Ancient History & Civilisation

Chapter 3

The Northern Wars: The Threat from the North (120–111BC)

However, before we can analyse the early phase of the Jugurthine War, we must first take a step back, in order to see how this war interconnects with the other events occurring in the Roman and non-Roman worlds (something that Sallust fails to do). In fact the survival of Sallust’s monograph on the war and the loss of a continuous narrative history such as Livy’s, can, if we are not careful, give us a dangerously one-sided approach to the period. In order to understand Rome’s reticence about engaging in a war in North Africa and their seemingly lacklustre early efforts, we must investigate the other concerns that were facing the Senate at the time.

The Lack of Sources

As mentioned earlier, the period of history we are covering suffers from a lack of surviving sources, especially in matters of foreign affairs. This is doubly the case when dealing with Rome’s Northern Wars in this period where, for great periods, we are reduced to scraps of information from the annalists, with barely more than names of generals and the peoples they fought, and sometimes not even that. For the last phase of the war, we are better informed, thanks to Plutarch’s biography of Marius, though this brings it own problems (see appendix five for a full analysis of the sources available).

This dearth of information is contrasted with the survival of Sallust’s monograph on the Jugurthine Wars, which, from a historian’s point of view, can create a one-sided view of the period. Thus we have wars in at least three major theatres of operation in this period – the North East (Macedon and Illyria), the North West (Gaul and Spain) and the South (Africa) – yet we only have a detailed narrative of one of them. However, any analysis of the importance of these areas of conflict should not be dependant on which one has sources available and which do not.

For the Northern Wars, we have an additional problem. As well as a lack of detailed campaign or battle narratives, we lack an understanding of the enemy that Rome faced. Although we have no Numidian sources, we can still try to construct an analysis for the war from the Jugurthine and Numidian perspectives, balancing out that of Rome’s. However, for the enemies that Rome faced in this period, there are almost no details which allow such a reconstruction. Thus the easiest course of action is to reduce them to the status of a faceless and anonymous enemy, and merely judge the war from Rome’s point of view, a course of action that we must try to avoid at all costs. Even using the term ‘barbarian’ is a dangerous one as it homogenizes a number of different peoples and races, and thus tactics and motives. This will be seen most clearly in the wars of the northwest when Rome faced a multitude of different races, most notably the Cimbri, Teutones, Ambrones and Tigurini. Nevertheless, these limitations and problems should not act as a deterrent for what is a crucial period of Roman military history.

Rome’s Northern Borders

When examining the detail of Rome’s territories in this period, there is marked difference between how neat and clinical they appear on a map and the reality of the situation on the ground. During the period of the Roman Empire, Rome’s northern borders had a far greater rigidity to them, with geographical boundaries such as the Channel (and eventually Hadrian’s Wall), the Rhine and the Danube. In this period of the Republic, however, there were no such fixed barriers; even the Alps and Pyrenees, although natural barriers, did not neatly correspond with areas of Roman control, as we shall see below. For the purposes of clarity we can split Rome’s ‘northern borders’ into two distinct regions, the northeast and northwest, as they represent two different situations and two different theatres of war.

Rome’s empire at this time was a disjointed affair, and in particular had no firm borders. As such, provincial boundaries were flexible, especially where it came to the Roman/non-Roman border. Furthermore, aside from Rome’s newly-acquired Gallic sphere of influence, all that lay to the north of Spain, Italy, Illyria and Macedonia was open barbarian territory. Here lay the vastness of the European continent, populated by a large and ever-changing array of native tribes, most of whom are only names to us now.

Furthermore, there was never an easy or clear-cut differentiation between Roman and non-Roman regions, on either a political or cultural scale. An area under Roman control contained peoples who had strong links with those not under Roman control.

In addition, there is the issue of alliances between Rome and those tribes not under their control. In most case these were nothing more than statements of friendship between the two, but as was seen in the case of the Cimbric migration below, these alliances allowed Rome to create buffer zones around their areas of formal imperium. This could have benefits as well as drawbacks. On the positive side, Rome would be alerted to any impending threat, long before it actually reached Roman territory, as happened in the case of the Cimbri. The only potential drawback with this system was that if they were not careful, Rome could get drawn into affairs that did not directly need its intervention, though these appear to have been few in number.

The Northern Wars – The Northeast

In annexing Illyria and then Macedon and Epirus, Rome acquired a huge exposure to ‘barbarian’ or tribal Europe, with few natural barriers between what was Roman and non-Roman and a large number of peoples within the Roman sphere but by no means Romanized. The Kingdom of Macedon itself had always had an ill-defined northern border and was prone to periodic raids and the occasional full-scale barbarian invasion (as seen by the Gallic invasions of the 280/279). In turning the kingdom into a province the Senate now had the problem of not only governing Macedon itself, but defending it from the barbarian tribes who did not respect Roman territorial boundaries. In effect this led to an almost constant period of warfare (whether on large or small scale) until Augustus took the north-eastern border up to the Danube, which in itself created new problems. The two decades in question (120–100 BC) were a period of intense military activity in this region.

The Illyrian Wars of 119–117 BC

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Romans had already experienced their fair share of victories and defeats in Illyria in the 130s and early 120s. Yet in 119 BC it appears that once again Rome had to send forces to the region to quell rebellious native tribes. Our sources for these campaigns are few and unclear. Nevertheless, one clear campaign that we can identify was that of L. Caecilius Metellus, one of the consuls of 119 BC, who hailed from one of Rome’s leading families (seeAppendix IV).

Our sources report that Metellus fought a Dalmatian tribe in Illyria, and came back to Rome in 117 BC to celebrate a triumph, after which he earned the name ‘Delmaticus’ to celebrate his victory. He also restored the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum, part of which can still be seen today. As for the war itself we have only four references, two of which are simple single-line entries in the surviving annals. The first of these comes from an abridgement of Livy stating that he subdued the Dalmatians.143 The second comes from Eutropius who states that both the consuls of 119 campaigned in Illyria against the Dalmatians.144 The third source is Appian, from the surviving fragments of his work on the Illyrian Wars, who is less than complementary about Metellus’ campaign:

in the consulship of Caecilius Metellus, war was declared against the Dalmatians, although they had been guilty of no offence, because he desired a triumph. They received him as a friend and he wintered among them at the town of Salona, after which he returned to Rome and was awarded a triumph.145

It is possible that Appian, writing several hundred years after the event, was using a source hostile to Metellus, though such actions can never be entirely ruled out. The scale of the war in Illyria is given greater scope by Appian, who slightly earlier in his narrative, stated that both Metellus ‘Delmaticus’ and his consular colleague, L. Aurelius Cotta, campaigned together against the Illyrian tribe of the Segestani. Morgan has an excellent analysis of the campaign and the sources.146

Thus, from these scattered fragments, it appears that both the consuls of 119 BC were sent to subdue rebellious tribes in Illyria, with Cotta returning (most probably to hold the consular elections for 118 BC) and Metellus staying to fight the Dalmatians as well. The potential scale of the war can be seen from the need to have both consuls fighting there and the fact that there were two major tribes involved in the fighting. Though we are denied any details about the war itself, it does seem to have been a serious affair and a threat to Rome’s interests, albeit one that they successfully dealt with.

The Scordiscian Wars I (c.120–111 BC)

As we have already seen, one of the greatest threats the Romans faced on their northeastern borders came from the Balkan tribes of the Scordisci. From the initial encounter in the 140s BC they were to be one of Rome’s most persistent enemies in the Balkan region, not being finally defeated until the reign of the Emperor Augustus (c.15 BC).147 Much of the information we have on them is both fragmentary and contradictory. There was no clear Romano-Greek concept of what ethnic group the Scordisci were. Strabo, Justin, the Periochae of Livy and Athenaeus all labelled them as Gauls; Appian named them as Illyrians and Florus as Thracians.148

Those who labelled them as Gauls had them originating as the survivors of the great Gallic invasion of Greece in 279 BC, which sacked the Temple of Delphi.149 Again we see the Romano-Greek obsession with Gauls, fostered in Rome by the Gallic sack of c390–386 BC and in Greece of the invasions of 280–279 BC, as well as their lack of understanding of the tribal regions of Europe.150 The best modem analysis of them is by Papazoglu, in his work on the early Balkan tribes (see bibliography).

Whatever their origins they were a powerful collection of tribes based on the Ister (Danube) in modern Serbia. Strabo divided them up into two main tribes, the Greater and the Lesser Scordisci, but again we have no way of telling how accurate a picture this was.151 What is clear is that they were clearly an expansionist tribe dominating the lower Danubian region. Again we have no clear idea of the process this took, but it is argued that they expanded both north and south from the Danube, dominating the tribes around them. This inevitably brought their sphere of influence to the borders of Macedon, which in 148 BC became Roman. It is interesting to note how quickly they clashed with the Romans following their annexation of Macedon, with our earliest reference being to a Roman defeat at their hands in 141 BC, which was possibly a catastrophic one, though we have no clear details.152 By 135, we find the Romans with the upper hand, operating outside the borders of Macedon and inflicting a defeat on them, with the sources then going silent on the matter.

However, this peace was broken in the period around 120 BC when we find traces of a massive Scordiscian invasion of Macedon. The primary piece if evidence we have for this lies in an inscription which details the defeat and death of the governor of Macedon, Sex. Pompeius, at the hands of ‘Gauls’. This is backed up somewhat uncertainly by a fragment of Diodorus.153 The inscription comes from a commemorative stele set up in the town of Lete (in Macedonia) thanks to the victorious Roman commander M. Annius and contains details of the campaign. The stele is dated in the twenty-ninth year of the Romano-Macedonian era, which is most commonly agreed amongst scholars to equate to 120/119 BC.154

The inscription gives us the basic details of the campaign, with a large tribal army invading the province of Macedonia. Naturally the governor, a Roman praetor named Sex. Pompeius met them in battle, but was killed and his men routed. They were rallied by the presence or arrival (this is not made clear) of Pompeius’ quaestor, M. Annius, who then led the Roman forces to victory, routing the invading tribe. Annius then moved forward towards the boundary of the province, where after several days he met another tribal force, reenforced by a Thracian tribe, named as the Maedi, led by their chieftain Tipas, and was again victorious. It is difficult to estimate the size of the force opposing him, but given his ability to defeat two tribal forces with relatively few men, we must be careful not to overestimate the strength of the enemy forces. Despite the stele of admiration for Annius, it is possible that these were no larger than raiding parties, rather than a full-scale tribal invasion.

Unfortunately, there is a gap in our sources for events in Macedon between these battles in 119 and those of 114 BC. One view to take is that these Roman victories saw the Scordisci withdraw back to their own territory only to invade once more in 114 BC. However, it is has been argued that one of the consuls of 116, Q. Fabius Maximus Eburnus, fought a series of campaigns in Macedon in 115–114 BC and that the most likely opponents were the Scordisci.155 This puts an entirely different complexion on matters and argues for a long-running war or series of clashes from 120 onwards, with little respite for Rome. Once again, we see that in this period Rome’s military attention was in the northeast, not elsewhere.

By 114 we hear of the dispatch of another consul, C. Porcius Cato, to battle the Scordisci. Once again our sources for the campaign are meagre, but what emerges is that an unnamed battle, either in Macedonia or Thrace, took place between Cato and the Scordisci which ended with the utter defeat and destruction of the Roman army.156 Cato survived and returned to Rome, where he was prosecuted and disgraced. We have no details of the size of the forces involved or the Roman casualties. For Rome, the consequences were grave, as with no force to oppose them, the Scordisci rampaged throughout Greece, apparently reaching as far as the Adriatic and sacking the temple at Delphi.157 The fear at Rome was such that they engaged in a traditional human sacrifice and had two Greeks and two Celts buried alive in the Forum Boarum.158 Though the sources are confused, it does appear that a Roman commander, M. Didius managed to defeat the Scordisci and drive them, at least temporarily from Macedon.159

The situation became graver for Rome when they received the news from their new allies in the northeastern Alps, the Taurisci (see below), that a large northern tribe, the Cimbri, were migrating towards them. For the consuls of 113 BC, civil war in Numidia was of little importance. On two fronts now Rome’s northern borders were under threat. Macedon and Greece had been invaded and ravaged by the Scordisci, whilst to the west, the Cimbri were approaching Roman-allied territory. The two consuls of the year were C. Caecilius Metellus and Cn. Papirius Carbo; Metellus received the command against the Scordisci and Carbo was sent to investigate the arrival of the Cimbri.

For Metellus’ campaign we have no details other than a brief note that in 111 BC he was awarded a triumph for his activities in Thrace.160 His triumph was held on the same day as that of his brother (see Appendix IV) and it is again possible that this triumph was awarded more for political than military reasons.

Other than his triumph we have no records of his activities, but given the work done by his successors in Thrace, we must conclude that there was no major confrontation between his army and the Scordisci. It is possible that he ensured that they were chased from the Roman provinces, but again this is speculation. It has also been argued that the arrival in the region of the migrating Cimbri led the Scordisci to evacuate Roman territory of their own accord in order to face up to this new threat to the north, though there is no direct evidence for this.161

It is unclear whether C. Caecilius Metellus retained command of the war for the year 112 BC. Certainly he did not return to Rome to celebrate his triumph until 111, but we know that one of the consuls of 112, M. Livius Drusus, arrived in Macedon and pursued the war against the Scordisci.162 In fact, we hear nothing about Metellus’ activities at all this year. What is clear is that Drusus had far greater success than Metellus:

Didius, finding them wandering about and dispersed in undisciplined plundering, drove them back into their own land of Thrace. Drusus forced them further still and prevented them from re-crossing the Danube.163

Marcus Didius, with great determination, checked these tribes that before had been always invincible and were roaming about without civilization or laws. Drusus confined them within their own bounds.164

Despite the omission of Metellus, it seems that Didius checked them in Macedon and Drusus took the fight to them over the border in the non-Roman Balkan region, defeating them and temporarily ending the conflict. Drusus returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph for his activities in 110 BC. It has been argued that Drusus did not actually reach the Danube, which was not done until decades later.165 Of additional interest is the actual triumph that Drusus celebrated, as it is recorded as being over both the Scordisci and the Macedonians. This latter element has led to speculation that once again a revolt broke out in Macedon against Roman rule, brought about by the Scordiscian invasion, possibly with the two groups allying. Though we have no other details it appears that it was soon crushed. This merely serves to emphasize the possible crisis that Rome faced on its northern borders in this period.

The Northern Wars – The Northwest

Rome’s northwestern borders were of a different nature to those of the northeast. In the east Rome held Illyria and Macedon and shared a huge land border with the tribal regions of Europe. In the west, until recently, Rome had formally held nothing on the other side of the Alps and Pyrenees. As noted earlier, the victories in the Gallic War in the 120s gave Rome hegemony over the tribes of southern Gaul. This was reinforced by the creation of the colony of Narbo in 118.166 This led to the embryonic province of Gallia Narbonensis, but was more of a buffer zone than a Roman province.

Furthermore, whilst Rome had had no formal holding on the far side of the Alps, they had created a series of informal relationships with the various tribes that dwelt within the Alpine region, some established by force and some by diplomacy (backed up by the threat of force). As mentioned above, it was this informal system that alerted the Romans to the impending arrival of the Cimbri in the region. In 115 BC the consul M. Aemilius Scaurus advanced across the Istrian Alps and gained the submission of the local tribe, the Taurisci, an action that was to have important repercussions soon afterwards.167

The Cimbric Wars I

The initial problem we face in analysing the early phase of the war is working out the nature of the enemy that Rome was facing. Strabo and the Periochae of Livy both state that the migrating tribe was the Cimbri, whilst Appian (whose Gallic War fragment is the largest account of this initial encounter) has them as Teutones. Velleius neatly side-steps the issue by having both tribes present.168 The problem we face is that until the campaigns of 102–101 BC, the sources do not separate the various tribes. There are two clear possibilities, each equally as valid.

The first view is the view that the three identifiable tribal groups (the Cimbri, Teutones and Ambrones) all migrated at the same time and were one mass and were referred to by one tribal name simply for matters of expediency or ignorance by our sources. The second view is that at this stage, there was only one tribe or people (the Cimbri) who entered the region at this time, and that the others followed later (in the late 100s BC). As will be detailed below, part of this discussion centres on whether it was a whole tribal migration or merely some of the tribes and peoples of the Cimbri. It is possible that, rather than being one event, this tribal migration may have happened over a successive number of years, with certain tribes going one direction and others in another direction. If one tribe found a hospitable region then they may have sent word to those left behind or heading in other directions to draw them to them. Whilst ultimately there is simply insufficient evidence to form a definitive conclusion, the analysis of the events of 104 BC (see Chapter 9), do lend themselves to the theory that the other tribes (of Teutones and Ambrones) did only enter the picture to assist the Cimbric invasion of Italy. For that reason the author prefers the view that at this point it was merely the Cimbri that Rome dealt with and will be solely refered to as such.

The Origins of the Cimbri

The next issues we need to address concern the identity of the Cimbri and their reasons for migrating. Their appearance in 113 BC is the first time they can be found in the surviving historical records, unlike their allies the Teutones, who can be found in the works of the explorer Pytheas.169 A number of ancient sources who comment on them come up with a number of different possible backgrounds for them.

Plutarch and Strabo present the fullest surviving discussions on the origins of these tribes, though we know of others that existed, such as Poseidonius (see Appendix V). Plutarch argues that they were Germanic, though he acknowledges that others gave them Gallic or even Scythian origin.170

The key problem here for our ancient sources was their lack of knowledge concerning both the geography and ethnicity of the tribes of Europe. In the period in question, Rome had penetrated no further north than southern Gaul and had no direct contact with any peoples of the outer-lying regions, other than trade via middle parties. By the time of the Empire, the Romans had penetrated and annexed all of Gaul, Britannia and for a while Germany, thereby gaining greater knowledge of the races that occupied these regions. Therefore, we have accounts written at the time, based on a scant knowledge and those written later with a greater understanding of the geography and ethnicity involved. Furthermore, the Romans had a tendency to see all races of the north as Gauls, certainly the ones who raided southwards. Both the Greeks and the Romans had suffered previously at the hands of Gallic invasions; Rome had been sacked in c.390–386 and Greece had suffered an invasion in 280–279, which resulted in a fresh battle at Thermopylae and an attack on Delphi. Thus for both the Greeks and Romans any such northern invaders summoned up memories of the Gauls and thus all invaders became Gauls.

An added problem is that when Rome did extend their dominion to include Northern Europe, they tended to introduce an artificial boundary between Gallic and Germanic based on the Rhine, but this was an artificial separation not based on any corresponding ethnic boundaries, and the problem with this is that what constitutes a Germanic tribe in the late first century BC and what we more commonly understand as a Germanic tribe of the later Empire and Dark Ages is another matter.

Finding no certainty in our narrative sources, we have to turn to wider fields, such as archaeology, linguistics and ethnography, which have analysed this problem for several centuries. Recently, Faux has produced some excellent compilations of the evidence to date, which all points to the Cimbri being a Celtic tribe, based on their similarities to known Celtic races.171

Their history before their encounter with the Romans is another matter and upon that there is no consensus. Some theories, based on accounts found in both Plutarch and Strabo, argue that they were a Gallo-Scythian race and connect them to the Cimmerians as found in Homer and Herodotus,172 others that they were the survivors of the Gallic attack on Greece in 280–279 who fled north.173 A more widely-argued theory is that they were part of the main Celtic movement of peoples and that this branch occupied the Jutland Peninsula (modern Denmark) somewhere in the region of the fifth or fourth century BC. Ultimately, it is an argument that will never be solved.

The Cimbric Migration (c.120–113)

As well as the various theories surrounding their origin, we also have to analyse why they moved south en masse and what their aims were. Given the size of the varying estimates of their numbers, 200,000 to 300,000, this was clearly a great migration.174 The reason most often stated in the sources is one of tribal migration caused by disastrous natural causes, namely rising sea levels. Although Strabo dismisses this theory, arguing that sea levels could not rise unpredictably (based on his limited experience of the Mediterranean), there is some geological evidence to support this. One key problem to this theory, however, is the fact that in Strabo’s day, the Cimbri were still to be found living in that region.175 If the Cimbri were driven from their traditional homes by a natural catastrophe, then what were they still doing there in Augustus’ time?

One factor that might help us understand this problem comes from the fact that we regularly talk of the Cimbri as though they were a single homogenous entity. From the descriptions of the battles that take place later in this period (101 BC, see Chapter 10), the sources name a number of different Cimbric chieftains or kings. The most logical explanation for this is that the Cimbri were not one tribe of several hundred thousand, but were a collection of differing tribes of the Cimbric peoples. Thus it seems that a number of the Cimbric tribes migrated from their homeland, either due to rising tide levels or some unknown reason, such as inter-tribal warfare, but a number of the tribes stayed in the region. It is also possible that population growth and overcrowding could have sparked off a mass migration, especially given an earlier example of this, found in Livy from the sixth century.176

It is also possible that the tribes that left acted as pathfinders for the whole race and would have summoned their brethren who remained behind once they had secured a new homeland. As they were ultimately defeated, this summons never came and so there were a number of tribes that remained and managed to cope in their old land as best as possible. If this whole migration was caused by rising sea levels or other pressure on natural resources, then the removal of such a large number would have eased the problems and made life more bearable for the remaining tribes.

We do not know when the Cimbric tribes began their migration, but it would have taken them a number of years to move southwards. Strabo preserves details of the route they took, southwards down towards and across the Danube.177 It has been postulated that the route they chose, which looks unusual to modern eyes, was based on the amber trading routes of tribal Europe.178 Strabo goes on to say that the Cimbric tribes encountered the Boiii, then the Scordisci, the Teuristae and finally the Taurisci, thus southwards to the Danube and then westwards towards the Alps. Unfortunately, for them, they encountered a hostile reception wherever they went. This is not surprising given that the appearance of several hundred thousand rival tribesmen and women would have gravely alarmed any inhabitants, fearful both of hostile intentions and having to share their resources with such a host. Ultimately, such defeats drove them towards the Alps and they entered the region of Noricum, home to the Taurisci.

As detailed above, the Taurisci were allied to Rome and in this case proved to be highly effective as an early warning system, as they were able to alert Rome to the advance of the Cimbri and request assistance. Not only would the Senate have been honour bound to help one of their allies in the region, but the mere mention of a migrating barbarian horde approaching Rome’s sphere of influence would soon have conjured up parallels to the infamous Gallic invasion of Italy in the 390s BC and the Gallic sack of Rome.

It is therefore no surprise that the Senate instructed one of the consuls for 113, C. Papirius Carbo, to take an army to the region to investigate this new arrival, defend their allies and deal with any threat to Rome. Both the Senate and Carbo’s initial fears can be seen by Carbo’s taking up a defensive position in the Alps, defending Italy from invasion.179 This was a clear example of the Roman mentality and could hardly be seen as investigating the threat or defending Rome’s allies. Upon the arrival of the Cimbri, Carbo then moved his army into Noricum to investigate the situation. What he found apparently did not tally with his concept of a ‘barbarian horde’. We are told that, upon hearing of his approach, the Cimbri sent ambassadors to him to apologize for transgressing the territory of the Taurisci, whom they did not know were allies of Rome, and promising to leave their territory and continue their wanderings.180 This description ties in with the information we have about the Cimbri in this period, namely that they were a migrating tribe looking for a new homeland, avoiding fighting wherever necessary. However, what happened next was to have a profound effect on the nature of their migration.

We will never know whether Papirius Carbo believed the Cimbric ambassadors or not; perhaps he believed it to be a ruse to lure him into lowering his (and Rome’s) guard. It is possible that these actions did not fit in with the Roman concept of a ‘barbarian’, especially in a time of renewed Scordiscian invasions in Macedon. This cultural misunderstanding would have been increased by the Roman paranoia about avoiding another Gallic sack, added to what must have been a personal desire for glory. Having achieved the consulship, the pinnacle of his political career, Carbo was faced with having to return to Rome and report that the ‘barbarians’ tamely agreed to turn back and wander elsewhere. It was far more attractive to him to defeat them in battle and return home a hero, having saved Rome from a new ‘Gallic menace’.

To this end he set about to deal with the Cimbri, despite their protestations of peace. Appian reports that he accepted the ambassadors’ offer to move on and even sent guides with them as an act of friendship.181 However, these guides had been instructed to lead the Cimbri in an unknown direction, but by the longest route possible. He then led his army by a shorter route and ambushed the Cimbri as they were resting; the result was the Battle of Noreia.

The Battle of Noreia (113 BC)

Infuriatingly, we have no details as to how the battle was fought or the size of opposing forces. What we do know is that Carbo turned this ambush into a Roman disaster. It is possible that in his haste to reach the Cimbri he overstretched his own forces, or chose a poor place to attack them, which allowed the greater Cimbric numbers to tell. What was planned as a Roman massacre of the resting Cimbri soon turned into a Cimbric massacre of the Romans, with Carbo’s whole army being destroyed. Again, we have no concrete numbers, but Appian reports that those who did survive only did so due to the onset of a large thunderstorm, which provided the Romans with cover to flee in small groups. Of the few who did survive Carbo was amongst them and returned to Rome in shame. His defeat became a byword for Roman military incompetence against the Cimbri, still being used by Plutarch, hundreds of years later.182

It is difficult to see how Carbo could have lost this battle so comprehensively, having both the advantage of surprise and having chosen his place of attack. The only two factors which may help to explain this, assuming that his guides did not treacherously warn the Cimbri, are numbers and terrain. It is interesting to note that prior to his attack, it is unlikely that Carbo ever saw the full scale of the Cimbric tribes, having only dealt with ambassadors that came to him. Therefore, he may well have been unaware of the sheer scale of the task he faced (later estimates place Cimbric numbers in the hundreds of thousands). The other factor is terrain. Appian speaks of the Romans fleeing into the woods, and we do not know if he attacked them in an open or wooded area. If he did so then he may have unwittingly foreshowed the later Roman disaster at Teutoburg Forest, which clearly illustrated the legion’s limitations in fighting barbarians in a wooded area. Furthermore, we do not know where he attacked the Cimbri. If he did blunder into the middle of the Cimbri then he would soon have found himself surrounded by their far greater numbers.

Whatever the cause, the outcome was another large Roman defeat by a ‘barbarian’ enemy, following from that of the Scordisci. Whether the Cimbri originally had hostile intentions or not, it is clear that Carbo’s actions left Rome nursing a need to avenge the loss and would have certainly soured the Cimbri against Rome. In the short term the defeat left Italy open to Cimbric invasion, though, in keeping with their stated intent, the Cimbri continued their journey northwestwards towards (hopefully) non-hostile territory.183Although the immediate danger for Rome had abated, a legacy of bad blood had been created that would come back to haunt Rome.

Summary

We can see that in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Jugurthine War, Rome’s focus was clearly on the north. In the space of just two years (114–113 BC) two Roman armies had been destroyed in battle with different barbarian foes: the Scordisci and the Cimbri. In the northeast, Macedon and Greece had been invaded and plundered by a large and persistent tribal enemy, whilst the defeat in the Alps had left Italy itself open to invasion. Once again it showed that despite their military superiority over the so-called more advanced civilizations of the Mediterranean, the Romans were still susceptible to defeat by northern tribes.

Thus, despite the importance given to the Jugurthine War by both the writing and survival of Sallust’s pamphlet on the war, for contemporary Romans the priority was their northern borders, assailed as they were by different tribes. Furthermore, it highlighted the fact that the supposedly-superior Roman military machine was not able to stand up to a supposedly ‘undisciplined’ tribal foe.

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