and put themselves and the city in their hands.
Antiochus and the Roman Envoys
Antiochus's project was going on as well as he could wish, and while he was in Thrace, Lucius Cornelius arrived by sea at Selymbria. He was the ambassador sent by the Senate to establish peace between Antiochus and Ptolemy. At the same time arrived three of the ten commissioners, Publius Lentulus from Bargylia and Lucius Terentius and Publius Villius from Thasos. Their arrival was at once reported to the king and a few days afterwards they all assembled at Lysimachia. Hegesianax and Lysias, the envoys who had been sent to Flamininus, arrived there at the same time. In the unofficial interviews of the king and the Romans the conversation was simple and friendly, but afterwards when an official conference about that situation in general was held, things assumed another aspect. For Lucius Cornelius asked Antiochus to retire from the cities previously subject to Ptolemy which he had taken possession of in Asia, while as to those previously subject to Philip he demanded with urgency that he should evacuate them. For it was a ridiculous thing, he said, that Antiochus should come in when all was over and take the prizes they had gained in their war with Philip. He also advised him to keep his hands off the autonomous cities. And generally speaking he said he wondered on what pretext the king had crossed to Europe with such large military and naval forces. For anyone who judged correctly could not suppose that the reason was any other than that he was trying to put himself in the way of the Romans. The Roman envoy having concluded his speech thus, the king replied that in the first place he was at a loss to know by what right they disputed his possession of the Asiatic towns; they were the last people who had any title to do so. Next he requested them not to trouble themselves at all about Asiatic affairs; for he himself did not in the least go out of his way to concern himself with the affairs of Italy. He said that he had crossed to Europe with his army for the purpose of recovering the Chersonese and the cities in Thrace, for he had a better title to the sovereignty of these places than anyone else. They originally formed part of Lysimachus's kingdom, but when Seleucus went to war with that prince and conquered him in the war, the whole of Lysimachus's kingdom came to Seleucus by right of conquest. But during the years that followed, when his ancestors had their attention deflected elsewhere, first of all Ptolemy and then Philip had robbed them of those places and appropriated them. At present he was not possessing himself of them by taking advantage of Philip's difficulties, but he was repossessing himself of them by his right as well as by his might. As for the Lysimachians, who had been unexpectedly expelled from their homes by the Thracians, he was doing no injury to Rome in bringing them back and resettling them; for he did this not with the intention of doing violence to the Romans, but of providing a residence for Seleucus. And regarding the autonomous cities of Asia it was not proper for them to receive their liberty by order of the Romans, but by his own act of grace. As for his relations with Ptolemy, he would himself settle everything in a manner agreeable to that king, for he had decided not only to establish friendship with him but to unite him to himself by a family alliance.
Upon Lucius and his colleagues deciding to summon the representatives of Smyrna and Lampsacus and give them a hearing, this was done. The Lampsacenes sent Parmenion and Pythodorus and the Smyrnaeans Coeranus. When these envoys spoke with some freedom, the king, taking it amiss that he should seem to be submitting their dispute against him to a Roman tribunal, interrupted Parmenion, saying, "Enough of that long harangue: for it is my pleasure that our differences should be submitted to the Rhodians and not to the Romans." Hereupon they broke up the conference, by no means pleased with each other.
VI. Affairs of Egypt
Scopas and other Aetolians at Alexandria
There are many who crave after deeds of daring and renown, but few venture to set their hand to them. And yet Scopas had better resources at his command for facing peril and acting boldly than Cleomenes. For the latter, anticipated in his design, could hope for no support except from his own servants and friends, but yet instead of abandoning this slender hope, put it as far as it was in his power to the touch, valuing more highly a glorious death than a life of ignominy. Scopas, on the contrary, while he had a numerous band of supporters and a fine opportunity, as the king was still a child, was forestalled while still deferring and planning. For Aristomenes, having discovered that he used to collect his friends in his own house and hold conferences there with them, sent some officers to summon him before the royal council. But he had so far lost his head that he neither dared to carry on his project, nor, worst of all, even felt himself capable of obeying when summoned by the king, until Aristomenes recognizing his confusion surrounded his house with soldiers and elephants. When Ptolemy made his way into the house and announced that the king summoned Scopas, at first he paid no attention to what was said, but simply stared at Ptolemy for a considerable time, as if inclined to threaten him and astonished at his audacity. But when Ptolemy came up to him and boldly took hold of his cloak, he then called on those present to assist him. But as the number of soldiers who had entered the house was considerable, and as some one informed him that it was surrounded outside, he yielded to circumstances and followed Ptolemy accompanied by his friends.
When he entered the council-chamber, the king first accused him in a few words and was followed by Polycrates who had lately arrived from Cyprus, and last by Aristomenes. The accusations brought by all were similar to those I have just stated, but in addition they mentioned his conferences with his friends and his refusal to obey the royal summons. He was condemned for these various reasons not only by the council but by those foreign ambassadors who were present. Aristomenes also, when about to impeach him, brought with him besides many other men of distinction from Greece, the Aetolian envoys also who had come to make peace, one of whom was Dorimachus, son of Nicostratus. The speeches of the accusers over, Scopas, speaking in his turn, attempted to offer some defence, but as no one paid any heed to him owing to the confusion of the circumstances he was at once led of to prison with his friends. Aristomenes after nightfall killed Scopas and all his friends by poison, but before killing Dicaearchus he had him racked and scourged, thus punishing him as he deserved and on behalf of all the Greeks. For this Dicaearchus was the man whom Philip, when he decided on treacherously attacking the Cyclades and the cities on the Hellespont, appointed to take command of all his flight and direct the whole operation. Being thus sent forth on an evidently impious mission, he not only did not consider himself to be guilty of any exceptional wickedness, but by the excess of his insolence thought to terrify both gods and men: for wherever he anchored his ships he constructed two altars, one of Impiety and the other of Lawlessness, and on these he sacrificed and worshipped these powers as if they were divine. He therefore must be pronounced to have suffered the punishment he deserved at the hands of gods and men alike; for having regulated his life by unnatural principles he met likewise with no natural death. The other Aetolians who wished to leave for home, were all allowed by the king to depart with their property.
The avarice of Scopas had been notorious even when he was alive—for his rapacity much excelled that of any other man—but by his death it became more so owing to the quantity of money and precious objects found in his house. For, aided by the savagery and drunken violence of Charimortus he had utterly stripped the palace like a burglar.
After the officials of the court had set to rights the matter of the Aetolians, they at once began to occupy themselves with the celebration of the king's Proclamation (Anacleteria). Although his age was not such as to make it pressing, they thought that it would contribute to the settlement of affairs and be the beginning of a change for the better if the king were thought to be now invested with full authority. Having made preparations on a generous scale they carried out the ceremony in a manner worthy of His Majesty's dignity, Polycrates, as it appears, having taken the greatest share in furthering this scheme of theirs. This man had while still young, during the reign of the king's father, been considered second to none at court in loyalty and energy, and so he continued to be under the present king. For, being entrusted with the government of Cyprus and its revenue in hazardous and complicated circumstances, he had not only preserved the island for the boy but had collected a considerable sum of money, and had now come to Alexandria to bring this money to the king, having handed over the government of Cyprus to Ptolemaeus of Megalopolis. Having, owing to this, been very well received and having amassed a large fortune in the years which followed, he afterwards, as he grew older, entirely wrecked his good name by the licentiousness and depravity of his life. A very similar reputation was acquired in his old age by Ptolemy, son of Agesarchus. When I reach that period I will have no hesitation in exposing the disgraceful circumstances attendant on their power.
THE END OF BOOK XVIII