Elis, Arcadia and Argos
For the impact of Sparta’s expansion during the archaic period on the rest of the Peloponnese see Introduction, p. 4. By the beginning of the fifth century most of the Peloponnese was linked to Sparta through the set of alliances which we refer to as the Peloponnesian League. The first attested instance of Sparta’s consulting its allies about intended action rather than simply issuing an order to them was c.504, when Corinth led the opposition to Sparta’s proposal to reinstate the exiled tyrant Hippias in Athens, and Sparta abandoned the proposal (Hdt. V. 91–3). In the late 490’s the Spartan king Cleomenes fled into exile in Arcadia, and is said to have united the Arcadians against Sparta (Hdt. VI. 74), but he was induced to return to Sparta, where he soon died in strange circumstances (Hdt. VI. 75, 84), and whatever he may have done in Arcadia did not last. The Arcadian cities of which we hear most are Mantinea and Tegea, in the south-east, competing as often as they cooperated, Mantinea being the smaller of the two. In 480 all the Arcadians contributed to the Greek force resisting the Persians. In 479 Tegea as Sparta’s oldest ally disputed Athens’ claim to take second place, but (despite the delay before the battle of Plataea was fought) the contingent from Mantinea did not arrive until afterwards. Elis at the beginning of the fifth century controlled the north-west of the Peloponnese as far south as Olympia: in 480 it was not represented at Thermopylae but did contribute to the force assembled afterwards at the Isthmus of Corinth; but in 479 its contingent, like that of Mantinea, did not arrive at Plataea until after the battle. Mantinea and Elis subsequently punished their generals (and Elis got itself included in the inscribed lists of patriotic states, though Mantinea did not): they may have been motivated primarily by fear of finding themselves on the losing side. Most if not all of what was later called Triphylia, the region south of Olympia and north of Messenia, was at this time still independent, and a force from Lepreum fought at Plataea. From the northeast of the Peloponnese, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon and Phlius are mentioned at various points in 480–479 , as are the cities beyond Argos: Troezen, Epidaurus and Hermione.
Argos itself had never acknowledged Spartan supremacy. Both cities laid claim to the region of Thyrea, on the coast east of Tegea: conflict over that in the 540’s (Hdt. I. 82) had perhaps been followed by a fifty-year treaty, after the expiry of which c.494 Cleomenes of Sparta attacked Argos and defeated its army at Sepeia but did not follow up his victory by bringing Argos into the Peloponnesian League. The defeat led to a change of regime in Argos (cf. below), but that made no difference to Argos’ hostility to Sparta, and so Argos stayed out of the Persian War of 480–479 and was suspected of sympathising with the Persians; but dissidents in Mycenae and Tiryns (cf. p. 26) did fight on the Greek side.
For the twenty years or so after the war we have to make the best of a jigsaw puzzle of evidence from which far too many pieces are missing. There are two themes which can be traced: political change, in Elis, Mantinea and Argos; and wars in which different states fought unsuccessfully against Sparta on different occasions. A synoecism (a word which denotes either political amalgamation or physical amalgamation or a combination of the two) of Elis is dated after the Persian Wars by Strabo (336–7 . VIII. iii. 2) and in 471/0 by Diodorus’ chronological source (XL 54. i). There already existed both a town of Elis and an Elean state before, and some at least of the other towns in the region continued to exist afterwards: there may have been a greater concentration of political power in the town of Elis, and some movement accompanied by a change in the balance of power within the citizen body, but the evidence does not point to a dramatic change. Elis may already at this time have dominated as perioikoi (subordinate ‘dwellers around’) some communities to the east, and some near Olympia: in the middle of the fifth century it extended its influence over the whole of the later Triphylia (Hdt. IV. 148. iv: cf. pp. 105, 132–3 , 234, 240).
Mantinea could be referred to as a polls at the time of the Persian Wars, and indeed in the mid sixth century (Hdt. IV. 161. ii), and it is said by Strabo (cited above) to have been synoecised by the Argives: it was to be split into its component villages by Sparta in 385, and reunited in 370 when Sparta was no longer strong enough to prevent it (cf. pp. 247, 252). A date around 470 for the physical synoecism is acceptable but not demonstrable: this will have involved the construction of an urban centre, and the migration of some of the population to it, but not the total abandonment of the old villages. In 421 Mantinea is described as democratic (Thuc. V. 29. i), and the aristocrats are said to have been pleased when in 385 the synoecism was undone (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 7).Tegea was a political entity in the first half of the sixth century, when it for a time resisted Sparta but eventually became Sparta’s first ally (Hdt. I. 65–8); despite that alliance, it harboured Spartan exiles both before the Persian Wars and after (Hdt. IX. 37. iv, VI. 72. ii); we do not know when its synoecism (Strabo) took place.
In Argos, as a result of the losses in the battle at Sepeia c.494, ‘their slaves had control of all their affairs, ruling and administering, until the sons of the fallen grew up’ (Hdt. VI. 83. i).The Greeks’ chattel slaves came from various sources, commonly outside Greece, and it is hard to think of them as a body of men capable of taking over the running of the state after Sepeia. Argos had a serf class of gymnetes, and some have thought of them; but more probably we should regard’ s laves’ as aristocratic abuse rather than literal truth, and follow Aristotle, who says that the Argives were obliged to take in some of their peri-oikoi (Pol. V 1303 A 6–8): in other words, there will have been a synoecism, political if not physical, with men from the outlying communities coming to enjoy a measure of power. The new regime continued the policy of not submitting to Sparta; but Mycenae, to the north, and Tiryns, to the south, remained independent, and fought under Spartan leadership against Persia when Argos did not. It is possible, though not certain, that some members of the old aristocracy found the new regime uncongenial, migrated there, and were content to follow a policy opposed to that of Argos (Pausanias’ account of the Persian War memorial set up at Olympia refers to ‘the Tirynthians from the land of Argos’ and ‘those of the Argives occupying Mycenae’: V 23. ii).
Herodotus (IX. 35. ii), echoed by Pausanias, gives in what should be chronological order a list of five Spartan victories: at Plataea, in 479; atTegea, against Tegea and Argos; at Dipaea, against all the Arcadians except Mantinea; against the Messenians at ‘the Isthmus’; at Tanagra against Athens and Argos (cf. p. 50). Diodorus, after narrating the earthquake at Sparta and the Messenian War under 469/8 (cf. pp. 31–2), reports under 468/7 that after the Persian Wars Argos and its allies besieged Mycenae; Sparta because of the earthquake and the Messenian War could not help Mycenae; and the city was captured and destroyed (XL 65). Strabo names Cleonae and Tegea as Argos’ allies on this occasion (377. VIII. vi. 19). After referring to the rule of the’ s laves’ in Argos, Herodotus reports that the sons of those who died at Sepeia recovered control of Argos; the’ s laves’ were driven out, and after a battle occupied Tiryns; after a period of balance they were incited by a seer from Phigalea, in Arcadia, to attack Argos, but after a long war Argos was victorious (VI. 83). And it may be relevant that, when the Athenians ostracised Themistocles (who after the Persian Wars showed signs of hostility to Sparta), he at first lived in Argos and visited other places in the Peloponnese, but fled from there when the Spartans produced accusations against him (Thuc. I. 135. iii-136. i: cf. pp. 38–9).
Certainty is impossible, but the way in which the pieces were fitted together by Forrest makes as good sense as any. There had been a form of synoecism - I should say producing not democracy but the admission to a share in power of men who had previously been excluded from power - in Argos after Sepeia. In the late 470’s there were synoecisms in Mantinea and in Elis; Mantinea was encouraged by Argos; and there grew across the Peloponnese an anti-Spartan alliance, which will have been encouraged by Themistocles. To this phase can be assigned Herodotus’ battle of Tegea and Diodorus’ war of Argos against Mycenae (his explanation of Sparta’s inability to help Mycenae may be a mistaken inference from his own order of narration). Then came the counterrevolution in Argos, by which the old dominant families recovered control, and Themistocles no longer felt safe in the changed Argos. After that belong, certainly, Argos’ war against the’ s laves’ inTiryns, and probably Herodotus’ battle of Dipaea, in which Mantinea was not fighting alongside the other Arcadians (Mantinea was to support Sparta against the Messenians: Xen. Hell. V. ii. 3). This could belong in the early 460’s . At Dipaea, according to Isocrates (VI. Archidamus 99) the Spartans fought with a single line of soldiers rather than a full phalanx: this has been seen as an indication that the battle was fought after the great earthquake and the outbreak of the Messenian War, but Dipaea is to the north-west of Tegea, and we may wonder whether the Spartans would have gone there at all then.
As for what happened in Argos, it may well be the case that those who had been in control for a generation, and who had welcomed Themistocles, lost power; and what happened next may even have been the work of the returned aristocrats, hoping to do well under the new dispensation. There seems to have been introduced either at this time or shortly afterwards a new articulation of the citizen body, with four tribes each subdivided into twelve phratries, and some public land (taken from individuals and from destroyed towns such as Mycenae) assigned to them - a reform which points in a democratic rather than an aristocratic direction; and this makes it easier to understand why, at the end of the 460’s , a self-consciously democratic Athens on breaking with Sparta formed an alliance with Argos (cf. p. 47). Certainly Argos could be described as democratic in 421–420 (Thuc. V 29. i, 31. vi, 44. i).
A brief sketch of Sparta’s unusual development has been given in the Introduction, pp. 4–5 . By the end of the eighth century Sparta had conquered the whole of its own region, Laconia; and, in a first war in the late eighth century and a second war which was perhaps in fact a series of conflicts spread over the mid and late seventh century, it expanded westwards to conquer Messenia too. The conquered peoples were made subject to Sparta, either as free perioikoi (‘those living around’), running their own communities but not allowed an independent foreign policy, or as helots (probably ‘captives’), in a servile status and bound to farm the land for their Spartan owners.
In the classical period the Spartans attributed all their civic institutions to Lycurgus, about whom nothing was reliably known (as is acknowledged in Plut. Lye. 1. i), and for whom they guessed at dates which seem far too early for what he was believed to have done. In fact not all of classical Sparta was created at a single moment, but there are some features which can credibly be dated about the beginning of the seventh century, between the First and the Second Messenian War: a document known as the ‘great rhetra’(quoted and discussed in Plut. Lye. 6), which combined five local units called obes with the three preexisting tribes in a new articulation of the citizen body, and which formalised the interaction of the two kings, the gerousia (council of elders, comprising the kings and twenty-eight men over sixty) and the assembly of citizens; also a (first) distribution among the citizens of conquered land and helots to farm it (though it now appears that, once distributed, this land became ordinary privately-owned property, in spite of what the later sources allege); finally (since the citizens both had the leisure because they no longer needed to engage in farming themselves, and had the need because of the subject population which had to be kept in subjection), the creation on the basis of already-existing age classes of a full-time programme of military training and life for the citizens.
To say this is not to rule out subsequent developments; in particular the five annually-elected ephors (‘overseers’), who did not supplant the two kings but took over many of the civilian functions of the heads of state from them, are not mentioned in the greatrhetra, and the first reliable attestation of an ephor is in the 550’s (Diog. Laert. I. 68, FGrH 105 no. 1). Austerity was perhaps more a matter of not accepting developments which were accepted elsewhere than of actually putting a stop to practices which had previously been current, though by the fifth century the Spartans were self-conscious in their austerity, and proud of it. But there were no doubt some deliberate decisions - for instance, in the second half of the sixth century, not to issue silver coinage at a time when many though by no means all of the other Greek states did start doing so. (However, the iron spits used as currency were not introduced as a deliberate alternative to coins in precious metal, as alleged by Plut. Lye. 9. ii-vi, but were probably an ancient institution retained into the classical period.)
It is worth mentioning that there have been suggestions of a Messenian war c.490, omitted from the main tradition. According to Herodotus, the Spartans did not arrive at Marathon in time to join the Athenians in fighting against the Persians, in 490, because they had first to wait for the full moon (Hdt. VI. 106. iii) and celebrate a festival, the Carnea. Plato, a century later, twice states that they were delayed by a Messenian war (PI. Lg. III. 692 D, 698 D-E), and in the mid twentieth century it was fashionable to interpret other texts in support of that; but those texts are better interpreted in other ways, and it is much more likely that the war was invented later, when religious excuses seemed less credible than they did in the Sparta of c.490.
Fig. 1 Fifth-century Spartan kings and regents
In Sparta the Agid king Leonidas had been killed at Thermopylae in 480: his son Plistarchus was too young to rule, so first Leonidas’ brother Cleombrotus acted as regent, and after Cleombrotus’ death in winter 480/79 his son Pausanias. Leotychidas had been Eurypontid king since the late 490’s . In 479 Pausanias commanded the Greek army which defeated the Persians at Plataea, Leotychidas commanded the naval force which was victorious at Mycale. They probably exchanged commands in 478. It was certainly in that year that Pausanias led a naval expedition first to Cyprus and afterwards to Byzantium (cf. p. 18); and we may guess that it was in the same year that Leotychidas went north with an army to punish the Thessalians for supporting the Persians. Herodotus reports that he accepted bribes when in a favourable position, and was found sitting on a glove full of money; he was brought to trial in Sparta, he was exiled and his house was demolished, and he ended his life in Tegea (VI. 72). Plutarch includes in a list of tyrannies overthrown by the Spartans one put down by Leotychidas in Thessaly (Her. Mai. 859 D); and among the stories of Themistocles’ opposition to Sparta after the war he has a (dubious) plan of Themistocles to destroy the Spartan fleet at Pagasae, in Thessaly, and a proposal of Sparta that states which had supported Persia should be expelled from the Amphictyony, the league of largely northern and central Greek states which controlled the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi (Them. 20: cf. p. 36). Diodorus, from his chronological source, records the death of Leotychidas in 476/5 (XL 48. ii), but his dates for fifth- and fourth-century Eurypontids seem to be seven years too early: possibly the explanation of his confusion is that Leotychidas was exiled in 476/5 and died in 469/8, or that immediately the throne was left vacant and it was not until 469/8 that his grandson Archidamus II was recognised as the next Eurypontid king.
Pausanias found himself in trouble too, and Thucydides gives an account in which he insists on the truth of charges which were never proved (I. 95, 128–135 . i). When he made himself unpopular with the Greeks at Byzantium, he was recalled and put on trial, and convicted on some lesser counts but acquitted of medism, treasonable support of the Persians, although that’ s eemed very clear’. To succeed him the Spartans sent out a man called Dorcis, but by the time he arrived the new alliance had been founded under Athenian leadership, and his attempt to take command was rejected. According to Thucydides the Spartans were happy to acquiesce in Athens’ new alliance (I. 95. vii, cf. Xen. Hell. VI. v. 34); Ath. Pol. 23. ii, if we accept the papyrus’ text and give it its natural interpretation, says they were not happy; Diodorus (XL 50) has a debate, in which it seemed likely that they would decide to fight to recover their leadership, but unexpectedly a member of the gerousia called Hetoemaridas persuaded them not to do so. Sparta was a notoriously secretive state, and this story, at odds with Thucydides, of a debate which resulted in no action is more likely to represent later invention, from a time when the Spartans were afraid of Athens and were asking how they had allowed it to become so powerful, than authentic tradition. No doubt there were some Spartans who supported Pausanias and his policy of involvement in the wider world; but when he and Leotychidas had both shown that they could not be trusted away from home, when the Athenian league was led by the pro-Spartan Cimon (cf. p. 37), and when Sparta’s control of the Peloponnese was insecure, it is not surprising that the majority was willing to leave the Aegean to Athens.
Pausanias, Thucydides tells us, returned to Byzantium in a private capacity, with a ship from Hermione in the Argolid, ‘allegedly for the Greek war but in fact in order to pursue his business with the Persian King’. He clearly did not collaborate with the Athenians, and in that situation collaboration with the Persians is likely enough. Eventually (perhaps c.470: cf. p. 22) the Athenians drove him out of Byzantium, and he moved to Colonae, in Asia Minor inland from the Hellespont. The Spartans sent a messenger to summon him home, and, having avoided serious trouble before, he obeyed; he was at first placed under arrest, but released when he undertook to stand trial.
The story then becomes increasingly hard to believe. The Spartans were suspicious of him, but lacked the evidence that would justify them in punishing a regent. It was apparently at this stage that they had removed from the memorial set up at Delphi (from which the’ s erpent column’ survives in Istanbul) the inscription in which Pausanias claimed personal credit for the defeat of the Persians, and substituted a simple list of the allied Greek states (M&L 27 ~ Fornara 59; according to [Dem.] LIX. Neaera 96–8 the change resulted from a prosecution of Sparta before the Amphictyonic Council). He was said to be in league with the helots, promising them citizenship if they would support him - and Thucydides insists that this was indeed the case. He was also still in touch with Artabazus, the Persian satrap in the Hellespontine province. One of his messengers, realising that previous messengers had never returned, opened the letter he was given and found that it included an instruction to kill the messenger. He showed this to the ephors, who set up an encounter in which the messenger reproached Pausanias for his lack of trust while some of them were hidden as witnesses. Even after that the ephors did not act immediately. When they were about to arrest him, one of them warned him, and he fled to the sanctuary of Athena of the Bronze House; he was blockaded there and starved to death, but dragged out before he died to avoid polluting the sanctuary.
The story has surely been improved in the telling, and Thucydides’ certainty about what cannot have been proved is suspicious. Not long afterwards the helots did revolt (cf. below): that might confirm the charge against Pausanias, but it might be that as a suspect figure who was safely dead he was a convenient scapegoat to whom blame could be attached. On the other hand, it is likely that he had been in touch with Artabazus while in Byzantium and Colonae, and it is credible that he remained in touch. But his chief offence was a greater degree of individualism than Sparta liked to see in its leading figures: his father had been half-brother of an earlier individualist king, Cleomenes, and Pausanias gave the name Cleomenes to one of his own sons (Thuc. III. 26. ii). Thucydides was perhaps so confident because his information came from a ‘good’ source, i.e. after Pausanias’ death the official account of him in Sparta was thoroughly hostile. In spite of that Thucydides pronounced Pausanias and Themistocles to be the two most distinguished men of their generation (I. 138. vi).
Thucydides claims in connection with Athens’ war againstThasos, of 465/ 4–463 /2, that the Thasians asked Sparta to support them by invading Attica. ‘They promised, hiding it from the Athenians, and intended to invade’, but were prevented by an earthquake (which killed a large number of the citizens) and the revolt of the helots and some of the perioikoi, particularly in Messenia (Thuc. I. 101. i—103. ii). Here again we have a story which ends in Sparta’s not taking action. Perhaps Thasos asked for Spartan help; but Athens and Sparta had not yet quarrelled, the Athenians were still fighting under the leadership of Cimon, and Sparta was shortly to ask Athens for help. Probably this like the story of Hetoemaridas is a later invention.
The rebels occupied Mount Ithome, in the centre of Messenia, and the Spartans tried to capture their stronghold. (We do not know what the Spartan victory at ‘the Isthmus’ [p. 26] was.) As the war dragged on they appealed to their allies, including Athens (still an ally by virtue of the Greek alliance of 481 against the Persians, and, says Thucydides, skilled in siege warfare). Cimon went, with a force of four thousand hoplites according to Aristophanes (Lys. 1138–44). But, perhaps because of the success of Cimon’s opponent Ephialtes in Athens (cf. p. 40), the Spartans ‘grew afraid of the Athenians’ daring and revolutionary nature’, suspected that they might change sides and support the rebels, and sent them home. Ephialtes had already been opposed to helping Sparta, and Athens now broke off its alliance with Sparta, made alliances with enemies of Sparta, and began building up its power in mainland Greece as well as the Aegean (cf. pp. 47–51).The rebels on Ithome finally came to terms with Sparta, were allowed to leave the Peloponnese, and were settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, on the north side of the Corinthian Gulf.
Thucydides dates the end of the war ‘in the tenth year’ (I. 103. i). There was a time when scholars used to infer from his criticism of Hellanicus (cf. p. 14) that every incident in his own account of the Pentecontaetia must have been recorded in its correct chronological sequence, to realise that it is impossible to find as many as ten years between the events mentioned before this war and those mentioned after, and to emend the text to obtain a smaller number. But Thucydides does not use temporal expressions when moving from one area of activity to another, and it is far more likely that in the interests of tidiness and intelligibility he has allowed a measure of overlap. Diodorus gives his main narrative of the war under 469/8, and like Thucydides says that it lasted ten years (XL 63–4); but from his chronological source he reports the end of the war under 456/5 (XL 84. viii). Philochorus seems to have dated the earthquake 468/7 (FGrH 328 F 117 ~ Fornara 67. A), but Pausanias dated it 464/3 (IV. 24. v ~ Fornara 67. C, cf. Plut. Cim. 16. iv). Some scholars have opted for the earlier date, supposing that Thucydides mentions the war at the point when it ended; but Diodorus’ chronological source is more likely to be right than his narrative date (cf. p. 15), and it is easier to believe that Thucydides mentions the war at the point when it began, and that the Athenians settled the rebels at Naupactus in the mid 450’s (cf. p. 50). The ten years of the war should be c.465/ 4–456 /5.
Maintaining control of the helots was always a high priority for Sparta (cf. Thuc. rV. 80. iii). This war, and the fact that it ended in a compromise, will have distracted Sparta’s attention from the wider Greek world. There were young and inexperienced kings on both thrones: Archidamus had succeeded his grandfather (cf. p. 30); by the early 450’s Plistarchus was dead and Pausanias’ brother Nicomedes was acting as regent for Pausanias’ son Plistoanax (Thuc. I. 107. ii). It is no surprise that in the years which follow we do not find Sparta pursuing active policies. But on one count the Spartans seem not to have been sufficiently worried. In the Persian Wars there were about 8,000 adult Spartan citizens, not far short of the notional 9,000 of the archaic period. By 418 there were significantly fewer, though it is not certain how many fewer; at the beginning of 371 there were perhaps 1,300, of whom 400 were killed in the battle of Leuctra (cf. pp. 251–2).The earthquake caused heavy losses among the citizens; the Peloponnesian War, a generation later, impeded the recovery which might otherwise have occurred; but, although they attempted some devices to stimulate the citizen birth rate, the Spartans did not promote significant numbers of non-citizens to citizen status, or relax those features of the citizens’ way of life which must have made the fathering of children harder.
NOTE ON FURTHER READING
The best general accounts of Spartan history are Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia, and Forrest, History of Sparta. On the distinctive aspects of Sparta Michell, Sparta, gives a traditional account. There are collections of articles embodying newer approaches in Cartledge, Spartan Reflections;inWhitby (ed.), Sparta; and in a series of volumes edited by Hodkinson and Powell (some naming Hodkinson first, others naming Powell first: see Bibliography). Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, shows that a number of long-held beliefs were unjustified. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue, warns against projecting back to archaic and classical Sparta all that is found in the late sources. Luraghi and Alcock (eds.), Helots and Their Masters in Lakonia and Messenia, re-examines that notorious institution.
On Peloponnesian history in the 470’s and 460’s see particularly W. G. Forrest, ‘Themistokles and Argos’, CQ2 × 1960, 221–41 at 221–32 ; A. Andrewes, ‘Argive Perioikoi’, in ‘Owls to Athens’ … Sir K. Dover, 171–8 .
On Elis see J. Roy, ‘The Synoikism of Elis’, in Nielsen (ed.), Even More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis, 249–64 ; and other articles by him in that volume, 229–47 , in Hansen (ed.), The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community, 282–320 , and his treatment in Hansen and Nielsen (eds.), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, 489–504 . On Arcadia see Nielsen and Roy (eds.), Defining Ancient Arkadia; Nielsen, Arkadia and Its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods; and Nielsen in Hansen and Nielsen (above), 505–39 (Arcadia), 540–6 (Triphylia). On constitutional change in Argos see M. Pierart, ‘L’Attitude d’Argos a l’egard des autres cites d’Argolide’, in Hansen (ed.), The Polis as an Urban Centre (above), 321–51 , esp. 332–4 ; and (on the Argolid in general) in Hansen and Nielsen (above), 599–619 .
In connection with Sparta, on the downfall of Pausanias see P. J. Rhodes, ‘Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles’, Hist, xix 1970, 387–400 . On the helot revolt of the 460’s it is no longer fashionable to emend the ‘tenth’ year of Thuc. I. 103. i (e.g. Gomme,Historical Commentary on Thucydides, i. 401–11): I follow D. W. Reece, ‘The Date of the Fall of Ithome’, JHS lxxxii 1962, 111–20 (ten years, beginning where Thucydides mentions it), against N. G. L. Hammond, ‘Studies in Greek Chronology of the Sixth and Fifth Centuries BC’, Hist, iv 1955, 371–411 at 371–81 = hisCollected Studies, i. 355–95 at 355–65 , and R Sealey, ‘The Great Earthquake in Lacedaemon’, Hist, vi 1957, 368–71 (different versions often years, ending where Thucydides mentions it).